Ethics

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

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

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INTERNATIONAL

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OCTOBER, 1900.

NATIONAL IDEALS; CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS.

If I had one remark and one only to make about National Ideals, it would be this: that the conscious and professed ideals are as straws in the wind; the unconscious or concealed ideals are the real forces that govern mankind. Some philosopher, I think it was Herbart, has compared the unconscious part of human character to the submerged part of an iceberg at sea. The great bulk of the iceberg is under water, invisible and unnoticeable: what we call the iceberg is only the cluster of towers and pinnacles that reach up into the light. The great bulk of human character lies below the water-line of consciousness. We breathe, digest, preserve our balance without thinking of it: we seek what we like and shun what we dislike without thinking of it: we devise the ways of getting or of shunning, we plot, scheme, flatter, slander, bribe and threaten —without thinking of it, without knowing it, without reason or conscience having a hearing on the subject.

The awakened, reasonable, conscious Man is the topmost tower of the whole great structure. But it is the instinctive and unconscious Man that supplies both the mass and the momentum. It is this submerged self, this self which, to use the mediæval phrase "slumbers beneath the threshold,"

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that counts for most in the movements of masses and of nations. The instinctive man is not, of course, necessarily wicked; he is the source of good as well as of evil, of love as well as of hate. But it is well to observe him: for if ever you cease to observe him, he will deceive you.

It must have struck every student of History who at the same time cares about contemporary politics, that there is one strange discrepancy between the record of politics in the past and his own consciousness of politics in the present. When he thinks over his political views, makes a speech or argues, he is constantly appealing to ideals, such as Justice, Liberty, Christian principles, patriotism, and he believes that these ideals guide both him and his party. When he reads a good history, he will find the differences of parties and of nations expressed almost exclusively by divergences of interest. The interests of France clashing with the interests of Austria; the interests of the landed classes, the interests of the manufacturers, the interests of the church—these come in history not as occasional factors in the life of nations habitually guided by Justice, Liberty and the rest of it: they come as permanent factors, as the main roots of action. It gives one a shock, this apparent cynicism of History. But the facts bear it out; and more, our own instinctive comments show that we expected it. From the beginning of the world till now it has been the same: farmers have always wanted corn to be dear; manufacturers have wanted labor to be cheap; slave-owners have always approved of slavery; liquor sellers have always approved of an increased consumption of liquor; aristocracies have always approved of their own privileges; leather-sellers have always held that more articles should be made of leather. The slave-owner produces a number of arguments explaining that slavery is a blessing to all concerned in it. The farmer writes pamphlets and books to show that Free Trade in corn will wreck the bases of society. "These," says the one, "are the reasons why I object to emancipation." "Those," says the other, "are the considerations that make me a protectionist."

History turns an amused glance at their reasons and ob-

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serves, "The slave-owners naturally resisted emancipation. The farmers were, of course, protectionists." And we are not in the least surprised at her tone. If we find a slave-owning emancipationist or a farmer who believes that even if he loses by it, poor men ought to have cheap bread, we either suspect his motives or we frankly admire him as a noble and exceptional man.

The unconscious ideals are what guide mankind. And among the unconscious ideals there is one especially that is vast and permanent: the very centre of the Ego is stirred by it: the ideal of the man's own prosperity, success, expansion. "I love the thing that makes me great and rich and admired. I hate the thing that pulls me down and makes me small and of no account." And if you argue to me that the first thing is bad and the second good, do you suppose that quivering centre of ambitious life within me will not cry in passionate denial: "No, the thing that hurts me is bad, cruel, treacherous: the thing that soothes and helps me is good." Do you suppose it will not reach out its feelers north, south, east and west for weapons to help it and arguments to slay your arguments?

Self-interest—in no high philosophical sense, but in its ordinary acceptation—is a vast factor in private, in every-day life. But in private life it is strongly and vividly counteracted by social and moral forces which are almost powerless in politics. A farmer who could let his own laborer starve to death before his eyes rather than part with a slice of bread would be a monster. Men are prevented from doing such things by all kinds of natural instincts. But the landed classes who caused thousands to die of famine in 1842 and 1846, in order to keep up their incomes, were very good people indeed. Is that not a fair way of putting it? I think it is. True, they did not say they supported the Corn Laws in order to keep up their income: they said it was because they believed in certain arguments. But why did they believe these arguments? Why did all farmers enthusiastically believe all arguments—whether they understood them or not—that tended one way, while all starving artisans believed the contrary arguments?

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The farmers believed their arguments because they wanted good incomes: the artisans believed theirs because they valued cheap bread.

Mere straight-forward self-interest, then, takes us a very long way in the explanation of politics. But obviously not the whole way. There are other instinctive elements. There is especially one other; this same growing and aspiring centre of life within us, the thing that in a baby or in Alexander the Great claims the whole world as its own, has other claims than the merely physical. When it has grasped all it can hold or hope for, when it is for the moment wearied with self-assertion, it likes to be stroked and praised, it likes to reflect upon its nobleness, justice and generosity. Consider the fowls of the air. A very pretty small bird, the great Tit, when hungry, will lift up its beak, split open its brother's head and proceed to eat his brains. It might then be satisfied, think you? Not at all! It has a moral nature, you must please to remember, which demands to be satisfied as well as the physical. When it has finished its brother's brains, it first gets very angry and pecks the dead body; then it flies off to a tree and exults. What is it angry with and why does it exult? It is angry with the profound wickedness of that brother, in consequence of which it was obliged to kill him: it exults in the thought of its own courage, firmness, justice, moderation, generosity and domestic sweetness. That song is its equivalent—poor innocent thing—of a patriotic leading article in the *Kreuz Zeitung* or the *Daily Telegraph* or the *Petit Journal.*

Human nature cries aloud for self-approval: it winces and shudders at the first touch of self-reproach or self-contempt. There are obviously two ways of avoiding self-reproach. The tiresome and precarious way of not doing what you suspect to be wrong or contemptible: and the bold and comparatively safe way of always admiring whatever you yourself happen to do. With the bird above mentioned, this course seems to be easy: he can admire himself all alone. Man, weakened by his increased self-consciousness, has not only to praise himself, but must get others to praise him: must persuade them, argue with them, cajole them, bribe them, frighten them, till

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at last amid the applause of all his immediate friends and associates his sensitive and anxious soul can rest in peace. Hence comes hypocrisy, the deep unconscious hypocrisy that governs nations and satisfies man's craving for praise.

"This noble spectacle," to quote the phrase of a famous general about war, "has, after all, an unpleasant side to it." "Never forget," said a Greek sophist to a Greek tyrant, "never forget to slander those you have wronged." He need not have said it. There was a silent and eternal sophist, one may be sure, below the threshold of consciousness, who could be trusted to teach that tyrant, and every tyrant, to slander those whom he had wronged or meant to wrong. "If they are good men" his heart cried within him, "I must be bad! And that I will never be! They are not good men: they are vile and wicked, and they hurt me; and I wish I could kill them over again!" The whole vast force of the unconscious self will, we may be sure, be exerted before all else in these three directions: he will insist on his own satisfaction: he will insist on his own goodness, and he will slander restlessly and ruthlessly those who make him feel sore.

Progress, moral advance, the upward movement of humanity consists mainly in the constant subjugation and direction of the unconscious self by the conscious. On the one hand we gain more power of knowing ourselves: on the other hand the unconscious beast below the threshold itself becomes changed; our actual instincts become a little civilized. This is obvious: it is generally taken for granted. What is not taken for granted is the extreme precariousness and superficiality of the process. If you scratch a Russian, it is said, you find a Tartar. And I dare say if you scratch any civilized European pretty deep, you will find something much the same. But scratch him deeper still and you get glimpses of that wonderful creature on whom our being is based, the great Ape that differed from other apes by its upright posture, its intelligence, its ambition, its exquisite sensitiveness to suffering; and by the fact that alone of the ape tribe it was a ravening beast of prey.

It pains us, of course, to be reminded of the beast's exist-

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ence. A certain shock was felt the other day in the House of Commons when the great grantor of testimonials of Honor and Dishonor drew a distinction between Honorable Members and Honorable Men. Yet no one can possibly deny that it is a real distinction. O'Connell in 1838 said it was "horrible to think that a body of gentlemen—men who ranked high in society, who were themselves the administrators of the law, and who ought, therefore, to be above all suspicion—should be perjuring themselves in the (Election) committees of the House of Commons." Of course they were perjuring themselves. It was well known. The leader of the opposition knew it. The government admitted it. The Law Officers of the Crown had remarked upon it. But the political instincts of the Great British nation objected utterly to having such a thing mentioned in public—especially by an Irishman. O'Connell was condemned, reprimanded and very nearly sent to Newgate. It is the first maxim of Parliamentary Debate, as it is the first maxim of decent society, that the existence of the beast within us should be concealed. It is the first necessity of all honest striving for self-improvement, as it is of all true philosophic study, to remember that the beast is there.

We are remaining below ground a very long time; yet once more, before we emerge above the threshold into full consciousness, let us consider one great semi-conscious clash of different ideals and differently constituted minds. On the one side we find the moderate and sensible statesman, Liberal or Conservative, the Peels, Liverpools, Cannings, Palmerstons—I wish to avoid for obvious reasons the politicians of the present day—on the other side you have a class that is difficult to name; the *Times,* when wishing to be lenient, would call them extremists and faddists; the *Spectator* in its new and improved style appears to describe them as "obscene and brutal." But these qualities are not sufficiently distinctive. They are, in the main, the people who believe in something. The former are the stuff of which Cabinet Ministers are made; they are sagacious, moderate, statesmanlike: they command the attention of the House of Commons. They know what is possible and

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what not. They run their heads against no stone walls. They never touch a new cause until it is becoming popular. They never fight for an old one when the battle is certain to be lost. They tend on the whole to avoid ruining their country; they flourish under constitutional governments and they are especially prolific and prominent in England.

Members of the other class may be brilliant, they may be conscientious, well-informed, honorable and wise; but they are not statesmen, and they are distrusted by the House of Commons. They do not study what is possible. They press for what they believe to be right; and they do not carry their Bills. You find them urging new causes that nobody will listen to; defending desperately old causes that are known to be hopeless. It is only in such moments that you notice these people at all; for as long as the old cause was defensible, our statesmen of the first class were defending it; as soon as the new cause is likely to prevail, our statesmen will take it up and carry it to a glorious issue, while its faddist author will be reduced to his normal obscurity.

Let me illustrate what I mean. The most characteristic English statesman, perhaps the greatest statesman, of the last hundred years, was Sir Robert Peel. The good work he did was prodigious. He carried Catholic Emancipation and Free Trade; he reformed the Currency, the Banking System and the Criminal Code. It is a most magnificent record doubtless; but let us examine where the magnificence lies.

Everybody knows that when he carried Catholic Emancipation he had been put in office as an anti-Catholic; just before he carried Free Trade he was the leader of the Protectionists. I do not wish to accuse him of inconsistency or dishonesty. All sensible men are inconsistent; and as for honesty—it is too difficult a quality to define. What I am aiming at is the actual political process by which these reforms were carried.

In the year 1800 a Mr. Boyd proposed the reform of the currency by a gradual return to cash payments. Various economists supported him. Eleven years afterwards Horner proposed the measure in the House of Commons and was defeated. Nineteen years afterwards, the conditions being in all

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essentials unchanged, a large number of people had begun to understand what the economists had been telling them all that time. The Liverpool government appointed a committee with Peel as chairman to consider the question, and Peel covered his name with glory by reporting in favor of Horner's proposal. Up to that time he had opposed it.

The case of the Criminal Code is the most instructive of all. The old English code, as we all know, was exceptionally savage and exceptionally imbecile. A man could be hanged for picking a pocket; hanged for stealing five shillings from a shop, hanged for stealing a fish, for robbing a rabbit-warren, for injuring Westminster Bridge, for cutting a hop-vine, for wounding a cow, for maliciously cutting a piece of serge, or for charitably harboring a smuggler; and for some two hundred other offences. In 1751 Bentham began his attack on this system; his works began to be widely read about 1775. In 1808 the first bill to deal with the subject was brought into the House of Commons by Romilly. He was opposed by the government and defeated. He renewed his attempt in 1810, in 1811, in 1812, in 1813. Then, discouraged, he waited three years. He tried again in 1816; again in 1818. Then he died. (It is very important that innovators should not have too much encouragement!) Sir James Mackintosh took up the cause. He succeeded in getting a committee of inquiry appointed in 1819; then he worked on year after year till 1823. Several of the smaller bills had passed the House of Commons during this time, but were thrown out by the Lords. In 1822 Mackintosh obtained a decisive majority in favor of a complete revision of the law. Now comes the statesman's moment; observe what he does. The government realized that opposition to the reform was no longer safe. They had to give way. And they realized at the same moment that really now one came to think of it, they had never had any particular objection to the measure at all. At the same time it was not desirable that an opponent like Mackintosh should have the credit of passing it. Peel rallied his supporters; promised a bill of his own; triumphantly defeated Mackintosh's resolutions. Then he proceeded to earn the gratitude of

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posterity and the name of a wise and liberal statesman by passing at one swoop practically all the Criminal Law Reforms that he had been opposing for the last fifteen years.

Do not suppose that I am hinting at dishonesty on the part of Peel. He was remarkably honest. When he said he had changed his mind, he probably had really changed it. And when he changed his mind, he generally confessed that he had. What I want to know is; what was it that made Peel great, and led the House of Commons to honor and to trust him—to trust him as they never trusted Mackintosh, as they would never have dreamed of trusting Romilly, much less poor Bentham? Was it, perhaps, that the statesman was a practical man, and the Reformers impractical idealists? Not in the least. There is nothing impractical in showing what ought to be done to improve the Currency and the Criminal Law: and nothing practical in refusing to do it when you are told how. Horner and Romilly and Mackintosh were the practical men: Peel the impractical. Was it any question of prudence and compromise? Was it that Peel himself desired the Reforms, but understood those difficulties and dangers which the Reformers failed to see? Not in the least. He frankly disliked and feared the Reforms, and never pretended anything else.

You might suppose again that the reason lay merely in the fact that the philosophers and faddists were "before their time." That implies some such account of the matter as this. Bentham saw a certain truth before any one else that we know of. It took about fifty years for that truth to drag itself round the nation and eventually reach the doors of the House of Commons. By that time Romilly understood it, and probably Mackintosh. They then proceeded patiently to explain it to Peel and others. They explained persistently for thirteen years, and then Peel began to understand, and so did the majority of the House of Commons. Some had understood it more rapidly, in five or ten years. They were flighty and tinged with faddism. Others never saw it at all; they were a little stupid and fossilized. But Peel's was a mind of exactly the right degree of density; he was just sufficiently slow without being absolutely impervious to reason. If he had under-

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stood it in ten years, he would have been abandoned by his powerful friends. If he had not understood it for sixteen years he would have been defeated by the Whigs. As it was, he took just thirteen years, and that was exactly the right time.

"How splendid," said the House of Commons to itself, "to have a leader whose mind moves so precisely at the right rate of speed. What wisdom! What solidity!"

This, no doubt, is all true. But there is something more subtle in the matter than mere difference of time. It is a question of instinct. Doubtless all the rational arguments in favor of Catholic Emancipation, of Free Trade and of Reform which Peel had heard repeated for so many years, did in course of time begin to affect him. But the decisive moment in each case came, not from his reason, but from his gregarious instincts. The majority of the House or the nation was at last definitely veering round in the new direction. The great bell-wether felt the inarticulate stirrings of the flock and strode suddenly forward. And the self beneath the threshold in the House of Commons had confidence in the self below the threshold in Peel. Instinct cried out to instinct and was at once understood. "I want the same things as you: I hate the same things as you. I am the stronger and subtler; follow me!" Peel stated his reasons, of course, in an elaborate speech, and said that the reasons had convinced him. People voted with him and said that the reasons had convinced them. But the reasons had very little to do with it. Men like Bentham or like Bishop Berkeley might be convinced by reasons. The instinctive Man distrusts and despises such persons. If a man is liable to be convinced by mere rational arguments, and follow them out consistently, there is no saying what may happen to him to-morrow. He may be an Anarchist or an Atheist. He may be harmless like Berkeley or pernicious like Robespierre. "In any case," cries instinct, "he is foreign and incomprehensible. He does not like what I like and hate what I hate. He may be wanting something that I do not understand; something horrible, which would hurt me. Let nobody trust him!"

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The classes who followed Peel felt that his instincts were theirs; that was why they trusted him.

So far we have contrasted Peel with the Reformers. The same lesson comes out if we contrast him with the consistent Tories. Croker retired from public life rather than be soiled by the contamination of a reformed Parliament and a purified corporation. Newcastle disobliged his leader and disobeyed his king rather than cease fighting against a measure he believed to be wrong. The learned and kindly old Lord Eldon, balked of his right to hang gypsies, to persecute Dissenters and Roman Catholics, and to send his political opponents to Botany Bay, still fought on for every single privilege or corruption or abomination that his soul loved; the majority might sweep past him; but a majority does not make wrong right; nor are the sentiments that were once applauded by a whole House of Parliament necessarily ridiculous now, because they are only advanced by one tottering old gentleman, courageous and alone.

The advantage of Eldon or Romilly over Peel is that each had a real thing to say. They believed in something definite; and no gregarious instincts or political necessities could drive them out of believing what they believed. If one of them was wrong, the other was very likely right. But Peel could never be right. Was it that he had contradictory beliefs, or was it perhaps that he had no belief at all, only the statesman's instinct for the right Parliamentary move, which seems, in the statesman, to take the place of real convictions, just as in Thackeray's supposed anatomy of George IV., "waistcoats and then more waistcoats" took the place of a heart.

On the other hand a government of Eldon's would certainly have led to revolution; and Romilly could not carry his reforms. Peel carried Romilly's reforms, and averted Eldon's revolution. That is the sort of place the world is!

In the eyes of a philosopher the statesman is very deficient in reasoning power. In the eyes of the moralist he has an elastic and callous conscience. In the eyes of the religious man he has no soul. The thing that he has, and he alone, is a steady majority behind him.

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We have hitherto been considering our Unconscious Ideals, and the conditions, often arduous and even ruinous, which they impose upon national progress or well-being. I should like to use the brief remainder of this paper in considering two, especially, of the ideals which we consciously profess.

Our two great political parties adopted after the Great Reform Bill, the names Liberal and Conservative, respectively, both of them most engaging names. Now it is not for a moment desirable to analyze what these parties really are, except for one remark in passing. The Liberal party has since the last century professed to be two things—progressive and democratic. The two things have gone together with us, because the progress of the country since 1815 has been in a democratic direction. But, of course, progress need not be democratic. In the east of Europe at the present day it is aristocratic; in Servia and Greece and to some extent in Russia the Progressives or Liberals are in direct opposition to the Democrats (in Servia called Radicals), who represent the artisans and peasants and object to new fangled ways.

That is a digression. But, dismissing any consideration of what the two parties really are, let us make out the ideals which, by their self-given party-names they claim to represent. The basis of conservatism is not to lose what we have laboriously acquired; to safeguard as a precious thing our constitution, our national character, our social organization. That is to say, the basis of conservatism is a great appreciation of the results of progress in the past, and a fear of losing the ground that we have gained, by any mistakes or acts of rashness. What is the basis of Liberalism? Exactly the same, with a slight difference of emphasis. The Conservative says, "We have progressed through the ages to a most satisfactory condition; let us be careful not to lose what we have won." The Liberal replies: "We have progressed through the ages to a most satisfactory condition; let us proceed further in the same direction."

There is no direct contradiction here. Nay, there is real agreement about nine-tenths of the subject, and only a differ-

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ence of emphasis about the other tenth. The Conservative is ready to progress if only you will be cautious. The Liberal is ready to be cautious if only you will jog on. This fundamental basis of agreement is one of the causes why English party politics have been on the one hand so smooth and successful, and on the other hand so often ignoble. There was so much agreement that the two parties could always understand one another and make tolerable compromises. There was so much agreement, that politics often looked more like a game between Ins and Outs than a serious contest between believers in opposing principles.

But, after all, what opposition of principle is possible? Both parties represent different stages of the same Ideals, the Ideals of Progress and Order. What party represents the opposite? Is it the Radicals? "We have both a Conservative government and a Conservative opposition," exclaimed Grote in 1838, and shook the dust of Westminster from his feet. Yet Grote, a typical Radical, was not essentially opposed in his principles to Lord John Russell, or even to Peel. He was bolder, perhaps more far-seeing; but his aims were not different.

The opposite ideal to that of Liberal and Conservative is represented by the man who is prepared to say: "We have progressed through the ages to a state that is worse than our first state! We must shatter this bad social order to pieces and go back to simplicity." Most of us have not much patience with this sort of man. "Back to simplicity!" we answer him. "What exactly is your model of simple life: the Red Indian, or the Negro, or the divers royalties of the Cannibal Islands?" "Not any of them," the Revolutionist may reply: "intellect and moral nature do not depend on a complicated social system. Thoreau and Emerson and Tolstoi and Walt Whitman and Rousseau and Plato and Epicurus did not become debased in mind because they turned their backs on civilization and tried to return to simplicity. If modern man ever breaks through his prison of convention and capitalism and wins his way back to simple life, he will bring to it the powers of intellect and character that he now possesses. He will not forthwith believe in Mumbo Jumbo or execute any wife for witchcraft

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whenever he has rheumatism. But suppose we accept your challenge," our Revolutionist may continue: "suppose in destroying this present social fabric, we fell at once to the level of the savage, what then? We know all you say about the horrors that are incidental to savage life,—especially when the White Man's helmet has once appeared above the horizon. But we remember what you perhaps forget, that almost all travelers, except those sent out for purposes of annexation, from Herodotus and Tacitus to Mungo Park and Livingstone and Selwyn, have with one voice dwelt upon the light-heartedness and the personal dignity of the normal life of uncivilized man. The normal life of the poor of Europe is not light-hearted and dignified; nor yet that of the rich. There are more and more things without which we are miserable, and with which we are not a whit happier. There are more and more possibilities of human suffering to be endured; more and more screens to hide the sight of the suffering from the authors of it. We civilized men are caught in a great trap; we mean no harm, but our every movement may bring torment to some fellow-man. We buy this tea-pot rather than that, prefer one box of matches to another; we cease to buy some old article of commerce because there is a new one we like better; and the result is that great numbers of men, women and children whom we have never seen or heard of, are forced by other people equally unknown to us, to work themselves into diseases, to become prostitutes or thieves, to starve for want of work, or at best to maintain a stunted life by incessant and meaningless drudgery. It is no one's fault. It is only Order and Progress.

"Again in a simple society people had at least a chance of enjoying their daily work. Under Order and Progress every worker as a normal thing is engaged in doing work which he cannot possibly enjoy, but has to do, ultimately, because he would starve if he did not. He spends his day watching a machine make an enormous number of fractions of a pin all alike; or in adding up columns and columns of pounds, shillings and pence which do not belong to him; or in teaching people whom he does not wish to teach and who do not wish to be taught; or in a thousand other ways, but always, except in a few odd

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cases, he spends his days in doing something he does not want to do because he is paid to do it. Nay, there is another thing," this captious rhetorician will continue: "the man is not only doing what he does not like, but is generally doing things or making things that nobody else likes. No one is a whit happier for those millions and billions of pinheads; nor for being taught things he does not want to know; nor for having all the machine-made furniture and clothes and foreign foods and newspapers and cheap cigars. It supports a large population. Of course it does. And is it better for a country to be supporting forty million discontented and degraded human beings than to have only four million 'light-hearted and dignified'?"

Revolution has few adherents in Europe, fewest of all in England. We are a prosperous nation, a prudent nation; and perhaps the most luxurious nation that has ever lived upon the earth. If we are essentially less happy than simpler societies, which is possible, we are not likely to see it. The very essence of the trap of material civilization is that the animal caught cannot draw back, but must go further and further in. If you compare Sir Gorgius Midas with the wildest Gallic-speaking gillie of his remotest shooting-box, you may strongly suspect that in every true sense of the words, the master is poorer, lower, stupider, unhappier and worse than his man. But you may be absolutely sure that Sir Gorgius will not consent to change places with him.

And in the second place it is probably also true that, of all the great writers who have preached a return to simplicity, from Diogenes to Tolstoi, not one has really shown us any road that leads there.

If there is one ideal more than another characteristic of this century in Europe it is what we may crudely term by the one word Philanthropy. Philanthropy is not only a vaunted motive like fairness, impartiality, desire for justice and the like: it is a really active force. Now of course in saying that philanthropy as a professed public force is new and characteristic of this century, one does not for a moment mean that the thing itself is new. It is based on primeval instincts: the being

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below the threshold himself is full of sympathy: and men have cared for their suffering fellow-men ever since human society began. The really remarkable thing about modern philanthropy is, I venture to think, that it has become secular and motiveless. Both in antiquity and in the Middle Ages there was a great deal of charity in various forms; but it was all associated with religion or patriotism or the like; and its apparent unselfishness and "irrationality" explained away. It is one of the strongest characteristics of human nature, to try earnestly, by hook or by crook to explain its own unselfish actions—as well as its selfish or malignant actions—by some so-called rational theory. It is a great advance in self-consciousness that we have, in private life at least, accustomed ourselves to the idea that it is quite natural for a man strongly to dislike the notion of other men suffering pain, and gladly to pay money to prevent their doing so.

It is then an ideal held, and largely acted upon, by many people, to keep looking out always for the extremest cases of human suffering and to spend their lives in alleviating them. It is perhaps the noblest, perhaps also the most fruitful, ideal now acting in public life. It is so powerful that it is often attacked; constantly of course counterfeited. Its dangers are the dangers of all generous emotion, lack of knowledge and lack of discretion. For instance, one particular form of this spirit has lately been prominent, the desire for active crusades in relief of distressed or oppressed communities under foreign governments. It is by no means a thing to sneer at, this generous enthusiasm. There is vastly more danger to humanity from lack of sympathy than from excess of sympathy; and if these movements are sometimes to be condemned, it must be not for caring too much about the oppressed people, but for not caring sufficiently about something else. It is not the too vivid imagination; it is the lack of imagination, here as elsewhere, now as always, that makes mischief. However, I have noted down a list—probably incomplete—of those nations which I have seen condemned in English newspapers during the last few years, as deserving for various reasons an immediate crusade against them. These nations are Turkey, Greece, Vene-

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zuela, the Afghans, Italy, Spain, the Cubans, the Chinese, Morocco, the Kafirs, Russia, France, Germany and the United States of America! It is perhaps due to oversight, that I have found no one just at present who wishes to make war on Austria. The rage felt by divers persons was in some cases mere patriotic "Hooliganism": in most cases, I should say, it was a really generous emotional force backed by masses of false information. It is so easy to get false information about any foreign power; we get reams of it every day about France; and so enormously difficult to get true information or even the preliminary knowledge that makes true information valuable. For instance, one of the chief causes of the proposed crusades against the French has been that we did not know the system on which evidence is given in a French court. Our English system is to give the witness as little scope as possible; to allow him merely to answer direct questions from a friendly lawyer, and then to let loose a hostile lawyer to badger and confound him. The French plan is to encourage the witness to say all that is in his mind, to draw him out and not to frighten him; especially not to allow the lawyers on either side to stimulate and intimidate him alternately, but to have all questions asked by the mouth of the impartial President of the Tribunal. I have no power of comparing the effectiveness and fairness of the two systems; but in every single French trial that is reported in England at any length, several of our newspapers go into hysterics because the witnesses are not examined by counsel. And when English trials are reported in France, my French friends tell me, there is equal indignation, first because the questions are asked by people who are not impartial, and secondly—this is an odd point—because the Judge and not the counsel for the defence has the last word before the jury retire.

This rather common-place fact is one reason why crusading philanthropy is so often the cause of harm; another is that philanthropy alone cannot start a crusade. It is only when the crusade coincides with the material interest of some influential group of people that it can be carried out. If financiers and officials disapprove, it is powerless. Let us look at this point

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closer. The passion of philanthropy, the hatred of oppression, provides throughout the country a great mass of people ready to take fire rapidly at a tale of wrong; ready also, one must confess, to believe the tale of wrong without much sifting of evidence. This is dangerous, but it might not do much harm except for one circumstance. Who is it who have the power of telling these tales of wrong and so stirring up the country? Who can criticize or expose such stories if they are false? Obviously the newspapers—the newspapers which support opposite political parties or are the property of rival capitalists. It is often a fortunate thing that rival capitalists are apt to hate one another! As long as this opposition goes steadily on, newspapers exercise a great deal of mutual criticism and bring out, both intentionally and unintentionally, a vast quantity of trustworthy information. But if ever the party system fails, or if ever the handful of men who own all the great Dailies happen to coincide in their interests or their prejudices, then heaven help the nation that is dependent upon them for its facts!

Even in the most favorable circumstances, when proprietors and wire-pullers slumber and no sinister influences are at work, how far in general is a newspaper calculated to keep a nation reasonable or informed of the truth? About as well as loose cannon on a ship's deck are calculated to serve the ship for ballast. When the ship is steady all is well. At the first heel to port, the cannon charge at the port bulwarks: if she veers to starboard back to starboard run the guns.

Consider the essence of what a newspaper is. It is a great financial concern, with say £250,000 of capital, depending for its very life on its advertisements, while its advertisements depend on its circulation. It is bound every morning to say things that please some 200,000 people (or more, if possible), and if it fails to please them it dies! What a tremendous undertaking that is! To please 200,000 different people every morning: and to please them, too, better than any other paper at the same price. It is difficult to conceive how the thing is done. Only one part of it appears obvious: that if you are lucky enough to see some subtle prejudice, some wave of unreasoning passion growing and spreading among the public

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that you appeal to, then your chance has come; you know what your public will like to read. But if you miss that chance, if you try to correct their passions and contradict their errors—why who will pay you money for the pleasure of being corrected and contradicted every day at his breakfast?

From the *Times* and the *Journal des Débats* to the *Libre Parole* and *Daily Mail* the conditions of financial life for a newspaper are essentially the same. Let us analyze a favorable instance. The *Times* is an English paper costing 3d.; the *Journal des Débats,* a French paper costing 2d. Only rich people, as a rule, will pay 3d. or 2d. for a daily paper. So, as the *Journal des Débats* has to please rich French people the *Times* is bound to please rich English people. It must confirm their faith in their own good qualities, it must praise the statesman that they admire. It must find arguments to support what rich English people think, and to bring to pass what rich English people want. It must hurt the feelings and damage the reputations of rich English people's opponents, it must delay or prevent the Reforms which might make rich English people less rich. Besides this, of course, the man who pays 3d. for his newspaper will expect an exceptionally good newspaper. It must have a special abundance of information, of two sorts: accurate information on the things where its public will be pleased with *bona fide* knowledge: carefully doctored information where the naked facts are damaging or unpalatable. There must be correspondents and a complete organization all over the world, to publish those facts which rich English people would on the whole like published, to conceal, twist or smother the facts which rich English people do not care to be told.

On the other hand, living as it does in great publicity, and appealing to a highly educated class, it must be in general a well-written and gentlemanly journal; and it ought never to be so grossly inaccurate or unfair or inconsistent as to create an obvious and damaging scandal or to shock the feelings of its own partisans. The *man* who writes is, of course, every bit as good and as conscientious as the man who makes boots or who preaches sermons. But the newspaper is different from the journalist. The man has his own beliefs and his sense of

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honor: he can remain silent when he will, can feel shame, can face unpopularity or money loss. But the Thing has no beliefs nor sense of honor. and if it does not make money it dies. If Brown's views, as printed yesterday, gave displeasure; let Jones's opposite views be printed to-morrow. The paper will never blush because it has changed!

You can think of exceptions to all these sayings. One knows of newspapers that have preached unpopular causes, that have taken their readers to task and made them face unpleasant facts, that have been willing to lose money and to endure persecution. That is only to say—and this is the thought that I fain would close with—that in the teeth of all material opposition, in defiance of all the subterranean influences of instinct there are men who work and suffer for things they believe to be good. They may be right in their beliefs and they may be wrong. It is absurd to say that the world is wicked, and that those against the world are sure to be right. "When in temper and where his own interest was not concerned," it was said of a famous Lord Chief Justice, "When in temper and where his own interest was not concerned, my Lord Jeffreys became the Bench with extraordinary dignity." Much the same compliment can be paid to the public voice of masses of men. If they know the main facts and are disinterested, the verdict of the majority will be just. But on nearly all questions that stir men's hearts or try their mettle, questions where a class judges between itself and another class, where a nation judges between itself and another nation, in such tribunals we must not look for a disinterested verdict: one of the litigants is absent; the court is crowded with counsel denouncing him: and the voices under the threshold are bitter and tyrannous and strong. The voices are a little nobler in the case of a nation than they are in the case of a man: in the case of a nation struggling for its freedom or claiming only such rights as are compatible with the same rights in other nations, the voices are almost entirely noble. At the worst they say *"we"* instead of *"I,"* and that is a great difference. But that very advantage makes them more dangerous, plausible and reckless in their essential claims. The man whose self-consciousness

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could be on the alert against his own selfish instincts, has often no suspicion of the injustice of his national instincts. In every nation of Europe from England and France to Russia and Turkey, in almost every nation in the world from the Americans to the Chinese and the Finns, the same whisper from below the threshold sounds incessantly in men's ears. "We are the pick and flower of nations: the only nation that is really generous and brave and just. We are above all things qualified for governing others: we know how to keep them exactly in their place without weakness and without cruelty. Other nations may have fine characteristics, but we only are normal and exactly right. Other nations boast and are aggressive, we are modest and claim only what is our barest due, though we cannot help seeing our own general superiority, and every unprejudiced observer admits that our territories ought to be enlarged. We are above all things reasonable. The excellence of our rule abroad is proved in black and white by the books of our explorers, our missionaries, our administrators and our soldiers, who all agree that our yoke is a pure blessing to those who bear it. It is only those envious and lying foreigners who dare to dispute the fact." Expansionists, Nationalists, Chauvinists, Irredentists, Pan-slavists, German Colonials,—how absurd they seem to us in every country but our own. Yet in every country they form, backed by the undercurrents of national life, a strong and persistent force, valuable if controlled, dangerous if gratified, and fraught with all the elements of explosion when other danger is in the air.

There is also—not in every country, not, I dare say, among the Chinese or the Finns, but in most countries of Europe, a small party which does not believe in the supra-normal rights of its own countrymen, which values good-will more than glory, and judges of national honor by standards approaching those by which it judges of personal honor; which believes in international morality, in the coöperation of nations for mutual help, in the ultimate Fraternity of Mankind.

A poor and despised class these in every community—dreamers, sentimentalists, doctrinaires, hypocrites, traitors—they have at least one advantage over the ultra-patriots. It is an old

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rule of logic that "truth by truth is never contradicted." But the "patriots" of one country by the "patriots" of every other are contradicted always in every item of their creed. These other parties in every other country of Europe are pleading on the whole for the same cause and upholding the authority of the same tribunal—the disinterested judgment of each man's conscience in the first place; and, as a Court of Appeal, whenever it is attainable, not the voice of one class, not the voice of one nation, but the disinterested verdict of civilized Humanity.

Few in each separate country, they are many in all countries taken together. And they will need that thought to comfort them; for in their own homes they will have little popular support or official recompense. They will need often to search their hearts and to steel their courage; and often to remember that famous statesmen and writers and preachers are not necessarily blessed when all men speak well of them; for so did their fathers to the false prophets.

GILBERT MURRAY.

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MEDICAL ETHICS.

THE questions which relate to medical ethics, or to the modes of conduct required by the claims, the duties, and the responsibilities of medical practitioners, seem to fall naturally into two chief categories, according as they relate to the conduct of practitioners towards the public and towards patients, or towards each other. The former class of questions are undoubtedly the more important; but, in the estimation of the profession itself, the latter sometimes appear to be the more interesting. They certainly lend themselves more readily to discussion, and they furnish a larger number of issues as to which divergent or even opposite views may not unreasonably be entertained. The duties which a medical practitioner owes to his patient and to the public, and those which he owes to himself and to his calling, may in certain circumstances appear not to be entirely harmonious; but there can scarcely ever be

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any real incompatibility between them. Both rest partly upon principle and partly upon tradition or experience; and both alike are unsupported by any authoritative sanction. There is not, and in the nature of things there cannot be, any document or code of universal acceptance to which either a doctor or a patient can appeal; nor is there any judicial or other body to which either can confidently turn for guidance. A custom has sprung up of submitting supposed "hard cases," or difficult positions, to the editors of the chief medical journals, and of inviting their opinions thereon; but it does not appear that this course is of any special efficacy. The statement put forward, mostly under a disguise of A and B, is usually that of one of the parties to the discussion which has arisen, and this statement might possibly be repudiated by the other; while there is no evidence that the occupancy of the editorial chair has been preceded by any special study of ethical problems.

There is a pictorial artist of great distinction and of northern nationality, who, among many other gifts showered upon him by nature and assiduously cultivated by practice, possesses that of rendering black surfaces in a curiously charming and attractive manner. A brother of the brush, whose own efforts in the same direction had been less conspicuously successful, determined to seek information as to the methods of his friendly competitor, and called upon him at his studio for this purpose. After chatting for a time, with much wit and liveliness, about the topics of the day, he suddenly said, "By the way, McGilp, how do you produce those telling effects in black in your pictures?" "Effects in black?" was the answer. "Eh, mon, I just tak' a bit o' black, an pit it on." If the late Sir William Jenner, whose irreproachableness in all professional relations was for many years proverbial, had been questioned about his rules of medical ethics, he perhaps could not have been more explicit. He would probably have replied that he had no rules, or that his only rule was to do as he would be done by. The late Sir Prescott Hewett was accustomed to declare "that it was not sufficient for a surgeon to be honest, he must be chivalrous"; and an authority of equal eminence, unhappily also lost to us, the late

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Sir James Paget, once summed up the claims upon a medical practitioner in the simple declaration that he "should neither neglect his duties for the sake of ease, nor abuse his opportunities for the sake of gain." The two negations may be held to include the whole framework of medical ethics; but the difficulty, in this as in so many other cases, resides less in enunciating principles than in applying them.

It may assuredly be held to follow from these negations that a medical practitioner is bound to bring reasonable knowledge and skill to bear upon every case about which he is consulted, and to apply this knowledge and skill to the best of his ability for the benefit of the patient; that he is bound to maintain proper reticence with regard to all private matters affecting the patient, his family, or his household; and that he is bound neither unduly to prolong a professional attendance, nor to demand an unusual or unreasonable recompense for his services. If he fail to bring reasonable knowledge and skill, or to give reasonable care and attention to the case, and if the patient suffer in consequence, the doctor may be cast in damages in a court of law; but the word "reasonable" is usually interpreted with some latitude in his favor. A general practitioner, for example, would seldom be condemned for having failed to bring to bear an amount and kind of knowledge which might reasonably be expected from a specialist. He would be measured by the customary standard of his calling, not by any ideal standard which might be put forward by persons who were wise after the event. Many actions at law have been commenced, by patients or their families who claimed compensation on account of errors said to have been committed by doctors in the management of injury or disease; but such actions have often been wisely abandoned by the plaintiffs as soon as it was seen that they would be resolutely defended. In many instances the allegation of error has rested upon the fact that the doctor whose conduct was impugned had adopted and acted upon a view which might have been perfectly justifiable, according to the data at his disposal, although it was not borne out by events; so that his mistake, however much to be regretted, was not of a kind to be condemned or punished.

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Injuries in the neighborhood of joints, especially fractures of bone extending into joints, have been fertile sources of litigation; because it may often, at the time, be impossible to ascertain the precise nature and extent of such an injury, and a too favorable opinion may have been expressed by a hopeful practitioner, desirous to do his best for the patient. In the present day, a doctor in a remote country district would hardly be adjudged to pay damages for not having at first discovered that a dislocation was complicated by a fracture, or a fracture by a dislocation; but a doctor in a large town, where a Röntgen-ray apparatus was available, would possibly be held not to have exercised reasonable skill and diligence if he had failed to procure its application, and thus to do everything possible in order to clear up any doubts which might exist. In either case, the only safe and proper course would be to give a guarded opinion rather than a positive one, and to mention to the patient or his family the worst possibility, while encouraging them to hope for the best.

Errors of judgment committed in good faith, and not aggravated by any attendant circumstances, whether they relate to questions of treatment, or to indiscreet revelations of matters which should have been concealed, although they may involve pecuniary liability, and may entail injury to reputation, are manifestly not of a kind to justify any severity of moral censure; and in this respect they differ widely from departures from principles of conduct, in relation to medical matters, which are generally upheld and adopted. Such departures may range from absolute criminality, or a near approach to criminality, to offences of various degrees against what may be described as professional honor with regard to patients, or professional comity with regard to other members of the medical calling.

Offences which are criminal in their nature, or which nearly approach criminality, fall under the jurisdiction of the General Medical Council, a body which was established by Parliament, in 1858, at the time when medical qualifications granted in any division of the United Kingdom where first made available in the other divisions also. The council was established

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mainly as an agency for securing that the courses of study and the examinations through which these qualifications were obtained should everywhere be kept at approximately the same standard. The duty of the council, as described in the House of Commons by the mover of the bill creating it, was "to fill the functions of visitors in the existing licensing bodies, and to ensure efficiency of teaching and of examination." It was intrusted with the control of the official "Register," in which the names of all persons possessing medical qualifications were to be inscribed, as a condition antecedent to the enjoyment of the recognition and other privileges bestowed upon them by law; and it was empowered to erase from the "Register," presumably as being unworthy of these privileges, the names of any persons who in England or Ireland were convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, or in Scotland of any crime or offence, or who might be found by the council itself, after due inquiry, to have been guilty of "infamous conduct in any professional respect." The clause containing these vague words was accepted by Parliament as it was drawn, without debate, and without inquiry as to the probable scope of its operation; but it has lately been assumed by some that it was intended to enable the council, in the words of a recent writer, "to regulate and control the relations of the profession to the public, and of one member with another." In this opinion I am unable to concur; first, because I am not aware of any precedent for an attempt, on the part of the English Legislature, to provide machinery for regulating the internal economy of a profession; and, secondly, because the machinery actually provided bears no discoverable relation to the end said to have been in view. For the attainment of such an end, the council should have been empowered to take minor offences into consideration, and to visit them with appropriately graduated penalties. It was only empowered to deal with convicted criminals, or with "infamous conduct" which had escaped conviction; and the only penalty it can inflict is erasure of the name of the guilty person from the "Register," with consequent deprivation of all his legal rights as a recognized practitioner. The council was not made a corporation by the act

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which called it into existence; and the fact that it did not receive any power to restore to the "Register" a name which it had ordered to be erased affords a strong argument that the framers of the act had regarded such erasure as a punishment only to be inflicted upon persons whose conduct had been so abominable as to establish their absolute unfitness to be intrusted with the discharge of professional duties. Since the council has become a corporation, it has directed the restoration of a name in several instances in which erasure had been ordered two or three years previously, and for some comparatively trivial offence. It has thus practically assumed the power of pronouncing a sentence of temporary suspension; but it has done this without any statutory authority, and merely in reliance upon the general right of a corporation to rescind or vary its own resolutions. It is very doubtful how far this reliance would be justified, if the power to restore were seriously challenged in a court of law; and at the present moment it is proposed to apply to Parliament for a new act, by which the power in question will be explicitly conferred.

Some of the first persons whose names were erased from the "Register" for "infamous conduct," not unnaturally denied that their conduct had been infamous, and challenged the decision of the council in the courts. In every such case, the decision has been upheld; but the appeals have required the judges to define in general terms the conduct to which the word "infamous" could properly be applied. It may fairly be said that the bench was at first disposed to regard the powers of the council, as a *forum domesticum,* with much disfavor; for, in the absence of leading precedents, they seemed eminently capable of abuse; but this feeling has in the course of years been wholly removed, by the extreme caution and discretion with which, under the guidance of singularly able legal advisers, the powers have been exercised. The appeals have called forth very near approaches to judicial definitions of "infamous conduct"; and that of Lord Justice Lopes, assented to by the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Davey, may be cited. "If it is shown that a medical man, in the pursuit of his profession, has done something with

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regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonorable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency," then it is open to the Medical Council to say that he has been guilty of "infamous conduct in a professional respect."

It is manifest, however, that "infamous conduct" eludes complete definition; and that the words *"reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonorable"* are scarcely more explicit; but they certainly could not be applied to acts which were merely undesirable, or even discreditable. The real meaning of "infamous" includes, of course, notoriety as well as evil-doing; but it is hardly possible that this view of the case was present to the mind of Parliament, or that there was any deliberate intention of excluding offences which were not notorious from the jurisdiction of the council. It may be conceded that, with the gradual elevation of the moral standard of a profession or of a community, supposing such a change to occur, the word infamous might come to be applied, with common consent, to actions which, at some earlier period, would have been thought to deserve only a milder epithet; but, even then, the use of the word must surely be restricted to offences properly regarded as grave and serious. The tone of thought of the Legislature, in relation to it, may be gathered from the fact that, as a disqualification for continued membership of the recognized medical profession, "infamous conduct" was placed upon a par with felony; and it can hardly be contended that the highly penal jurisdiction of the council should be called into play, or that the one extreme penalty which it is able to inflict should be inflicted, merely for the prevention or punishment of offences against professional comity, or for minor transgressions of the customs or unwritten laws which usually regulate the conduct of practitioners. Much has been made by some of a recent decision of the Council to regard as "infamous" the improper employment of unqualified assistants. But this only applies to cases in which the assistants are employed to act independently of the principal in matters requiring professional skill and knowledge; and such an employment of them is not only a fraud

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upon the patients to whom they are sent, but is a fraud likely to entail disastrous consequences. In the words of the Council's edict, the practice "is in its nature fraudulent, and dangerous to the public health." It is surely quite reasonable to regard systematic and habitual fraud, of a dangerous character, as "infamous."

Except, therefore, in relation to offences which are either criminal or with difficulty distinguishable from criminality, the jurisdiction of the Medical Council may be left out of account; and offences against professional honor or professional comity must be brought under the cognizance of some other tribunal. It is unfortunately true that the profession itself, of late years, has shown more anxiety about the latter class than about the former. It can hardly be said, however, that there is any general agreement of opinion about either, or any code to which either can be referred. Many attempts at framing such a code have been made by various bodies and individuals; but none of such attempts have been conspicuously successful. It has been objected to most of them, not without some show of reason, that they were mainly intended to secure established practitioners against the competition of new comers; while the framers of the codes would usually reply that the real object was to prevent competition from being turned to the disadvantage of the whole profession by the public. I have before me the rules and by-laws of a well-supported suburban medical society, the by-laws being founded on the "Code of Medical Ethics" of the Manchester Medico-Ethical Association; and all medical men who are elected into the society are required to signify in writing their acceptance of and adhesion to these by-laws, as a condition of membership. Although somewhat lengthy, they are worth reprinting, as a fair illustration of views widely entertained by the profession on the subjects to which they relate.

SECTION I.—GENERAL.

ARTICLE 1. No Member shall lower the dignity of the profession by the following or any similar practices:

(*a*) Soliciting private practice either by public advertisement in the newspapers, by placards, by the public distribution of circulars, cards, or handbills, or by personal solicitation by agents.

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(*b*) Members or their relations calling on new residents with the object of obtaining them as patients.

(*c*) Deriving pecuniary profit from the sale of any secret remedy, or giving testimonials as to the efficacy of the same.

(*d*) Entering into any compact with a druggist to share profits.

(*e*) Publishing, or permitting the publication of cases, operations, or professional articles (except on matters of general public interest) in non-professional newspapers or journals.

(*f*) Shielding unqualified persons in illegal practice by "covering" or otherwise.

(*g*) Tendering for an appointment not vacant or on lower terms than the past or present occupant.

ARTICLE 2. No Member shall belong or act as Medical Officer to any Society whose agents adopt any of the practices mentioned in Article 1.

SECTION II.—CONSULTATIONS.

ARTICLE 3. No Member shall meet in consultation any unqualified person, or any qualified practitioner who bases his practice on exclusive views of treatment, or who habitually adopts any of the practices mentioned in Article 1.

ARTICLE 4. Differences of opinion in consultation should not be divulged unnecessarily, but where these are irreconcilable the circumstances should be fully and frankly explained to the patient's friends.

ARTICLE 5. The attendance of a consulting practitioner shall cease when the consultation is concluded, unless another appointment is made, and no Member introduced to a family in consultation shall afterwards undertake sole attendance upon that family, except with the knowledge and consent of the former medical attendant.

ARTICLE 6. When it becomes the duty of a Member occupying an official position to see and report upon a case of illness or injury, he shall in the first instance communicate with the practitioner in attendance so as to give him the option of being present. The practitioner seeing the case officially shall scrupulously avoid interference with, or remarks upon, the treatment which has been adopted.

SECTION III.—ATTENDANCES ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER PRACTITIONER.

ARTICLE 7. A Member having undertaken the care of the practice of another medical man during sickness or absence, shall not charge either the patient or the absent practitioner for his services, except in the case of special arrangement between the practitioners.

ARTICLE 8. A Member called upon in an emergency to visit a patient who under ordinary circumstances would have been attended by another practitioner, shall, when the emergency is provided for, retire in favor

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of the ordinary medical attendant, but shall be entitled to charge the patient for his services.

ARTICLE 9. When a member is called to a case of obstetric emergency during the absence from any cause of the proper medical attendant, he shall cease his attendance when the emergency has been provided for, or on the arrival of the proper attendant; if in the meantime he has assisted at the patient's delivery, or has been detained for a considerable time, he shall be entitled to one-half of the fee.

ARTICLE 10. A Member called upon, without previous arrangement, to attend a patient during the sickness or absence from home of the regular medical adviser, shall cease attendance as soon as the latter is able to take charge of the case, but shall be entitled to charge the patient for his services.

ARTICLE 11. When a Member is consulted by a patient whom he has previously attended as the officiating friend of another practitioner, he may propose a consultation, but shall decline to take charge of the case.

ARTICLE 12. When a Member is requested to attend a patient already under the care of another practitioner (the case not being one of emergency), he shall decline to do so except in consultation with the practitioner in attendance, or in case a consultation be not agreed to, until the practitioner in attendance has been informed that his services are no longer desired.

SECTION IV.—ATTENDANCE ON PRACTITIONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

ARTICLE 13. A Member shall not charge for his attendance upon a practitioner or his family, or the near relatives of a deceased practitioner, in cases where the cost would naturally fall on a practitioner or his representatives, unless the special circumstances of the case warrant it.

SECTION V.—SCALE OF FEES.

ARTICLE 14. Members are not required to conform to any particular scale of fees, but are recommended to avoid the habitual charging of such small amounts as eighteenpence or a shilling—without having regard to the position of the patients, as being derogatory to the dignity and interest of the profession.

If we consider the foregoing "articles" as a whole, I think it will be conceded that the majority of them are so far right and reasonable that they cannot fairly be objected to on the part of the public, whose deep interest it is (although they do not always recognize the fact) that the members of the medical profession should be in the highest degree trustworthy in

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all the relations of life, and should habitually act upon a high standard of honor and propriety. Some of the "articles" must be regarded as having special reference to conditions or practices which are local rather than universal; some, at least to the non-medical mind, may appear to require a certain amount of explanation, and others could hardly be carried into full effect without considerable friction. Under "article 1," for example, clause (*b*) might easily become a source of difficulty; because in many provincial towns new residents are called upon as a matter of course by inhabitants of similar social position; and the wife of a local doctor might be so circumstanced, in the society of the place, that her omission to call upon a new comer would amount to something like a slight. It would obviously be impossible always to distinguish a call made as a matter of social courtesy from a call made "with the object of obtaining the new residents as patients." In many cases the two motives might be concurrent. Clause (*d*), again, might be held to exclude the possibility of an arrangement which is often found to work conveniently both for patient and doctor; an arrangement, namely, by which a general practitioner who does not supply his own medicines directly, supplies them indirectly through a local dispensing chemist, who is by mutual agreement responsible to him for their quality, for the accuracy with which they are prepared, and for the prices to be charged for them, whether the charge be made to the doctor, who includes it in his account with the patient, or made directly to the patient himself. There is nothing objectionable in such an arrangement, if it be declared and understood; and the clause appears to be really aimed at the receipt, by prescribing practitioners, of secret commissions from druggists by whom their prescriptions are prepared. It is very doubtful, *pace* Sir Edmund Fry, whether such a custom has any real existence, and anything of the kind is absolutely prohibited by the Royal College of Physicians of London, alike as regards its Fellows, its Members, and its Licentiates. "Article 3," which prohibits consultation with "any qualified practitioner who bases his practice on exclusive views of treatment," is, perhaps, mainly directed against what is called "homœop-

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athy," although it would also apply to exclusive methods of real or so-called "treatment" of other kinds, such as "Christian Science," or, in some cases, perhaps, to "massage," or to "electricity." Its foundation, as regards homœopathy, is in the general conviction of the medical profession that the system or doctrine so-called is too obviously and flagrantly in opposition to the known facts of science to be honestly entertained by anyone who is acquainted with them. It follows that between the professed homœopath and the regular practitioner (although the former may be duly qualified) there is no common ground, no basis upon which a consultation can be useful to the patient. If the homœopath believe in his own system, it is better that he should have the sole responsibility of applying it; and, if he do not believe in it, but only professes such belief as a means of practising upon the credulity of the ignorant, while he really avails himself of the ordinary resources of medicine, he is not a person with whom it is expedient to have any relations which can be avoided. "Article 5," again, seems to require some comment, and would be improved if the word "consent" were omitted from it. It is for the patient to choose his doctor; and, as long as he acts openly and fairly, no one can have any possible right to give or to withhold consent in the matter. An equally inadequate recognition of the rights of the patient, or of the disinclination which he may not unnaturally feel to "change horses when crossing a stream," is perhaps discoverable in the general tone and construction of "articles 8 to 12"; but the real operation of these would hardly extend farther than to discourage concealed or underhand consultations, or the playing off, by the patient, of one practitioner against another. It must not be left out of consideration that they apply, one and all, rather to exceptional conditions than to such as will be of daily or ordinary occurrence in practice.

In the by-laws, as a whole, the principle of *Beati possidentes* may be said manifestly to prevail; and in favor of this it may be urged that the *non-possidentes* will in all likelihood become *possidentes* in their turn, and will then realize the value of customs which, in an earlier stage of professional development, they might have been inclined to rebel against or to condemn.

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Many of the clauses are obviously intended to prevent any form of underhand dealing in regard to the care of patients; and, so far, are worthy of unqualified approbation; while others seem to be not quite free from a "trades-union" spirit, the general prevalence of which in the profession would be the greatest conceivable disaster which could befall its members, and would inevitably tend both to lower their status in the estimation of the public, and to degrade their standards of conduct from "principles" to "rules." Sir Prescott Hewett's injunction to his pupils to be chivalrous could hardly be fulfilled by anyone whose views of propriety were based upon the teachings of a trades-union, or were in sympathy with its pursuit of merely sordid ends by means of unredeemed and unenlightened selfishness. The framers of the code would, therefore, have been better advised if they had given not only a place, but even prominence, to the claims of patients, and to an assertion of the duties of a practitioner as well as to an assertion of his rights. The tendency of trades-union policy would be to convert the doctor from a trusted and sympathizing friend into a merely mercenary helper; and to destroy the relations of cordiality which have so great an influence upon the success of his work. Happily, the great majority of doctors are better than any of the codes to which some of them profess allegiance; and in this, as in other cases, the merits of an individual are often found to overshadow and conceal the faults of a system.

A code such as that which I have quoted has usually grown up as a result of the local prevalence of certain evils against which it has been expected to provide. Competition in the less prosperous walks of the medical profession, as among practitioners in the poorer quarters of populous towns, has reached a very acute stage, and tells with great severity upon large numbers of struggling men, who may thereby be induced to follow courses not always consistent with self-respect. Doctors have increased, at least in proportion to the growth of population, if not even in excess of it; and the progress of science diminishes the work they have to do. There is less illness, and that which occurs is less protracted. Baillie, when asked the

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best remedy for acute rheumatism, is said to have replied "six weeks." An average case would now be convalescent in six days. Quite a number of chronic diseases, which were formerly regarded as incurable, and which gradually wore out the lives of their victims under protracted suffering, requiring constant medical attendance and supervision, are now quickly cured by surgical means, or terminate fatally after the failure of a well-directed endeavor so to cure them. The general result has been a stress of eager competition; under which it cannot be a matter for surprise if some practitioners, with a *clientèle* limited to classes whose own ethical standards are not exalted, should have recourse to questionable methods of obtaining patients; methods which, among cultivated people, would defeat the objects of those who used them. Hence, for example, the condemnation of circulars and handbills, such as are often distributed, in districts where they are likely to be effectual, by men whose necessities, or those of their families, have rendered them indifferent to the censure of more prosperous neighbors, or to the knowledge that they are offending against the great body of professional opinion. The cardinal fact to these men is that they have their living to get, and they seek to get it by such means as offer themselves. Their customary expedients are duly prohibited in "codes" which have no effective sanction; and the conflict between practitioners of this class and the code-makers is like that between guns and armorplating, or between analysts and adulterators.

The several examining bodies, by which qualifications to practice medicine are conferred, may fairly be said to do what they can to check evils of this nature; but their powers are extremely restricted, and are of very various kinds. These bodies are the several Universities of the three divisions of the kingdom, the Royal Colleges of Physicians and of Surgeons of England, Scotland and of Ireland, the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow, the Society of Apothecaries of London, and the Apothecaries' Hall of Dublin. Speaking generally, it may be said that the Universities have no disciplinary powers over their graduates, whether medical or non-medical; and, still speaking generally, men who have been so educated as to

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obtain university degrees are a sufficient law unto themselves. In a very few instances the names of such graduates have been erased from the "Medical Register," either as convicts or for "infamous conduct in a professional respect"; but the erasure leaves them in possession of their degrees, which, as a rule, the Universities conferring them have no power to withdraw. The Royal Colleges of Physicians and of Surgeons hold their powers of licensing under Royal Charters, and are able to impose conditions subject to which their licenses are given, and on violation of which they may be taken away. A Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians of London, for example, is not admitted as such until he has signed an undertaking faithfully to observe and obey the statutes, by-laws, and regulations of the College relating to Licentiates, and to submit to such penalties as may be lawfully imposed for any neglect or infringement of them; and one of the by-laws provides that "if it shall at any time appear, or be made known to the President or Censors, that any Licentiate of the College has obtained the license by fraud, false statement, or imposition, or has been guilty of any great crime or public immorality, *or has acted in any respect in a dishonorable or unprofessional manner,* or has violated any statute, by-law, or regulation of the College relating to Licentiates, the President and Censors may call the Licentiate so offending before them, and having investigated the case, may admonish, or reprimand, or inflict a fine not exceeding ten pounds; or, if they deem the case of sufficient importance, may report the case to the College, and thereupon a majority of two-thirds of the Fellows present at a meeting of the Fellows, which must be specially summoned for that purpose, may declare such Licentiate to be no longer a Licentiate, and his license shall be revoked and withdrawn; and such Licentiate shall forfeit all the rights and privileges which he does or may enjoy as a Licentiate, and his name shall be expunged from the list of Licentiates accordingly." The Royal College of Surgeons of England has very similar powers, given by a by-law which provides that if any Fellow or Member shall after due inquiry be judged by the Council of the College to have been guilty of disgraceful conduct in

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any professional respect, he shall be liable to removal by resolution of the Council from being a Fellow or Member of the College, in which case his Diploma or Diplomas shall thereupon be void, and shall become the property of the College, and be delivered up by such Fellow or Member of the College on demand. The College of Surgeons, moreover, has the important right, which the College of Physicians does not appear to possess, of restoring the forfeited diploma of a Fellow or Member at any future time, and on such conditions as the Council of the College may see fit in the particular case to impose. This practically gives a power of suspension as well as of deprivation; and may enable the College of Surgeons to deal effectively with cases in which permanent deprivation would be too severe a punishment, and which, therefore, might present serious difficulty to the College of Physicians. The license of the College of Physicians, and the membership of the College of Surgeons, are now usually conferred together after examination by a Conjoint Examining Board; and a holder of the one qualification is almost of necessity a holder also of the other; but the disciplinary powers of the two Colleges are exercised independently. It might therefore happen that one of these bodies had taken away its qualification while the other had not done so. In the case of both, the description of the offences which justify deprivation is large and indefinite, and its interpretation from time to time would manifestly be liable to vary with the individuals composing the meeting of Fellows of the College of Physicians or the Council of the College of Surgeons. In both Colleges, it is believed, there is a certain amount of confidential admonition of Licentiates or Members to whose conduct the attention of the authorities has been called, and this is supposed in most instances to be effective. It is, nevertheless, probable that some instances of questionable behavior may escape notice, and the extreme penalty does not seem to be frequently enforced, except in the case of practitioners whose names, after due inquiry, have been erased from the "Register" by the General Medical Council. Powers of an analogous kind are possessed by the Scotch and Irish licensing bodies, and are used in a similar manner; the

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discipline of the Irish College of Surgeons being somewhat noted for its strictness.

The Society of Apothecaries of London has no such control over the conduct of its Licentiates, but this is in no way the fault of the Society. Its power to license is derived from an Act of Parliament, not from a charter; and it is required by this act to admit to examination all applicants of good moral character who have passed through certain prescribed courses of study. Such applicants, if they satisfy the examiners, are entitled to their licenses as a matter of right, and are subject to no other conditions. They cannot be called upon to sign any undertaking as to behavior, or to submit to any by-laws. If they are afterwards convicted of felony or misdemeanor, or if their names are erased from the "Register" for infamous conduct by order of the General Medical Council, the Society is by a subsequent act empowered to remove their names from its list of Licentiates, but it has no power to recall and resume possession of the diploma by which the license was originally conferred, nor has it any power of restoration to the list except after a fresh examination, conducted in accordance with the requirements as to curriculum and knowledge of the time at which it is held. It appears to follow that a medical man, whose sole qualification is the license of the Society, cannot be restored to the "Register" by the General Medical Council itself, if his name has once been erased from it. He has ceased to possess any "registrable qualification." The Council, consequently, in the cases of such practitioners, is compelled either to leave their offences unpunished, or else to punish them by a necessarily permanent deprivation of their legal status.

Besides the varieties of disciplinary control mentioned above, nearly every medical society is so constituted as to possess some means of expelling members who transgress its by-laws, or whose continued membership is in any way calculated to be injurious to its reputation. I remember two instances in which great London societies, both of them primarily scientific in their objects, have held inquiries with regard to the conduct of members, inquiries one of which terminated in expulsion, the other in acquittal. In one of these instances, the member

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was charged with the habitual performance, for the sake of gain, of an unnecessary and unjustifiable surgical operation; a kind of offence which might equally well have been dealt with by either of the Royal Colleges, or, in circumstances of sufficient aggravation, by the Medical Council itself.

The foregoing considerations appear to justify the statement that medical practitioners whose patients are largely among the working classes or the poor have endeavored by combinations among themselves to enforce what may be described as trades-union rules for the restraint of devices suggested by the stress of competition; but that such combinations are incomplete, and may easily be set at defiance by any practitioners who do not choose to join them. The offenders will be treated more or less contumeliously by those who combine, but nothing effectual can be done in the direction of controlling them. It is idle to suppose that the English Legislature will ever consent to inflict disabilities upon men who choose to sell what skill or knowledge they possess at their own estimate of its value; and, even if the Royal Colleges were to render their rules or their interpretation of them more stringent, it is obvious that the absolute freedom possessed by the Licentiates of the Society of Apothecaries would remain, and that without a new Act of Parliament, it could not be curtailed by any action on the part of the authorities of the Society. It is for this reason that what may be described as the trades-union section of the medical profession has for a long time been seeking to induce the Medical Council to declare "infamous" some of the proceedings incidental to keen competition, such as "underselling," "touting," or the circulation of handbills, and to punish them by erasure from the "Medical Register." It is not in the least likely that the Council will take such action; nor, if it did, is it in the least likely that its action would be sustained by the High Court of Justice.

With regard to moral offences of definite delinquency, such as from time to time are liable to be committed by individual members of any large class or profession, the existing means of control or punishment appear to be fully adequate to meet the requirements of the case; and the decisions of the Medical

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Council, or of the chief medical societies, or of the Royal Colleges, with regard to matters of this kind, would usually, if not always, be supported by the still stronger power of public opinion.

A much more important question than any hitherto dealt with is how far the prevailing ethical standard of the medical profession may be regarded as adequate to the peculiar position and duties of its members; and on this question there is only too much reason to fear that the verdict of an impartial observer would not be altogether favorable, and that many circumstances have combined to exert a somewhat adverse influence.

Fifty years ago, the ordinary, and for an intending general practitioner in England or Wales the only, channel of entrance to his calling was through a period of apprenticeship; that is to say, of domestic pupilage under a medical man already in practice. This pupilage was preliminary to hospital study; and, during its continuance, the learner almost necessarily acquired the traditions and tone of mind of the profession, just as the traditions and tone of mind of the profession of a solicitor are acquired during the analogous period of articled clerkship in an office. He learnt, almost incidentally, how to conduct the *business* of a practice, how to avoid friction with patients or with other medical men, and how to conduct himself in all the intricate relations of professional life. As he acquired professional knowledge, his opportunities of independent action were gradually enlarged under the supervision of his teacher; and the pleasure which he would experience from a growing consciousness of power to be useful to his fellow creatures would induce a feeling of kindly sympathy towards, and of interest in, all those for whom his services were required. He would learn to value the beginnings of a reputation for kindness and for dexterity. His early anatomical studies would be facilitated and rendered interesting by their practical applications; as, for example, in seeing at the bedside how a knowledge of the outlines and projections of a bone enabled the surgeon to ascertain that its fragments were placed and maintained in correct relative position after a fracture. If his environment were satisfactory (and, as a rule, parents and

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guardians were careful as to the hands in which they placed the young people over whom they had control) he would spend some years in daily contact with an intelligent man of mature mind, who would gradually wean his thoughts from childish things. He would be stimulated and helped to continue his school studies with an increased appreciation of their value, to acquire some knowledge of the best writers in his own tongue, and to make some beginnings in the pursuit of natural science in directions likely to be useful in his future career. He would learn the elements of chemistry; and if in the country, would acquire a working knowledge of the flora and fauna of the vicinity. He would almost unconsciously acquire the art of prompt and accurate observation; and he would carry this with him into the sick-room. A difference of opinion between his teacher and a consultant, or between his teacher and a neighboring practitioner, or some disagreement about the charge of a patient, would compel him to reflect upon the principles of action in such cases, and to form some definite ideas with regard to the future guidance of his own conduct in analogous circumstances. With the discontinuance of domestic pupilage, all these advantages have been lost, and have been lost for the very doubtful gain of a slight prolongation of "schooling." The student now goes direct from school to hospital; and the principles of medical conduct are not systematically taught at either. He is required to pass a "preliminary examination in arts" which may represent but a mere semblance of real education, and which frequently leaves him a schoolboy, with a schoolboy's distaste for learning. He is more likely to read *Tit-Bits,* than Shakspeare, or Milton, or Macaulay. His first two years are devoted to anatomical and physiological study, the beginnings of which are no longer facilitated by practical applications, or by a daily growing sense of their utility and necessity. When he goes into the hospital wards, a patient is to him a mere bundle of "instances" (the Baconian term for phenomena), instead of being a suffering fellow mortal, whose pain he is assisting to alleviate, or whose danger he is endeavoring to avert. A student so circumstanced may acquire a considerable knowledge of morbid processes, but very little knowl-

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edge of the thoughts and ways of men and women. He goes into practice; and when he is confronted with a difficult position he has no guidance but his own instincts or his own judgment, the latter very likely warped by some sense of injury, or by some real or fancied wound of his self-esteem. If his instincts be those of a gentleman, they will probably, after more or less blundering, guide him into a right course; but, if they should be those of a trades-unionist, they will be more likely to lead to action of a kind not calculated to elevate the profession in the estimation of the community.

Coöperating with changes which have thus introduced an element of uncertainty into the mental attitude of medical practitioners towards the public, there have been other changes which have introduced a similar uncertainty into the attitude of the public towards the profession. There has of late years been a marked tendency among a large number of wealthy and not very wise people, whose lives are devoted to the business of trying to amuse themselves, to set up their own standards of medical ability and "eminence," and to disregard those which have been set up by the profession itself. The popular standard scarcely requires more than a good address, an ingratiating manner, and a mastery of phrases; and, in the business of pushing the possessor of these advantages into prominence in his calling, it sometimes happens that paragraphs in newspapers, not conspicuous either for their literary merit or for the accuracy of their information, hold a place analogous to that held by touting handbills in the competitions of Whitechapel or of Lambeth. Rich people who crave for notoriety are not displeased when they see announcements of their casual indispositions in "society" papers; and it is conjectured that the supply of materials for such announcements is occasionally rewarded by touching references to the skill and devotion of the doctor in attendance, whose popularity is not unlikely to be still farther increased by the anxiety of Mrs. A., who is external to some particular charmed circle, to know all about the illness and daily progress of "dear" Mrs. B., who is within it. In many less noticeable instances, *savoir-faire* and tact, and the personal recommendation of the many people to whom

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these qualities are pleasing, have much more to do with success in practice than professional knowledge and ability. The former, it must be remembered, are manifest to all who come into contact with those who display them, the latter are only discoverable by kindred knowledge. The standard of the profession rests partly upon discretion and integrity in all professional relations, but still more upon public work, done as a hospital physician or surgeon, a teacher, an experimenter, or a writer; and it is unfortunately true that men who have reached high positions in one or more of these capacities, and have consequently deserved and received the entire confidence of their professional brethren, have not always been sufficiently careful to cultivate social graces as adornments of or accessories to scientific distinction. The different character of the two standards has made itself felt, moreover, not only in relation to skill, but also in relation to conduct, concerning which the public, and especially what would be called the fashionable public, is very much less exacting than the profession. In these circumstances, it can hardly be a matter for surprise if we find a few medical men whose aim it is to satisfy the popular standards rather than the professional ones; and, if the number of these men be actually small, the consequences of their acts are often unfortunately conspicuous. It is notorious, for example, that, among certain classes in London, there is an increasing desire to avoid the responsibilities of maternity; and there is only too much reason to believe in the existence of medical practitioners to whom this desire does not appeal in vain, and who are ready to gratify it by incurring the risks, both to the patient and to themselves, which attend the induction of miscarriage. The latter risks are so grave as to afford a plea for demanding large pecuniary recompense, as well as assiduous recommendation to others; and, prior to detection, a practitioner of the class referred to, may, to all appearance, be a prosperous and respected gentleman. He may have a large *clientèle,* may drive a handsome equipage, may be carefully dressed, and may even make it a condition that he shall be socially, as well as professionally, supported by his patronesses. One person of this kind was not long ago detected and

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sent to penal servitude: on which a lady, who was asked how she and her friends would manage in his absence, replied, smiling sweetly, "Oh, we have found another man." There is no reason to believe that the proceedings indicated have been carried, in London, to anything like the extent which has been reached in Paris; where, if modern French fiction can be believed to rest upon any basis of fact, it has become a recognized practice, among surgeons of acknowledged dexterity and of fair repute, to perform, upon perfectly healthy women, operations which are intended to supersede the necessity for miscarriage by rendering conception impossible. Such operations involve serious risks, both immediate and ultimate, to the persons who submit to them; but the operators themselves would be able to take shelter under some pretence of the existence of disease, and would not be likely, even under English law, to render themselves liable to any penalty. Nothing of this kind could, it may almost certainly be declared, be attempted in this country; inasmuch as it would be impossible to find either surgeons or assistants who would lend themselves to such a prostitution of science. Nevertheless, even in this country, it cannot be doubted that objectionable practices exist, or that their existence points to a condition in which the highest standards of professional conduct, instead of being invariably supported by the public, are forced to maintain themselves, as best they can, against a not inconsiderable amount of hostile social influences. Few things could be more disastrous than the spread of an impression, among young medical men and students, that a plausible manner, and an easiness with regard to scruples, were shorter roads to professional prosperity and success than those which are opened out by unblemished integrity and by assiduous study.

A condition which is produced by a perhaps unconscious "non-morality" among the rich is closely paralleled by one which is produced by ignorance among the comparatively poor; and in both cases the conditions may easily be productive of hardship to men who are endeavoring to do what is right. The young surgeon or physician who has striven to learn his duties thoroughly and to perform them conscien-

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tiously, and who sees himself outstripped in the race by rivals of whom the same could not be said, is certainly deserving of sympathy; and similar trials have often to be encountered in a lower sphere of practice. In the Welsh colliery districts, for example, it is not at all unusual for the confidence of the mining population to be unreservedly bestowed upon some ignorant man, who was perhaps formerly a medical student, but whose career was interrupted before he obtained a qualification, and who has been many years in large practice, nominally it may be as an "assistant," but in fact as a principal, the nominal principal being really paid by him, and having little to do except to sign death-certificates for the "assistant's" patients. To enable an unqualified person to practice as if he were qualified is the definition of the offence commonly called "covering," which, when proved, is usually punished by the Medical Council with erasure from the "Register." It has more than once happened that, in such a case as the foregoing, the action of the Council has compelled the supposed principal to sever his connection with the supposed assistant, and that the latter has immediately transferred his "services" to a rival practitioner in the same district, and has taken the bulk of the practice with him. In such cases, it may often be extremely difficult for the Council to follow up the matter, on account of the refusal of the patients or neighbors to give any evidence which would show that the unqualified person has attended sick persons independently. The grievance usually remains unredressed, until some local quarrel enables the acts to be established.

On a review of the whole position, I fear it must be admitted that the general ethical standard of the medical profession has not been elevated by the events of recent years, and that the subject is eminently worthy of the best attention of the leaders of the profession. The tendency in some quarters has been towards decadence from the standards of a gentleman to the standards of a trades-union; from the standards of a man of honor to the standards of a man of business; from the standards of a philanthropist to the standards of a self-seeker. It is hard to say whether the decadence was commenced by lower aims on the part of the practitioner, or by a diminished appreciation of high aims on the part of the public. Both conditions

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have probably been concerned in the general result; but it is from the profession itself, if at all, that reforms must originate. It should be the business of the profession to educate its employers, to teach them the true objects and the true dignity of medicine, to show that the receipt of payment for services is not incompatible with the most absolute honesty in rendering them, and that everything which lowers the doctor in the estimation of the public has a steady tendency to diminish his usefulness to the community, and to impair his power of rendering the services which are sought at his hands. A French writer has already described him as "Le Mal Nécessaire"; and, if he once ceases to be governed by principles which render him absolutely trustworthy, this is the position which he will naturally tend to assume. The English doctor especially has a great heritage to protect; for it was of him that Robert Louis Stevenson wrote the well-known words with which I may fitly bring this article to a conclusion. "There are men, and classes of men, that stand above the common herd; the soldier, the sailor, and the shepherd not unfrequently; the artist rarely; rarelier still, the clergyman; the physician almost as a rule. He is the flower (such as it is) of our civilization; and when that stage of man is done with, and only remembered to be marvelled at in history, he will be thought to have shared as little as any in the defects of the period, and most notably exhibited the virtues of the race. Generosity he has, such as is possible to those who practice an art, never to those who drive a trade; discretion, tested by a hundred secrets; tact, tried in a thousand embarrassments, and, what are more important, Heraclean cheerfulness and courage. So it is that he brings air and cheer into the sick room, and often enough, though not so often as he wishes, brings healing." May it be assumed that the defects to which I have ventured to call attention are "defects of the period" only, that they are the mere passing indications of a transition stage in the ethics of the profession, and that it may emerge from this stage with increased power to fulfill its highest duties, and with increased willingness to accept its most weighty responsibilities.

R. Brudenell Carter.

London.

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IS COMMERCIAL INTEGRITY INCREASING?

THIS article consists, with only slight changes, of two letters written in reply to some questions addressed by a clergyman to a number of business men in St. Louis a few years ago. The following questions were submitted:—

1. Are the principles which underlie present business methods opposed to the principles of Christianity, so that one cannot succeed, by doing to others as he would have others do to him?

2. Is it true, that to succeed in business men must commit sin?

3. If so, what sins? Must they deceive? Must they blunt the fine edge of honesty in any way? Must they disregard Sunday?

4. Ought the pulpit to try to elevate the standards of trade?

To the first three questions I answer, most emphatically, No! To the fourth question I reply, yes; if the clergy, after a careful investigation and study of the subject, conscientiously believe that other forces are not at work which tend to constantly elevate the standards of trade, and that their efforts in other ways will not indirectly be productive of more good.

My reasons for these conclusions are based on a business experience of over thirty years, which convinces me, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that during this period great progress has been made in elevating the methods of trade; that the standard of commercial honesty and business integrity of the man of mercantile affairs of to-day is far higher than ever before, and that matters have so shaped themselves that much success in business cannot be attained by any other means than by the strictest adherence to the principles of honor and equity.

The tendency of the times is and has been for many years past towards the centralization of business. Whether this is for the good of the community at large is at present a much-discussed question, my own belief being that it is the working out of an economic law which advanced civilization makes necessary, and that time will demonstrate that it is for the best

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interests of all both from the economic and moral standpoint. As a consequence of this tendency, the mercantile and manufacturing houses and banking institutions of to-day are of greater magnitude than those of a quarter of a century ago. One who has seen day by day the changes which have created present conditions in business, should be able to draw comparisons to prove his conclusions. As I am engaged in the mercantile business, I shall take chiefly that line for my comparison, although what I may say applies with equal force to manufacturing and other lines.

It is a common belief among those who have not investigated the subject that, as business has become more aggressive and profits greatly lessened, proprietors have, to a great degree, ignored the golden rule—"Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," and equalized a severe per cent. of loss in profits by great reductions in salaries, and by demanding the performance of more work on the part of the employés. This belief is erroneous, for we are to-day, with some few exceptions of minor importance, paying substantially the same salaries for the same services that we did twenty-five to thirty years ago, while the purchasing power of money is two or three times greater, and the hours for work are less.

If no material reduction of salaries has taken place, if the working hours are less, and if it now takes three times the quantity of goods to equal the same amount in dollars and cents that it did formerly, greatly increasing the expense of conducting business while our per cent. of gross profit has been more than cut in half, the question naturally arises: How have we survived and continued to make our business profitable? Simply by the adoption of the most economic methods, and by a very large expansion of business which is only possible by inspiring confidence. And confidence *cannot* be maintained excepting by universally upright dealings. There is no man possessed of sufficient brains to make a permanent success of business by a departure from these lines, unless he has a monopoly, and monopolies are few and far between.

In former years, when the average house did a small business and when competition was not as great as it is now, there was

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an opportunity for deceit and disreputable methods to be to some extent temporarily successful. There were few trade papers giving quotations and it was exceedingly difficult for a purchaser to keep thoroughly posted, which made impositions, in the way of excessive prices for goods, possible. As a natural consequence there was irregularity, and customers of the same class could be charged different prices and those prices kept track of. The very large profits obtained were an invitation for deceit in defending them. The retail stores pursued the same practice: they charged what they could get, and the favored clerk was the one who could, by the smoothness of his tongue, get the most exorbitant prices. These conditions have all changed and can never prevail again. This is proved by the fact that the largest concerns and the ones most favorably situated and best organized are content to make two and a half to three and a half per cent. net on sales, and from five to seven and a half per cent. on their capital.

When organization was not as good as it is now, it was customary for business firms, during the busy season, to work their employés nights. This hardly ever occurs nowadays, and Sunday work, on the part of employés or employers, is rarely heard of. We have demonstrated in the past, in our own establishment, that night work, except on very unusual occasions, does not pay. Our records in various departments have proven that the gain made was more than lost by poorer service subsequently, due to over-fatigue. The laws of nature cannot be ignored without the payment of a penalty, and any man or set of men who disregard these laws, which make necessary a rest of one day in seven, in the long run injure their business instead of advancing it. Independent of any moral side of the subject, Sunday work is a mistake.

As the traveling salesmen are the mouthpieces of the houses they represent, they reflect the character of their principals, and it is right that in a general way their employers should be judged by them. I know of nothing in connection with business that so positively demonstrates its moral improvement as the change that has taken place in this class of employés. Formerly many, I think I may say most, firms expected them

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to be more or less convivial with customers; they were given great license in their expense accounts; they were not measured by their direct results, and, as a consequence, they were more or less disreputable. At the present time I am proud of our salesmen; they are an honorable, intelligent, dignified set of men. They cannot be otherwise and retain their positions. They are given a small route, in the central portion of which they select as large a town as possible for their home and headquarters, from which, as a rule, they go forth every Monday morning, spending their Saturdays and Sundays at home. In this way they are not deprived of restraining home influences, as was the case when the routes were large. Few salesmen now have a larger territory than they can cover about every three weeks. They not only have to be intelligent and thoroughly posted on the goods they sell, but on competitive goods sold by others as well; and moreover, they have to be informed in regard to the peculiar wants of their respective routes. The up-to-date salesman is an authority on goods, and to a great extent a counsellor and adviser to his customers. As he is coming in constant contact with them, they know him for what he is. Having a small route from which he is expected to achieve certain results and by which he is measured for his salary, he strives to retain all his trade. This he can only do by selling customers such goods as he knows they can sell, any hard stock on their shelves bought from him being a constant advertisement against him. He must be strictly truthful and straightforward, for any dereliction on his part shatters confidence, which is fatal to a continuance of business relations. He realizes, as few others do, that the *first* deception or resort to subterfuge with his customers is the fatal mistake that cannot be overcome. When routes were larger he could lose the trade of one party and equalize it by making a new customer somewhere else in the wide field he covered.

We have had a very large experience in employing new salesmen, and while this experience has taught us a great deal and enabled us to understand the many qualifications which are necessary for their success, we are by no means infallible in our judgment of them, for the reason that we cannot always tell

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whether they are straightforward. To be successful, a man must be intelligent, persevering, possessed of tact, and, above all things, the embodiment of honor. It sometimes happens that we give a position to a man to represent us on the road, who is thoroughly well informed in our business, who is gentlemanly in his manner and bearing, exceedingly magnetic, combats all arguments well, and we make up our minds that in him we have a treasure. He starts out on his route and is a phenomenal success. Later on we have complaints from our customers in reference to the orders he has taken; we find that he resorts to subterfuges and artifices, that he stuffs orders, etc., and not being able to correct him, he ultimately loses his position. In other words, he has all the qualities in his make-up for a good salesman, with the exception of the one that is the most essential and important of all—namely, the ingredient of honor.

As I have already indicated, the chances for taking advantage of customers are very much less now than was the case twenty-five or thirty years ago; yet opportunities are not altogether lacking. Our own line of goods happens to be an exceedingly complicated one. From time to time there are parties starting in the business who, in the very nature of things, cannot be well informed; yet the best houses make it a practice not only not to take advantage of them, but to do them the fullest measure of justice within their power. We ourselves would rather sell stock to a new party than dispose of ten times the amount of goods in other ways, for we believe that if that party bestows on us his confidence and we do not betray it in any way, he will undoubtedly appreciate the fact later on in his business career, when he is better educated in the goods, and the continuance of his trade will be reasonably sure to follow.

If salesmen have improved (and of this there is no doubt) it is not because men of that class, independent of their connection with their houses, would naturally have done so, but because their principals exact a certain standard which they must live up to and follow. In large houses it is customary to send to the salesmen general letters from day to day, giving changes in prices, information in relation to goods, and instructions for their guidance. The matter for such letters is arranged and

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written by heads of departments as well as principals. In our own establishment, in order that there may never be given to the salesmen any misinformation whatever, it is made the duty of one of the chief officers to audit these letters before they are permitted to be printed.

There is nothing more necessary to success in a large wholesale house than to have the active support and coöperation of its employés. This cannot be obtained unless they positively believe that every statement made to them by their principals is absolutely true. If one departure is made, there is no reason in their minds why other information should not be of the same character. It is not only necessary to prevent misstatements in order to achieve the best results, but it is also necessary for the customer. Large houses that have a trade in various sections, accomplish this by putting in their catalogues "Not recommended" against certain qualities of goods. In some places cheap goods which fill the requirements of purchasers are bought knowingly. These would not be serviceable or desirable goods for customers in other localities. It is necessary to keep a complete stock of various kinds and qualities of merchandise in order to meet the requirements of all classes of trade. Yet the best houses, believing that there is the best value given in the highest grades of goods, push them, and sell the poorer qualities under protest.

There is a prevailing impression that the shrewdest buyers are often the most deceitful persons. As I happen to be in charge of the buying department, I am prepared to contradict this, and to prove that such impressions are false. In fact, no buyer can be successful for any length of time and in any way resort to deceit or misstatements. There are few departments in a house wherein there exists such absolute necessity for straightforward dealings. Manufacturers selling goods in large quantities make their prices confidential as a rule, and while a temporary benefit may be accomplished by a betrayal of prices, on the part of the buyer—that is, by giving the quotations of one manufacturer to a competing one, as a leverage to obtain lower prices from him—the benefit is never lasting. Men of experience in business are not so unsophisticated as to believe

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that favors, said to be extended to them exclusively, are denied to others; if prices are betrayed to them, their own in turn will be made use of in a similar way to others. Suspicion is at once created, which in itself prevents a buyer from obtaining what he is entitled to, from a fear, on the part of the seller, of creating a demoralization in prices.

Every buyer with us understands that in purchasing goods he must be strictly fair and just to all. He must, regardless of personal preferences, place his orders with firms which have earned them by their quotations, even though the per cent. of difference in price be slight. His statements must be accurate and truthful; he must never betray the confidence of manufacturers.

If a business of any magnitude is worth conducting, it is worth perpetuating, and it cannot be perpetuated except by the selection of the best and most efficient men obtainable to take charge of the important departments in it. These men, who are expecting at some future time to occupy still more important positions, understand full well that they must carry out the policy of the house, and if the policy of the house is honorable they must rigidly adhere to it. The young men who are employed from time to time are acute of observation and are not slow to recognize this, and they naturally emulate the example of those who are over them.

In all departments there is an education in politeness, patience, tact, tolerance and forbearance, which are not only absolutely necessary for a business life, but good qualities for the home as well. Such environments sharpen the sense of honor and quicken the perception of justice and equity. A man may err in his home life, commit all kinds of abuses and excesses, and have his offences condoned on account of family pride. But the laws of trade are inexorable; they are unrelenting and unforgiving, and every mistake, every disreputable or dishonorable act, directly or indirectly, entails pecuniary loss.

I do not mean to imply that business is altogether pure in its operations, for such is not the case; but in a general way the methods are good, and in my opinion will not only remain so but will continue to improve. There are parties engaged in

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business who, in order to obtain orders, will give commissions to buyers; and the moral perceptions of some are so opaque that they cannot see that there is little distinction between this and disobeying the Eighth Commandment. This kind of business can only be done in a limited way, because, as a rule, the purchases that are made are by parties who buy for themselves. When such is not the case there is a temptation and an opportunity for fraud, and in consequence the contracting business, the railroad business and the government business are more or less tainted with it.

Extreme pains to prevent fraud often lead to it. The government, in some of its transactions, affords an excellent example of this. At certain seasons of the year a description of the goods that are wanted for various places throughout the country is published in pamphlet form and distributed very generally for the purpose of inviting parties to make bids. The detail necessary for this work is very great. The government requires that for every item bid on (excepting the most standard goods, which are specific in their nature) there must be a sample submitted. And when the contract is awarded to a firm, said samples are given to an inspector, who must see that the goods are exactly the same as samples submitted and is expected to see them packed and shipped. All bills must be made out in multifold, to send to different parties for the purpose of the detection of anything that may be wrong in connection with the transaction. Business firms that have bid on these requisitions and received orders for the goods have at times been put to unusual inconvenience and in consequence have met with considerable loss. Inasmuch as all goods have to be held subject to inspection, it is necessary to lay out on floors all those not in original cases. It has transpired in some instances that this space, which is valuable and often necessary for the general operation of business, has been occupied in this way for a period of two months or more, awaiting the uncertain arrival of the inspector. Inspectors, who are not always all they should be in point of integrity, are prone to deal in technicalities and decline to receive goods, regardless of the fact that they are exactly the same as the ones that have been bid for, and, in a very

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manifest way, invite fees for their service to the bidders and lack of service to the government. The best firms find that they are better off without this kind of business, and the consequence is that few parties care to have anything to do with it, and the government pays a very high price for the goods it buys—quality considered.

The railroad business is, in a certain way, conducted on similar lines; that is, the railroad companies make up their requisitions from month to month and invite all parties who are in position to supply goods to make bids, and there is no doubt that the "greasing of palms" is an easy way to make money out of such business. As in the case of government bids, the goods do not go to the parties who are to own them. In the case of the government they go to the various agents, who have no direct interest in them. In the case of the railroads, the goods are shipped to their various machine shops and store rooms.

These abuses have prevailed in the past to a very much greater extent than at present, because large corporations like railroads have found that their best interests were served by having in their various buying departments men in whom they could place implicit confidence and paying them the necessary salaries to hold them there. In other words, they give them power and measure them by the results they achieve, thus recognizing the fact that the detail necessary to prevent fraud is not only expensive, but defeats the very object it is intended to accomplish. As a consequence the purchasing agents of railroads to-day, as a rule, are men of a very high standard of integrity.

People have said to me quite often that they supposed that an establishment like ours had a system of operation that would make it almost impossible for an employé to defraud us. While we aim to be a very systematic and well organized house, I must candidly admit that there are quite a number of employès who, if they so elected, could defraud us. They have been given certain positions because we believed them to be men of undoubted honor and integrity in whom we could place the most implicit confidence. We are glad to say

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that, with a trifling exception or two, in all our business history we have not found that our confidence has been misplaced. We know full well by our business experience that if we adopted the methods in operation in government matters, we could not accomplish what we are now able to do. There may be extremes in both directions; that is, a system so loose in its operation as to positively invite fraud, and another so complicated as to make business expensive, and to give a certain class of employès the feeling that confidence is placed in the system, rather than in themselves.

We find that in order to prevent fraud, less and less latitude has been given by the municipal government to the highest officers, and more and more plans have been put in operation to prevent leakage, pilfering, etc. But there is a growing belief among the best thinkers of the country that we have gone to extremes in that direction, and that the best interests of all will be conserved by conducting the affairs of the municipality more on the lines of those adopted by some of the largest and best organized houses—namely, by giving the mayor and other officers more latitude and holding them responsible.

Anti-Trust laws and various other laws are being passed quite generally in many States which contain some few good clauses and many pernicious ones. These laws are usually urged by political demagogues to cater to a sentimentality on the part of an ignorant constituency and not for any good reason. They hamper trade in various ways. They are expected to be dead letters in some cases, and they are more or less evaded and always will be.

Municipal legislation is often so corrupt that many a man who earnestly wants to do right indirectly bribes his way for perhaps the privilege of a switch, rather than have his business held up indefinitely. His conscience is palliated by the feeling that his highest duty is to his family or his stockholders, many of whom may be widows and orphans. I do not attempt to defend such actions—there is no moral defence. I am simply showing that the chief occasions for disreputable acts in business houses are largely outside of regular business channels.

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Great license is undoubtedly taken by many business men in giving in taxes. In this and other matters a business man is expected to have, in addition to his real conscience, a commercial one. This I confess is bad. The operation of a commercial conscience in such matters lowers one's moral standing.

Some existing business conditions do tend to destroy a fine sense of honor, and to neutralize the effect of other agencies for good. This class of business, however, is, as a rule, avoided by the large business houses.

Among the bankers, whom some politicians have denounced in the most unmitigated terms, we find high examples of integrity and honor. The small bankers or usurers of former years have been succeeded by men of the highest standards who can be trusted. They have advanced while statesmen appear to have degenerated into political demagogues.

The farmer has been mistakenly held up as the best example of honor. His environments are such that he does not come in touch with the public and have the same opportunity for moral advancement as other classes. Mechanics and other skilled workmen are recognized generally by men who understand such matters as being very much superior to the farmer in moral perception.

From what I have said it may be inferred that business men are honest because it pays to be honest. Well, it does pay to be honest and we cannot gainsay the fact. Yet a business man, if he is built on the right plan, sees the eternal fitness of things and recognizes those higher laws which he may not profess to define but nevertheless firmly believes in. His environment and training do not blunt but on the contrary keenly sharpen his perception of right and wrong, and he must transact his business in accordance with it, in order to maintain his self-respect. He is impelled to deal correctly and to be honest, solely because it is right to do so, which from my point of view is the highest motive that can actuate a man.

I have heard the statement made that mercantile training engenders mercenary motives, that it makes the general aim in life of a business man mere money-getting. My experience among business men with whom I associate is a positive and absolute refutation of this statement.

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It remains to consider the point of view of a man who says—

"That the principles which underlie the present business methods are opposed to the principle, 'Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you,' is proven by the saying—and a true one—that 'competition is the life of trade.' "

"The golden rule is the spirit of coöperation, while competition *must* and *does in fact* tend to annihilate all spirit of coöperation."

"Competition in one way or another, either towards competitors or else towards employés, tends to prevent the practice of the golden rule."

I take direct issue with these statements. Competition stands for advancement and civilization, and instead of opposing coöperation and ignoring the teachings of the golden rule. it fosters both and makes it necessary in business affairs to put them into operation to achieve satisfactory results.

I have tried to show that during the past generation, a period far more intense in commercial competition than any in our history, the working hours of employés have grown shorter and wages have remained the same while their purchasing power has become much greater. It may be argued that employés should receive more fruits of their labor. But if they received all the fruits of their earnings, it would mean only a small advance per capita. We do not employ anyone for a given length of time. We do not even have contracts to that effect with our traveling salesmen. We hold that no one can do us justice who becomes dissatisfied, and it is better for us and better for him to leave whenever he sees fit. Further than that, if an employé is offered a larger salary, a better opportunity for advancement, it is his duty to take advantage of it and we should not stand in his way.

During the past twenty-five years a great many of our employés have left us and started in business for themselves, among them many whose services were valuable and with whom we regretted to part; yet, singular as it may seem, with the exception of one who has not been in business long enough to demonstrate what he can accomplish, not one has been successful. In fact, they have all given up their undertakings and

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gravitated back to clerical positions. Of all the employés who have voluntarily left us, eighty-five to ninety per cent. have made applications to return.

Men are not endowed equally, and ability of any quality will seek its level. Does it not follow that the golden rule is being practiced by the successful business houses in holding their employés up to the maximum level of their abilities? We must deal with conditions and recognize facts, and facts prove that about ninety-five per cent. of business men fail to succeed, and only five per cent. of the whole have sufficient "all round" business ability to sustain themselves independently. Severe competition has forced the large business concerns to be coöperative in their methods. The modern establishment is so coöperative in its workings that most successful business men must frankly admit that their success has been due to it.

Statistics show that the best-organized and most favorably located manufacturing and mercantile institutions do not make over two and a half to three and a half per cent. on sales. Even if they give their customers goods at cost, they would not benefit them much in a pecuniary way. This would be carrying out the golden rule in a way not pleasant to contemplate, and would lead to disastrous results.

If a straightforward customer becomes involved, we endeavor to assist him as far as we can consistently. If a firm meets with adversity and makes an honest failure, it is almost the universal custom for mercantile creditors to say—"Pay what you feel you are able to. Attempt no more." This is the golden rule in a more beautiful form.

I. W. Morton.

St. Louis, Mo.

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THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO EVOLUTION.

WITHIN the memory of the present generation a great change has come over our conceptions of nature, and it was to be expected that these altered conceptions should react on our views of conduct, with the result, as some think, of demanding a reassessment of moral values and a reconstruction of ethical science on the lines of evolutionary teaching. The history of ethics shows that it has been at all times very sensitive to the shock of those far-reaching events and discoveries by which old associations are loosened and the possibilities of speculation proportionately extended. When Zeno the Stoic substituted the conception of a world-wide community for the idealized city-state of Plato and Aristotle, he was more than probably translating the conquests of Alexander into theory. By placing the site of his Utopia in the New World, Sir Thomas More shows clearly enough that the discovery of America combined with the spirit of the classic Renaissance to suggest a complete reorganization of society. And it is interesting to observe that the new thought does not invariably work on the lines of the new experience, but may even attempt to reverse them. While Charles I. and his Parliament were disputing by arms for the right to coerce opinion, or at least the public expression of opinion, Milton was framing a theory of free speech equally remote from the views of either party. While a Jacobin tyranny was rising on the ruins of the old French monarchy, Wilhelm von Humboldt was preaching the gospel of individualism in his juvenile essays on "The Sphere of Government." Godwin's "Political Justice," written shortly afterwards without any reference to the work of his young German contemporary, is a still more thorough-going protest against every kind of coercion, whether exercised by the one, the few, or the many. Nothing could well be more opposed to the teaching of Rousseau, the great apostle of the National Convention; and Mary Wollstonecraft, in her "Rights of Woman," sets herself as energetically against Rousseau's scheme of female education

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as her future husband sets himself against the polity of the "Contrat Social."

Neither the conquests of Alexander nor the discovery of America, neither the English nor the French Revolution, involved such a shock to old prejudices or threw open such a vista of new possibilities as the doctrine of organic transmutation. Had the dreams of alchemy been fulfilled they would have brought no such promise of boundless wealth and of perpetual youth.

But the relation between evolution and ethics is of a more specific sort than that which has existed between new experiences and old standards of conduct in the past. For, whatever may have been its origin among the Greeks, the theory of development, as revived in modern times, is distinctly an outgrowth of moral idealism. When philosophy had extended the notion of a supreme good from an individual to a universal possession, human history came to be viewed as the process by which that boon was being won, in other words as a process of gradual growth; and by a further generalization the human race itself was conceived as having been developed from a purely animal ancestry, and the higher from the lower animal types by virtue of the same efforts towards perfection that are now bearing us onward to our ultimate destination. No one, I think, who studies the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer in their chronological order, can fail to observe that he began with the end, working down from an ideal of human perfection to the simplest forms of existence through the social, psychological, vital, and physical processes, of which it was to be the final result. And his endeavor to interpret evolution as a rearrangement of matter and motion, whether successful or not, aims at securing for our future hopes the guarantee of ineluctable necessity and scientific demonstration. And another great systematic thinker of the last generation, Edward von Hartmann, while on many points diametrically opposed to Mr. Spencer, agrees with him in this method of reading evolution by the light of its ethical end. Only the English optimist finds his end in the most complete expansion of life, while the German pessimist finds his in the absolute extinction of existence

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itself. A Hegelian might use either system as an illustration of the principle that opposites tend to pass into one another. According to Mr. Spencer, who in this instance may be taken to express the general opinion of modern astronomers, human life, after attaining the greatest happiness of which its environment permits, must eventually come to an end with the planet on which it is borne—in other words, the worst that can happen is sure to come. On the other hand, the more complete extinction anticipated by Hartmann is from his point of view the best thing that can happen, and, as such, is the determining principle of progress. But this extinction may not, after all, be final. There is an even chance that the will to live may emerge once more from the annihilating equation with the will to die toward which it tends, to tread again the weary round of illusion and despair. And Mr. Spencer's conclusion leaves more than a hope that from the crash of dissolving worlds a new universe may be born.

In reading such speculations one thinks of the *Dies Iræ*, with its appeal to the witness of psalmist and sibyl, or of the infinitely reiterated petition for our Father's Kingdom to come. And as the doctrine of an ideal end to be realized by the collective efforts of the human race was a nursling of Hebrew prophecy and Christian prayer, so also the optimistic interpretation first of human history, then of all history as a working out of that ideal, was a survival of the belief in an overruling Providence. But, in the judgment of many, evolution as a scientific law leaves no standing-ground for that belief. At any rate, modern science has definitely discarded the assumption that the world was constructed for our benefit, and it looks on nature as a system of forces, that moves round or moves on in complete disregard of our wishes or our hopes. In the language of the schools, teleology has everywhere been superseded by mechanical causation; and even those who hold that the teleological method may still be legitimately applied would explain it in an Aristotelian rather than in a Platonic sense; that is, they would say that the different parts of an organism existed for the sake of each other and of the whole, not for the sake of an external end or of an end that has not yet been

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realized. It is, of course, true that when the evolution of life is explained by such causes as natural selection or adaptation to the environment, there seems to be an implication that vital development follows a certain direction and is impelled by forces having possibly an ethical value; but what that direction and value may be is still an unsettled and disputed question.

Let us assume for a moment that the question has been decided in a sense adverse to the hopes of the older prophets. We will suppose that the survival of the fittest acting in conjunction with the progress of material civilization tends to create a type of character as selfish as the Martians of Percy Greg's "Across the Zodiac," or a society as degraded as that foreshadowed in the romances of Mr. H. G. Wells. What will be the attitude of ethics in the face of her revolted daughter evolution? Must she reconsider her whole position, transform her standards, and appeal to new motives of action?

I must say that for my part I do not feel the necessity for any such change of front. Faith in the ultimate triumph of right over wrong was, as we have seen, inherited from religion; it was trust in the divine government of the world translated into the language of scientific philosophy. But even within the limits of theology such doctrines as that the moral law depends on the will of God, and that our compliance with it depends on the prospect of something that will happen after our death in a readjusted scheme of things, have never been allowed to pass without a protest from great numbers of believers. Much less need the independent morality of the present day suffer itself to be influenced by contingencies whose occurrence would only prove, what has long been known, that right is not always might. The masters of philosophy have not taught us to worship success, and we are not going to worship it even should it be presented to us under the garb of evolution. No scientific sociologist will maintain that, judged by reference to any principle of progress, the path of humanity through all past history has described a uniformly ascending curve; yet at no period, however dissolute or violent, have the ideal demands of righteousness been lowered; and the most inspiring examples of self-devotion from Homer's Hector

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onwards, have ever been offered by the defenders of a hopeless cause.

A reference to the kindred science of æsthetics may put the point contended for in a clearer light. It is notorious that the advances of modern industry do not make for beauty. Our buildings, our costumes, our vehicles, our means of communication and of publicity, grow more hideous every day; and it is probable that the future holds possibilities of still greater horror in reserve. Yet the canons of good taste remain unaltered or develop by a logic of their own, in which the spectacles of common life take no share except as object-lessons in what to avoid; our appreciation of the old models is not less but if anything more keen than ever; nor is there any reason to believe that the instructed critics of future generations will fall below us in this respect. And even if we foresaw that beautiful things were doomed to utter disappearance or neglect among posterity, our love for them would not lose one jot of its intensity, nor would those among us who can create them work with diminished energy at their glorious tasks. But if numbers have no authority as against the laws of beauty, neither have they any authority as against the laws of right.

If so much be admitted, a somewhat unexpected consequence seems to follow. I have been reasoning on the assumption that evolution will bring about the substitution—at least among the mass of mankind—of a lower for a higher standard of conduct, and I have tried to show that our ethical attitude would not be affected by the prospect. Now let us reverse the assumption, or, in other words, let us return to the optimistic theory that evolution is tending towards a golden age, an age of relative if not quite absolute moral perfection. Does such a prospect place our present morality on any firmer foundation? I find myself compelled to answer that it does not. As regards the ethical standard, the supreme good, we are no better off than before, for in assuming the perfect goodness of the society that is to be, we assume that its members will act up to our standard of morality, whatever that may be. Our *summum bonum* is not the end because it will be realized, but it will be realized because it is the end. Perhaps, however, the doctrine of evolution, if it supplies no new principle of action, supplies

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a new motive of action, and makes the performance of duty easier or more agreeable through the magnificent prospect that it opens up. An adherent of this school certainly has one great advantage over the philosopher in "Rasselas" who bids men live according to nature, and who, when the Prince of Abyssinia asks him what he means, can only say that to live according to nature is to coöperate with the general tendency of the present system of things; for if he has mastered Mr. Spencer's Ethics he is in a position to define that tendency with extreme precision. But he could not tell any more than Johnson's Stoic how the Prince's desire for felicity is to be gratified by coöperating with the present or, for that matter, with the future system. Indeed, not only are our actual burdens not lightened but they are even increased by an additional feeling of responsibility for the future of mankind. Of course he can appeal to whatever motives are ordinarily invoked on behalf of disinterested virtue. But these are equally available whatever theory of evolution we adopt, or even if we refuse to adopt any theory whatever. For my part, I can only imagine one additional inducement to be good which this view supplies, and that is the satisfaction of finding ourselves on the winning side. But unfortunately the same considerations that intervened to protect our moral fibre against the chill of despair must equally render it inaccessible to the stimulus of hope. We are pledged not to worship success, and righteousness must be no dearer to us in victory than in defeat. Nor is it by any means certain that the evolutionary forecast would have an invariably stimulating effect. If in moments of temporary disaster and despondency a vision of ultimate triumph may come to reanimate the drooping courage and to rally the broken lines of those who fight for the good cause, it is equally possible that a fatalistic confidence in the forces that ensure success without the aid of any particular individual may relieve them from the necessity of painful and gratuitous exertion.

Like historical optimism, this method of enlisting evolution on the side of conscience is in truth a survival of religious belief. We have so long been accustomed to regard the Will that creates and guides the universe as the source and sanction of

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ethical distinctions that when a chain of mechanical causes has been substituted for that will, we are easily induced to accept the "stream of tendency" as a "power that makes for righteousness," or, like Wordsworth, "to recognize the soul of all our moral being in nature and the language of the sense." And, just as it has often been shown that an appeal to supernatural sanctions derogates from the perfect purity of the moral motive, so it may be urged with equal reason that to be moral because morality holds the winning cards is not to be moral at all.

So far I have discussed the relation between ethics and evolution from what some will call a very limited point of view. They will say that the pioneers of evolution have greatly underestimated the scope of their own discoveries or rather of the method that they have introduced into philosophy, that we have passed from a solid to a fluid régime of thought, and that in view of the boundless prospects opening before us a currency of even some millenniums fails to guarantee the perpetual validity of our moral values.

In considering the point thus raised, let me begin by calling attention to a truth which, simple and obvious as it may seem, is rather apt to be forgotten. Evolution is not a power any more than time, but an abstraction, a general expression for a variety of specific changes perfectly definite in their character, our knowledge of which is derived from and limited by experience. Now experience does not warrant the assumption that variability—for this rather than evolution would be the most appropriate term—is the ultimate law of things. Indeed it would be absurd to apply the name of law to a condition that would make law impossible. What modern science calls evolution is a law, but a secondary and derivative law, only intelligible as a phase of elementary masses and movements of which the properties are constant and the sum can neither be diminished nor increased. Walking has been defined, or rather described as a perpetual losing and recovering of one's balance, and that is precisely what evolution amounts to. It is a transition from one state of equilibrium to another, and a transition that cannot be eternally prolonged. And, therefore,

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according to the only complete theory of it as yet offered—Mr. Spencer's theory—evolution has its limits. As the Germans say, good care is taken that the trees shall not grow into the sky. In the solar system a condition of stable equilibrium has long ago been reached. The changes still going on, on the earth's surface are due to forces whose intensity is continually diminishing and which must ultimately become exhausted. In living bodies, whose metamorphoses offer the very type and prerogative instance of evolution, it is a process of adaptation to the environment, and must cease when adaptation is complete, as there can be no vital competition when all are equally fit to survive, and no inheritance of acquired habits when the acquisition of new habits has become useless. Even now advance seems to take place almost solely along the lines of social development, and we may expect individuals to be modified, if at all, merely by becoming better adapted to the social state, in other words by becoming more moral, as morality is now understood—a result that will leave ethical science unchanged.

Admitting that there is no reasonable prospect of a fundamental change in the conditions of individual and social life, it may still be contended that ethical opinion, being subject like every other complex structure to the law of evolution, is in a state of perpetual flux, the certainties of one age melting away before the keener or bolder scrutiny of the next. Well, at any rate, such forebodings leave the position of ethics no worse than it has been since speculation on the subject first awoke. At an early period the different customs prevailing among different nations attracted the attention of Greek observers and suggested the theory that moral distinctions are not natural but conventional. In modern times the same argument based on a much wider range of experience has been employed, among others by Montaigne and Diderot, to justify the same scepticism; and Hume in one of his most entertaining essays has shown how widely the moral estimates of his own day differed from those of classical antiquity. Convictions based on mere habit and custom are always liable to such attacks, but ethical scepticism, like every other scepticism, while

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most valuable as a protest against the principle of authority, is powerless as against the principle of reason. Our ethics need no more be affected by the discordant practices of uncivilized or half-civilized tribes than our physics are affected by their mythology. The physical sciences also have their history, their evolution; and the later stages of that history often show not merely a change but a complete reversal of earlier views. As regards stability, indeed, ethics seem to have a decided advantage over other branches of knowledge, due, no doubt, to greater familiarity with the facts and greater interest in their correct interpretation.

One more possibility remains to be examined. Let us suppose that the doctrine of evolution leaves our ethical standard and sanctions untouched, that we are still to conceive the collective interest of society all the world over, through all time, and with the inclusion of all sensitive beings, as the highest good—good for the whole by definition, and made good for each individual by processes about which we differ, but in whose outcome, under the form of obedience to law more or less voluntary, more or less complete, we are agreed—we ask ourselves to what extent our notions about the means for accomplishing this great end are affected by the doctrine of evolution. Is it not possible that in the light of our new knowledge certain laws hitherto supposed to be of absolutely binding obligation may have to be repealed as useless or mischievous to the supreme interests of humanity, seeing that we have not only to "coöperate with the present scheme," but with the future scheme as well?

I am afraid that here also we get no clear answer or an answer dictated by the prepossessions of the inquirer. It is true that systems of individual life and of social organization more or less opposed to existing opinion have been confidently put forward as the logical consequence of a belief in evolution. But an impartial examination will show that in every instance the proposal is one that has long been current among advanced thinkers, so-called (often the most retrograde of mankind), and is now being switched on to evolution as a means of drawing attention or of recommending it to popular favor. And

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as usually happens with such interested interpretations the appeals go to prove that the new doctrine can be invoked with equal plausibility on behalf of the most divergent programs. Wagons moving in opposite directions are hitched to the same star. Mr. Spencer argues from the facts both of biological and of social development that government will first be limited to the maintenance of social order and will then be gradually superseded by voluntary coöperation based on the universal recognition of proprietary rights. But then Mr. Spencer was an individualist before he adopted the development hypothesis; and there are those who, while they adhere to the general principles of his philosophy, hold that the state is destined to monopolize all the instruments of production and to direct the whole industry of the people. Imperialists anticipate and welcome a continuance of the process by which the huge political agglomerations of the present day have been formed, while positivists preach and predict the break-up of the existing Powers into small communities connected by a loose federal tie. A great majority hold that war is an unmixed evil and bound to disappear with advancing civilization; but there are some among us who agree with Hegel in treating regularized slaughter as an invaluable moral tonic of which, fortunately for the higher interests of humanity, occasional doses will never cease to be dealt out.

In the sphere of private morality there is the same discordance of opinion, the same easy reference to evolutionary standards, the same utter absence of originality. Social progress leads towards monogamy, and towards unlimited freedom of divorce, or even total abolition of the marriage-bond. Seeing that the improvement of the race has so far been carried on by natural selection we are to give more scope to this beneficent agency by forbidding the propagation of the weak and sickly, by allowing the hereditarily diseased and incapable to die out, and by permitting or prescribing the painless extinction of unpromising infants—all in the name of evolution, but in obvious imitation of pre-scientific theory and practice. But the still numerous class who object to having human beings treated like a herd of cattle need not try to fight down

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their amiable feelings. They will be told by the next speaker that the conscience of whose protests they are half ashamed is, from the evolutionary point of view, their safest guide, being the product of ancestral experiences of race-utility organized in the nervous system, or what practically comes to the same thing, in the social tissue by which they are surrounded; while the views they abhor may not uncharitably be ascribed to atavistic degeneration. Or, again, it may be suggested that their unreasoned revulsion from modern Platonism is a collateral product of sympathetic interests, which on the whole do far more good than harm, and to tamper with which would be to risk their entire eradication. On both sides the new arguments are after-thoughts that in the long run do but neutralize one another, leaving the motives by which conviction is really determined to work as before.

If the foregoing analysis can be trusted we are left with a negative conclusion. The doctrine of evolution from which so much had been hoped throws no fresh light on the problems of ethics, although perhaps the study of ethics throws some light on the evolution of that doctrine itself. But, apart from the gain of a lost illusion, our conclusion may count for that negation of a negation which implies a stronger assurance of positive truth. What some are apt to regard as a solvent of moral certainty seems powerless to loosen its cohesion. The lessons on which the world's choicest spirits have lived are not made obsolete by any modern discoveries; nor is there reason to believe that a reversal of moral values is, any more than a reversal of logical values, among the surprises which the future has in store.

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TRUTH-SEEKING IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

WHAT ought to be the attitude of the educated man in regard to those doctrines of religion which have been taught him in childhood? We all know that this question presents itself with some degree of urgency to everyone who is thoughtful and conscientious, and that it often becomes obtrusive very early in adult life. Sometimes the answer is given at once, with the impetuous eagerness and assurance of youth,—only later to be greatly modified or wholly retracted; sometimes it is stifled or postponed till its interest has yielded to the insistence of practical affairs, the routine of habit, or the attractions of a life of amusement; sometimes the doubt which the question implies is fought against as a thing of evil and crushed by strenuous effort; while occasionally the individual, endowed with patience and candor, thinks out some solution which for him is permanently satisfying and honorable. The unlikenesses here referred to are not in relation to the sets of beliefs to which the diverging paths may lead; the point to be noticed is that the action of the mind when employed upon this subject will vary greatly in different cases. Even if we consider only those instances where the earnestness and honesty of the inquirer are competent to the task of examining beliefs hitherto held sacred, and of striving to prove all things in order to hold fast that alone which is good, we still find a diversity of opinion as to whether this task should be undertaken at all, and, where it is attempted, differences as to the methods to be employed, the limits of the investigation, and the end which it is desired should be reached. The whole subject has obviously a far-reaching moral interest which makes good its claim for consideration.

Probably few at the present day would attempt to maintain that an uncritical and facile assent should be immediately granted to dogmas, which, resting mainly on authority, yet deal with problems at once the most vital and the most complex with which the human mind can grapple. That there is some

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legitimate use of the reason in application to a creed is generally admitted. But, granted the right of the individual to concern himself with the grounds of his religious beliefs, how far does this right extend? Is it not merely a right but a duty? What benefits and what dangers may come from its exercise? Are there any interests with which those of the intellect may conflict,—any so superior to its own that in submission to them it must give up its demand for free and unlimited inquiry? Finally the question may arise, whether reason is adequate to the work it proposes to do, or whether it must necessarily find itself at last reduced to a confession of nescience, —a confession that may seem to justify an indifferent or despairing acquiescence in doctrines which the most careful investigation fails either to establish or to negate.

If such an examination into the basis of a religious creed is to be undertaken at all, it must have for its direct object the attainment of truth. If an earnest man calls in question the more important of the religious dogmas which he has been taught,— such, for example, as the incarnation, the supernatural authority of the bible or the church, the immortality of the soul, the existence of a world-creator and world-ruler,—and tries to find out whether he should continue to accept these ideas or to reject them, it is because he desires to hold only such opinions as are in agreement with real fact. Why has he such a desire? One answer is that he holds truth to be, in and for itself, a good, that is, intrinsically desirable. Another answer is that truth is good for that which it brings with it or which follows from it,—because it gives an intensifying of pleasure, or an increase of mental power, or a strengthening of the moral fibre, or perhaps that it does all of these. For if truth be not either for itself or for its consequences an object which it is wise to hold dear, that man surely does well who simply refuses to criticise or investigate his belief in supernatural religion; since the anxiety and unrest during the process and the sense of loss which often accompanies its result are painful and disturbing factors in the life experience. Moreover, in many cases, there is no small risk that if the religious formulæ are laid aside the ethical teachings so closely bound up with them may be

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shaken in their influence, and the moral life lose thereby much support and stimulus. Then, too, it is no trifling task to weigh the evidence for and against any part of the supernatural theory of the universe, or to follow out the implications of theological doctrines, often highly abstruse in form and coming down to our generation in phraseology, originally scholastic and technical, and now only the more obscure and vague from being popularized in the religious consciousness. Add to these, the pain of breaking through old habits of thought, the possible severing of those ties of friendship and kinsmanship which the possession of a common faith and hope does so much to draw close, and the many sacrifices which even in our day may follow from the conscientious disapproval of the orthodox, and we may fairly conclude that unless truth is something so precious that even the smallest part of it is a pearl of great price, for the sake of which the merchantman may well sell all that he has, it is better to shut the eyes of the soul and continue passively receptive of teachings which are intimately bound up with the social life of the community, which can claim the sanction of centuries and are sweet with the fragrance of early association. An adequate discussion of the subject would have to consider two questions: What is the worth of truth? and, Is truth attainable? both involving some notice of that old question of "jesting Pilate's," What is truth? The limits of the present paper render possible only a brief treatment of the value of truth.

We all grant that truth-speaking is in the main a good thing. But the average conscience remains self-complacent if the verbal expression corresponds fairly well to the opinions held, without undertaking any very close examination as to whether such opinions coincide with reality. Not so Plato, who, in the well-known passage in the "Republic," maintains that "the ignorance of the soul of the lie within," that is, self-deception, is the true lie, hateful alike to gods and men,—the lie of which mere falsity in words is but a shadowy and comparatively unimportant image. And surely the great philosopher is sounder here than is our popular morality, in the recognition that the attainment of a true insight into fact, so far as it

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lies in our power, is a duty. For if, as all thinking men admit, the ideal life for humanity involves its fullest and richest development, then knowledge is not the merely useful tool by which natural laws can be made subservient to our pleasures or convenience; it is the food for the soul which man must appropriate and assimilate if his intellectual life is to maintain itself and expand. To rest in ignorance where knowledge is possible is to starve, to accept the false through indolence or cowardice is to try to get nourishment from poison. Moreover, a new truth that is an apprehension of fact as it is, is more than an addition to the contents of the mind; it is a test, a critical instrument by which opinions already held can be sifted and the wheat separated from the chaff. With the reception of the Copernican doctrine in astronomy, for example, there was thrown a new light upon innumerable assumptions previously held unquestioningly, and in regard to science, philosophy and religion a great mass of rubbish was detected, and in time was thrown out from the consciousness of civilized mankind. So it is in the life-history of the individual. When some important fact, or significant generalization about fact, like a new planet swims into a man's ken, he finds that his old opinions take on a new aspect,—some are found fuller than ever of meaning and worth, while others are seen to imply contradictions and absurdity; relations before unsuspected are found to exist, and subtle and elusive fallacies are laid bare. And if it be asked, whether the advantage does not come rather from the novelty than from the truth of the new idea, we answer no, for though a new idea when false may change the mental content, it does not so test it. The mind is bound to come into contact with reality, and this the false opinion will only render it the less capable of assimilating. To preserve his false views, a man must force his mind to contract instead of expand, and so shut himself off from the real. He who believes that the sun goes round the earth must either close his eyes to facts that other men recognize, or hold ideas that cannot be brought into relation with one another without contradiction. It is, of course, indisputable that a theory, which later may be found insufficient and incorrect, may for a time be of

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considerable use in rendering self-consistent and orderly many half-apprehended phenomena. But to admit the value of an inadequate explanation is merely to assert that it is better than no explanation at all. Or, we might rather say, that it is only in so far as such a "working hypothesis" is true,—that is, in so far as it is a statement of what the appearances do actually suggest, that it has value at all. Obviously, it is the conception which new discoveries constantly tend to confirm that gradually makes good its title to be a truth; and such remains ever fruitful in purifying the mind from old errors and preparing it for the reception of new knowledge. "As light," says Spinoza, "reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false."

But, it may be urged, the whole case has not yet been fairly stated. Grant that man as an intellectual being demands truth, yet man's whole nature is not summed up in his intellect. He cannot live by knowledge alone any more than by bread alone. His emotional nature is not satisfied though you supply him with a whole universe of matters of fact; the science which satiates the brain may leave the heart hungry. Fact, indeed, is too sad, it is fiction, dreams, visions that we want. "We live by admiration, hope and love." Love is and must be blind; tear the bandage from his eyes, and the too visible world contains so much that is dull and base that we turn from it with shrinking and distaste. Hope, alas! implies an ignorance of what life really is, and to admire is the privilege of the child-like and the simple. Who increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow. Let us suppose then that the principal dogmas of Christianity—the conception of a divine fatherhood, an infallible revelation, the promise of an eternity of bliss for the believer and of some far-off divine event for the race, are all but creations of the imagination,—still their presence within our consciousness shows our need of them. Imagination asks for a dream-land in which to rise above the sordid tragedy of life. The desert would appall us but for this mirage. Fairy stories are better than science primers. The old beliefs are at least beautiful, and beauty as well as truth is a good.

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This contention is based upon a pessimism which is too widespread among sensitive and thoughtful men of the present day to be left out of account. It is true, as has often been shown, that the pessimistic theory of the world is one which can neither be proved nor disproved, since feelings, in their more complex forms at all events, are insusceptible to measurement. But the pessimist does not need proof, the misery and evil of human existence are for him too all-pervasive and insistent. Christianity when most vigorous and aggressive, saw the present world in the same dreary, chill, light. "If in this life only we have hope," said the great apostle, we are "most miserable." The escape is into another life,—a life that was firmly grasped as an eternal and indisputable verity by the early Christian, but that the modern man of culture and scientific training must "will to believe" in,—must, if need be, close his eyes and stop his ears to believe in, since only so can he escape from the grip of the sordid and the low. For in any case, it is asserted, it is such faith in the supernatural which can render existence tolerable and even happy, since if we give free play to the imagination, and permit it to enter in behind the veil of sense and time to build itself habitations eternal in the heavens, it may well be that even the sufferings of this present time shall not seem worthy to be compared with the glories of this transcendent sphere. Why then let the meddling intellect intervene with its curious criticism and super-subtle analysis? Let us rest and be thankful.

The answer to this argument is almost a commonplace. To a man of intelligence and culture in the present day, the voluntary acceptance of a creed which can be retained only by refusing to subject it to the scrutiny of reason can give little comfort or satisfaction. The remedy is a mere soporific, and leads to no cure. True, a faith may be secured, in many cases actually is secured, by building it upon a basis of authority, by raising about it buttresses of ceremony and religious observance, and by carefully screening it from all blasts of destructive criticism. But how delicate is such an artificial product, how little its succour avails amid the swellings of Jordan! The classic example of success in this effort to develop a faith on the discredit-

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ing of reason, is that of Blaise Pascal; and it is still difficult for the student, watching the delicate balance of his fine and sensitive mind, to determine which prevailed, the ardent religionism of the superimposed creed, or the profound and almost cynical skepticism that underlay it. What none can doubt is the intensity of his melancholy. If a religion has for its object the securing of permanent consolation and serenity, it must at least be as a house that is founded on a rock. A modern man of literary culture, and acquainted to some extent with the results of scientific and historical research, who yet refuses to examine his creed lest he should lose his hold on it, is far from the calm and settled conviction of the early Christian whose faith quenched the fires of martyrdom and turned the edge of the sword,—for there always remains a half-consciousness of the doubt to which he has refused admittance. His religion is like the Don's helmet, it only remains intact because its owner is too prudent to try its strength.

Yet it is indisputable that the various systems of supernatural religion do make strong appeal to the higher feelings, and give satisfaction to human hearts. Especially in this true in our day of the teaching of the more liberal Protestant churches, which have gradually laid aside many of the harsher dogmas of mediæval and Calvinistic theology. None the less it must be pointed out that only a crude and inadequate psychology can represent imagination and emotion as so separated from, and opposed to, intelligence that they can only be cultivated at the expense of reason. The little child believing in Jack the Giant-Killer, holds the story of his feats to be literally accurate; but the educated reader believes in Hamlet not as a correctly-depicted historical character, who once in Denmark spoke thus and acted so,—but as the concrete presentation in beautiful form of a profoundly interesting type. It would be grotesque to argue, that because we want to feel Hamlet's "truth," we must try to believe in spite of evidence that perhaps Shakespeare was a transcriber of history rather than the creator of a wonderful work of art. And wherever in the doctrines or narratives of the Christian, or any other, religion, there is the figuring forth of some truth regarding

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man or nature, there need be no fear that the critical reason by its most ruthless work can ever rob us of a jot or a tittle of it. We may learn how the myth has arisen,—how the story differs, perhaps very widely, from the actual occurrence that it purports to describe; but the inner core remains untouched, or rather it is made the more clear that it is in such truth that we have the precious thing, while the imagery and circumstance which have clothed it have their value only as lending it vividness and charm. The more knowledge increases, the more do we recognize the intrinsic worth, because the essential truth, of a great work of the creative imagination. As all historical and literary investigation of three centuries, and all the progress of modern philosophy and psychology, have only quickened the world's appreciation of Shakespeare's Hamlet, so the most rigorous skepticism if applied, let us say, to the most sacred of all the New Testament narratives, need touch no whit of that which makes it beautiful, pathetic, and heroic; it will be for us not the less, but the more, "true," when we have learnt to distinguish what in it was merely accidental, and unhistorical. "We live by admiration, hope and love" we repeat, but these must be founded, not on dreams or fancies, but on the real, the vital, and the permanent.

Nor is the rational criticism of a creed, whatever be its results, likely to be more inimical to the emotions connected with the moral life than to the imagination. New conceptions of the universe may indeed direct our affections towards natural, rather than supernatural, objects; but the altruistic feelings are too deeply rooted in our human nature,—they are too intrinsic to that nature, to be cast out by any upheaval of religious ideas. Love "is an ever-fixed mark, that looks on tempests and is never shaken." We are sometimes told that the doctrine of a personal immortality is needed to give strength and warmth to our tenderness for kinsman and friend; and that a love which cannot pass beyond the grave is but feeble and evanescent. The answer is that whether we live forever, or only for a few-score years, love can last while we last; and that which ceases only when we cease, is for us permanent. The annihilation of its object, if we hold this takes place, does

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not check love; the remembered kisses after death are not more sweet, the touch of a vanished hand does not cling closer in memory, to the most orthodox believer in a heaven of bliss, than to him who thinks of the dead as gone into an everlasting silence. Love may have led man to believe in immortality, but it is not this belief that causes the love. Nor does altruism in its wider form, the enthusiasm for humanity, depend upon the acceptance of any theological dogmas. If the age of miracles should be regarded as mythical, if supernatural help should no longer be trusted in for the relief of human misery, if the world should cease to be regarded as the work of a supremely good and great Person,—yet not the less urgent, to some perhaps rather the more urgent, would be the demand for human strength, and knowledge, and sympathy. If there be no wisdom higher than that of weak, fallible man, the greater must be the need for the best efforts of all to be put forth to feed the little lamp of human reason, and to bring as many as possible within the circle of its light.

To suppose that the higher and more spiritual qualities are dependent upon a conservative clinging to generally-received religious doctrines, is a mistake that is often due to the assumption that truth is a barren abstraction of some sort, quite isolated from all human interests,—an assumption which implies that those who claim for the intellect the right to examine all its opinions impartially, and to accept as credible that alone which has valid evidence in its favor, are trying to resolve all our warm living experience into a rigid rationalistic schema. Man, we are told, cannot live upon categories, life is more than logic. Not in a world of speculative thought, but in a world of action and passion, does his work lie; and that religion which best helps him to keep his heart open to the sorrows of others, and most stimulates him to play his part as a man in a world of men,—that it is which justifies itself, be its philosophy right or wrong, its conceptions sound or false. And this objection, if it is directed against the over-estimation of mere thought-forms, to be found in some idealistic systems of philosophy, is well taken, but it does not for a moment affect our contention of the high value of truth-seeking. For truth is not

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a net-work of logical formulæ, nor a table of abstract categories; it is not a matter of abstraction at all, it is the apprehension by reason of concrete reality.

For the question which the conscientious inquirer, whose case we have had in view, will put to himself, is just this: These statements which I have perhaps hitherto received unhesitatingly, referring as they do to a whole class of subjects having the deepest interest and the most vital importance to me and to all mankind,—are they in accord with existing fact or no? Is there anything in the universe corresponding to phrases which till now have possessed for me a peculiarly valuable and sacred significance,—God, immortality, the divine incarnation, a miraculous intervention in the natural sphere, the providential government of the world? And if any such correspondence exists, how close and complete is it? Manifestly, what is demanded here is not a barren analysis of metaphysical terms, undertaken for the sake of a pedantic longing for literal and logical accuracy. The effort is to come face to face with facts,—with those facts, moreover, which any thinking man, and the conservative religionist not the least, must acknowledge to have the most practical bearing on life and conduct. If such an investigation involves a consideration of "abstract ideas," and perhaps to some extent it inevitably does so, that at all events is not its goal. The concrete may have to be analyzed into its elements, but it is not with such elements, but with the complex whole that we are ultimately concerned. The more intense is the desire to get into close touch with the real, to see fact as it is, unblinded by personal prepossessions and freed from the haze of prejudice thrown around us by the habit of concurring in the opinions of others, the more earnestly will the inquirer ask—not, what is the pleasantest, the most comforting thing for me to believe?—not, what creed will give the sharpest spur to my sluggish conscience and quicken into fullest life my gentler susceptibilities?—not, what will most gratify my imagination and my æsthetic aspirations?—but simply, what is true? Are these things so, or otherwise? It is the real which is wanted, it is the real with which the reason has to do; "was

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vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig."

There needs no proof that men have other interests to satisfy than those of reason; and that for the vast majority the demands of the senses, and of the emotions most closely connected with the senses, are far more insistent and clamorous than are any of the problems presented to the intellect. The higher forms of the reasoning powers have been evolved only at a very late stage of that indefinitely long process of which our civilized humanity is the result, and they are as yet but partially and imperfectly developed. That man is a rational animal is a true definition only as it signifies the possession of some potentiality of reasoning. We all know but too well that we are, so far as concerns most of our actions and many of our beliefs, quite irrational animals,—creatures of instinct and of custom, of prejudice and childish fancies. But just because our higher intellectual nature is a hardly and but recently won conquest, into the borders of which we have scarcely yet entered, does it become us to protect it and hold its interests dear. "We ought," says Aristotle, "to make every effort to live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties, for though it be but a small part of us, yet in power and worth it far surpasses all the rest." Truth is one aspect of the ideal, of the "summum bonum" of the old philosophies. It is the ideal that gives worth to life. The best that we can conceive of in human conduct, that is the ideal for the guidance of our active life. No moralist has yet made fully clear what our humanity would be were such moral perfection to be reached by society and by the individual, but all ethical progress must make toward this dimly-seen and far-distant goal. The highest that the æsthetic consciousness can imagine when it considers that beauty which is everywhere in the world, has never yet been made actual in visible or audible form by poet or artist, yet he is something less than man who is wholly deaf and blind to its influence. So truth is also for us the good, in so far as we are intelligent, thinking beings. We can be satisfied with an indolent dependence upon authority, we can shut our eyes to evi-

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dence and choose to believe what we want to believe, only on pain of dulling and deadening the very faculty which enables us to contemplate an ideal at all; for neither conscience nor imagination live independently of reason. If theology is more than superstition, if its arguments are valid, if its objects are verities, it can afford to court the most rigorous examination, and to give praise and cordial welcome to the inquirer who brings to its study the cool impartiality and the searching thoroughness of the scientific spirit.

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THE ETHICS OF TOLSTOY AND NIETZSCHE.

THE eighteenth century, although it gave birth to Rousseau, the greatest of sentimentalists, was preëminently the rationalistic century. The rationalism of Kant dominated the thought of its closing decades. The Critical Philosophy proclaimed the supremacy of the pure reason, and in its ethical teaching found no place for emotion, but scorned all action resulting from good-feeling as non-moral, and "pathological," recognizing as moral only such actions as were performed without other feeling than regard for the abstract form of the moral law.

Against this rationalism, which found the reality of the world in abstract thought—a mere logical scheme of relations without life or feeling; a skeleton unclothed by flesh and blood,—men at length began to revolt. This revolt found its most complete expression in the writings of a man of genius, whose poetic and artistic nature was repelled by the dry formalism of the current theories, and who ventured to think out a philosophy from a new standpoint. Discarding the claims of "reason," Schopenhauer found the real beneath all appearances in "Will" or spontaneous energy, the nature of which is blind and aimless striving. Organisms are evolved

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as instruments for the satisfaction of its ceaseless cravings, and these develop and grow more perfect, till, at length, in the higher forms consciousness arises, and as the function of a complex brain, intelligence is evolved which serves to guide the "Will" to the satisfaction of its desires. The intellect reaching its full development, the hopelessness and futility of the striving for individual satisfaction is recognized and the "Will" turns against, and negates itself, seeking for peace and deliverance from the fruitless struggle. This is found in the disinterested pursuit of truth; more fully in artistic contemplation; but chiefly in the life of the saint, or Yogi, in whom striving ceases because universal sympathy has taken the place of the egotism which constitutes the essence of all individual existence.

Schopenhauer's ethics are based on the feeling of sympathy, pity, or compassion. He held that man is by nature entirely selfish. "The natural individual if forced to choose between his own destruction and that of the whole world besides, would destroy the world in order to preserve himself, that drop in the ocean, a little longer." He has no consideration for others save in so far as fear teaches him the necessity of respecting their wishes lest they should injure or destroy him. This necessity, however, does not give rise to morality, but only to the hypocrisy of politeness, and thus man is essentially unmoral; his life and social activities are inspired by pure selfishness, all appearances to the contrary being merely the masks by which men conceal from one another the hideous egotism which is yet the very essence of their being. The instinctive feeling of egotism cannot be overcome by "reason," but only by another instinctive feeling—the feeling of sympathy—which reveals to the heart our unity in the one Will manifested in all the diversity of individual existence. This alone has the power to contend with the "Will to Live"; this alone renders possible that small part of conduct which is truly moral; this alone can substitute the "Ethical," for the "Cosmic" process.

Schopenhauer's philosophy has profoundly influenced the thought of our time. It has seemed to furnish a philosophic

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basis for the scientific theory of the struggle for life; by its opposition to rationalism and by basing all morality upon feeling it has harmonized with our repugnance to the abstract thought of the last century, whilst its pessimism has found an echo in the hearts of many, worn out by the stress of life in an age of such rapid change and such fierce excitement. Above all it has formed the starting point of the theories of two of the most influential of modern thinkers, Fredrich Nietzsche and Leo Tolstoy, and colored their whole thought and life.

Tolstoy came under the influence of Schopenhauer when he visited Germany in 1857, and that influence is evident in all his writings, but most, perhaps, in his latest works. Nietzsche, in his college days at Leipzig chanced upon a copy of the "World as Will and Idea" in a second-hand book shop. Turning over the leaves he was struck with its insight. He bought it, and hastening home with his treasure flung himself on the sofa and began, he says, to submit himself to the influence of that vigorous and sombre genius. "Here I saw a mirror in which I perceived the world, life, and my own nature in terrible grandeur. Here there met me the full, unselfish sunlit gaze of art. Here I saw sickness and healing, exile and a haven of refuge, hell and heaven!"

Schopenhauer was an artist rather than a thinker. He excelled in flashes of insight, rather than in logical and systematic thought. His philosophy based on feeling and recognizing no rational order in the world is consequently thoroughly pessimistic. The intellect is the slave of the "Will" and can only attain independence by the negation of the Will to Live. The mere feeling of sympathy is made the sole foundation of morality. Intensely individualistic and finding no organic unity in society binding the life of a man to that of his fellows and giving form to his activities, this philosophy issues in complete asceticism. In Schopenhauer the man and the philosopher were at variance. The timid, cautious, cold-hearted, selfish man, with aristocratic exclusiveness, and contempt for the "vulgar herd," was the very antithesis of the saint demanded by his philosophy for whom Schopenhauer had a per-

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fectly sincere admiration which never, however, caused him to attempt to realize the ideal.

To endeavor to do this in actual life and to develop to its remotest consequences the implications of the doctrine of pity and self-negation was reserved for Tolstoy, himself a man of fine artistic sensibility and of keen insight, but above all of a rich emotional nature; ever restless and unsatisfied with life, and filled with a deep longing for deliverance from the fierce and never-ending conflict of impulse and will, of feeling and reason, of the actual and the ideal, within him. After a youth and early manhood spent in the usual fashion of his class and country, except that his sensibilities were far keener, his moral nature much deeper and his life more intense than that of his fellows; first a soldier, then a pleasure seeker, and later on the admired genius of a literary circle—Tolstoy was seized by a feeling of despair over the aimlessness of life. "My life," he confesses—"was but a long indulgence of my passions; it was a thing without meaning, an evil." He tells us how he realized that, like the rest of his class, he was but a social parasite, living a pampered and unreal life on the toil and bloody sweat of multitudes who yet were happier than he, because immersed in the activities and duties of life and sustained by their religious belief they feared neither toil nor death, taking life as it came, and looking upon its good and evil as alike the will of God. Tolstoy sought to find the secret of their happiness and peace, and thinking it arose from their religion, joined with them in the services of the church, and tried to share their beliefs, but in vain. He found it impossible to run counter to his reason and to revive the faith of his childhood. For a long time he lived in despondency till he became acquainted with a peasant of remarkable religious genius who seemed to have really made his own the great secret of life—a secret which lies at the basis of the Christian and Buddhistic religions, and which Schopenhauer had formulated in philosophic language. Not content henceforth to merely know the truth, Tolstoy felt constrained to live it, and with all the fiery ardor, the passionate enthusiasm of his nature he cast aside convention, position, and worldly fame, and turned lovingly

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to share the life of toil and self-renunciation of those men of the people who passing their lives in "heavy labor and unrepining content . . . . live, suffer, and draw near to death in quiet confidence and oftenest with joy." With more or less consistency he has since lived the peasant life, teaching his doctrine of toil, poverty, non-resistance to evil, and of universal sympathy and love, in novels and tales, in newspaper articles, and in books like "My Religion," "Life," "My Confession," "What to Do," and "The Kreuzer Sonata." At last he has formulated his mature doctrine in a very lucid and concise form in a work entitled "The Christian Teaching," which though intended for posthumous publication, he was persuaded by a friend to give to the world during his lifetime. From this work may be obtained the clearest and most complete idea of Tolstoy's ethical theory.:

Man begins to reflect on the meaning of his life because he perceives a contradiction within it. On the one hand he is an animal, with impulses and desires craving for satisfaction, whilst on the other he is a spiritual being. Beginning life as a mere animal he gradually awakens to the consciousness that individual welfare is unattainable—that his life is full of care, and of sorrow, that limitations of all kinds narrow and hem it in, while death surely awaits him at the end; in short, as the old French rhyme has it--

"Avec la suer de ton visaige
Tu gaignerais ta pauvre vie
Apres maint travail et usaige
Voici la mort qui te convie."

When once this consciousness has seized hold upon a man, he can no longer return to the careless joy of the animal which lives in the moment without a thought of aught beyond. Life becomes for him a burden and an enigma, the only solution of which is to be found in the Christian teaching which tells him that he is "an angel being born of a beast and that all our life in this world is naught else but this process of birth." He learns that his misery arises from his regarding himself as a separate being, but when he ceases so to regard himself and

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realizes that his true desire is for universal welfare he is born into the spiritual world. The true self of man is this Infinite Love which is ever seeking to manifest itself, but man is still, even after the awakening of the "reasonable consciousness" within him, owing to contracted habits of animal life, inclined to perform "acts directed toward the welfare of the separate being and which are contrary to love. By so doing man not only deprives himself of the welfare of true life, but fails to obtain the welfare of his separate being; acting thus he commits sins." Sins, Tolstoy defines as "obstacles to the manifestation of love." They may arise from the natural animal tendency to seek one's own personal welfare, or from traditional modes of life, or from deliberate attempts to find new ways of increasing the welfare of one's separate personality. One may find personal pleasure in the satisfaction of one's needs; one may wish to throw the burden of satisfying these needs upon others, or one may provide for future needs. Again, one may seek to subjugate and dominate others, or to indulge sexual instinct; and finally one may "produce artificial excitement of one's physical and mental faculties." These are the six sins of sensuality, idleness, avarice, ambition, sexual sin, and the sin of intoxication, which preserve the illusion of the separate being, and oppose the manifestation of love.

These sins, when once they have been recognized as such, might be overcome with the greater ease were it not for certain "traditional justifications" or "snares" whereby the sins are "sanctified." Thus, one may justify his regard for his separate well-being, by the necessity of preparation for future good work, such as study, securing a livelihood and so forth; by the demand made upon him by wife and child; by the requirements of some organized work or business in which he is engaged; by fidelity to the interests of members of voluntary associations and fellowships; or finally by regard for the interests of organized society or the state. These "snares" are rendered more powerful by the deceptions practised by religious teachers, who direct reverence to the men who have taught the truth rather than to the truth itself; encourage belief in miracles; hypnotize people by rites and ceremonies, and

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above all poison the mind of innocent and trustful childhood by inculcating all kinds of superstitions and falsehoods, thus poisoning life at its very source.

Having freed himself from religious deception a man must not fear to recognize the truth, but must give up lying to himself and thus avoid the "snares" which appear to justify his sins. These latter he must attack in the order of their importance, beginning with "the sin which, if yielded to, precludes the possibility of all contest with others"—the sin of *intoxication*. It must be borne in mind that for Tolstoy, the word intoxication has a very wide meaning; not only drinking, but smoking, the eating of spices and highly seasoned food of all kinds, adornment of one's person or dwelling, dancing, playing, music, gymnastic exercises, gazing at pictures, and even cycling are all forms of "intoxication" because they all pleasurably stimulate the faculties of body or mind; in fact strengthen the Will to Live. "Although," as Tolstoy confesses, "men will never, while in the body, altogether liberate themselves from the excitement and intoxication produced by food, drink, movements and surroundings, the degree of this intoxication may be reduced to the smallest limits." It is easy to see that having dealt with the "sin of intoxication" it will be a light task to overcome the other sins, leading up to what Tolstoy, like his master Schopenhauer, regards as the centre of all, sexual desire. "Reasonable consciousness when awakened in man demands . . . . complete abstinence."

Such are the Ethics of extreme self-negation and asceticism expounded with deep conviction, great clearness and contagious enthusiasm in the "Christian Teaching," but the ultimate goal of the theory is stated with unflinching logic and courage in the very remarkable article on the "Demands of Love," published in the *Daily Chronicle* of October 2, 1897. Tolstoy here supposes the case of a man and his wife of the well-to-do class who have "realized the sin of a luxurious and idle life lived amidst people crushed by work and want." Having got rid of their superfluities, they settle in the country, keeping only a small income (Tolstoy supposes £15 a year), for themselves, and for the rest maintaining themselves by their labor.

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They try to help their poor neighbors in all possible ways—give away almost everything they possess—but are constantly assailed by the new demands which love makes upon them. Where can they stop? Tolstoy answers the question thus,—"Having worked all day they return home; having no longer a bed or a pillow, they sleep on some straw they have collected, and after a supper of bread, they lie down to sleep. It is autumn. Rain is falling, mingled with snow. Someone knocks at the door. May they refuse to open? A man enters wet and fevered. What must they do? Let him have the dry straw? There is no more dry, so they must either drive away the sick man, or let him, wet as he is, lie on the floor, or give him the straw, and themselves, since one must sleep, share it with him."

"But even this is not all; a man comes who is a drunkard and a debauché, whom they have helped several times, and who has always drunk whatever they gave him. He comes now, his jaw trembling, and asks for six shillings, to replace money he has stolen and drunk, for which he will be imprisoned if he does not replace it. They say they have only eight shillings, which they want for a payment due to-morrow. Then the man says, 'Yes, I see, you talk, but when it comes to acts, you're like the rest: you let the man you call a 'brother' perish, rather than suffer yourselves.'

"How is one to act in such cases? Let the fever-stricken man have the damp floor and lie in the dry place yourself—and you will be further from sleep than the other way. If you put him on your straw and lie near him you will get lice and typhus. If you give the beggar six of your last shillings, you will be left without bread to-morrow; but to refuse—means, as he said, to turn from that for the sake of which one lives."

"How is one to act? What is one to do? Not to draw back is to lose one's life, to be eaten by lice, to starve, to die, and—apparently—uselessly. To stop is to repudiate that for the sake of which one has acted, for which one has done whatever good has been accomplished. And one cannot repudiate it, for it is no invention of mine, or of Christ's, that we are brothers and must serve each other; it is real fact, and when it has once

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entered you can never tear that consciousness out of the heart of man. How, then, is one to act? Is there no escape?" And Tolstoy answers: "We must go forward prepared to die. Only *that* love is true love which knows no limit to sacrifice—even unto death."

It is impossible to read this without being deeply moved, without admiring the greatness and nobility of the man who with rare intensity of feeling and piercing insight has penetrated to the bottom of human misery and risen to the height of self-devotion and heroic self-sacrifice, and yet we feel that neither here nor in the "Christian Teaching" does Tolstoy satisfy the reason. We feel that the outcome of his teaching is indeed *death,* and more; it is, as he himself seems to have a suspicion, *useless death!* To the people in the village but little good, and it may be, much harm, has been done. They have learned to prey upon others, instead of working and helping themselves; their vices have been cultivated, the drunkard has been given the means to further debauchery, has been helped forward another stage on the road to ruin; a centre of infectious disease has probably been created. Instead of the Happiness which Tolstoy says results from utter devotion to the ideal, there is little but misery. Two cultured people suffering acutely, and a whole village sunk still deeper in misery and despair by their well-meant, but unwise benevolence!

This apparent *reductio ad absurdum* forces us to examine Tolstoy's theory as expounded in the "Christian Teaching" more narrowly, and when we do so we seem able to detect the initial error from which all the rest follows. Tolstoy asks the question, "Why is a spiritual being, love, enclosed within the separate being of man?" and he answers, "Love in every separate man, and in all mankind, is like steam confined in a boiler; the steam expands, drives the piston, and performs the work. As in order that the steam may do its work there *must* be the *resistance of the boiler,* so, also, in order that love may accomplish its work, there must be the resistance caused by the limits of the separate being which encloses it." This may seem a satisfactory answer, but it is not in accordance with the pronouncement we find in another place, and which forms

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the foundation of his whole theory of asceticism and absolute self-negation, that *the spiritual "rejects all the demands of the animal in man,"* and that when the "reasonable consciousness" awakes in man he desires that his life should be *"purely animal or else that it should be purely spiritual."* The resistance of the boiler is essential to the useful action of the steam. If the steam *bursts* the boiler it escapes uselessly into the air, and the whole worth of the engine is lost. So uselessly does a man act who helps on a drunkard to ruin and starves himself in consequence. It is not true that man, normally, desires to be "purely animal" or "purely spiritual," a beast or an angel. He desires to be truly a *man*. The rejection of "all the demands of the animal in man" is really the denial of the moral life itself—in the attempt to be a "purely spiritual" being, man either spends his life in vainly trying to fly in a vacuum, which leads to disgust with life and finally to death, or he gives up the attempt in despair and falls back as nearly as possible into the "purely animal."

"All passions have a time when they are fatal only, when with the weight of their folly, they drag their victim down; and they have a later, very much later period, when they wed with spirit, when they are spiritualized. . . . To annihilate passions and desires merely in order to obviate their folly and its unpleasant results appears to us at present simply as an acute form of folly. We no longer admire the dentist who *pulls out* the teeth that they may no longer pain. . . . The Church fights against passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its cure is *castration*. It never asks, How to spiritualize, beautify and deify a desire—it has, at all times, laid the emphasis of discipline upon extermination. . . . But to attack the passions at the root means to attack life itself at the root: the praxis of the Church is *inimical to life."* These wise words of Fredrich Nietzsche's go to the very core of the matter. Reason does not "reject all the demands of the animal in man," but purifies and spiritualizes them and organizes them into the system of a life which is truly human, neither bestial nor ascetic.

In a recent article in the *New Order,* on Marriage, Tolstoy

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categorically declares, "there cannot be any such thing as a Christian marriage." In consequence of his abstract separation of the animal and the spiritual he regards marriage as a merely animal union—an indulgence of the lusts of the flesh and denies the possibility of spiritualizing sexual love and thus making it the basis of, and a means to, the love and service of Man. "Falling in love," he declares, "union with the object of one's love (however verse or prose may seek to prove the opposite) never facilitates but always impedes the attainment of an end worthy of man." And again: "The Ideal of the Christian is love to God and to one's neighbor, whereas sexual love, marriage, is service of self, and is, therefore, in any case an obstacle to the service of God and man, and, therefore, from the Christian point of view, a fall, a sin." How much truer is Nietzsche's aphorism: "Chastity and sensuality are not necessarily antithetical; every true marriage, every genuine love affair is beyond such antithesis." "Do I counsel Chastity?" he exclaims in "Zarathustra." Chastity is a virtue with some, but with most almost a vice. "But even your best love is but an enraptured parable, and a painful heat. It is a torch that is to beacon you to higher ways."

"One day ye shall love beyond yourselves! If so, first *learn* how to love. And hence ye have to drink the bitter cup of your love."

"Marriage: thus I call the will of two to create that one which is more than they who created it. I call marriage reverence unto each other as unto those who will such a will."

To find in marriage and the family relationships the means by which we first "learn how to love," the nest in which is nurtured the wider love to humanity; to all that lives and feels, is surely a truer view than that which regards marriage as only a "snare," a "fall," or a "sin." Tolstoy's rejection of marriage is a part of his rejection of all the forms in which the spiritual nature of man has endeavored to express itself. Preparation for life by study, organized labor, voluntary associations of all kinds and finally the state or organized society are all regarded by Tolstoy as like the family, mere "snares," by which sins are justified. He admits that they are explained

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"as the result of the demands of the spiritual life itself," but as his ideal is an ascetic one,—the extirpation of the animal desires instead of their subordination and organization—he finds them mere hindrances to its realization. We have then to join issue with Tolstoy on the question of the *ideal itself*. We wish, indeed, to realize the spiritual life, but we are human beings, in whom the spiritual life is embodied in an animal organism—and this, moreover, is the only spiritual life of which we have any knowledge, or can even form any conception, therefore to endeavor to reject all the demands of the animal in man, leading, as we have seen it does, to the rejection of all the forms in which the spiritual life has organized and rationalized those demands, is to deprive the spiritual of all content, to reduce it to nothingness, to move towards death!

Perhaps the chief value of Nietzsche's writings is found in the clearness with which he discerns, and the energy with which he repudiates, and combats, the deadly tendency of a morality based solely on the feeling of sympathy, which must finally issue in an asceticism like that of Tolstoy. Of a soft and gentle character, naturally inclined to tenderness and sympathy—he ruined his health by his voluntary service in the military hospitals during the Franco-German war—he came to recognize that "in the beautiful and in pity there was always the greatest danger for me"; he experienced in his own person the nihilistic effects of Schopenhauer's teaching which he at first so eagerly embraced; vividly realized the inevitable outcome of a life which attempts to be "purely spiritual"; and fought with all the passionate intensity of his soul against this doctrine of death.

"The problem of *décadence* is that which has occupied me most profoundly;" he writes in the preface to "The Case of Wagner." "I have had reasons for it. 'Good and evil' is only a variety of that problem. When one has learned to discern the symptoms of decline, one also understands morality,—one understands what conceals itself under its holiest names and valuation-formula: namely, *impoverished* life, desire for the end, great lassitude. Morality *negates* life."

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This is the fundamental thought of "Beyond Good and Evil," and "A Genealogy of Morals," the works in which Nietzsche most fully develops his ideas on Ethics. He approaches Ethics from the standpoint of Physiology. For him the moral life has no independence. It is entirely subordinated to Biology. The morality of a man is only a symptom of his physiological condition. "Everything good is instinct and consequently easy, natural, free." "A well-bred and prosperous man will necessarily perform certain actions, and instinctively avoid others; he carries the disposition which he physiologically represents into his relations with men and things. His virtue is the consequence of his good fortune." In "Beyond Good and Evil," he describes the evolution of morality from this point of view. There are three periods in the history or moral development. In the first, or Pre-moral period, deeds are estimated solely by their consequences. Then follows the Moral period—that in which we live—when reflection has arisen and the stress is laid on motives, when the "superstition" obtains that the worth of an action lies in the worth of its motive. We are passing out of this period since we are beginning to discover that "intentional morality has been a prejudice, a rashness, a something provisional, perhaps something of the rank of astrology or alchemy, but in any case that which must be transcended," and so we are entering upon the Supra-moral period when the worth of an action is seen to be "precisely in that which was not intended by it," but in that of which the intention was only "a sign and symptom," namely, the health and vigor or the weakness and decay of the organism. Nietzsche regards current morality as nothing more than action motived solely by the feeling of pity; and the predominance of this feeling is a sign of weakness and degeneracy, and this morality appears to him the symptom of degeneracy, the outcome of the same want of strong, healthy life which finds expression in pessimism and asceticism. "To me this ever-spreading morality of sympathy," he complains, "revealed itself as the most dismal symptom of our dismal grown European civilization, as a round-about way to a new Buddhism? to a European Buddhism? to Nihilism?" It arose, he imag-

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ined, among a weak and conquered race, such as the Jews, and begins by the *resentment* of those to whom forcible reaction is impossible and who must be satisfied with an imaginary vengeance against their oppressors. It is, he declares, a slave morality which he thus describes: "Suppose that the oppressed, the suffering, those who are not free, who are uncertain of themselves and weary—suppose that these moralize, what will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion in regard to the whole situation of mankind will find expression. The eye of the slave rests with disfavor upon the virtues of the powerful; he feels skepticism and disgust, a refinement of distrust in regard to everything good which such circles hold in honor. . . . On the other hand those qualities are brought into prominence and covered with light which serve to ease the existence of suffering; compassion, the kind, helping hand, the good heart, patience, industry, humility, friendliness, receive here their meed of honor. For these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means to make the pressure of existence endurable. A slave morality is essentially a morality of utility."

Very different is the "Master-morality"—the morality of stoical heroism as opposed to the morality of sympathy. This is a symptom of the health, vigor, and beauty of the dominant races and therefore gives the foremost place to power, courage, pride, self-confidence. In the moral estimates which "took their rise among a ruling race," Nietzsche declares, "it is the proud and elevated states of the soul which are felt as distinctive, and as determining the order of rank. The High-born man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of these proud and elevated states finds expression. He despises them. In this . . . kind of morality the opposition, good and bad, it will be noted, is equivalent to well-born and contemptible. . . . The good, *i. e.,* the noble, the powerful, the higher-situated, the high-minded—felt and regarded themselves and their acting as of first rank in contradistinction to everything low, low-minded, mean, and vulgar. Out of this *pathos of distance* they took for themselves the right of creating values, of coining names for these values."

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This morality, which in a crude form was practised in primeval times, when spiritualized and turned from mere brute strength into the dominance of power combined with intellect and beauty, becomes the supra-morality of the future, and is the complete negation of the morality taught by Schopenhauer. That was the negation of the will to live; this the full and unqualified assertion of the "Will to Power," which for Nietzsche is the real principle of all life and, therefore, the principle of morals also. Nietzsche had only reached this position after a long course of thought. Like Tolstoy he started with the full acceptance of Schopenhauer's doctrine of the irrational will, the consequent aimlessness of life and the need for deliverance from the futile struggle, but at first he sought this deliverance by the way of art. In this he was aided by his friendship for Richard Wagner, whom he met for the first time at Leipzig. "I have found a man," he exclaims in his enthusiasm, "who reveals to me like no one else the picture of what Schopenhauer called the 'genius.'" Nietzsche saw Schopenhauer's philosophy exhibited in a living form in Wagner's music. His delight inspired his first work, "The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music."

In this work Nietzsche argues that the Greeks had imagined the calm and beautiful world of the Olympian Gods—of whom the type is Apollo, the god of sculpture, the art of beauty—as a dream-world of refuge from the cruel reality of the world as conceived of by the old Greek popular wisdom, illustrated by the story of Midas and Silenus. In contrast with this Apollonian art arose the wild cult of Bacchus or Dionysius—the world of intoxication in opposition to the dream-world of beauty. It found expression in music,—the art which expresses the whole soul, not the harmonious alone, but also the discordant; the ugly as well as the beautiful. And to music was added dancing, in which the animal nature expressed itself in voluptuous motion. The poetry of Dionysiac intoxication rejected the objectivity and measured movement of the Epic, and uttered all the life and passion of the soul in Lyrics, which expressed in burning words the passions which inspired the music from which they sprung. From the

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union of these two forms of poetry Tragedy was born. Nietzsche thinks that the chorus of Mænads and Satyrs—the true men, half beast, half god—was the original and essential part of Tragedy. It sings how the invisible God, the wise and suffering one, "suffers and is glorified and therefore does not itself act. Later on the *noble man,* as Prometheus or Œdipus, is the central figure," the essence of whose tragic existence is that "with the heroic impulse of the individual towards the universal, with the attempt to stride over the boundary of individuality and to make himself the sole world-being, he experiences in himself the hidden contradiction in things,—*i. e.,* he becomes criminal, and suffers." The Attic tragedy died at the hands of Euripides, by the development of critical thought which came to full consciousness of itself in Socrates, the speculative man, who finds all evil in ignorance, and the anodyne of existence in the search for truth. Man now turns away from art, and, in the course of centuries, has reared the mighty fabric of science, on the foundation of the "firm belief that thought with the clue of causality can penetrate to the deepest abyss of being, and that thought has power, not only to know true being but even to correct it. This high metaphysical delusion is given out as the instinct of science and conducts it further and further to its limits when it must transform itself into art. . . . We must conclude that there is an eternal conflict between the theoretical and the tragic view of the world, and only after the spirit of science has been brought to its limits, and its claim for universal validity, through the proof of those limits, has been destroyed, may we hope for the re-birth of tragedy." This time was come. Kant and Schopenhauer had destroyed the illusion that science can explain and correct the world, and tragedy was born again in the musical drama of Wagner. It is important to dwell upon this remarkable work—historically false indeed, but full of marvellous flashes of thought, and of suggestive ideas expressed in the nervous style of which Nietzsche was master—because it contains the germ of his latest views in a more attractive form than they afterwards assumed. Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche looks for salvation to art, but to an art which no longer aims at

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the beautiful but at the sublime. It is profoundly pessimistic. "Knowledge kills action," Nietzsche declares. "The glance into the horrible truth of things outweighs every motive to action. *Now no comfort exists.* . . . In the consciousness of a truth once beheld one now sees everywhere only the terrible or the absurd, and loathes it. Here, in the greatest danger of the will, Art approaches, as a saving healing enchantress; she alone is able to turn these thoughts of loathing over the terrible or the absurd of existence into shapes with which one can live. These are, the sublime, as the artistic conquest of the terrible; and the comic, as the artistic disburdening of the disgust with the absurd, for only as an æsthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified." Here, in the conception of the tragic man, we find the germ of the *Uebermensch,* or Beyond-man. He imagines a generation arising with a fearless glance and "heroic bent towards the terrible"; a race of "dragon-slayers" with bold steps who in their proud daring "turn their backs upon all the old optimism and its doctrine of feebleness in order to live resolutely in the whole and the full."

Later on, Nietzsche formed a close friendship with a young scientist, Dr. Paul Rée, and under his influence threw himself for a time with all the ardor of his nature into the study of science. He now claims the first place for truth, is a utilitarian in morals and above all a zealous defender of the evolution theory which seems to give a scientific justification of his philosophic pessimism. Writing of this time, he says, "I became estranged from art, poetry and nature." But the passionate intensity of his nature would not allow him to rest in the calm conclusions of science, and in the next works which came from his pen, "Dawn," and "The Gay Science," the beginnings of his later phase of thought and the growth of his ideal of the "Uebermensch" or "Beyond-man," are discernible. A belief in the Pythagorean year, or great cyclic year of the universe, by the revolution of which everything recurs again and again in the immensity of eternity, had become a veritable nightmare to Nietzsche and deepened his pessimism. "All the unspeakable little and great of thy life must return to thee,

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and all in the same order and connection; this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and likewise this moment and I myself—the everlasting hour-glass of existence is turned again and again forever, and thou with it, thou mote of the dust." "Ah, man forever returns!" he exclaims in agony, "contemptible little man forever returns! Even the greatest were far too mean! And eternal recurrence even for the pettiest! Ah, Loathsome! Loathsome! Loathsome!"

Science seemed no defence against this fear and disgust. "Science itself," he suspects, may be, after all, only "a fine defence against truth!" Yet in the conception of evolution, of the struggle for life, and the consequent possibility of the improvement and perfectibility of the species, he saw a ray of hope. Could it be possible to create in the course of generations a finer, harder, more strenuous race who should not shrink from any hardship or pain, but who, having pierced the veil of illusion and seen the absurdity and horror of life, should face that horror and absurdity with the stern joy of a warrior and the derisive laughter of a god? This ideal now takes full possession of Nietzsche's mind and he escapes from the pessimism of his master, to an optimism, indeed, but to an optimism of a promethean kind,—a defiance of the world. "He who like me," he boasts, "has long troubled himself to think out pessimism to the bottom . . . . he has, perhaps, in this way, without exactly willing it, opened his eyes to the opposite ideal—to the ideal of the haughtiest, most truly living, and world-affirming man who has not only come to terms with what was and is, and learned to put up with it, but who desires to have it over again, just as it was and is to all eternity, calling insatiably Da Capo, not only to his own existence, but to the whole piece and play and at the bottom to that which needs this spectacle and causes this need."

Nietzsche now finds life worth living because he conceives of it as a means to a higher form of existence—"Man is a bridge and not a goal." He dreams of the advent of the *Uebermensch*—the nobler race man is destined to create, and to give place to. In his wild and extravagant, but often strangely

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beautiful and suggestive prose-poem or rhapsody, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," he proclaims this ideal, "I teach you the Beyond-man. Man is something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him? All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves; and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide, and rather revert to the animal than surpass man? What with man is the ape? A joke or a sore shame. Man shall be the same for Beyond-man, a joke or a sore shame."

The race of the Beyond-man would be, before all else, healthy and strong, brave, sincere, keen-sighted, strenuous, free, but also proud, hard, egotistic; scorning all weakness and all sympathy and pity as born of weakness; they would rejoice in meeting opposition, pain and hardship, pressing triumphantly forward through life with heroic will, laughing with a laughter not untouched by cynicism at all weakness, whether in themselves or others.

In noble words "Zarathustra" exhorts his disciples to become the creators of the "Uebermensch."

"O my brethren, I consecrate you to be and show unto you the way unto a new nobility. Ye shall become procreators and breeders and sowers of the future."

"O my brethren, not backward shall your nobility gaze, but *forward*. Expelled shall ye be from all father's and forefather's lands!"

"Your *children's land* ye shall love (be this love your new nobility!) the land undiscovered, in the remotest sea! For it I bid your sails seek and seek!"

"In your children ye shall *make amends* for being your father's children. *Thus* ye shall redeem all that is past!"

This dream of a noble, a heroic race which should surpass men, as man has surpassed the ape, gradually faded from Nietzsche's mind. He probably came to see that he had misunderstood Darwinism when he believed that functions were quickly developed by inheritance; that "in two or three generations all has already become instinctive,"—but that vast periods of time are required for any great modification of a race to arise by way of inheritance. In his latest work, "Antichrist," we

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read: "The problem . . . . is not what is to replace mankind in the chain of being (man is an *end*) but what type of man we are to *cultivate,* we are to *will,* as the more valuable, the more worthy of life." The *Uebermensch* of the future is replaced by the "Distinguished Soul," the healthy, beautiful, strong, proud, heroic man who is not destined to arise in some distant future, but exists now, and as the outcome of evolution and the flower of human life, feels his existence justified. He is thoroughly egotistic, without love or pity for the "much too many," the common herd, whom he regards with undisguised contempt, cherishing the immovable belief that to a being such as he "other beings are naturally in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. The distinguished soul accepts the fact of its egotism without any question, moreover without any feeling of harshness, compulsion, or arbitrariness about it, rather something that has its basis in the permanent law of things."

The Distinguished Soul as thus conceived, coldly egotistic, proud and stern, the oppressor and despiser of his fellow-men, regarding himself as the meaning and highest product of society and rewarding the sacrifices of others only with scorn and contempt, is assuredly not a lovable being; yet in his fine, robust health and vigor, in his intellectual ability, in his cultivated taste, and above all in his resolute will which finds expression in a life of heroic struggle, strong self-control, and a noble contempt of ease and pleasure, there are not wanting traits of human excellence. But the logic of Nietzsche's thought carries him further, he lays the stress more and more on mere strength.

"What is good?" he asks in his latest work, and he answers, "All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself, in man."

"What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness."

"What is happiness? The feeling that power increases—that a resistance is overcome."

"*Not* contentedness, but more power; *not* peace at any price, but warfare; *not* virtue but capacity (virtue in the Renaissance style, *virtù,* virtue free from any moralic acid).

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"The weak and ill-conditioned shall perish: first principle of *our* charity. And people shall help them to do so."

"What is more injurious than any crime? Practical sympathy for all the ill-constituted and weak:—Christianity."

Thus in Nietzsche's ideal the human traits tend to disappear. The heroic will leading the "dragon-slayer" of Nietzsche's earliest work "to live resolutely in the whole and the full" has become the "Will to power" and this necessarily leads on to mere egotism, harshness, and cruelty. At the *base* of all the noble races he admires, Nietzsche finds "the beast of prey, the splendid blind beast roaming wantonly in search of prey." His "distinguished soul" being entirely self-centred, rejecting human fellowship, sympathy and love with scorn, becomes at last little else than the man of prey or even the beast. Cæsar Borgia and Napoleon, in the latter of whom "appeared the incarnate problem of *the noble ideal as such* . . . . Napoleon the synthesis of monster and Beyond-man," seem to go near exemplifying his ideals.

There is much in Nietzsche's writing which is of great value and worthy of careful study and prolonged thought. His demand for health and strength as a condition of all worthy life is surely sound. His protest against the existence of the weaklings who are so numerous in modern society, and who ought never to have been born and are unfit both in body and mind to face the duties and pains of existence, is sorely needed. His contempt for the sickly and sentimental sympathy which loves to dwell on disease and suffering rather than strenuously strive to remove their causes—which admires itself for its tenderness of heart, but is quite incapable of a manly conflict with evil, is most timely. But his defence of a proud and egotistic aristocracy, of unfeeling and even brutal egotism, even of downright cruelty; his scornful repudiation of love and sympathy and of the feeling of human fellowship which is man's greatest joy, is harmful, false and evil, and tends only to the disruption of society and the loss of the hard-won gains of evolutionary progress.

Tolstoy and Nietzsche are the very antithesis of each other. Tolstoy's asceticism is the reaction of a sympathetic and deeply

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religious nature against the parasitic and voluptuous life of his youth. Nietzsche's worship of strength, health, beauty, and vigorous will is the revolt of a proud and sensitive soul, against the limitations, the feebleness and the misery caused by a diseased and suffering organism. Tolstoy preaches the suppression of all instincts, the rejection of all the demands of the animal in man; for Nietzsche "everything good is instinct," while "to *have* to contend with instincts" is for him the sign of *décadence*. Tolstoy finds the only way of happiness in the Christian life, and sums up the conclusions of his life experience in the "Christian Teaching." The last book which Nietzsche wrote is entitled the "Antichrist,"—and in it he characterizes Christianity as "the most subterranean conspiracy that has ever existed,—against healthiness, beauty, well-constitutedness, courage, intellect, *benevolence* of soul, *against life itself.*"

Yet they have much in common. Both deny, either formally or by implication, the presence of a rational order in the world, are therefore pessimistic and deny any objective truth or principle of conduct common to all. Tolstoy, it is true, speaks of the "reasonable consciousness" which awakens in man, and of the "Will of God" as determining the conditions of life; but the first merely serves to reveal to us our inner chaos, and to show us the contradictions of our being, without giving us any guidance for solving them, and the second appears as an altogether inscrutable fate. Nietzsche repudiates in the strongest terms the presence of reason in the world or any kind of cosmic harmony. "The character total of the world is to all eternity chaos," he cries, "not in the sense of a missing necessity, but of missing order, articulation, form, beauty, wisdom." So recognizing no appeal to reason, both are dominated by feeling; Tolstoy by the feeling of love and sympathy, Nietzsche by pride and contempt. The ethics of the former are the ethics of self-negation—of the latter of unconditional self-assertion. Neither recognizes the truth that a truly human life is not the uncontrolled indulgence of feeling, but an "activity according to reason."

The writings of Nietzsche and Tolstoy are works of genius,

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they abound in flashes of insight, are heavy with deep emotion, full of contagious enthusiasm, and above all suggestive and stimulating to thought. By their unflinching courage and consistency, and the daring with which principles are worked out to their ultimate consequences, they are very helpful in the study of ethical problems. Read together they complement each other. Opposite errors are cancelled and truth made clear to the mind. They offer a complete demonstration of the impossibility of founding ethics on mere feeling, show the necessity of recognizing the claims of reason to organize and harmonize life, and the value of the institutions—sadly imperfect as they are—in which the rational life has expressed itself.

Tolstoy is a pure anarchist. The state he regards as the greatest of all the "snares" that prevent men from fighting against their sins, and the other forms of organized life also fall under his ban. Nietzsche wavers between the position of an individualism which regards the free life of "hermits and hermits in pairs" as its ideal, which sees in the state the "new idol" and the "coldest of all cold monsters," a device of the "much too-many" to fetter and enchain free souls,—"where the state ceaseth, there beginneth that man that is not superfluous"—and that of a kind of aristocratic régime after the model of the Hindu caste system, where everything should be sacrificed to an aristocracy the essence of which he declares to be that "it feels itself not as function (whether of the throne or of the country), but as the meaning and ultimate justification of the whole, that it accepts therefore with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men, who for its sake must be depressed and be reduced to be incomplete men, slaves, instruments."

Ethics must be founded on the real nature of man, but as man is an animal, the content of his life is found in his needs and desires and in the activities directed to their satisfaction—to reject these and to attempt to make life purely spiritual is, as Nietzsche so clearly saw, to destroy life itself. On the other hand, man is a rational being, and therefore these same instincts and desires, if blindly followed, will deprive life of its human character and reduce it to the level of the beast.

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Reason has already, to some extent, organized the animal instincts and impulses in harmony with its ends. We are all born and grow up within such organizations—form part of such organisms. To them we owe that measure of human life to which we have attained. Their evils, imperfections and numberless abuses should not blind us to their worth, lead us to aim at their destruction or to imagine that a higher life could be lived in a state of anarchy, or that a proud and selfish aristocracy scorning to be a function of society could ever realize the highest human excellence, rather should we labor to make the state and all the other forms of social organization a more perfect expression of the reason which has called them into being. Not in a life dominated solely by the feeling of sympathy which rejects all pleasurable activity and offers to others what it refuses for itself, still less in a life of cold and loveless egotism and scornful pride; not in self-assertion alone nor in self-negation is the truly moral life. The true good of man—the principle and goal of Ethics, transcending the antithesis of altruism and egotism—is a Common Good realized in a society so organized as to give effect to the equal rights of all its members which belong to them in virtue of their common humanity, whilst affording opportunities for the development of the faculties with which men are so unequally endowed and giving scope for their exercise in the service of the whole.

MAURICE ADAMS.

LONDON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE NEW DEMOCRACY. By W. Jethro Brown, M. A., LL. D. Macmillan & Co. Pp. ix., 215.

This very interesting and well-written book is an appeal for certain reforms and changes as necessary to the health of modern Democracy. The fact that two of the changes suggested have already been achieved in Tasmania, whence the author writes, suggests that the book is rather of local than general interest; on the other hand, it certainly gains by being in actual touch with practical politics. The argument states three defects, and offers three remedies: "modern politics falls into three grand problems—the problems of expression, of character and of union."

To take first the problem of expression—"Demos is dumb," says the author, and the problem of securing an expression of popular opinion is increasing. He quotes from Mr. Godkin that you can never tell what the people will think, and from Mr. Lecky that the "public opinion of a nation is something quite different from the votes that can be extracted from all the individuals who compose it." This failure of the people to express itself he attributes to "the inorganic character of the present system of representation." "The electors of a typical constituency are united by no bonds of kinship, and, indeed, represent every variety of political opinion." The remedy offered lies in an improved form of representation, either in the Referendum (direct democracy), or in "Hare's system" (indirect democracy), and the author sums up very decidedly in favor of the latter.

The ordinary English reader will be disposed to question the statement of this part of the problem. In the first place, is the people really dumb? We may sometimes be unable to *predict* on which side a constituency, or even the whole nation, might vote on a particular occasion; it does not follow that when the time comes the people will not be capable of making its wishes known. But further, a direct vote for or against is not the only, nor always the best, means by which a body of people can express itself. Take, for instance, a complicated code of factory legislation such as comes from time to time before the country. If the whole body of workers and employers interested in it were to

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record a vote for or against it as it stood, such a vote might be a most inadequate expression of their will with respect to it. What really takes place is a minute and expert criticism of all its details, expressed (say) by the accredited representatives of the Trade Unions, caught up and repeated and criticised again by the Press, forced upon the attention of the Home Office by deputations and memorials and public meetings; and resulting probably in a modification of the Bill which is more likely to express the wishes of the whole people concerned than either its acceptance or rejection in the original form. Or take again the attitude of the great Friendly Societies or Coöperators; organized bodies which have deliberately avoided political representation. It would be ridiculous to say that these have no means of expression upon measures which affect their interests. Indeed when the question of Old Age Pensions was before the country it is probable that no expression of opinion was so eagerly looked for nor so influential as that of the Friendly Societies.

Nor can we concur in the contempt with which the author, in common with many other reformers, regards the so-called "geographical area" as a basis for representation. The electors of a typical constituency may not be united by "bonds of kinship," but it will be strange indeed if they have no common interests, arising it may be from local industries, local traditions, local characteristics, and above all from local institutions. Nor would it probably be well to abolish these local ties if we could. We may discredit them, as the author does, by calling them the expression of parochialism or provincialism, but the fact remains that they form the best, if not the only school, in which the people is trained to take an intelligent and disinterested share in the wider interests of the community. It is easier for a man to learn the practical difficulties of government, and the necessity for considering all interests, in the affairs of his local vestry or Board of Guardians than in the more complicated and less tangible affairs of state; and the way to educate the people to the wider views and higher ideals which the author so rightly desires is not to get rid of parochialism, but to substitute a truer and wiser parochialism for one which may be selfish or corrupt.

It is because the locality is or may be in this sense a reality, and a most important training school in self-government, that Hare's system of voting does not recommend itself so universally as its admirers would have. Neither experience nor argument,

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we are told, has prevented us from adopting it in England, but simply dislike of innovation and allegiance to the spirit of parochialism and the omnipotence of majorities. It would surely have been worth while, before passing such severe strictures, to have analyzed the situation a little more carefully, and to have tried to find in the nature of the facts, if not yet in the minds of men, some better reason of the non-acceptance of the panacea. That better reason undoubtedly exists, though it may not yet have found adequate expression; and we may, I think, find a clue to it in the importance of this very "spirit of parochialism" which is so rashly repudiated by the author. Until a man has learned to work harmoniously with his immediate neighbors, to reconcile his interests with those of the men he is meeting constantly and in different capacities, to realize in their most concrete form both the difficulties and advantages of organized action, he will not properly appreciate, nor be able to judge the greater problems of the State. His neighbors are an organic part of a man's life just so far as he feels himself bound to them by common interests in a common life. The wider and deeper we can make that life, the less likely we are to suffer from the evils of a bad parochialism. If we cut out all interests wider than those of the gas and water supply, and deeper than that of ordinary social intercourse, it will, of course, tend to become narrow and trivial. It sounds well to say that "the tie by local contiguity is to be superseded by the bond of kinship—kinship not of blood, but of ideas"; but ideas that are to be vital and a moving force must stand the test of being brought into the arena of actual daily life. When they have been scoffed at by one neighbor, and supported by another, and modified by a third, and have issued alive, but much mangled from the campaign of a local election, they will be far more powerful and practical than if all their task had been to appreciate an electioneering address in exact accordance with themselves, sent round by an invisible candidate to an invisible constituency.

Nor is it clear that the Hare system brings with it other definite advantages which are claimed for it. "Under the Hare method of voting the extinction of the minority ceases. *Every* elector may have a representative in Parliament." So may every elector now, in just the same sense, if he choose to vote with the majority. It is significant that in the election quoted as illustrating the process in Tasmania half the candidates were rejected,

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and some at least of the supporters of those candidates would be unrepresented. For it is really begging the question to say that a man's fifth or sixth preference represents him, when he probably only votes for Five or Six, either to fill up the paper or because he doesn't dislike them so much as he does two others. It may be argued, too, that it is as well that the minority should be unrepresented until they have fought their ideas into a position of dignity. To quote from the author himself, "the wise rule of the strong demands the sustained opposition of the weak. When victory puts an end to strife, the days of good government are numbered,"—and if the minorities are not heard in Parliament they will be all the louder in their constituency.

But, indeed, the Hare system, as worked in Tasmania, might as well be called double representation of majorities, as representation of minorities. For the old "order of merit," or most votes, is substituted a system by which any candidate gaining a certain number of votes is elected, and the votes which he may gain beyond that number are distributed among less fortunate candidates in order to bring up their number of votes to the quota. Upon what principle? X gets the majority of votes, represents, therefore, the majority of voters, and every one who voted for him has his representative. One would expect that under this system the wishes of these electors would now be ignored and the wishes of the minority consulted; but no. The surplus of X's votes is to be distributed in accordance with the *second* preferences of those who have already got one representative, and should the second again have a surplus, then the fortunate majority will again have their third preference consulted and will take part in electing a third candidate. But it does not at all follow that the man liked second best by the majority is the man liked best by the minority. Further, another process of re-distribution also takes place. Suppose that when all the surplus votes are distributed less than the possible number of candidates have obtained the quota; that out of a possible six, only three have obtained the quota, the remaining votes being distributed among nine candidates. Then of these candidates the one who has fewest votes, *i. e.,* represents the minimum minority, is declared out of the running, and his votes are transferred according to the second preferences of the minority. This process is repeated until only the required six are left, each time the man with fewest votes being cut out. So that in the result

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the majority may be represented—say—by their three first preferences; the minority by their three last, or not at all.

The chapter on the Study of History as a means of educating public opinion is interesting and true. But History by itself can never be sufficient to qualify the democracy to solve political problems. To trust to it alone would be like teaching chemistry out of a text book and without demonstrations. We must have our political laboratories as well as class-rooms, and these are to be found wherever the people are gathered together for the purposes of common action.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY, ENGLAND.

THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OF CHRISTIANITY. By John Caird, D. D., LL. D., late Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, with a memoir by Edward Caird, D. C. L., LL. D., Master of Balliol. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons. 2 vols.; pp. cxli., 232; 297.

These volumes contain the Gifford Lectures delivered by Principal Caird at Glasgow in sessions 1892-93 and 1895-96. They are printed as they were delivered, without having had the author's revision before publication; but they are not on that account imperfect, except that, if Principal Caird's health had not given way, he might have written two or three additional lectures. The Master of Balliol's brief memoir of his brother is excellently done. Possibly some very fervent admirers of Principal Caird may think that the memoir is too modest, that Mr. Caird has carried his fraternal restraint too far; but if that be a fault, it is a good one. A man's fame stands with the impression which is made by his work, and it may well be questioned whether laudation in a biography has ever much value. The memoir gives us the picture of a strong, quiet nature, growing steadily in thought and power, without crisis or turmoil. The life of Principal Caird was that of a great preacher, teacher and administrator, outwardly uneventful, but ever more and more extensive and deep in its influence. No man in recent times did more to give breadth and sympathy to religious thought in Scotland. As his own spiritual and intellectual development proceeded without any violent breach or turning, and as in doing a revolutionary work he retained a conservative spirit, he was saved from the exaggerations in thought and expression which almost inevitably arise

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from sharp conflict, and his teaching was broadly constructive and eminently wise. Thorough idealist as he was in his maturity, he was not in his student days laid hold of by philosophy, "at least in any form that strongly influenced his inner life" (p. lxv.). But seeking an idealist basis for theology "as a form of scientific knowledge and not merely as a supernatural revelation," he passed from the study of Kant to an interest in Hegel, determined "mainly by two things: first, by the thoroughness with which he carries out the idealistic principle, and secondly, by the strong grasp of ethical and religious experience, which is, perhaps, Hegel's greatest characteristic" (p. lxxiv.). "As he would have nothing to do with sceptical defences of religion, so he spoke almost with contempt of the various half-way houses that have been built between the position of Kant and a thoroughgoing Idealism, as also of the many attempts of modern theologians to evade the open field of thought and to fall back upon some moral or æsthetic or religious faith, which is not to be explained or criticised by reason."

The first fruit of Principal Caird's endeavor to apply idealistic principles to theology was his well-known "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion," and in these Gifford Lectures, his latest writings, the same line of thought is carried out. "What Green said of the 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,' is true also of them. The line of argument followed is not in the highest sense original; it is in the main Hegelian, though not by any means following Hegel slavishly; the thought has been thoroughly assimilated and recast in the writer's mind, and is developed with the same lucidity and beauty of expression and fullness of illustration which are characteristic of his other writings" (p. cxxx.). According to the deed of foundation the subject of the Gifford Lectures is natural theology, and to some readers it may appear strange that the "Fundamental Ideas of Christianity" should be regarded as falling within the scope of the lectureship. We are accustomed to think of Christianity as essentially a revealed religion; but Principal Caird maintains from the outset that there is no fundamental distinction between natural and revealed religion, and, indeed, that the evidence and value of revealed religion lie in its higher rationality. "There is no such thing as a natural religion or religion of reason, distinct from revealed religion" (I., 23). "If we were to compare the teaching of revelation with that of the so-called natural religion in point

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of accordance with reason and conscience, I unhesitatingly affirm that the former is more profoundly rational, more deeply true to our spiritual intelligence than the latter" (I., 19.). Christian religion and morality do not consist of natural religion and morality with some peculiar doctrines and virtues added: "Christianity is natural religion elevated and transmuted into revealed" (I., 24.). This main principle, laid down by Principal Caird in Lecture I., is further elaborated from another point of view in Lecture II., which deals with the relations of "faith and reason." The position of those who maintain the necessity of an initial and intuitive act of faith in all genuine religious experience, a response not of the head, but of the heart to the spirit of God, is expounded with a fairness and clearness so admirable as to be almost persuasive; but, while it is admitted that we must begin with faith, it is shown that the faith with which we begin is in reality implicit reason.

From this standpoint the remaining lectures consider in detail the fundamental ideas of Christianity, its view of God and His relation to the world, its theory of the origin and nature of evil, its system of moral restoration, through the ideas of the Incarnation and the Atonement, and its account of the kingdom of the spirit and the future life. The Trinitarian idea of God is defended on the grounds that "the highest unity is that which combines in itself the elements of unity and difference" (I., 62), and that "regarded as a mere solitary, self-identical infinite, the nature of God would be a stranger to that which is the highest element of a spiritual nature—the element of Love. Without life in the life of others, a spiritual being would not be truly spiritual" (I., 70.). A "solitary, self-sufficient God," having merely the capacity of love and other spiritual qualities, "would be only a potential God" (I., 72.). But nature and man, the finite world, cannot be regarded as the adequate medium of the self-revelation of God, (1) because the finite cannot fully express the infinite, and, (2) because "if the finite world were the only medium of the divine self-revelation, it would follow that the nature of God is a progressive one" (I., 75.). "All that unfolds itself progressively in the history of the world" must be regarded as "already comprehended in the eternal self-revelation of God." The further development of this idea involves a full consideration of the relation of God to the world (Lectures IV. to VII.). The Pantheist view is expounded so as to show that it exaggerates the unity

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between God and the world, while on the other hand, the Deist view is shown to involve too sharp a dualism. Pantheism annuls the finite world or absorbs it in the infinite, Deism reduces God to a finite, anthropomorphic personality. But these systems are steps towards the Christian idea, the main elements in which are (1) that infinite Mind or Intelligence constitutes the reality of the world, not simply as its external creator, but as its inward spirit; (2) that by its very nature infinite Mind or Spirit has in it a necessity of self-manifestation to and in a world of finite beings, and (3) that the infinitude of God does not involve the negation of the finite world, but is the principle of the individuality and independence of nature and man (I., 143, 144). The discussion of Pantheism and Deism is clear, suggestive and far from unsympathetic, and the exposition of the Christian view, with its thorough and patient consideration of difficulties, is one of the finest parts of Principal Caird's work. Yet one cannot feel that the difficulties have been quite overcome, and the discussion itself suggests new questions in a way which is doubtless inevitable when we are considering such ultimate problems. If God and man are (as Principal Caird suggests; I., 157 *sqq.*) members of a relation, in such a way that each necessarily implies the other, does not God become finite? Must we not suppose some greater being, comprehending the relation and both of its members? It is, of course, true that we speak of a relation between whole and part, although the whole includes the part. But in such a case must not both whole and part be taken as abstractions? And, *ex hypothesi*, God is the concrete. There is, there must be, a way out of the difficulty; but the way remains to be found.

It is fundamentally the same problem that presents itself in the discussion of the origin and nature of evil, which is the other chief subject of these Gifford Lectures. The eighth Lecture considers, with admirable lucidity, balance and insight, the Augustinian or ecclesiastical theory, the merits and defects of which and of its Pelagian opposite are clearly represented, so as to form an introduction to the more comprehensive discussion in Vol. II. The various theories of the origin of evil are in this volume traced to Pantheist, Deist and Christian views of the relation of God to the world. The theories with a Pantheist basis are those which "virtually evaporate" the existence of evil by making it merely negative or privative and those which trace evil to "the sensuous nature of man," or to the "conflict which necessarily arises be-

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tween the flesh and the spirit." The theories which spring from Deist views are those which ascribe the origin of evil to an abstract human freedom, a freedom of indifference or something akin to it; while the Christian doctrine of sin follows from "the fundamental principle of Christianity," "that the finite spirit is the necessary organ of the being and life of God, and that this self-revelation" [of God in and to the finite world] "implies in the finite spirit an element of distinction or difference, which contains in it at least the possibility of sin" (II., 4). This account of the Christian doctrine of sin at once suggests, in another form, the difficulty already raised as to the relation of God to man. If God is the absolute Reality and if the finite is not illusory, must not the finite spirit, with all its acts and thoughts, be a moment in the life of God? Must not the "element of distinction or difference, which contains in it at least the possibility of sin" be a distinction or difference within the divine unity? And if this is so, it would seem best to take this as the foundation or starting-point of the inquiry and to endeavor to define sin in consistency with the principle that it must somehow be comprehended within the Absolute. This method is the strength of the "Pantheist" position, whatever value we may ascribe to the actual definitions it offers. The opposite method, which is the more generally followed, begs the question in its anxiety not to ascribe the causality of evil to God. It uncritically assumes as its governing principle a more or less definite theory of the nature of sin, which is the very object of the whole inquiry. It would be untrue to say that Principal Caird's argument rests on such dogmatic presuppositions. It is, indeed, remarkably little open to such a charge. And yet one cannot but feel that the definitions or descriptions of moral evil which he offers are not quite definite enough, that the question of the ultimate meaning of sin (its meaning in the absolute) remains somewhat in haze. "Goodness is true, badness false or perverted, self-realization." "For a being made in the image of God, sin is selfishness, goodness self-realization through absolute self-surrender to God" (II., 57). "It is not in the satisfaction of natural desires, but in the fact that it is an infinite nature that is seeking satisfaction in them, that the essence of sin lies" (II., 68). Accepting such statements as these, we still seek to know how, in a perfectly rational universe, "selfishness" or "perverted self-realization" is possible and what meaning we must attach to the words. And again one is tempted

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to ask whether there is not a sense in which an infinite nature not only may, but must, seek satisfaction in natural desires, and whether sin or selfishness is not rather to be regarded as seeing things in wrong proportions and acting accordingly? Turning the question round, we might ask: Can there be a human "life spent in the satisfaction of merely natural propensities"?

The remaining lectures deal with doctrines (the Incarnation, Atonement, etc.), which belong more to theology proper than to Metaphysics or Ethics; but it is hardly necessary to say that the strong ethical interest of the book is maintained throughout and that the subjects are discussed with the calm, massive reasonableness and high spiritual feeling which we find in all Principal Caird's work. Considering the book as a whole, I think it may safely be said that nothing wiser, more fair and more sympathetic has been written regarding the "fundamental ideas of Christianity."

R. Latta.

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Training of the Young in the Laws of Sex. By Rev. the Hon. E. Lyttelton. Longmans, Green & Co., 1900. Pp. ix., 117.

This little book is an earnest, honest, attempt to answer two questions: (1) "Since our children are exposed to the risk of gathering vicious ideas about life and birth, ought we not ourselves to forestall the danger by giving wholesome teaching?" and, (2) "If so, how is this to be done?" To the first of these questions the first, and larger, half of the book is devoted; the second question occupying the remainder. The writer tries to show that curiosity in regard to the mystery of birth and life, is natural, unavoidable, and, to begin with, innocent; that owing, not to supposed evil influences at school, but to neglect to satisfy this real need at home, such curiosity is at the mercy of evil-minded companions; that consequently from the beginning, a "subject which in itself is full of nobleness, purity and health," becomes indelibly associated with dissimulation, impurity and vice, to the direct injury of the innocent mind and to the destruction of that natural confidence between child and parent which, until these questions obtruded themselves, had been perfect; that the only effectual antidote to these evils is "healthy ideas previously implanted and based upon instincts of reverence and home affection"; and finally that "the resulting mischief (from neglect

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of this antidote) is enormously more prevalent than is commonly supposed."

In answer to the second question the author holds that the education should begin between the ages of eight and eleven, and be given by the mother. The facts of maternity should come first, then those of paternity. Later, towards puberty, the father should inspire a true conception of manhood, its responsibilities and the sacred dignity of human life. Of these two stages in the instruction a careful scheme is drawn up in detail.

Whatever the verdict which the individual reader may pass upon the success of the attempt here made to deal with a subject so difficult to handle, there can be no question that the treatment throughout is worthy of the highest praise. It is truthful, delicate and stimulating to a degree. No one, again, can dispute that the danger is a real one, that the risk of ignoring it altogether in the home is one to be avoided, if possible, and that the shyness and reserve which prevent so many parents from speaking to their children on this subject is a barrier most difficult to break down. But controversy will necessarily arise over the author's solution of the second question—how such teaching is to be given? The practical difficulties are not only very great, but vary indefinitely. It may be that no two households could, in detail, adopt any one plan. Nor does the author intend this. His suggestions are put forward, apparently, to illustrate the kind of instruction he thinks desirable, but to leave the actual method of teaching for individual taste, based upon sympathetic insight, to decide. On the other hand, it is just in concrete practical detail that the difficulties consist, that guidance is most needed. For example, according to the author, instruction should begin at the age of eight to eleven, when the child is beginning to be dissatisfied with the fairy tales, etc., with which his curiosity about the arrival of his youngest brother or sister has been hitherto put off. Now if the only persons to be considered were (say) two children of the age suggested and their mother, no harm, and a great deal of good, might result. But there are also nursemaids, governess, older brothers and sisters, perhaps visitors. The two children in question would certainly talk, simply and freely, in the presence of these others. Apart altogether from any social awkwardness thus arising would not the giggles of the nursemaid, or the "Hush!" of the governess, etc., etc., quickly teach the children that in some strange way this subject is different from others?

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Would they not stimulate a morbid curiosity to know more (but to conceal that they know it) than a wise and loving mother would impart? If everyone the children met were as pure and singleminded, as discreet and refined, as the mother, the problem would be comparatively simple, but the facts of life are far otherwise.

The subject is a thorny one and beset with small practical difficulties, multifarious in variety. That many of these are left untouched, a few possibly increased, by the suggestions of this little book is to be expected. On the other hand much may be learnt from it, both directly and indirectly. It is a book which no parent or schoolmaster can fail to be helped by, and to the author of which many parents will feel a debt of genuine gratitude.

W. H. Fairbrother.

Lincoln College, Oxford.

The Making of Character: Some Educational Aspects of Ethics. By John MacCunn (Professor of Philosophy in University College, Liverpool), in The Cambridge Series for Schools and Training Colleges (Cambridge University Press).

A book of this kind, produced in a Series intended, as the publisher would say, to supply a felt want, needs to be reviewed from two standpoints—as a contribution to instruction in Ethics, and as a contribution to the theory of Education. Now from the first standpoint there is indeed much to commend, much to be grateful for. Professor MacCunn is writing most immediately for normal students, who have no time for the serious pursuit of philosophy, but who crave for some enlargement of mind. These young people often have great ability and they can find a few odd moments for thought in spite of the weary treadmill of Whitehall requirements. Nothing can be better for them than a popular introduction to Ethics, written from the standpoint of a man who recognizes the gravity of the teacher's task. Such a chapter as that upon "Habit and its Limitations," or a later one on "Sound Moral Judgment" will achieve their aim in making the young teacher understand what is meant by Ethics. But from the second standpoint, the standpoint, shall we say, of a teacher face to face with the problems of school life, the book is disappointing. It would not be fair to say that Mr. MacCunn avoids and ignores the more difficult issues involved in these problems at the pres-

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ent day, but the impression is left that he scarcely regards these as matters to be included in the "educational aspects" of ethics. Thus, there is no more anxious problem than that which has faced English statesmen ever since 1889, as to the ideals of Secondary and of Technical Education respectively. The materials for handling the problem are all at hand; Chapter V., on Livelihood, shows that the writer knows the ground, but he rules such a controversy out of his discussion. He is equally silent upon those questions relating to the development of character in the corporate life of an organized school society, which we connect with the name of Arnold of Rugby; and of the theories of moral progress by means of instruction which are associated with Herbart.

We may, perhaps, assume, in the absence of an introduction explanatory of the writer's views, that he distrusts any attempt to bring ethical thinking close home to the affairs of the schoolroom. The teacher must be content with some "aspects" of ethics, but must not look to the philosopher for any more precise insight into the processes by which character can be "made" in the classroom or the playground. The distrust of "systems" is deeply grounded in the minds of all English scholars; and it is natural for a lecturer on Ethics, standing apart from children's life, or knowing that life only in the family, to see much to criticize in all that is labelled with the name of Froebel or Herbart or Arnold; to refuse to consider the ethical bearings of a Code or an Education Act.

But, after all, the man at work must have some kind of working system; education to him does not mean simply the "educative influences" of society, of Nature, and the like, but it is a deliberate process, a huge machine, by which the human being is nowadays controlled from babyhood to the years of adult life. And to such a worker, this book, while eminently helpful as a general introduction to Ethics, will do little service. Nay, it may do harm, by encouraging the current scepticism as to the necessity for a strict ethical treatment of the practical business of the teacher. Such, at any rate, is the impression left on the mind of the present reviewer who took up the book in the hope of finding what is not there, what perhaps the author would not regard either as within his province, or as a fruitful subject for treatment by any one, who has to train and guide the thoughts of young teachers.

If, then, the second title had been omitted and the book had

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not appeared as expressly written for teachers, it would have done better service to the cause of education.

J. J. FINDLAY.
INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL FOR BOYS, CARDIFF.

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF THE CHILD; ITS GROWTH AND HEALTH IN EDUCATION. By Francis Warner, M. D., F. R. C. P. London: Macmillan & Co., 1900. Pp. xvii., 233.

The name of Dr. Francis Warner is well known in connection with such subjects as child-study, and the training of the mental faculty. The present volume is concerned with the adaptation to the life-history of children (up to years of puberty) of the methods of observation and inference. Much as the older type of schoolmaster may scoff at what is now required, in addition to academic distinction and what used to be called "scholastic attainments," from those who take teaching as their profession, there nevertheless is ample reason for the belief that the parents of the next generation will not be willing to entrust their children to the care of men who are unacquainted with the application of elementary physiological principles to child-study. No doubt this is very largely due to the general improvement in the standard of interest taken by parents and relatives in everything connected with the physical and intellectual development of the young. To this class must be added the increasing number of students and readers who "desire to obtain a real grasp of the great problems concerning the relations of mind and body in the child." Both classes will find Dr. Warner a safe guide. Such of us as have been endeavoring for years to coördinate and systematize our observations upon children may find but little that we do not "remember to have known," But both to those who have found the fascination of child-study, and to those who wish to make themselves acquainted with the relations between mind and body in the child, this volume will be found more than a useful compendium of information. I say this, because I feel that the atmosphere—so to speak—in which the author keeps the reader is not the cold atmosphere of the laboratory. He does not believe in the boy's professional expressionlessness. A book of this kind presents so many points for notice that, within the space allotted to me, I must confine myself to a selected few. I choose two which have in particular attracted my attention during the last ten years. The one—sleep—will in particular reward the atten-

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tion of the house-master; the other—eyesight—appeals to all, both parents and masters.

Dr. Warner might have devoted with advantage more space to the subject of sleep, especially as the layman for whom this volume is intended is in general woefully ignorant of its phenomena and their causes. But little appears to be known of the connection between the mechanism of sleep and the supply of blood to the brain. Yet no one who reads pp. 24 and 124, the only passages in which sleep is directly discussed, would suppose that the arrest of consciousness which we describe by the word "sleep" is, according to many scientific investigators, due to the withdrawal of blood from the brain. This may perhaps be because Dr. Warner does not hold this view; but that is what the reader would like to know. We should like to have had his views upon many points, such as the injurious effect of excess of sleep. Does it tend to a weakening of the consciousness or of that totality of qualities which we call the "character"? What is the value of "morning school" before breakfast? Of regularity in hours of going to sleep and getting up? Ought the hours of rising in the case of young children be made to depend upon light? What is the effect of early rising on dark mornings as compared with bright? If a child on awakening cannot be aroused to consciousness at once, but is prone to lie in a half-awakened state, is this due to any dilatory brain action, and if so how should the tendency be checked? Is habitual dreaming harmful, and if so what can be done to combat it? These and other questions of a similar nature are intimately connected with the condition of the nervous system of a child, deserve full and careful treatment, and may not unfairly be supposed to come naturally within the scope of a treatise of this nature. Then again, the general question of the training of sight might have been entered into with more detail. How far does hypermetropia affect the student in his school life (1) under normal conditions, (2) if physically weak, (3) if badly fed, (4) if rooms are badly lighted? Seeing that the majority of children are hypermetropes in some degree, these questions cannot be irrelevant in pages that deal so excellently with eye-movements, and eye-training. Being at present away from books, I cannot give exact references, but the Report on the Eyesight of School Board Children, by Mr. Brudenell Carter, drawn up for the Education Department in 1895 or 1896 (not apparently included in Dr. Warner's "Bibliography"), contains much in the way of interesting statistics that give additional point to the excel-

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lent remarks of the author on eye-drill. We should like to have heard more from Dr. Warner on the connection between visual impressions and spelling. He is probably quite correct in saying that inexactness of "eye-fixation" may be the cause of bad spelling. It might be of use to try if any improvement could be effected by accustoming the subject to such exercises as assisted Houdin, the French conjurer, in the performance of some of his marvellous feats. He would walk slowly past a shelf or shop-window, noting at a glance the nature of each article exposed, and then name them in order. This has suggested itself to me for an abnormal case under my own observation. A boy of fourteen would spell a word, giving all the letters of the word, *correctly in groups, but incorrectly in order of groups.* Thus "nad," "adn," "betiauful," or even "tibeauful," would be versions of "and" and "beautiful." At sixteen he is still poor at spelling, but not abnormally so. The inversion of groups has disappeared. In his case I attribute the improvement to the fact that at fourteen he was placed in the chemical laboratory, where a two years' training in accurate and delicate observation may have had much to do with the decrease of abnormality.

Although it may be very easy to point out topics which might have been treated more at length by Dr. Warner, I have been unable to discover any detail which has been altogether ignored, nor should I have dwelt at such length upon "sleep" and "sight," had not the author specifically addressed his book to "teachers." As far as this book goes it is thoroughly sound, precise, and lucid, and deserving of the most careful study on the part of parents and teachers. The author is *facile princeps* in the field which he has chosen, and in which he has spent "laborious days" for the last twenty years. I may even venture to go further and to say that among all his competitors and imitators he is the sole *authority.*

W. J. GREENSTREET.

STROUD, GLOUCESTERSHIRE.

INSTITUTES OF EDUCATION. By S. S. Laurie, M. A., LL. D.; Professor of the Institutes and History of Education in the University of Edinburgh. Second Edition Revised and Extended. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1899. Pp. xiv., 442.

This new edition of Professor Laurie's most general and systematic work on education is to a large extent a new book. Much of the first edition consisted of mere headings for lectures and

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brief summaries of topics. This undoubtedly resulted in a very serious limitation of both the popularity and the usefulness of the book. In the present edition these outlines have been expanded into that fuller treatment which is alone capable of doing justice to the author's views. We think Professor Laurie would have been well-advised in going a step further and discarding the lecture form altogether. The conditions of lecturing and of appealing to readers through the printed page are so different that a presentation which may be admirable in the one case is seldom altogether appropriate in the other. We have felt this more than once in reading the present work. Many of the most important parts philosophically strike us as unnecessarily technical in form and as rendered needlessly difficult by extreme compression of statement. In the lecture-room any difficulties which may arise from such causes can be immediately dealt with, but with the printed page it is more difficult, and we fear that this will limit the circle of readers to whom the book will be of real value. On the other hand, the practical applications of theory are throughout set forth with a lucidity which leaves nothing to be desired. There is thus a curious unevenness about the style which rather detracts from the reader's enjoyment.

But when we turn from the form to the matter we have nothing but praise for Professor Laurie's work. We certainly know no book on the subject which is at once so philosophical, so sane, and so thoroughly practical. Beginning with a consideration of the end and means of education generally, the author passes on to consider "method and its philosophical basis" in the two great realms of intelligence and ethical life. Throughout, the unity of the whole educative process is insisted on. "The supreme end of all education is an ethical end" (p. 16), is the keynote of every chapter. And this not accidentally or arbitrarily but because of the very nature of man. "The vital principle in all education is the evoking of the will (for knowledge and conduct); for Will in its reason-form constitutes the distinctive humanity of the child" (p. 289). It is in this insistence on will as "the root and nerve of reason in man" (p. 315), and on the consequent essence of education as training and discipline that the special worth of Professor Laurie's book lies. He emphasizes the very point which the fashionable Herbartianism of the day neglects. "'Character building,' says the Herbartian, 'is Will-training'; this is true: 'Will-training is the apperception of

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ideas'; this is false" (p. 311). It follows that the foundation of method is not sought in an analytic empirical psychology, but in a rational psychology which assumes will-reason as the governing fact throughout. Some of the chapters in which this rational psychology is worked out, are, as we have said, by no means easy reading, but they are emphatically worth mastering. From his psychological results Professor Laurie deduces his main principles of methodology, and we are glad to see that these have been reduced to a much more systematic form than they presented in the first edition of the book.

When he passes to ethical education, Professor Laurie shows that no new principles are involved. Not only is all education ethical in the widest sense, in that it leads Will to use its materials aright, but ethical education in the narrower sense follows the same general principles of method as does intellectual education. The chief difference is that whilst in intellectual education we instruct by presentation, in ethical education we instruct by training, for "perception is here perception of a *feeling* in activity" (p. 320). The whole subject is admirably worked out and the chapters on moral authority are amongst the best in the book. They cannot be profitably summarized, they should be read and thought over, and—still more important—practised by all who aspire to be educators. The whole book, indeed, is one which must attract both the attention and the respect of all who are interested in the great subject of which it treats, a subject which our author calls "the chief aim of all politics," and of which he says, "to the teacher, more than to any other, the future belongs" (p. 426). This book should do much to so form and influence the teacher that he may perform his great work well.

J. Welton.

The Yorkshire College, Leeds.

Democracy and Empire, with Studies of their Psychological, Economic and Moral Foundations. By Franklin Henry Giddings, M. A., Ph. D., Professor in Columbia University, New York, author of "The Principles of Sociology." New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. vii, 363.

The title of this book, along with the statements in the Preface, lead the reader to expect something more systematic than he finds.

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As matter of fact, two-thirds of the book has little or nothing to do with the relations of democracy and empire. The remainder that does occupy itself with this subject-matter is somewhat miscellaneous in character, and seems on the whole the least satisfactory part of the volume. When one compares it with an illuminating historical and critical treatment of substantially the same theme, in a special instance, like the late Professor Seeley's "The Expansion of England," it suffers materially. At the same time, all is interesting, vigorous and makes the reader think.

The question that is occupying the minds of not a few on this side of the water at the present time is, how can a democracy, consistently with its own principles, conduct imperial rule? If it attempts to do so, what is likely to be the effect upon those principles? By imperial rule is meant rule without the consent of the people ruled. The Queen of England, for example, is not called Empress of Canada or of Australia, but she is "Empress of India."

Americans are particularly embarrassed in discussing the question with reference to their own case, since the fathers of the American state made some references to the rights of "all men" and put forth the general statement that governments derive their just powers "from the consent of the governed." Englishmen have never been so imprudent as that. English democracy is one thing, and English rule in India is quite another—they are conducted on different principles. It was so with the Athenian democracy and its empire, the Athenians being quite innocent of "views" about the rights of barbarians. But Americans have a tough nut to crack. How does Professor Giddings help us out?

In the first place, he shows that states have rarely, if ever, been founded on the consent of the governed—something that the fathers probably never doubted; and that the American state has not been as true as it might have been to the spirit of its principle —something their children must confess.* Further, he minimizes the principle, by saying that it really means simply the

*The suppression of the "Rebellion," however, is not a case in point. The "Rebellion" was neither more nor less than an attempt to break up a certain political unity. If the "States" who wanted to secede had been forced into the "Union," in the first place, as Professor Giddings intimates was the case with Rhode Island, his reference would be appropriate. The people of the entire country by their free consent formed the Union (and this is all that "the consent of the governed" means—it is a political, not a

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probable consent of the governed *in the future*, when they shall have a chance to reflect on the benefits of the treatment to which they have been subjected—the governors apparently being the judge of the probabilities. But as this would justify almost any aggression, the only limit being the inflation and assurance of the aggressing party, it is evident that the thoughtful among us can get little help in the present predicament from it.

Secondly, in relation to the policy this country is now entering upon (unless there is a change of government in the near future) Professor Giddings, instead of discussing it in the light of ethical considerations, regards it as *fatum*—"as certain as the advent of spring after winter," a part of "cosmic law,"—and opposition to it as futile as "opposition to the trade-wind or the storm" (p. 270). Now, of course, we cannot do much with trade-winds or cosmic law, and, if the case is so, must submit. All the same our reason is not satisfied—and we are accustomed to think that in questions of action, even if not of historical fact, reason may have a voice. Moreover, Professor Giddings elsewhere in these discussions gives full scope to ethical considerations, so that we are at a loss to understand his rather ostentatious dismissal of them here*—unless he feels that in this case they tend in another direction. Indeed, he is not as considerate with us as the initiator of the policy, our Chief Magistrate himself, who urged not that destiny settled matters, but that "duty determines destiny," and who has always in his speeches presented considerations of national responsibility and obligation. And when we look into the basis of Professor Giddings's contention about "destiny," we find the "array of impregnable facts" resolving themselves into a prospect of certain "economic advantages," along with the desirability of a "friendly alliance with Great Britain," and of uniting with her against "the Russian-Chinese combination" (pp. 279-289). This then is the practical meaning of "cosmic law"! We suspect that

particularistic, principle, applying to peoples not to individuals as such) and the people alone could dissolve it. The coercion of individuals (or even sections) belongs to any State; who fundamentally authorize the coercion (how wide the basis of consent is) determines the *form* of the State.

*He says, "In attempting to answer these questions, let us confine ourselves to the observation of what has been, what is, and what probably is to be, leaving the discussion of what ought to be to those who feel competent to undertake it" (p. 279).

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"cosmic law" would have been just as well satisfied with a course in the Philippines like that which Sir Andrew Clarke pursued in the Malay Peninsula as with our present destructive policy—or, to come nearer home, with a course like that which this country determined upon at the outset in relation to Cuba. To identify cosmic law with a particular piece of doubtful public policy, or lack of policy, is a remarkable *tour de force*. The fact is that in not dissimilar fashion "cosmic law" might be shown to be on the side of crime or any other shameful social facts, and we be exhorted to discontinue our "idle contention" against them, instead of seeking to prevent their recurrence in the future. And imperialism is not yet a "fait accompli" in America.

As to the retroactive effect of imperial rule abroad on democratic principles at home, Professor Giddings does not even discuss it. For instance, Professor Seeley says: "Even where the conquering power has a much broader basis [than the Roman Republic], it is commonly altogether transformed by the effort of conquest. The wars by which the conquest is made and then the establishments necessary to maintain the conquest, call for a new system of government and finance" ("The Expansion of England," p. 247 Amer. ed.). This did not happen for England in dealing with India because of peculiar circumstances. And yet a possibility of something of the sort appears to be not quite passed. Mr. Theodore Morison, in his "Imperial Rule in India," after quoting Froude's remark that "free nations cannot govern subject provinces," says: "It is conceivable that England may one day provide an illustration of the truth of this aphorism," and adds that if an imperial sentiment is once vigorously ascendant in English politics, he can believe that for the better governing of British dependencies "we would be willing to forego some of the liberties which impede our sway in India"—and Mr. Morison, it should be said, is friendly to British rule in India. Difficulties of this sort Professor Giddings does not consider—unless we except a complacent assurance that all parts of the British Empire, including even India and the African colonies, are growing more democratic (p. 2), a statement which sounds odd when we remember that only last year Lord Salisbury's ministry was seeking to limit municipal self-government in Calcutta, and that at the same time the London Indian Society was protesting against a new sedition law.

A further difficulty about empire in general (whether conducted by a democracy or not) is thus stated by Professor Seeley:

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"When the state advances beyond the limits of the nationality, its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the condition of most empires; it is the condition, for example, of our own empire in India. . . . When a nation extends itself into other territories, the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities which it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them. When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject or rival nationalities cannot be completely assimilated, and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger" ("The Expansion of England," p. 46).

This difficulty, that so seriously confronts Americans in the Philippines, Professor Giddings does not take into account, unless it be in a general statement that "men of differing nationalities and faiths, if also of discordant minds, can live and work together for a common purpose only when a coercive power maintains order among them" (p. 63).

Professor Giddings says what commends itself in speaking of the desirability of larger political aggregates and of the protection of the semi-civilized, barbarian and savage communities of the world by the larger civilized nations. But this need not be "empire." The larger aggregates may be formed and protectorates established without violating the principle of the "consent of the governed." The British Empire, Professor Seeley remarks, "is not properly, if we exclude India from consideration, an empire at all."

We have left no space in which to discuss the solider and weightier portions of Professor Giddings's volume. They have no necessary connection with its title—and would blend about as readily with anti-imperialism as with imperialism. A vast amount of sense as well as of sober idealism (the two are not so different) is packed into such chapters as "The Costs of Progress" and "Industrial Democracy," the substance of which first appeared in the pages of this JOURNAL—though an extraordinary attack on organized labor disfigures p. 132. The tolerant and genial temper of the author is happily displayed in a passage like the following (p. 87):

"In its larger being [the reference is to social organization in the future], individualism, socialism and communism will not be the mutually exclusive things that they now seem to be. There will not be a narrower but a wider field for individual effort, not

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less but more personal liberty. At the same time, more enterprises will be brought under public control; and more of the good things of life will be distributed, like the sunshine and the air, in free and equal portions. The displaced men and women will be more quickly reëstablished than now, their services will be made of greater value, and society will assume a larger portion of the burden of their misfortunes."

Expressions of this sort should be remembered when one reads elsewhere (p. 220) that socialism is "an attempt to emancipate everybody by shackling every individual arm" and that its method "is that of compelling everybody to meddle with everything that is none of his business, and of forbidding him, under any circumstances, to mind his own business."

William M. Salter.

Chicago.

Dictionary of Political Economy. Vol. III., N-Z. Edited by R. H. Inglis Palgrave, F. R. S. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. xxii., 762.

Reviewing a volume of Palgrave's "Dictionary of Political Economy" is much like reviewing a volume of the "Encyclopedia Britannica"; that is to say, it is quite impossible without writing a book of considerable size. All we can offer here, therefore, is a brief notice and appreciation of the work before us.

To begin with we heartily congratulate Mr. Palgrave and his collaborators on the completion of their Herculean labors. It is enough to say that the result is worthy of the distinguished men who have contributed to it. Our expectations naturally rise high after reading the list of contributors at the end of this volume, a list which includes almost all English-speaking economists and many famous foreigners as well as recognized specialists upon semi-economic technicalities; and so far on most references to the work the reviewer has found his hopes fully realized. The editor seems to have been extraordinarily successful in securing articles on their subjects by the authors of standard works; thus we find Mr. Bonar writing on Population, Mr. Acworth on Railways, Mr. Mackay on the Poor Law, Professor Ingram on several of the writers he has investigated for his history, and Professor Sidgwick on Political Economy, to mention but a few

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instances. While upon this question we should like to make a suggestion. We feel sure that it would be a great convenience if the next edition of the dictionary contained a supplemental index giving the articles contributed by each writer, so that those who want to use the book not merely as a dictionary may read from it any particular author when they feel inclined. To say that the articles are of unequal merit is merely to say that the book is the joint product of human beings; but, whatever the merit of the article, in the majority of cases a very copious list of authorities is given, so that a reference to the dictionary means an enormous saving of labor to those working at a special subject, if for that reason alone. But in addition to inequality in merit we have detected inequality of another character. Some of the articles are historical and comparative, while others are merely dogmatic. Now an author is perfectly free, subject to the over-ruling providence of his publisher, to settle for himself whether his book shall contain historical elements and data from all places or not; but we doubt whether he should have such liberty when contributing to a dictionary. On consulting a dictionary on some particular word, say "rent," the ordinary man expects to find, in addition to a definition, some description of rental systems in far-off Cathay, as well as in his own and neighboring countries, and, in addition to an exposition of the modern theory of its determination, some account of the development of such theory. And the ordinary man would find his expectations realized in some of the articles in Palgrave's Dictionary, but not in all. We are aware, of course, that an historical and comparative treatment would be extremely difficult now upon some subjects, and that for this reason many of the articles in the "Encyclopedia Britannica" are at present dogmatic; but we fancy that most will agree that the fuller method is the ideal to aim at, at any rate in a dictionary.

In view of the multitude of articles continued within the covers of this volume we should, no doubt, be acting the prudent part in avoiding all special reference; yet we cannot forbear mentioning three articles. Professor Sidgwick's discussion of the Scope and Method of Political Economy is, we hardly need say, masterly; but would not some further notice of the historical school have been desirable in an essay for a dictionary? Mr. James Bonar's pages on Adam Smith seem to the reviewer to be a model of what a dictionary treatment should be—oh, why has the editor put them in almost unreadable print! Thirdly, Professor

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Flux breaks new ground with an article on Polegraphy (Greek, πωλεῖν, to sell). This article we do most heartily welcome. It is a lucid exposition of a work entitled "Le Commerce," by M. H. Lefévre, sometime private secretary to the late Baron James de Rothschild, a work which seems to have been little read. In it, dealings in a developed market, including dealings in "futures" and "options," are diagrammatically treated with considerable success and originality.

In conclusion we must express our conviction that Palgrave's Dictionary will remain a standard and indispensable work for many years to come. No economist, who is an economist in the general sense, can afford to be without it; and its service to men of business and public officials should be considerable. We marvel not that its production has occupied twelve years, but that it has not taken more.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

TWO SERMONS ON SOME OF THE MUTUAL INFLUENCES OF THEOLOGY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES. By the Ven. James M. Wilson, M. A., F. G. S., Vicar of Rochdale and Archdeacon of Manchester. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. 36.

These sermons were preached during the visit of the British Association to Dover. Their main contention is that Theology is a science. "There is no reason, in the nature of things, why there should not some day be a section, or sub-section, of the British Association for the Advancement of Science devoted to the recording of theological research, and to registering its progress."

Many of the parallels which Archdeacon Wilson draws between Theology and the natural sciences are extremely suggestive and valuable. In each case we find hypotheses, in each case we are subject to the relativity of knowledge, in each case we have no right to suppose that we have reached finality, in each case we find conclusions of every degree of certainty. But I think that the author goes too far when he ignores the fact that the methods of science and of metaphysics are very different, and that the method of theology must be that of metaphysics.

"The *differentia* of Theology from other sciences lies, not in its scope, nor in its method, but in the fact that the necessity men seem to be under to seek for a rational explanation of themselves and of their surroundings, and to demand complete unity in this

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explanation, drives and has always driven the philosophic theologian, as it does not drive all men, to postulate in all forms of energy, as well as in human personality, the presence and action of a Divine indwelling Spirit. Certain spheres of observation and study lend themselves more obviously than others to the suggestion and verification of this hypothesis, and it is these, therefore, which form the chief sphere of Theology." Again, we are told, that, like other sciences, Theology "is based on the observation of phenomena only."

If I understand this rightly, it means that Theology works inductively. For induction is the method by which the natural sciences deal with phenomena. Now I cannot see how a Theology based on induction—even the widest possible induction—could have any claim to even the slightest probability. For those conclusions, whose truth Theology wishes to determine, are conclusions about the universe as a whole. A God who ruled part only of the universe would not be God. We have not freedom if there is *any* collocation of circumstances in which we could not act freely. We are not immortal if *any* collocation of circumstances could destroy us.

Can any induction offer us the least probability on any of these subjects? To judge of all Frenchmen by the first man encountered on the Calais pier would be rash, but would it be so rash as to trust such an induction? We do not know the extent of the universe in time and space, but we do know that all our inductions are based on observations limited to an insignificant portion of that time and space. If every phenomena on this planet, or accessible to astronomy, since the birth of history, harmonized completely with the hypothesis of a beneficent Creator, what amount of help would that give us, *if we kept to inductive methods,* towards a conclusion that this was the best hypothesis for a universe of which all such phenomena were an insignificantly small portion? Archdeacon Wilson deprecates the claim of any Theological conclusion as finality. But such conclusions would surely be devoid of even the slightest provisional value.

"It is," we are told again, "because of the immense mass of human experience which testifies that Jesus Christ has taught men, as no one else has taught them, to realize our relations to God, and gives men that ideal and hope and rest, that we are compelled to think of Him, as St. John did, as the manifestation of the Divine Life, and look to Him as the revealer of the Way of Life. Such a

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faith passes out of the region of hypothesis. In presence of this practical exactitude, derived from experience, we may well forget that, in theory, this too is but an inference from experience."

But if the testimony of human experience were unanimous what, by the methods of science, could it prove? Surely no more than that Jesus was the greatest moral teacher *so far* within that period of the history of our planet which is covered by our historical knowledge. It could only place him in the position in which some one else—perhaps Buddha, perhaps Socrates,—was before the Sermon on the Mount. And it could give no ground to suppose that he might not be displaced to-morrow by a new teacher, as they had been displaced by him. This would scarcely be enough for Archdeacon Wilson, who, in the second sermon, speaks of the Incarnation as "unique." But what more could be reached by this path?

I am not attempting to deny that Theology can start from experience and reach universal results. I believe that it can. But I submit that it must employ, not the methods of science, but such methods as those by which Kant and Hegel arrived at a truth which is both deeper and broader than the truths of science. It is with metaphysics, not science, that Theology has to reckon. This, no doubt, is to be regretted for many reasons. For Theology has a message she desires to deliver to the average man. And the average man, while he is inclined to trust the methods of science, neither trusts nor understands the methods of metaphysics—at any rate, at present. But although it is to be regretted, I do not see how it can be avoided.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Idealism and Theology: A Study of Presuppositions. By Charles F. d'Arcy, B. D. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. viii., 294.

In this book the author starts from a partial acceptance of the idealism of T. H. Green, but holding that this idealism fails to furnish a complete philosophy he seeks to show that it finds its true development or correction in a conception, which itself is found to coincide with Christian Theism. According to Green the principle of the world is a self-consciousness the nature of which is to be conceived after the analogy of the human consciousness, the human consciousness being in fact but a partial

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manifestation of the divine. The author admits the truth of this view so far, that self-consciousness is necessarily the ultimate category of our thought, but argues that the ultimate nature of reality cannot be fully expressed in terms of self-consciousness. God is personal, but He is also more than personal. The ultimate unity is not a personal unity, but a unity of persons, a unity in which all personal spirits find their bond of union (p. 93). And thus we are brought to a conception of God which finds its expression and confirmation in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Now setting aside any difficulties which might be raised in regard to the idealistic starting point or the theological goal of this argument, there seem to be several serious difficulties in the course of the argument itself. In the first place, it is difficult to understand the *combination* of the predicates, personal and superpersonal as applied to the ultimate reality. The very argument by which it is shown that the ultimate or divine unity must be *superpersonal* in order to be *a unity of persons* seems wholly to forbid us to conceive God as personal. Secondly, the connection between this philosophical doctrine of a superpersonal unity and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity seems to be merely superficial. For either the divine persons fall to the level of finite persons or there are two unities, a unity of divine persons and a unity of finite persons. This objection is admitted by the author in his concluding chapter to demand a clear answer. How far the demand is satisfied the reader may judge. "The answer," it is said, "has been given, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The human person is . . . . . a person and nothing more. He cannot rise to the absolute point of view and see all in one. He attains final unity by an act of faith. . . . . Such limitation cannot be attributed to the Divine Persons. In what way the ultimate unity belongs to them, how they inhere in it and it in them, it is impossible for us to say" (pp. 266-7). The combination of the predicates, personal and superpersonal was difficult enough, but to these we are asked to add the Trinitarian predicate multipersonal. "As person, or rational intelligence, [God] is immanent in nature. As multipersonal, He transcends nature, and interferes in nature, just as one human will interferes in the experience of another. As superpersonal, He unites all in one, and occupies a position of transcendency in a higher sense" (p. 153). It is somewhat surprising to find that this additional Trinitarian element is brought forward as the clue to a difficulty.

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Finally, although the author believes that his proposed reconciliation of philosophy and Christian theology also affords a solution of various religious or theological difficulties, its value in this respect seems to be a matter more of belief or assertion than of demonstration. For instance, speaking of the problem of predestination the author states the difficulty as follows: "The difficulty involved in the old problem of predestination is precisely the same as that which came to light in the consideration of the relation between free-will and necessity. If full sway be given to the Divine Personality, it swallows up the human. If the rights of the human personality be asserted against the Divine, the latter suffers limitation, it becomes one among many, it ceases to be truly Divine. We have to choose between a freedom of God which annihilates man and a freedom of man which annihilates God. The only way out of the difficulty is that already indicated: the assumption of a transcendent superpersonal unity as the ultimate truth of the Divine Nature" (pp. 170-1). Would it be unfair to say that the only obvious connection between the solution of the problem and the assumed superpersonal unity is that both are beyond our knowledge? It is, at any rate, not quite apparent how the superpersonal nature of the divine unity can affect the question of human freedom one way or the other. And perhaps it may be said generally that the assumption of a transcendent principle of explanation is little more than an admission that an explanation is required which we cannot give. That the assumption is not without its dangers may be seen from the following expressions. "Just as, on the side of knowledge, the effort to harmonize the human self with the Divine, forces us to appeal to a principle of reconciliation which is transcendent, so, on the volitional side, the effort to give the human will its place in a universal system discloses an opposition which no effort of thought can overcome. We have to choose between philosophy and human nature, between theory and fact; and in that choice theory must go to the wall" (p. 107). A theology which finds its "opportunity" in the supposed difficulties and failures of philosophy is one which is open to suspicion from the religious no less than from the speculative point of view.

H. Barker.

Edinburgh, Scotland.

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POEMS OF NATURE AND LIFE. By John Witt Randall. Edited by Francis Ellingwood Abbot, With an Introduction on the Randall Family. Boston: George H. Ellis.

This is a book that belongs less to the public than to those who have a special and personal interest in the man whom it commemorates. It records the uneventful life of a person of strong and fine, if rather morbid, nature, who shyly and secretly served the Muses; and reprints the poems which he published—if their almost private circulation may be so characterized—during his lifetime. The Editor, who writes the memoir, gives a frankly enthusiastic and very personal view of his admired friend, to whom he was greatly indebted, evidently; and we forgive him a lack of perspective and disinterested discrimination in his portrait and estimate. John Witt Randall was a recluse, who touched life at too few points to make his career of general interest and importance; but what we like in him is his sturdily sincere refusal to call himself a Christian when he had ceased to believe in the common essentials of Christian doctrine. As for his poems, while they outrank much minor verse in general quality, they include little that calls for rescue from forgetfulness. The shortest are the best; and we should select the "Lament of Orpheus" as an example of his highest minstrelsy. The "Ode to Conscience," like several others, contains felicitous lines; but is diffuse and abstract. If ethical earnestness and fineness constituted good poetry, these verses would rank high; but the Orphic, singing quality we must have.

PERCIVAL CHUBB.

NEW YORK.

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

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1900

WAR AND PEACE.

THE framer of an ideal polity may find it convenient to place his perfect commonwealth in some inaccessible region of the world. It simplifies the internal problems of political society to isolate the state; but such simplification means abstraction from the actual truth of facts. The practical reformer who is keenly interested in some constitutional change, or in legislation which he thinks will ameliorate the social condition of the mass of his fellow-citizens, is apt to be impatient with politicians whose minds seem to run away to the ends of the earth. But the enthusiast is inevitably the man of one or of a few ideas. The impartial student of politics and the really wise statesman must both have eyes for international as well as for domestic affairs. Even the constitution of a state cannot be fairly judged without consideration of the questions, whether there are dependent communities in other parts of the world whose welfare must be directly affected by the character of the home government, whether the territory of the state is compact or scattered, whether its frontiers are well defined by "natural," *i. e.*, geographical, boundaries or determined by artificial treaty-made lines cutting through regions where no barriers of water or rock hinder easy communication, whether the natives beyond the frontier are strong or weak, civilized or bar-

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barous, militant or peaceable. Political institutions and habits of government, which may work well in a community secure against outside interference and even against direct outside influence, may prove unworkable and disastrous in a state dependent for its food supplies or for the employment of its workmen upon safe communication with distant countries or exposed to the attack of an ambitious and excitable neighbor or to the incursions of semi-barbarous and ill-governed hordes.

The Utopian state which has no neighbor must still have some means of compelling obedience and of repressing disorder within its own bounds, unless its inhabitants are supposed to possess automatic virtue and to live at peace through a preëstablished harmony. The actual state, which is one among many states, which has neighbors and commerce, must be prepared to resist attack from without and to protect its scattered children and dependents. Most person would, indeed, regard this as the primary and least disputable of all the functions of the state; and, as a matter of history, it is mainly through the necessities of military defence that peoples have become conscious of their unity and have submitted to the authority of government. War has ever been the great maker of nations. There are some, however, who would get rid of the difficulties of foreign policy in an easy fashion by declaring that all war is wrong, while others allow war only when it is "just" (in their opinion) or they allow it in case of self-defence, but condemn it when it is what they call "aggressive." The Quaker moralist, Jonathan Dymond, lays down in his "Essays on the Principles of Morality," (published originally in 1829; 9th edition, 1894, p. 270), that all war, even in self-defence, is wrong, because contrary to "the peaceable precepts of Christianity," such as "Resist not evil," "Love your enemies," "Unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek," etc. In a commendatory Introduction written for some previous edition of the work, John Bright uses these words: "If we may presume to ask ourselves, what in the eye of the Supreme Ruler is the greatest crime which His creatures commit, I think we may almost with certainty conclude that it is the crime of war." The inaccurate term "crime" is clearly here used as a rhetorical equivalent for

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"sin." The religious anarchist, Count Tolstoy, living more fully in Eastern ideas than was possible to the Exeter linen-draper and the Rochdale cotton-spinner, takes the words: "Resist not evil," as forbidding not merely war, but all use of force on behalf of morality or social order. The Quaker casuists are not so consistent. "It is the duty of the civil magistrate," says Dymond, "to repress the violence of one man towards another and by consequence it is the duty of the individual, when the civil power cannot operate, to endeavor to repress it himself. . . . Many kinds of resistance to aggression come strictly within the fulfillment of the law of benevolence. He who by securing or temporarily disabling a man prevents him from committing an act of great turpitude, is certainly his benefactor. . . . It is an act of much kindness to a bad man to secure him for the penalties of the law" (p. 135). This is quite in the spirit of Plato's "Gorgias." Jonathan Dymond has strong opinions about bad debts and approves of all insolvency being treated as a crime (p. 195), possibly a wise suggestion from the commercial point of view, but not very much according to either the letter or the spirit of the Christian gospels. There is some want of logic in this honest tradesman's adaptation of the precepts of Oriental idealism; or rather, perhaps, it is a want of imagination. He sees the necessity of protecting his household, his shop and his earnings against the ruffian and the rogue; but just because the army and the navy had been so successful in their business in the last great European war he does not, amid security and peace, realize that they have done anything at all for him and his. If a wretched tramp steals a pocket-handkerchief—off with him to prison. If a Napoleon threatens the commerce and the constitutional liberties of Great Britain, fold your hands and ingeminate "peace, peace." Any arguments that are valid for the maintenance of law-courts, of policemen and of prisons, are valid also for the maintenance of a system of defence against attacks from without and for the protection of the routes of commerce. Even if we get rid of patriotic sentiment, we cannot be certain that every invader, if we did not resist him, would maintain as good a system of internal peace and justice as we have at present, nor

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that he would be equally tolerant of conscientious refusals to wear weapons and serve in the wars at the commandment of the magistrate.

Do the Christian Scriptures, on any fair interpretation, actually condemn war? Not one of the texts habitually quoted as condemning it relates to contests between nations. "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." These words were uttered in condemnation of resistance to civil authority, even when unjustly used (Matt. xxvi, 52). There are many passages which condemn rebellion even against despotic government based upon conquest. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's" (*i. e.,* pay the taxes imposed by the imperial government); "Submit yourselves to the powers that be;" "Honor the king" (*i. e.,* the Emperor Nero). Such precepts support the Roman Empire and were expressly intended by Jesus and by Paul to discourage Jewish aspirations after national independence. It was the Roman conquests and the strong military despotism of Rome which gave the world the peace and order and toleration that made the spread of the Christian religion possible. The ascetic John the Baptist tells the Roman soldiers to abstain from violence and wrongful exactions (*i. e.,* from looting, or in any way ill-treating the civil population). His precepts are precisely those of any respectable general of a modern army, sufficiently disciplined. He tells them to be content with their pay; he does not treat the soldier's profession as in itself wicked. He does not call them hireling murderers, or say that they are earning the wages of sin. Jesus and Peter do not tell the devout Roman officers who come to them that they must leave their unhallowed calling.

Moral precepts such as "Love your enemies" are addressed to individuals, not to nations, which are only metaphorically persons: and such precepts are, perhaps, more often fulfilled by the brave soldier who has no hatred in his heart against the individuals of a hostile nation, than by those preachers, politicians and journalists, who seem to think the commandment means, "Take the side of the enemies of your country and prove your righteousness by imputing corrupt motives to her

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statesmen." Whether turning the other cheek to the smiter, giving to all borrowers and beggars, and making things easy for the thief (Matt. v, 39-42) are compatible with civilized and orderly society, is a question which need not be discussed at present. In any case these "counsels of perfection" are clearly addressed to individuals, and they are not the precepts which the members of peaceable industrial communities are specially ready to obey.

"A nation must be prepared to fight: but it ought not to fight except in a just cause." This opinion expresses the sentiment of the average peaceable citizen who is not a Quaker, nor an anarchist, religious or otherwise. But what does it mean? "War is right—when it is right." Justice requires to be determined: and since the time of Plato's "Republic" that has been found a difficult and lengthy matter, except by those who are content to fall back upon their own instincts or prejudices or to follow some guide which they suppose to be infallible.

No Christian community, except the Quakers and some similar sects, condemns all war. Thomas Aquinas discusses some of the texts to which I have referred and gives his own conclusion as follows (I quote from Father Rickaby's translation):

> There are three requisites for a war to be just. The *first* thing is the authority of the prince by whose command the war is to be waged. It does not belong to a private person to start a war, for he can prosecute his claim in the court of his superior. . . . . The *second* requisite is a just cause, so that they who are assailed should deserve to be assailed for some fault that they have committed. Hence Augustine says: "Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, in cases where a nation or a city has to be chastised for having either neglected to punish the wicked doings of its people, or neglected to restore what has been wrongfully taken away." The *third* thing requisite is a right intention of promoting good or avoiding evil. For Augustine says: "Eagerness to hurt, bloodthirsty desire of revenge, an untamed and unforgiving temper, ferocity in renewing the struggle, lust of empire [*libido dominandi, i. e.*, of arbitrary rule. Our word 'Empire' does not necessarily mean that] these and the like excesses are justly blamed in war." (Summa, II., 2.; qu. 40).

It may be noticed that Augustine includes the avenging of injuries among just causes of war. Some modern sentimentalists, careless of the accuracies of language, speak as if "avenging wrongs" meant the same thing as indulging the evil passion of revenge. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas fall into no

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such confusion. Thomas Aquinas does not raise the problem of the possible abolition of all war. To get rid of private wars, to keep the clergy from fighting and to mitigate the ferocity of combatants, seemed sufficiently urgent reforms to the philosopher of the thirteenth century.

If we turn from the "angelic doctor" of the mediæval church to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, a curious alteration is to be noted in the wording of the clause about war in Article XXXVII. In the original Latin form it is: *"Christianis licet, ex mandato magistratus, arma portare, et justa bella administrare,"* or, as it was put in the English version of 1552: "It is lawful for Christian men . . . . to serve in lawful wars." In the Article as it has remained since 1562, the word "lawful" is omitted before "wars." "It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars." Had the English bishops and Queen Elizabeth's government come to recognize the inconvenience of leaving it to the individual conscience, no longer guided by a Church that claimed infallibility, to decide which wars were just and which were not?* It may be argued, indeed, that in such a brief declaration it is honester and wiser to leave out a term like "just" or "lawful" of which no definition is given. The Westminster "Confession of Faith," Ch. xxiii., clause 2, declares that "it is lawful for Christians to accept and execute the office of magistrate, when called thereunto: in the managing whereof, as they ought especially to maintain piety, justice and peace, according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth; so for that end, they may lawfully, now under the New Testament, wage war upon just and necessary occasions." This seems to leave a good deal open to the individual's judgment. What laws are "wholesome"? What occasions are just and necessary? Those who have accepted the Westminster Confession have not usually felt their stern religion inconsistent with the use of the "argument of pike and gun" at the command of their lawful magistrates and on occasion even against "the powers that be."

*The discrepancy is pointed out by S. H. Reynolds in his edition of Selden's "Table Talk." (Oxford: 1892), p. 5, *note.*

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Archdeacon Paley, whom we may take as a good representative of the average reasonable citizen applying Christian precepts on utilitarian principles, writes as follows in his "Moral and Political Philosophy," Book VI., Ch. xii.:

The *justifying* causes of war are, deliberate invasions of right, and the necessity of maintaining such a balance of power amongst neighboring nations, as that no single state, or confederacy of states, be strong enough to overwhelm the rest. The objects of just war, are precaution, defence or reparation. In a larger sense, every just war is a *defensive* war, inasmuch as every just war supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted or feared.

The *insufficient* causes or *unjustifiable* motives of war, are the family-alliances, the personal friendships or the personal quarrels of princes; the internal disputes which are carried on in other nations; the justice of other wars; the extension of territory or of trade; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighboring or rival nation.

This passage has much historical interest. The repudiation of mere dynastic reasons for war, the stress laid on the balance of power, the non-recognition of wars of liberation or of the sentiment of nationality, are all characteristic of the early years of the century. What Paley says in the second paragraph is considerably modified by what he goes on to say. After insisting that what statesmen ought to consider is not extent of territory, but raising the greatest quantity of happiness out of a given territory, he adds:

There are, indeed, two cases in which the extension of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The first is where an empire thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which divide it from the rest of the world. Thus we account the British Channel the natural boundary which separates the nations of England and France; and if France possessed any countries on this, or England any cities or provinces on that side of the sea, the recovery of such towns and districts to what may be called their natural sovereign, though it may not be a just reason for commencing war, would be a proper use to make of victory. The other case is where neighboring states, being severally too small and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that surround them, can only be safe by a strict and constant junction of their strength; here conquest will effect the purposes of confederation and alliance; and the union which it produces is often more close and permanent than that which results from voluntary association. [This is illustrated by the unification of England and of France, respectively.]

Besides the rule of prudence which consists in preferring internal happiness to extent of territory, save in the cases

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mentioned, Paley recognizes also the maxim, "never to pursue national *honor* as distinct from national *interest*." But he adds: "This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honor of a nation for the sake of its interest." Thus Paley's utilitarianism keeps him from applying his principles in too abstract a fashion. He does not limit just wars to wars of self-defence, and he gives to self-defence a very wide interpretation. He sees, as every reasonable and prudent citizen must see, that cases may arise where the safety of a nation may require its government to appear formally as the aggressors. There is certainly a widely spread and very proper feeling that self-defence is the least questionable justification of the use of force; but self-defence is not an unambiguous term, and people have been known to invade and annex their neighbor's territory and declare that they were only doing it in self-defence. We must not judge the right or wrong of a war by laying too much stress on the mere form of aggression. It may be important to know who struck the first blow; but it is also important to know what each of the combatants was doing and saying before, and not merely immediately before, the outbreak of hostilities. To limit just wars to those where an attack has been already made by the enemy might be to condemn the more conscientious nation to destruction.

The word "defence" is not as free from ambiguity as it may seem in abstract political ethics: neither is the word "self," when applied to a nation. Is it reasonable to regard the existing geographical boundaries of nations at any given moment of time as absolutely fixed *de jure divino* and to call every attempt to alter them unrighteous aggression? How can those who propose to stereotype the political map of the world in 1900 accept with approval many of the changes that have taken place since 1800 and since 1700? If an existing nation has a moral right to defend itself, has the struggle to attain national existence never had any justification? On the other hand, has every nation that in any sense exists at any time an absolute moral right to maintain its independence against the general interests of larger groups of human beings? A nation, after all, is only by metaphor an individual organism or person. A

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human being, as a moral person, as a subject of rights and duties, must be a member of some society, but not necessarily of any one particular society. Nations exist for mankind and not mankind absolutely for the sake of nations. A nation may come into being or may be absorbed in some wider community; and the birth of a nation or the absorption of a nation may be either good or evil for the human beings affected.

Let me consider some of the judgments we are in the habit of passing on historical events at a sufficient distance from our own times to enable us to see them in proper perspective. We disapprove, let us say, the partition of Poland, but regard it as inevitable because of the anarchical constitution of the country. We approve of the American colonies fighting for their independence against the stupidity of George III. and his ministers, although we see that war might have been avoided had the British government been in wiser and more enlightened hands. We disapprove of the rebellion of the Confederate States, although admitting that the South Carolina Declaration of Independence of 1860 has a greater show of quasi-legal right than the Declaration of 1776: we approve of the determination of the Federal government to carry on the war to the end without listening to proposals of compromise or arbitration. We may perhaps condemn the British government for engaging in war against the French Republic in 1793, but we approve of the war against Napoleon, when it became clear that he was aiming at a general domination over Europe. (An interesting change of sentiment towards the war with France may be noticed in the utterances of Robert Burns. In 1794 he proposed the ambiguous toast: "May our success in the present war be equal to the justice of our cause," and nearly had to fight a duel with an officer. Later on, he joined a volunteer company and wrote patriotic verse.) We may admit that Switzerland and Italy gained indirectly by being conquered for a time by the French. The restored Swiss constitution had to treat the inhabitants of Vaud and Ticino no longer as subjects, but as equals. Italy, after long slumber, received the idea of unity and constitutional government. The Venetian Republic, mourned by Wordsworth, was a decayed oligarchy: and the idea of a new "Italy"

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was of more value than the picturesque shade of a city-state. Out of the Napoleonic wars came, partly by Napoleon's own revolutionary policy, partly by reaction against it, the nationality movement which has transformed the map of Europe in the nineteenth century. The unification of Germany, the liberation of Italy from foreign rulers and its unity under constitutional government, the emancipation of Greece and the Danubian states from Turkish oppression and misrule, the recognition of the Hungarian constitution—these changes, all of which might have seemed impossible in the beginning of the century, are now accomplished facts, and are by all believers in political progress regarded as advances in human well-being, however poor may seem the prosaic reality when measured by the hopes of the poets who sung and the enthusiasts who died for these causes. Every one of these changes has been directly or indirectly brought about by war. The Crimean war, which ushered in an almost continuous series of European wars, is not now generally regarded in Great Britain with the enthusiasm to which Tennyson gave such magnificent utterance. To buttress up the decaying Ottoman Empire seems a poor reason for so much suffering: and the only country which may seem to have gained anything from it, was, perhaps, Italy. The intervention of Sardinia in a quarrel with which it had nothing to do may seem contrary to all the precepts of Paley or any other moralist. And yet the bold action of Cavour may seem justified by the result: he obtained a place for Sardinia in the counsels of Europe and a hearing for the cause of Italy. Could Italian independence have been won without the intervention of Napoleon III., dictated partly, perhaps, by sentiment, partly by self-interest? Yet such intervention would have to be condemned, if self-defence alone justifies war. And what are we to say of the raid of Garibaldi into Sicily without the authority of his lawful sovereign? Many Roman Catholics make it almost an article of faith to abhor the seizure of Rome by Italian troops in 1870: and yet an obscurantist ecclesiastical government upheld by foreign troops may well seem to have few claims on our sympathy. There was a good deal of sympathy with Denmark in 1864, on the ground that Denmark was a

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small state attacked by two large ones; most of us would feel now that that was a somewhat irrational transference of schoolboy ethics to international disputes, and that the German states had a very good case. Many of us take the side of Prussia against Austria in 1866, because Prussia was the more progressive country and because Italy and Hungary, and Austria itself in the long run, gained by the issue. Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has a special horror of everything that he calls "militarism," nevertheless speaks of the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany as a punishment of the French for their aggressiveness (see his "Principles of Ethics," I., p. 318). Most of us probably feel that the question cannot be so simply settled; that those who pushed Napoleon III. into a war for which the French army was not prepared were doing France a grievous wrong, that Germany was, perhaps, justified in reclaiming provinces that had been German once, but that these provinces, though German in population, had become so French in their sympathies that some treatment short of annexation (*e. g.*, neutralization) might well have been adopted if compatible with the security of the German Empire, but that now every year that passes makes them more and more German.

Some of these wars may be judged differently by many readers: and in every case a much more detailed statement would be requisite before any judgment could be quite fair. But let anyone take the judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied cases, and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval to wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence under all circumstances, that there are some cases in which we approve of absorption of smaller states by larger, that there are cases in which we excuse intervention of third parties in quarrels with which at first they had nothing to do, and that we sometimes approve war even when begun without the authority of any already existing sovereign. Can any principles be found underlying such judgments? In the first place we ought not to disguise from ourselves the fact that our judgments after the result are based largely on success. If we do not exactly say that all successful wars are just wars, we admit that no nation is justified in engaging in war unless with

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a reasonable prospect of success. We may forgive or admire the courage of desperate men fighting for a lost cause; but we should condemn a government which knowingly led a people into a hopeless contest or continued it after it became clear that a prolongation of bloodshed and suffering could not affect the ultimate issue except by inducing the victor to impose harder terms. The sympathy so often expressed for the weaker or smaller state, simply because weaker or smaller, is æsthetic rather than ethical: it is really a survival of that barbaric feeling about warfare which regards it as a noble sport. If a small state inflicts on a large state injuries which would justify war, if inflicted by a state of equal power, there is no sufficient reason for abstaining from demanding redress, with war as the alternative, simply because the war is likely to be successful. It is recognized that a revolution is never justified except by success, though we may excuse individuals who have engaged unsuccessfully in rebellion for what we regard as a good object with a reasonable prospect of succeeding. There seems no reason why the same maxim should not apply to wars.

In judging past events, we are more influenced by results which affect large numbers of persons than by the small personal occasions of them which may have attracted most attention at the time of their occurrence. In judging of present events we are often so much occupied with apportioning responsibility to individuals that we are apt to neglect the larger currents of human affairs which individuals have only a limited power of diverting or controlling. Aristotle has said of revolutions that the occasions of them may be trifling, but that men do not rebel about trifling things. And now that wars are great national affairs in which rulers cannot engage without very widespread national support, we may apply Aristotle's profound remark to wars also. The anecdotal historian, the gossiping journalist, and the political partisan attacking the government, like to trace the origin of a war to the intemperate language of some diplomatist or statesman or to the interested schemes of some self-seeking financier. The personal devil is convenient for those who like facile explanations and wish to have some one to lay the blame upon. But such expla-

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nations are not very scientific. The responsibility of individuals is more difficult for human beings to estimate fairly than the tendencies of events and institutions when seen on a sufficiently large scale, and I think it will be found that our judgments on the wars of the century from 1770 to 1870 turn very largely on the question: Which of the conflicting forces was making for constitutional government and for social progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the higher civilization? And thus it is, that we may sometimes approve the rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old. Words like "inevitable" or "manifest destiny" are apt to be used rashly or dogmatically. But there is everywhere an inevitable conflict between inconsistent types of civilization: and with human nature such as it is, and human governments such as they are, this conflict cannot always be kept in peaceful channels. Wars should never be judged as isolated phenomena. They are incidents or symptoms of larger movements. The divine right of kings and constitutional government, society based upon slavery and society based upon labor for wages, ecclesiastical domination and lay liberty, the principles of the Holy Alliance and the principles of the French Revolution, the statecraft of Metternich and the ideals of Mazzini—oppositions like these are irreconcilable because they are the oppositions of different stages of human development; and compromises between them have only avoided war for the time being, sometimes at the cost of a more terrible struggle afterwards. War is a harsh form of dialectic, a rough means of solving hard problems, but war or the genuine threat of war is often the only way; for there are always people, especially the champions of reactionary and antiquated types of rule, who will recognize no argument unless it is backed up by sufficient force. If you are pleading with the Turk, for instance, on behalf of persecuted Christians, a demonstration of ironclads proves your argument more effectively than maxims of religious liberty and peaceable progress in which the fanatical Mohammedan disbelieves and about which the corrupt official does not care. The pity is that Armenia has no seacoast, so that what has been done in diverse ways for civilization in Greece


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and in Crete and in Egypt, cannot be done in Armenia, except by Russia, the most backward of the great powers of Christendom.

Some wise person (I do not know whom), has said: "I am for peace at any price—even at the price of war." In judging wars by their success, and in apportioning responsibility beforehand by considering likelihood of success, we must take account not merely of victories in the field, but of the establishment of orderly government afterwards. "Providence," it has been said, "is always on the side of the big battalions." That is not true, unless the big battalions are also well disciplined, skillfully led and the commissariat properly cared for. That is to say, military success, in the long run, does prove the possession of certain moral and intellectual excellences. And the nation which not merely conquers, but maintains its conquests and governs subject peoples so as to give peace and security to races previously harassed by constant wars, or which assimilates them to any considerable extent, so as to spread civilization over a larger portion of the world—such a nation has justified itself in the judgment of history, which, as Schiller said, is the world's Day of Judgment. The wars of nationality which have characterized the nineteenth century are wars of a higher type than the dynastic rivalries in which people were too often merely the counters with which princes played. Wars fought by citizen-armies, whether under conscription or as voluntary soldiers, are wars of a higher type than those fought by foreign mercenaries. The nationality movement marks a great step in human progress. But we are allowing our ideas to crystalize if we suppose the nation—especially the nation which represents only one homogeneous race—to be necessarily the highest and final type of political society. The political philosophers of Greece could not see farther than the autonomous and independent city-republics; and we know that small city-states with their intense eager life, though they contributed so much to the intellectual greatness of ancient Greece and of mediæval Italy, condemned Greece and Italy to constant internal war, to foreign conquest and to loss of political freedom. Representative institutions have made the self-governing

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nation possible; but we have no right to assume, with some political theorists, that a great number of comparatively small independent nations, leaving the barbarous and savage races of the world to "work out their own development"—represents either the highest type of human society or a possible type. May not a few great "Empires," in which self-governing federated communities control the less advanced races, represent a higher stage—more likely to be stable, less exposed to war and preparing the way for a federation of the world?

The word "Empire" has been applied in very different senses: and it is easy to praise or to blame "imperialism" by laying stress on one meaning or another. The early "empires," as we call them, of Assyria, Babylon, Persia, etc., were the result of mere conquest of territory in order to increase the fame and the wealth of the governing race. The conquered peoples were, unless very rebellious, left to themselves, provided they paid tribute. The Ottoman Empire is a survival of this type. It has been well described as "anarchy *plus* the tax-gatherer." The conquests of Alexander of Macedonia belong to a higher stage, because he seriously set himself to plant Hellenic civilization in the East and to unite the more civilized "barbarians" with the Greeks. But he left no permanent political or legal institutions. The Roman Empire is the first real example of an empire which gave laws and institutions and citizenship to its subjects. The Roman Empire was a military despotism, because the idea of representative government did not yet exist and only a city-state could be a self-governing republic. But the Roman Empire gave Europe, Western Asia and Northern Africa such peace as they had never enjoyed before and such as they have never had since. The *pax Romana* proves, perhaps, that the blessings of mere peace are overestimated by those who realize the horrors of war, but have had no experience of the evils of stagnation and torpor. The British Empire in India is in some respects the closest parallel that exists to the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean lands. The problems of India arise largely from the internal peace which allows the growth of a population vastly greater than ever existed there before. India has been acquired in a curiously hap-

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hazard fashion, and the story of its conquest has some dark pages. But the governing of India is a responsibility which Great Britain cannot shirk except at the cost of throwing its teeming population back into anarchy, which would speedily invite some other conqueror. The rule of India brings with it other heavy responsibilities in other parts of the world, responsibilities which must soon be shared by a federation of all the self-governing communities that make up what is called the British Empire—if that empire is to last. The late Mr. Freeman, with a keen sense for the historical antiquities of political terms, used to urge that "Imperial Federation" is an absurdity. So it is, if we are looking solely at the empires of the past. But just as representative government was the great political invention of the Middle Ages, so federation (as distinct from mere leagues or confederacies) is the greatest political invention of modern times. To the Greek philosopher a republican *nation* would have seemed an impossibility. A federal empire (like Germany), a federal republic, a federation of self-governing communities with dependencies more or less autocratically governed according to their degree of civilization—all these forms now seem possible to us.

In politics it is always difficult, but most necessary, to avoid being the slaves of words—especially of words that have been used as party cries. Do not let us assume that a government is necessarily of a higher type, because it calls itself a "republic," or that it represents despotism and oppression because it is called a "monarchy" or an "empire." So-called "republics" may be narrow oligarchies in which those of a particular race or a particular religion rule the other inhabitants despotically. What are called monarchies may be in a true sense commonwealths: and what are called empires may be more under the influence of democratic ideas than some republics. Irrespective of names, we have always to try to find out which is the cause of order and progress, which of misgovernment and reaction. The words "national freedom" and "independence" attract our sympathies; but the "freedom and independence" of a caste of nobles, of an intolerant clergy, or of an exclusive and unprogressive race may mean the denial of freedom and

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opportunity for development to the more progressive part of the population. When the Swiss federal government put down by force of arms the *Sonderbund* and expelled the Jesuits in 1847, it is easy to represent that as an interference with the independence of the Catholic cantons—the original home of Swiss liberty: and the war really meant the final overthrow of the ancient type of lax confederation and the restriction of "state rights." But to those who believe at all in human progress, this forcible suppression of the separate league, like the American civil war, meant a real step forward.

The abstract principle of non-intervention is no more a tenable maxim in international politics than is the principle of *laissez-faire* in domestic politics. Some nations by their geographical position or by the compact nature of their territory are happily more free than others from the difficulties and responsibilities that may arise for all civilized and progressive peoples. If our neighbor had a tiger roaming in his garden and making our garden dangerous, we should probably shoot the tiger if he refused to lock it up or could not manage to do so. Anarchy and disorder in a neighboring state cannot always be overlooked. And from a distant state there may come a cry for help from kindred in race, religion or stage of civilization, which may seem to justify intervention, provided intervention is possible with a fair prospect of escaping other international complications. Stay-at-home persons may find it easy to accept the principle that every people should be left to work out its own problem for itself—as if every people were a unity or a person in the same sense. But the enterprise of the trader and the zeal of the missionary carry them into barbarous and savage lands: and non-intervention on the part of their countrymen may become a very difficult policy to maintain, and a policy which may only lead to unchecked cruelties on the part of the less scrupulous white adventurer and to the martyrdom of the nobler representatives of civilization. And both these things are likely to bring about intervention, spheres of influence or acquisition of territory. It is false to speak as if acquisition of territory in tropical lands, which the white man cannot permanently inhabit, were entirely due to lust of gain.

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That might be more truly said--where people do not usually say it—of the settlement of white races in temperate countries already inhabited by lower races. The desire to suppress the slave trade, and the obligation of defending fellow-citizens have been important factors in the overthrow of the independence of various African despots. The acquisition of territory inhabited by lower races has in no case, perhaps, been free from some harshness and ill-treatment of the natives; and where the natives do not die out or diminish with the advance of European civilization, the conquering nation has to face very difficult problems. But it is as "inevitable" that vigorous and enterprising white races should overflow into other lands, as it is that water should run down hill. And the state which simply shuts its eyes to what its citizens are doing—for good or evil—in distant lands is shirking its responsibilities under the plausible pretext of non-intervention. What used to be the favorite method, the plan of giving charters to trading companies, was a compromise between doing nothing and undertaking a task—one of the many compromises in the world which creates fresh difficulties instead of settling any. It is unreasonable to suppose that the political atlases of this year will be of much use a hundred years hence: and to discuss the ethics of the relations between nations and between higher and lower races on that assumption is to substitute an abstract science for a consideration of urgent practical problems. The moralist, who does not profess to base his judgment on an absolute and detailed code revealed to him by supernatural authority or by the light of Nature, must be content to regard the struggle for existence between nations and between types of civilization as of itself helping to determine political right and wrong. But he must guard against crude applications of biological conceptions to social evolution. The nation is not an organism in the biological sense, the same human being may belong to many social organisms and the extinction of the less successful social organism does not necessarily mean the destruction of the individuals belonging to it. In other words, human evolution does not take place only by death and by war.

What prospects are there of war giving place to less cruel

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methods of settling international difficulties? Not so long ago the hopes of many were stirred by the Czar's Rescript, proposing a reduction of armaments. The proposal came strangely from a country which at the moment was increasing its military expenditure; and to some it has occurred that Russia is the country which could most easily reduce its armaments, for it need not fear attack or invasion. It is easy to put down "progressive reduction of armaments" in a programme of international reform. But how are states, rightly alert for the interests of their own subjects, to be induced to accept such a scheme? Who is to fix a maximum force for this or that particular country? Who is to determine whether so many less infantry and cavalry in one nation are really the equivalent of so many or fewer ironclads in another? Furthermore, would it be altogether in the interests of peace or civilization that a state which has been brought to the verge of bankruptcy by excessive expenditure should be put in a position of equal military advantage with a country whose credit is sound because it has good government, and an educated, enterprising and industrious population? Wars will not be diminished by being made less costly. The huge citizen-armies of modern times are a heavy financial burden. But when we contrast them with the hireling adventurers with whom princes and republics carried on their wars in previous centuries, we see that great proggress has been made, not merely in the manner of conducting war, but in the serious sense of responsibility with which it must now be undertaken.

The Hague Conference rightly gave most attention to more practical matters—to amendments in the laws of civilized warfare and to schemes facilitating resort to arbitration. The quiet work of international jurists from Gentilis and Grotius down to the present time has done far more to help on the interests of humanity and to diminish the physical and moral evils of war, than all the rhetoric of Peace Societies. Arbitration is a valuable remedy; but it is not a panacea, and the cause of arbitration is only injured by the notion that it can be made a substitute for war in any and every case. Arbitration, in the sense in which the term is used in International Law, is only

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applicable between nations whose international status is recognized and mutually admitted. It is inapplicable, where the main ground of dispute is the claim of one party to be a sovereign independent state and the refusal of the other party to admit that claim. If the United States government had attempted to avoid bloodshed by submitting to foreign arbitration the questions between the Federal government and the Confederate states—that would have been tantamount to conceding all that the Southern seceders demanded. In cases where arbitration is perfectly applicable, the limits within which a question is submitted to arbitration must be very carefully laid down. The British government was perfectly right in submitting to arbitration the frontier dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana; but it was, I think, perfectly right in refusing to submit the matter to arbitration unless *bona fide* occupation by British subjects for a considerable period under the belief they were settling in British territory were taken as evidence of British dominion. To leave a question of frontiers to be settled entirely by charters and maps of centuries ago would be to fall back into the feudal manner of treating human beings as if they were mere appendages to the soil. If ownership of territory were to be determined irrespective of actual occupation, and of seizure by force, what claim could any people of European descent have to any inch of American ground? Arbitration as a substitute for war may be compared to litigation as a substitute for trial by combat; but the analogy is not exact. A war is not an artificially regulated encounter like a duel; it is one form of natural selection. Arbitration about frontiers is not litigation about ownership; civilized sovereignty does not mean the same thing as ownership of property. It is mere careless rhetoric when acquisition of new territory is spoken of as "robbery" or "burglary": individual property rights may not be disturbed in the least and may even be better secured than they were before. It is abstract thinking, if questions of sovereignty are suffered to be settled by ancient documents without regard to the interests and convenience of actual human beings.

It is more than a hundred years since Kant wrote his essay

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"On Perpetual Peace." Kant saw quite clearly that there is only one way in which war between independent nations can be prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent. If we wish to know how war is to cease, we should ask ourselves how it *has* ceased. Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? Why did Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though they had fought against each other only four years before? The rise of modern nations meant the suppression of private and tribal wars and of wars between rival cities. The absorption of smaller nations into larger political bodies means the prevention of war within great areas. In the ancient world, as we have seen, a despotic government seemed the only means by which this peace could be obtained. Representative and federal government open up other ways. Kant's project for a universal federation includes the stipulation that every state must have a "republican" government, but by that he only means a representative government. It is quite clear that a court of international arbitration cannot ensure the enforcement of its decisions, unless it is the tribunal of a federation, with federal troops to check rebellion. It need not be thought that the soldier will ever become useless on this earth, although his duties may be more and more assimilated to those of the policeman.

Switzerland is one of the smallest of nations, but perhaps it offers more suggestions than any other of the means by which great changes may be effected. Switzerland is already the headquarters of many international bureaus and conventions. Switzerland has a constitution which maintains national unity without destroying cantonal institutions. It unites different races, different religions and four languages. Its army system, which enforces military drill on every young man before he obtains the privileges of citizenship, is so managed as to interfere very little with industrial pursuits and to be an excellent training school of civic education. For one set of problems Switzerland offers no help. A federation of civilized nations may be possible, when they are all constitutionally governed; but there may also remain large parts of the earth unfit for constitutional government. Tropical lands are apt to

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become black anarchies or white tyrannies; and in the interest of black and white alike the controlling hand of governments influenced by the ideas of temperate and civilized countries is absolutely necessary. Our federation of "free states" will have territories under it, which must be governed more or less despotically by a trained and capable civil service. This is a federation of the world, which is not an altogether visionary ideal. The "European concert," international postal and telegraph bureaus, the Geneva convention, international congresses of all kinds, existing federal institutions—these are the germs out of which may grow the diminution, the mitigation, and, possibly, the cessation of wars.

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THE UNITY OF HUMAN NATURE.*

IF one could stand on the edge of the moon and look down through a couple of thousand years on human politics, it would be apparent that everything that happened on the earth is directly dependent on everything else that happened there. Whether the Italian peasant shall eat salt with his bread, depends upon Bismarck. Whether the prison system of Russia shall be improved, depends upon the ministry of Great Britain. If Lord Beaconsfield is in power, there is no leisure in Russia for domestic reform. The lash is everywhere lifted in a security furnished by the concurrence of all the influences upon the globe, that favor coercion. In like manner, the good things that happen are each the product of all extant conditions. Constitutional government in England qualifies the whole of western Europe. Our slaves were not set free without the assistance of every liberal mind in Europe; and the thoughts which we think in our closet affect the fate of the Boer in South

*An address delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Hobart College.

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Africa. That Tolstoy is to-day living unmolested upon his farm instead of serving in a Siberian mine, that Dreyfus is alive and not dead, is due directly to the people in this audience and to others like them scattered over Europe and America.

The effect of enlightenment on tyranny is not merely to make the tyrant afraid to be cruel, it makes him not want to be cruel. It makes him see what cruelty is. And reciprocally the effect of cruelty on enlightenment is to make that enlightenment grow dim. It prevents men from seeing what cruelty is.

The Czar of Russia cannot get rid of your influence, nor you of his. Every ukase he signs makes allowance for you, and on the other hand, the whole philosophy of your life is tinged by him. You believe that the abuses under the Russian government are inscrutably different from and worse than our own; whereas both sets of atrocities are identical in principle, and are more alike in fact, in taste and smell and substance than your prejudice is willing to admit. The existence of Russia narrows America's philosophy, and misconduct by a European power may be seen reflected in the moral tone of your clergyman on the following day. More Americans have abandoned their faith in free government since England began to play the tyrant than there were colonists in the country in 1776.

Europe is all one family, and speaks, one might say, the same language. The life that has been transplanted to North America during the last three centuries, is European life. From your position on the moon you would not be able to understand what the supposed differences were that the Americans make so much fuss over. You would say, "I see only one people, splashed over different continents. The problems they talk about, the houses they live in, the clothes they wear, seem much alike. Their education and catch words are identical. They are the children of the Classics, of Christianity and of the Revival of Learning. They are homogeneous, and they are growing more homogeneous."

The subtle influences that modern nations exert over one another illustrate the unity of life on the globe. But if we turn to ancient history we find in its bare outlines staggering proof of the interdependence of nations. The Greeks were wiped

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out. They could not escape their contemporaries any more than we can escape the existence of the Malays. Israel could not escape Assyria, nor Assyria Persia, nor Persia Macedon, nor Macedon Rome, nor Rome the Goths. Life is not a boarding school where a bad boy can be dismissed for the benefit of the rest. He remains. He must be dealt with. He is as much here as we ourselves. The whole of Europe and Asia and South America and every Malay and every Chinaman, Hindoo, Tartar and Tagal—of such is our civilization.

Let us for the moment put aside every dictate of religion and political philosophy. Let us discard all prejudice and all love. Let us regard nothing except facts. Does not the coldest conclusion of science announce the fact that the world is peopled, and that every individual of that population has an influence upon the conduct of all the rest, an influence as certain and far more discoverable than the influence of the weight of his body upon the solar system?

A Chinaman lands in San Francisco. The Constitution of the United States begins to rock and tremble. What shall we do with him? The deepest minds of the past must be ransacked to the bottom to find an answer. Every one of seventy million Americans must pass through a throe of thought that leaves him a modified man. The same thing is true when the American lands in China. These creatures have thus begun to think of each other. It is unimaginable that they should not hereafter incessantly and never-endingly continue to think of each other. And out of their thoughts grows the destiny of mankind.

We have an inherited and stupid notion that the East does not change. If Japan goes through a transformation scene under our eyes, we still hold to our prejudice as to the immutability of the Chinese. If our own people and the European nations seem to be meeting and surging and re-appearing in unaccustomed roles every ten years, till modern history looks like a fancy ball, we still go on muttering some old ignorant shibboleth about East and West, Magna Charta, the Indian mutiny and Mahomet. The chances are that England will be dead-letter, and Russia progressive, before we have done talk-

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ing. Of a truth, when we consider the rapidity of visible change and the amplitude of time,—for there is plenty of time, —we need not despair of progress.

The true starting point for the world's progress will never be reached by any nation as a whole. It exists and has been reached in the past as it will in the future by individuals scattered here and there in every nation. It is reached by those minds which insist on seeing conditions as they are, and which cannot confine their thoughts to their own kitchen, or to their own creed, or to their own nation. You will think I have in mind poets and philosophers, for these men take humanity as their subject and deal in the general stuff of human nature. But the narrow spirit in which they often do this cuts down their influence to parish limits. I mean rather those men who in private life act out their thoughts and feelings as to the unity of human life; those same thoughts which the poets and philosophers have expressed in their plays, their sayings and their visions. There have always been men who in their daily life have fulfilled those intimations and instincts which, if reduced to a statement, receive the names of poetry and religion. These men are the cart-horses of progress, they devote their lives to doing things which can only be justified or explained by the highest philosophy. They proceed as if all men were their brothers. These practical philanthropists go plodding on through each century and leave the bones of their character mingled with the soil of their civilization.

See how large the labors of such men look when seen in historic perspective. They have changed the world's public opinion. They have moulded the world's institutions into forms expressive of their will. I ask your attention to one of their achievements. We have one province of conduct in which the visions of the poets have been reduced to practice,—yes erected into a department of government,—through the labors of the philanthropists. They have established the Hospital and the Reformatory and these visible bastions of philosophy hold now a more unchallenged place in our civilization than the Sermon on the Mount on which they comment.

The truth which the philanthropists of all ages have felt, is

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that the human family was a unit—and this truth being as deep as human nature, can be expressed in every philosophy—even in the inverted utilitarianism now in vogue. The problem how to treat insane people and criminals has been solved to this extent, that everyone agrees that nothing must be done to them which injures the survivors. That is the reason we do not kill them. It is unpleasant to have them about, and this unpleasantness can be cured only by our devotion to them. We must either help the wretched or we ourselves become degenerate. They have thus become a positive means of civilizing the modern world, for the instinct of self-preservation has led men to deal with this problem in the only practical way.

Put a Chinaman into your hospital and he will get treated. You may lie awake at night drawing up reasons for doing something different with this disgusting Chinaman,—who somehow is in the world and is thrown into your care, your hospital, your thought,—but the machinery of your own being is so constructed that if you take any other course with him than that which you take with your own people, your institution will instantly lose its meaning; you would not have the face to beg money for its continuance in the following year. The logic of this, which if you like is the logic of self-protection under the illusion of self-sacrifice, is the logic which is at the bottom of all human progress. I dislike to express this idea in its meanest form; but I know there are some professors of political economy here, and I wish to be understood. The utility of hospitals is not to cure the sick. It is to teach mercy. The veneration for hospitals is not because they cure the sick, it is because they stand for love, and responsibility.

The appeal of physical suffering makes the strongest attack on our common humanity. Even zealots and sectaries are touched. The practice and custom of this kind of mercy have therefore become established, while other kinds of mercy which require more imagination are still in their infancy. But at the bottom of every fight for principle you will find the same sentiment of mercy. If you take a slate and pencil and follow out the precise reasons and consequences of the thing, you will always find that a practical and effective love for mankind is working

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out a practical betterment of human conditions through a practical self-sacrifice. The average man cannot do the sum, he does not follow the reasoning, but he knows the answer. The deed strikes into his soul with a mathematical impact and he responds like a tuning fork when its note is struck.

Every one knows that self-sacrifice is a virtue. The child takes his nouishment from the tale of heroism as naturally as he takes milk. He feels that the deed was done for his sake. He adopts it; it is his own. The nations have always stolen their myths from one another and claimed each others' heroes. It has required all the world's heroes to make the world's ear sensitive to new statements, illustrations and applications of the logic of progress. Yet their work has been so well done that all of us respond to the old truths in however new a form. Not France alone but all modern society owes a debt of gratitude to Zola for his rescue of Dreyfus. The whole world would have been degraded and set back, the whole world made less decent and habitable but for those few Frenchmen who took their stand against corruption.

Now the future of civil society upon the earth depends upon the application to international politics of this familiar idea, which we see prefigured in our mythology, and monumentalized in our hospitals—the principle that what is done for one is done for all. When you say a thing is "right," you appeal to mankind. What you mean is that every one is at stake. Your attack upon wrong amounts to saying that some one has been left out in the calculation. Both at home and abroad you are always pleading for mercy, and the plea gains such a wide response that some tyranny begins to totter, and its engines are turned upon you to get you to stop. This outcry against you is the measure of your effectiveness. If you imitate Zola and attack some nuisance in this town to-morrow you will bring on every symptom and have every experience of the Dreyfus affair. The cost is the same, for cold looks are worse than imprisonment. The emancipation is the same, for if a man can resist the influences of his townsfolk, if he can cut free from the tyranny of neighborhood gossip, the world has no terrors for him; there is no second inquisition. The influence is the

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same, for every citizen can thereafter look a town officer in the face with more self-respect. But not to townsmen, nor to neighboring towns, nor to Parisians is this force confined. It goes out in all directions, continuously. The man is in communication with the world. This impulse of communication with all men is at the bottom of every ambition. The injustice, cruelty, oppression in the world are all different forms of the same non-conductor, that prevents utterances, that stops messages, that strikes dumb the speaker and deafens the listener. You will find that it makes no difference whether the non-conductor be a selfish oligarchy, a military autocracy, or a commercial ring. The voice of humanity is stifled by corruption: and corruption is only an evil because it stifles men.

Try to raise a voice that shall be heard from here to Albany and watch what it is that comes forward to shut off the sound. It is not a German sergeant, nor a Russian officer of the precinct. It is a note from a friend of your father's offering you a place in his office. This is your warning from the secret police. Why, if any of you young gentlemen have a mind to get heard a mile off, you must make a bonfire of your reputation, and a close enemy of most men who wish you well.

And what will you get in return? Well, if I must for the benefit of the economists, charge you up with some selfish gain, I will say that you get the satisfaction of having been heard, and that this is the whole possible scope of human ambition.

When I was asked to make this address I wondered what I had to say to you boys who are graduating. And I think I have one thing to say. If you wish to be useful, never take a course that will silence you. Refuse to learn anything that you cannot proclaim. Refuse to accept anything that implies collusion, whether it be a clerkship or a curacy, a legal fee or a post in a university. Retain the power of speech, no matter what other power you lose. If you can, take this course, and in so far as you take it, you will bless this country. In so far as you depart from this course you become dampers, mutes, and hooded executioners. As for your own private character it will be preserved by such a course. Crime you cannot commit

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for crime gags you. Collusion gags you. As a practical matter a mere failure to speak out upon occasions where no opinion is asked or expected of you, and when the utterance of an uncalled-for suspicion is odious, will often hold you to a concurrence in palpable iniquity. It will bind and gag you and lay you dumb and in shackles like the veriest serf in Russia. I give you this one rule of conduct. Do what you will, but speak out always. Be shunned, be hated, be ridiculed, be scared, be in doubt, but don't be gagged.

The choice of Hercules was made when Hercules was a lad. It cannot be made late in life. It will perhaps come for each one of you within the next eighteen months. I have seen ten years of young men who rush out into the world with their messages, and when they find how deaf the world is, they think they must save their strength and get quietly up on some little eminence from which they can make themselves heard. "In a few years," reasons one of them, "I shall have gained a standing, and then I shall use my power for good." Next year comes, and with it a strange discovery. The man has lost his horizon of thought. His ambition has evaporated; he has nothing to say. The great occasion that was to have let him loose on society was some little occasion that nobody saw, some moment in which he decided to obtain a standing. The great battle of a lifetime has been fought and lost over a silent scruple. But for this, the man might, within a few years, have spoken to the nation with the voice of an archangel. What was he waiting for? Did he think that the laws of nature were to be changed for him? Did he think that a "notice of trial" would be served on him? Or that some spirit would stand at his elbow and say, "Now's your time?" The time of trial is always. Now is the appointed time. And the compensation for beginning at once is that your voice carries at once. You do not need a standing. It would not help you. Within less time than you can see it, you will have been heard. The air is filled with sounding boards and the echoes are flying. It is ten to one that you have but to lift your voice to be heard in California, and that from where you stand. A bold plunge will teach you that the visions of the unity of human nature which

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the poets have sung, were not fictions of their imagination, but a record of what they saw. Deal with the world, and you will discover their reality. Speak to the world, and you will hear their echo.

Social and business prominence look like advantages, and so they are if you want money. But if you want moral influence you may bless God you have not got them. They are the payment with which the world subsidizes men to keep quiet, and there is no subtlety or cunning by which you can get them without paying in silence. This is the great law of humanity, that has existed since history began, and will last while man lasts—evil, selfishness, and silence are one thing.

The world is learning, largely through American experience, that freedom in the form of a government is no guarantee against abuse, tyranny, cruelty, and greed. The old sufferings, the old passions are in full blast among us. What, then, are the advantages of self-government? The chief advantage is that self-government enables a man in his youth, in his own town, within the radius of his first public interests, to fight the important battle of his life while his powers are at their strongest, and the powers of oppression are at their weakest. If a man acquires the power of speech here, if he says what he means now, if he makes his point and dominates his surroundings at once, his voice will, as a matter of fact be heard instantly in a very wide radius. And so he walks up into a new sphere and begins to accomplish great things. He does this through the very force of his insistence on the importance of small things. The reason for his graduation is not far to seek. A man cannot reach the hearts of his townsfolk, without using the whole apparatus of the world of thought. He cannot tell or act the truth in his own town without enlisting every power for truth, and setting in vibration the cords that knit that town into the world's history. He is forced to find and strike the same note which he would use on some great occasion when speaking for all mankind. A man who has won a town-fight is a veteran, and the country is full of these young men. To-morrow their force will show in national politics, and in that moment the fate of the Malay, the food of the Russian prisoner,

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the civilization of South Africa and the future of Japan will be seen to have been in issue. These things are now being settled in the contest over the town-pump in a western village. I think it likely that the next thirty years will reveal the recuperative power of American institutions. One of you young men might easily become a reform President, and be carried into office and held in office by the force of that private opinion which is now being sown broadcast throughout the country by just such men as yourselves. You will concede the utility of such a President. Yet it would not be the man but the masses behind him that did his work.

Democracy thus lets character loose upon society and shows us that in the realm of natural law there is nothing either small or great; and this is the chief value of democracy. In America the young man meets the struggle between good and evil in the easiest form in which it was ever laid before men. The cruelties of interest and of custom have with us no artificial assistance from caste, creed, race prejudice. Our frame of government is drawn in close accordance with the laws of nature. By our documents we are dedicated to mankind; and hence it is that we can so easily feel the pulse of the world and lay our hand on the living organism of humanity.

JOHN JAY CHAPMAN.

NEW YORK.

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HENRY SIDGWICK.

HENRY SIDGWICK, who died at Terling Place, Essex, on the 28th of August last, was one of the three or four most prominent philosophical writers, and by far the keenest philosophical critic, of his day in England. He was born in 1838, the son of a Yorkshire clergyman and one of a family of scholars, and was educated at Rugby School and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He graduated 33rd Wrangler and Senior Classic in 1859, was elected a Fellow of Trinity in the same year, and at once appointed to a college lectureship. For the last forty-one years of his life he was almost continuously occupied in educational work at Cambridge. In 1875 his lectureship was transformed into the office of Praelector of Moral and Political Philosophy; he resigned this office in 1883, but was in the same year appointed to the Knightbridge professorship of Moral Philosophy. He held the professorship till the end of May in the present year, when the knowledge that he had been stricken by a dangerous illness led to his resignation.

Sidgwick's reputation in the world of letters was made in 1874 by the publication of "The Methods of Ethics." But before that date he was known to a large circle of friends in Cambridge, Oxford, and London, as a man of subtle and perfectly balanced intelligence, of great brilliance in discussion, and of unique personal charm. It was known, too, that his sensitive and upright moral principle had led in 1869 to his resignation of his Fellowship at Trinity, because he was no longer able to accept the theological test which he had with good conscience subscribed to on his admission, and which was, at that time, still required of persons admitted to fellowships.* The problem,

*Under the statutes then in force all persons admitted to degrees in the Universities had to declare themselves *bonâ fide* members of the Church of England. A more stringent test was required of persons admitted to fellowships. Sidgwick resigned on the 15th October, 1869. "The effect," says a contemporary, "was decisive." "Among residents a body of opinion

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which involved this sacrifice in its solution, forms the subject of his first independent publication, "The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription" (1870).

Since the publication of the "Methods of Ethics," Sidgwick's unwearied literary activity has been shown by his elaborate volumes, the "Principles of Political Economy" (1883), and the "Elements of Politics" (1891). He contributed fourteen articles to *Mind,* besides numerous critical notices and discussions, and several articles to this JOURNAL. These latter and some other essays—several of them addresses to Ethical Societies—have been collected into a volume of "Practical Ethics" (1898). His works include also "The Scope and Method of Economic Science" (1885), his Presidential Address to the Economic Section of the British Association, and "Outlines of the History of Ethics" (1886), a largely extended reprint of his article "Ethics," contributed to the Encyclopædia Britannica. At the time of his death he had been for some years at work on a political treatise in which the abstract method of the "Elements" is supplemented by historical study of political forms, and on a systematic metaphysical inquiry. It is hoped that considerable portions of these may be in a sufficiently advanced state to admit of publication. Many of his occasional articles also should be rescued from the usual fate of such literature. Among these the article on "Bentham and Benthamism," which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* for 1877 may be mentioned, as now little known and difficult to obtain.

In addition to his literary and teaching work, Sidgwick took

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crystallized, and it was found, to the surprise of many, that the majority had become favorable to abolition." On the 29th November following, at a meeting held in St. John's College Lodge, the agitation for the abolition of the tests was set on foot. "A similar meeting was held two days before at Oxford," but "it was on receipt of intelligence of the new move at Cambridge that the Oxford meeting was taken in hand." Sidgwick's action also determined the reformers to agitate for the abolition of the test on admission to fellowships as well as of that on admission to degrees (other than degrees in divinity). The tests were abolished by Act of Parliament in 1871. See Sir George Young, in *The Cambridge Review,* 1st November, 1900.

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his full share of academic business. An unusually busy man, he never seemed to be hurried for time, and had the secret of utilizing the odd quarters-of-an-hour which are commonly wasted between different engagements. His wide sympathies, practical wisdom, and complete disinterestedness made him a trusted leader both in ordinary business and in many reforms and new departures. He speaks somewhere in his "Ethics" of a lively interest in fairly prosperous institutions as one of the great sources of happiness. It cannot be said that the University ever realized all his ideals of what a University ought to be as a place of education and of original work; but it has been, at least, a "fairly prosperous institution;" and he cannot but have been aware that its prosperity was due in no small measure to his active devotion to its well-being. His services to the cause of the higher education of women are well known. From the first he was its most active and devoted supporter; and he remained throughout his life the most powerful advocate, the wisest counsellor, and the most generous friend of the movement. He also took a generous, if less prominent, part in the development of the provision for scientific study and research which has distinguished Cambridge during the past generation.

As a philosophical and ethical teacher Sidgwick founded no school. Cambridge does not provide a field such as T. H. Green found open at Oxford for "those who have a faith to communicate." At Oxford philosophy has a place assigned it in the school which both from its traditions and from its numbers is the most important in the University; at Cambridge, it is not combined with classical or other studies, but has a place of its own; its students have the whole of their time for its pursuit; and the number of English undergraduates for whom such a curriculum is adapted can never be large. If the Moral Sciences Tripos has a position in the estimation of university and college authorities far higher than the mere number of its students can account for, this position is largely due to the influence of Sidgwick, to his care in organizing the philosophical teaching, to his own untiring zeal as a lecturer, and to the distinction which his reputation gave to the department of which

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he was the chief representative. Sidgwick exerted a powerful influence, both intellectual and moral, upon his pupils. But his temperament was too critical, his intellect too evenly balanced, to admit of his teaching a dogmatic system. He had certainly disciples for his own special forms of doctrine; but they were never very numerous, and of late years perhaps had not increased in number. What he taught was much more a method, an attitude of mind; and his teaching was a training in the philosophical temper—in candor, self-criticism, and regard for truth. He had himself arrived at and formulated a definite set of doctrines, at least in ethics, politics, and economics: probably also in many questions of metaphysics. But these were not rounded off into a system. His adherence to one side in a philosophical controversy was always tempered by a due regard for the elements of truth in the opposed theory. The most notable example of this is his attitude to the hedonist tradition in English ethics. His "Methods of Ethics" was accepted by the representatives of that tradition as a most powerful argument for Utilitarianism or (as he termed it) Universalistic Hedonism; but Sidgwick saw that the theory could be rationally maintained only by relinquishing the view which almost all his predecessors had regarded as proving it, the view that pleasure is the only possible object of desire. This careful distinction of problems, which he carried out in many other questions, enabled him to maintain a balanced and independent position between the purely rationalist and the purely empirical schools.

On the whole he may be regarded as in ethics, politics, and economics belonging to the same school as J. S. Mill, but as having still further refined its doctrines. He was the first leading English thinker of this tradition who brought to bear upon it the scholarship and special training of the universities. He had a scholar's sympathy with Intellectualism; and sought to combine the formal ethical principles of the Intellectual school with the content of empirical hedonism. To this extent his theory is eclectic; but it is an eclecticism reached by a thorough criticism of each of two rival doctrines. Criticism exhibits something of real value in each view, and these ele-

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ments of value are taken up into the new theory. Sidgwick's clear insight made it impossible for him to overlook the difficulties in the way of rounding off his beliefs into a complete theory of life. The supreme aim he put forward for conduct—"Universal Happiness, desirable consciousness or feeling for the innumerable multitude of living beings, present and to come,"—was defended as "an end that satisfies our imagination by its vastness, and sustains our resolution by its comparative security." But no one has pointed out so clearly and convincingly as he has done the difficulties which surround any attempt to measure the value of conduct by its effects in producing this "desirable consciousness or feeling." It is almost as if he wished to forewarn his pupils and readers against the enthusiasm which had given to Utilitarianism the passion and purpose of a creed in the minds of J. S. Mill and other disciples of Bentham. In perfect candor he rivalled J. S. Mill, and he far excelled him in technical knowledge of philosophy and in critical subtlety, but he was without that conviction of the truth and social importance of a simple set of beliefs which made Mill's influence so potent. Sidgwick had to see all round a question, to observe the weaknesses as well as the strength of every position. He seemed to take delight in standing on ground which would bear his weight, but nothing more, in poising himself on a height where only his perfect nerve could maintain him in equilibrium. It is therefore not surprising if he did not fill the minds of his hearers with devotion for a doctrine or a creed. Admiration, rather than imitation, was the most fitting attitude for others to adopt. But upon those who could receive it, his teaching had a finer effect than enthusiasm for any set of beliefs; it communicated an enthusiasm for truth itself: the rigor of self-criticism as well as the ardor of inquiry. Severely intellectual in his method of instruction, if his teaching was touched by emotion at all, it was the *amor intellectualis veritatis* that inspired it.

Sidgwick's views on general philosophy are not marked by any great unifying conception. And this want would seem to be a consequence of his whole mental attitude. His loyalty to reason made it impossible for him to rest content with hypo-

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thetical solutions: no μῦθος was allowed to give imaginative completeness where logic had failed to systematize. The view, often put forward more or less explicitly in these days, that feeling and will have rights in the determination of one's philosophy was not his. Weight was given to purely intellectual considerations only. And he seems to have expected to reach the final synthesis (if at all) by the same kind of reasons as those which establish departmental truths. Perhaps it is not fanciful to connect with this characteristic the motive which led him to devote so much time and labor to the investigation of the elusive phenomena which make a special claim to be known as "psychical." He was one of the founders and the first president of the Society for Psychical Research; and the scientific character of the Society's work is in all probability largely due to his influence. He fully recognized the strange mixture of conscious and unconscious deception in the mass of evidence brought before the Society; but he seems to have arrived at the conclusion that, after all necessary sifting, the alleged facts were sufficient to establish the hypothesis of telepathy—that, under certain unknown conditions, communications could pass from mind to mind without the usual intermediation of the senses. Further light than this on the destiny of the soul he did not find; and it is noteworthy that even the hypothesis of telepathy does not seem to have been utilized or referred to by him in the writings which he gave to the world as contributions to philosophy.

Sidgwick was not without the desire to see things as a whole, which is the impulse that leads to system. But he had himself felt the difficulties in the way; and he was an unsparing critic of every attempt at unity—especially those made in the two most important movements of his time, the speculative construction of T. H. Green, and the more ambitious theory of natural evolution put forward by Mr. Spencer. With both these writers he carried on some controversies, and neither, it must be said, was his match in dialectics. He had an unerring instinct for the weak places of an argument; and the impression his criticisms are apt to leave with us is that all constructive systems owe their impressiveness to a certain vagueness at the

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critical points of the proof. By these criticisms he rendered a service of great value to clear thinking; and their value will be increased if they lead to an adequate discussion of the kind of proof required for the vindication of a general or philosophical point of view.

It was not of philosophical theories only that Sidgwick was a great critic, but also of those vaguer ideas, emotions, and desires which make up the inner life of man. The third book of his "Methods of Ethics," entitled "Intuitionism," consists in large part of an analysis of the Morality of Common Sense,—a sympathetic elucidation and examination of the moral notions which, whether expressed in books or not, form the ethical inheritance of the average educated man of the present day. Nothing that he has ever done excels this portion of his work. In it he has made conscious and explicit what is in all men's minds, and has summed up its significance. It may be presumptuous even to guess at the verdict of posterity; but perhaps it will turn out that this book will retain a permanent value, even if the careful construction and criticism of theories on various topics which he has put forward should be superseded. It does for the cultured Englishman of the latter half of the nineteenth century what Aristotle, in his "Ethics," did for the Athenian of his time. The permanent interest of its subject-matter and the severe distinction of its style mark it as a classic.

It is impossible to close this notice without referring to the sense of loss under which the University term has begun. Life will be a poorer thing to very many; and there are not a few who feel that the wisest and the justest man they have ever known has passed away.

W. R. Sorley.

Cambridge, England.

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THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF SIDGWICK'S "ETHICS."

I. *Sidgwick's Empiricist Sympathies.*

To English-speaking students the "Methods of Ethics" should have peculiar interest as representing, on first sight, the typical form of English thought. "The English thinker keeps as close as possible to phenomena, and the principles which he uses in the explanation of phenomena, themselves lie in the realm of concrete experience. He keeps constantly in touch with the popular consciousness. His reverence for reality .... and his distrust of far-reaching abstraction are strong."* True of most of Sidgwick's predecessors, those words appear, to superficial readers of his work, true of Sidgwick also.

In aim and sympathies he was, it will probably be admitted, an Empiricist. But Empiricism has for years been losing its hold on the land of its birth and development. True to the long and distinguished line of his empiricist predecessors, true also to his own sympathies, Sidgwick refused to associate himself with the Idealistic invasion, unconscious, perhaps, that the irruptive forces had already broken into the citadel of his own thought. Thus at a time when German ideas threatened to inundate the Universities of Britain he stood as a sympathizer with, if not a representative of, the less ambitious, though not less important type of thought which goes by the name of Empiricism.

II. *Special Merits of the "Methods of Ethics."*

The "Methods of Ethics" is important for another reason. It possesses a merit to which no ethical work, except that of Aristotle, can lay an equal claim, the merit of transparent fairness and honesty. So extreme, at times, is Sidgwick's desire to be absolutely judicial that he leaves his readers in some per-

*Falckenberg, "History of Modern Philosophy," Eng. translation, p. 84.

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plexity as to his own positive attitude. He is conscious of merits and, still more, of demerits in every ethical system. We are wont to regard him as a Utilitarian and as a critic of Intuitionism, but he is aware of the many difficulties in the former system, and of so much truth in the latter that his most constructive chapter is headed, "Philosophical Intuitionism." We are wont to regard him as a critic of Kant, yet, as we shall presently see, he borrows from Kant the leading doctrine of the *"Grundlegung"* (the doctrine of impartiality of judgment) and the leading *motif* of Idealism (emphasis on rationality of conduct). He has a good word for Egoism, even though the result of his examination thereof apparently is that "a dubious guidance to a despicable end"* is all that the Hedonistic calculus has to offer." Few are the maxims which he permits to pass unscathed through his critical mill; for these, however, we are thankful, well-assured that they have made out a good claim to validity.

Thus the chief philosophical excellences of Sidgwick are critical acumen and honesty of aim; his chief defect, absence of constructive power. These, taken together, leave upon the mind of each reader a feeling of negativeness, paralyzing at first to some, stimulating to others, valuable to all, pleasant to none. As a constructive ethical work, the "Methods of Ethics" is confessedly a failure; construction was not its aim. As a critical *propœdeutic* to positive works it is invaluable and unique. The ethical systems of the future will be all the better for the appearance of a work which might well be called (to borrow Kantian terminology), "Prolegomena to every future system of Ethical Philosophy which can claim to rank as Science."

III. *Sidgwick's Critical Treatment of Idealism.*

We have emphasized this aspect of Sidgwick's work because it is now our duty to call attention to one instance (fortunately quite a solitary one) in which his impartiality is not so obvious. Though never consciously unfair to Idealism, he felt

*"Methods of Ethics," Book III., ch. 1.

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himself out of sympathy with it, though, as we shall presently see, there were strong Idealistic undercurrents in his own mind. In his "Methods" he never did full justice, even critically, to its point of view. He occasionally refers to it; he criticizes a few of its minor characteristics, but he never faces the weighty metaphysical arguments of Green and Green's successors. The want, it is true, is to some extent supplied by his article on "Green's Ethics" which he contributed to the pages of *Mind*. But in view of the influential position of Oxford thought, it is astounding that a five-edition treatise on the leading methods of Ethics should devote only a few scattered remarks (mainly footnotes) to the most important of contemporary systems, and that Idealism, so far as dealt with in the text, should be treated merely as a form, and not, apparently, a leading form of Intuitionism. For every other system he has a word of praise; every other system he treats with seriousness and respect; his treatment of this by means of a few *en passant* strictures, is perfunctory and inadequate. No reader of the "Methods" unacquainted with contemporary events would imagine that, at the time Sidgwick wrote, Idealism in Britain was a powerful, growing, and apparently victorious system of thought; the inference would rather be that the prevailing system was a crude Intuitionism, after which, as a good second, came Egoism. To the students of the future, Sidgwick's book will therefore convey an altogether wrong impression of nineteenth century thought, and the error will not be removed by an examination of the same author's "Outlines of the History of Ethics," in which the work of Green is represented by less than two pages of exposition.*

IV. *Sidgwick's Eclecticism.*

We might almost say that Sidgwick was inspired by a *furor* for compromising. His system is *prima facie* the most remarkable ethical compromise in existence. He seems to have had a suspicion of any pretentious and apparently homogeneous system of thought, convinced, no doubt, that any such system

*Pp. 259-60.

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was dowered from birth with failure. He refused, therefore, to add to their number, and preferred rather to examine keenly existing systems, to select from each its kernel of truth after the husk has been removed by his powerful criticism, and then to present these fragments to the world, uncoördinated and almost unsystematized. Such was his task, useful, no doubt, perhaps supremely useful. It may be that all systems are doomed to fall, and if so the philosopher who saves from the wreckage of each a solitary truth, is performing a more valuable task than one who seeks again to construct where so many predecessors have failed. But the result to which Sidgwick leads us is remarkable in the extreme, and by Kant would have been regarded with horror and contempt. For Sidgwick has done what Kant, at the outset of his ethical treatises, declared fatal to the truth of the science; he has not "begun with pure philosophy (metaphysic) without which there cannot be any moral philosophy at all"; on the contrary he has "mingled pure principles with empirical," and hence his treatise "does not deserve the name of philosophy."*

Criticism, compromise, and empiricist sympathies are, then, some of the most striking features of Sidgwick's thought. We find them in two predecessors with whom he had much in common, Butler and Reid. When "Common Sense" rationalizes it becomes Eclecticism; Sidgwick was to a large extent an Eclectic. This fact will become more obvious as we proceed, for it is now our duty to point out, what has been already suggested, that, in spite of his empiricist sympathies, and his love of criticism and compromise, Sidgwick had been powerfully though unconsciously influenced by the system he despised. His empiricism, like that of Mill, had yielded here and there to the pressures of deeper thought.

V. *Outline of the Kantian Elements in Sidgwick's Ethics.*

We have already referred incidentally to the emphasis laid by Sidgwick on "rationality" of conduct. "Right" he invari-

*"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals," Abbot's translation, p. 5.

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ably interprets in the sense of "rational." Kant does the same. The main difference between the two philosophers is that while Kant establishes the claims of reason by a lengthy argument, Sidgwick does little more than assert them. Here, as elsewhere in his work, whenever he stood on the brink of a great positive doctrine Sidgwick shrank back, refusing to embark upon the treacherous sea of construction and preferring rather the loved and familiar fields of criticism and negation. But the fact that throughout his great work he equates "right" with "rational" is significant in the extreme.

Again, when he admits that the notion of "oughtness" or "rightness" must be taken as "ultimate and unanalyzable"* he breaks still further with Hedonism and Empiricism. No consistent Hedonist would admit that the notion is "ultimate," and the few who would admit it to be "unanalyzable" would only do so on the ground that a meaningless notion is no notion at all, and therefore certainly unanalyzable. Hedonists contend that, if there is any validity in the notion of "oughtness," the notion is capable of further analysis into "conduciveness to happiness or to absence of misery." Sidgwick, therefore, in identifying "oughtness" or "rightness" with "reasonableness," and maintaining that the notion represented by these words is fundamental to ethics, is far removed from the position of a consistent Hedonism.

But in his apotheosis of reason he goes still further; he admits that reason can act as a motive to the will. This, as Professor Sorley† points out is really the question of questions in Ethics, and any intelligible doctrine of the Freedom of the Will must have as its basis the free motivity of Reason.‡ Such free motivity has always been denied by consistent Hedonists such as Hume. "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." "Reason can never of itself be any motive to the Will." If the cognition of an act as "right" or "reasonable"

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*"Methods of Ethics," Part I., ch. 3.

†"Ethics of Naturalism," p. 16-17.

‡ "We admit at once that if (man) is not free or self-determined in his motive, he is not free at all."—Green: "Prolegomena to Ethics," § 97.

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does, as Sidgwick admits, "give an impulse or motive to action,"* the function of reason cannot be merely ancillary; reason is itself a spring of action, and Hedonism is therefore psychologically and ethically unsound. We are reminded of Kant's words; "Our existence has a different and far nobler end (than happiness or satisfaction), for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended."† Though Sidgwick shrank from drawing such an inference as this, and refused to interpret the Summum Bonum in any except a Hedonistic sense, his admission that reason can give a motive to action is really fatal even to his highly attenuated Hedonism.

Again, as already pointed out incidentally, and as admitted by Sidgwick himself,‡ the maxim of "Justice" expounded in the "Methods" bears a close resemblance to the Categorical Imperative of Kant. "Whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances." "Act on a maxim that you can will to be law universal." We shall see later that these two principles are not identical, but that they are closely related is obvious on the first glance.

One further case of parallel thought between these two thinkers is presented by the way in which each of them extricates himself from the Antinomy of Practical Reason. Kant, when faced by the facts of an experience which does not reveal an invariable connection between virtue and happiness, falls back upon the postulates of God and Immortality.§ Sidgwick brought to a very similar *impasse* sees no other exit therefrom than the theological one, though his confidence in this non-ethical solution of ethical difficulties appears to have been less than was the case with Kant. We say "appears," because in the last and very highly characteristic chapter of the "Methods," his attitude towards the theological problem is, while professedly impartial, really negative rather than posi-

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*"Methods," Part I., ch. 3.
† "Fundamental Principles," Abbot's translation, p. 12.
‡ "Methods," Part I., ch. 13.
§ "Critique of Practical Reason," Abbot's translation, p. 210 *seq.*

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tive. But, as pointed out above, Sidgwick never did full expository justice even to his own positive doctrines, and therefore the negative impression which is conveyed by this most important chapter may be a wrong one. In any case, he was, throughout his work consistent in his avoidance of ultimate metaphysical solutions.

VI. *Sidgwick's Treatment of Egoistic Hedonism.*

In spite of the important Idealistic or Rationalistic elements which we have shown to exist in his philosophy and most of which are, in his case, traceable, perhaps, to Butler, rather than Kant, Sidgwick did not professedly break with Hedonism. He criticises, it is true, Egoistic Hedonism, with keenness and severity, but he cannot free himself from the belief that the system he criticised must have a place in Ethics. Psychological Hedonism, however, he utterly and finally overthrows; men's actions are not always, nor even usually, directed deliberately at happiness. He even admits, as the "fundamental paradox of Hedonism," that a conscious striving for personal happiness, is, unless carefully limited, destructive of the very happiness for which it strives. But, while admitting all this, he clings to the Hedonistic view that the Summum Bonum can only be expressed in terms of happiness, or, as he calls it, "Desirable Consciousness"; and that an egoistic striving after it, tempered by a knowledge of the above "paradox," is a duty. "I ought to seek my own happiness" is a principle which he regards as categorical and intuitive.

When, however, we take this principle in connection with others which he lays down with equal confidence, its Hedonism becomes less pronounced. "Oughtness" or "rightness" is equivalent, he tells us, to "Reasonableness." It is reasonable to seek my own happiness. What is the motive to such action? Does the motive lie in the *end*, or in the *reasonableness?* If in the former, then Sidgwick is a Hedonist; if in the latter, he is not. Now he has admitted that the reasonableness of an act supplies a motive to its performance. We may claim, therefore, that on his own showing Reason is the fundamental ethical principle, and that the famous declaration of Hume that

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it "is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" is erroneous. Reason has no mere ancillary function to Feeling; it is the judge before whose bar all feelings have to appear. But surely it is more even than that. It is, in the only possible sense of the term, a "free cause," operative, no doubt, among feelings, but contributing a principle which cannot be explained by feeling; a cause whose activity is aided here and checked there by favorable or unfavorable conditions, but which yet contains the potentiality of passing judgment on the very conditions which further or hamper it. Such, we conceive are the inferences we must draw, though the language is not his, from Sidgwick's two important admissions that Rationality supplies a motive to the will, and is itself an "ultimate and unanalyzable" principle.

VII. *Sidgwick's Utilitarianism.*

So far we have discussed only the Egoistic type of Hedonism, and have ignored an important principle which, in Sidgwick's view, is as intuitively certain as that of Egoism. "Whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances." Here the emphasis on Reason is even startling. There is an obvious divorce from Egoism, and no obvious reference even to Hedonism, for, as he points out, the maxim is independent of our view of Ultimate Good. It is a formal principle, enunciated solely by the abstract reason, and bearing a close relationship to Kant's Categorical Imperative. It may indeed be regarded as the simple converse of the latter. Kant's principle is that, whatever act can be willed by me as a universal law, is right for me; Sidgwick's, that whatever act is judged to be right for me, I judge also to be right universally. The question then arises, which of these formulæ is the more fundamental and satisfactory? Simple conversion of hypothetical propositions, is illegitimate, hence the formulæ are not identical; one may be true, and the other false.

It will be clear, on examination, that Sidgwick's principle is preferable to Kant's. The universal applicability of a moral rule follows causally from its rightness; its rightness does not follow causally from its universal applicability. [The case is

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somewhat similar to that of the two Kantian criteria of *à priori* truths; necessity, as Hamilton points out, is the cause of universality, and therefore not coördinate with it.] If this be the case, Kant's formula ceases to be a fundamental one; universality is merely a *proprium* of right conduct, and the real definition of rightness has still to be sought. Kant, by reversing the relation between rightness and universality only apparently supplied a definition of rightness; in reality, the whole question was begged. If universality follows from rightness we are not justified in deducing rightness from universality.

VIII. *The Summum Bonum.*

What, then, is rightness? If the history of past thought is a sufficient guide there can be two and only two answers to this question. The answers have to be found either in a Hedonistic or an Idealistic interpretation of the Summum Bonum. Sidgwick chose the former, and by so doing, introduced, we consider, a fundamental inconsistency into his system.

It seems a hard thing to say of a reasonable system such as Hedonism that it is fundamentally and obviously false. And yet, unless it can refute the weighty declaration which Kant made at the opening of his first ethical treatise, it stands condemned of inadequacy. "A good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being worthy of happiness."* The idea of *Desert* is a stumbling-block to every Hedonistic system; consequently, desperate attempts are made to get rid of it. But no Hedonist (to say nothing of other men who are not Hedonists) can destroy or explain away, sociologically or psychologically, this ineradicable principle. "The right of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator."* The most thoroughgoing Determinism is really powerless to destroy the conviction that happiness *ought* to go to the deserving and not merely to the prudent. Indeed it is Determinism which bears the clearest

*"Fundamental Principles," Abbot's translation, p. 9.
*Ibid.

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witness to the principles, for all Determinists object to regarding punishment as merely retributive. Why? Because they regard the criminal as unable to help his criminality and therefore as undeserving of retributive punishment. If he *were* a free agent retributive punishment would, they consider, be legitimate. Desert is therefore a fundamental notion alike to the extreme Libertarian, the extreme Determinist, and to the Rational or Self-Determinist. It is not *per se* a mere product of association, or of sociological or evolutionary conditions, though the latter, no doubt, have been operative in giving to it the weight of the social sanctions in which however it is itself implied.

Now Hedonism is unable to reduce this conception to lower terms. No analysis of the notion of Desert will yield the Hedonistic principle of Prudence.

Our analysis will, however, yield another notion, that of Rightness. It is the man who has acted *rightly* who deserves happiness. Is a further analysis possible? We think not. The notion of *rightness* is the ultimate *datum* of Ethics; it can be generalized, so as to apply to a life rather than to an act, but it cannot be resolved into anything simpler or more fundamental. When generalized it yields us the more or less definite notion of an Ideal of conduct, a Perfect Life or Being; it never yields us the notion of Prudence. The connection between the notions of Rightness and of Pleasure, if, indeed, there is any clear connection at all, is a synthetic and not an analytic one. In short there is, in Ethics, an absolute "Ought"; one that varies, no doubt, on its material side in savages and civilized, in determinists and libertarians, in fools and philosophers; varies, except in its "Oughtness." We find this fact implied in Mill's "Sense of Dignity," and in Sidgwick's confession that "oughtness" must be accepted as an "ultimate and unanalyzable" notion. Treat "rightness" or "oughtness" as a delusion, and no system of Ethics is possible. Sidgwick demonstrates this in the third chapter of his "Methods." Had he only consistently followed out the line of thought there initiated he would have arrived at a different conception of the Summum Bonum.

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In contending that our common and ineradicable notion of "Oughtness" implies a Perfectionist and not a Hedonist Ideal we are not seeking to restore to Ethics any crude Moral Sense or Intuitional theory, but merely to lop off Hedonistic excrescences which are merely a source of inconsistency and weakness. Happiness, we may well hope, is man's ultimate lot, though in face of the arguments of pessimistic philosophers, and apart from theological postulates, we can have little assurance that such is the case. Happiness may, as Kant expressed it, be a part of man's *perfect** good, but it is no part of his *supreme* good, nor is it his duty to seek to realize *mere* happiness either for himself or for others. "Mere" happiness, indeed, is the sorriest of social ends. The Summum Bonum is an ideal of Reason, an ideal constantly taking shape in new concrete forms, and differing therefore in this respect from the purely formal and abstract ideal of Duty which we find in Kant. Kant's ideal was, we may admit, too abstract, but it was at least pure; for he knew too well the folly of trying to build a system of Ethics upon non-ethical foundations. "Maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on them."§ The ideal of Reason may, as Sidgwick contends, be vague, but somehow or other it is powerful; and, as keeping closer to reality, it avoids the innumerable contradictions which, from the dawn of Philosophy, have lain latent or patent in every system of Hedonism. Until Hedonism can clear itself of its contradictions, and can explain more intelligibly than hitherto it has done the simple phenomena of duty, desert, self-sacrifice, and quality of pleasures, we are bound to conclude that there is, somewhere or other, a fundamental error in its assumptions.

IX. *The Contradictions of Hedonism.*

It is here, in the admission of the Hedonistic contradictions that Sidgwick's work has the greatest significance. He has

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**Consummatum* or *perfectissimum*.—"Critique of Practical Reason," Abbot's translation, p. 206.

§ Ibid., p. 209.

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started out from the assumption that the Summum Bonum can only be thought of, "in a cool hour," in terms of pleasure, or "Desirable Consciousness"; so far, then, as the actual nature of the Summum Bonum is concerned, he appears as a thorough Hedonist. But, after giving to the service of ethical Hedonism his keenest powers of intellect, he sees no possibility of reconciling into a single system its two forms, while, at the same time he cannot deny the ultimate rationality of each. Thus, through the very heart of Hedonism runs a chasm, which he can only bridge by a theological postulate. Two thousand years of philosophy have failed to present the world with a self-consistent ethical system, based on Pleasure as the Summum Bonum. Sidgwick has failed, like his predecessors; but, unlike them, he has not hesitated to set forth the inherent contradictions of the system with which he is in partial sympathy. The "fundamental paradox" and the still more "fundamental contradiction" stand before us unconcealed. May the truth not be that, somewhere in the Hedonistic system there is a "fundamental" error?

In these days we are wont to condemn the Ethics of Kant as formal and ascetic. The "formality" we may admit and deplore, and with its removal much of the "asceticism" will disappear also. But the more we examine the primary notions of Ethics the more we shall become convinced that questions such as "How can I best forward my own and other people's happiness?" are not ethical questions at all. Happiness is a *"proprium"* or *"accidens"* (perhaps a "separable" one) of Virtue; it can give no "ought"; it can be the basis of no system. When attempts are made to employ it as such a basis, results, such as those we have seen in Sidgwick's case, are bound to follow. Non-hedonistic principles have to be introduced to give any possible plausibility to the product; and even when pressed into service and employed to the uttermost, they fail to save the system from hopeless and glaring contradictions. Thus Sidgwick's work, coming at the end of a long series of other attempts at Hedonistic construction, bears witness not only to the inroads of Idealistic thought, but to the internal weakness and bankruptcy of Hedonism itself.

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POSTSCRIPT.

The following incident relative to Professor Sidgwick's own view of his work is told me by Mr. Oscar Browning.

Sidgwick had just completed his "Methods of Ethics." There lay the manuscript, accepted by Messrs. Macmillan. The author looking upon it said to Mr. Browning: "I have long wished and intended to write a work on Ethics. Now it is written. I have adhered to the plan I laid out for myself; its first word was to be 'Ethics,' its last word 'Failure.' "

The word "Failure" disappeared from the second and succeeding editions, but I doubt whether Sidgwick ever acquired a faith in the possibility of a perfectly satisfactory ethical system.

F. H. HAYWARD.

GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

EDUCATION IN JAPAN.

THIRTY years ago, the Japanese people were practically where the Chinese are to-day; they were immersed in a sea of ignorance. In matters of art and manufacture, they went by a mere routine of practical experience, with no kind of scientific knowledge whatever. In religion and social usages, they were slaves of superstition, being in constant terror of offending the spirits of land, water and fire, of wood and stone. In politics, the narrowest particularism ruled the day, the patriotism and interests of a Japanese being confined within the narrow limits of one of three hundred principalities which split up the empire; a rudimentary sort of national sentiment being only noticeable in the universal hatred of "foreign barbarians." To be sure, there was an educated class—the Samurai—who had the monopoly of political and military privileges, who, numbering perhaps one-fifteenth of the population, were in a way highly cultured, remarkably free from popular superstitions and leading lives characterized by uprightness and devotion to duty. Yet the culture of these men was as one-sided as that of a Chinese mandarin; and in matters of science and the out-

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side world they were as ignorant as the most ignorant of their countrymen. That out of this sea of ignorance there arose a new Japan, civilized, free and strong, was due more to the introduction of a modern system of education than to any other one thing.

There were, of course, other potent factors which contributed toward the evolution of modern Japan. Among the more important of these may be mentioned: the overthrow of feudalism, with its accompanying caste privileges; the introduction of a modern code of laws and a judicial system, giving equal protection to all classes and to all legitimate interests of the people; the reform of the administration of the finances and of taxation, as well as the introduction of the modern banking system; and finally, the inauguration of a representative form of government. It is easy to see, however, that all these reforms, wise and far-reaching as they were, would have proved to be but mere paper and ink reforms, if it had not been for the rapid successes of a newly introduced system of education.

The modern system of education in Japan is largely the gift of America. In the middle of the seventies, when the system was first introduced, through the efforts of Count Oki, educational minister in those days, it was chiefly American advisors and men inspired with American ideas about education who shaped the policy of the government. Mr. Kido, one of the three leading statesmen of the Restoration epoch, who, as member of the famous Japanese Embassy of 1872-1873, paid special attention to educational matters, seems to have been deeply impressed by the state of things he saw in the United States. Again, it was Mr. Arinori Mori, at one time a student in the United States and afterwards the Japanese Minister at Washington, who in those early days did much to inspire and shape, though indirectly, the educational policy of the government, and when he was finally appointed in 1885 chief of the educational department, after his mind had been further enriched by a thorough study of educational matters in England and the continent of Europe, he entirely reorganized the system then in existence and gave it a new life and energy.

The educational system as it now exists is essentially similar

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to the system in vogue in America and Europe. It begins with the common school course, comprising a primary department covering four years, to which children at the age of six are admitted, and a secondary or higher grade covering another four years. Above this there is the middle school course of five years for boys and the high school course of four years for girls, to both of which those who have been two years in the higher department of the common school are admitted. Above the middle school stand the higher schools, of which there are six in the country, and which provide three years' preparatory course for the Imperial University, mostly in languages and mathematics, as well as, in the case of some of them, four years special training in medicine, law or engineering, instruction being given in the vernacular. Only the graduates of the middle school are admitted to the higher middle school, through competitive examination. Lastly, at the head of all stand the two Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto—the former consisting of the colleges of law, medicine, engineering, literature, science and agriculture; the latter of the colleges of science and engineering, medicine, law and literature. There is a provision made for the post-graduate studies, called Dai-gaku—to which only graduates of superior scholarship are eligible. The system as tabulated stands as follows:—



*The normal school consists of male and female departments and trains teachers for common schools, while the higher normal school trains teachers for normal schools, middle schools and girls' high schools. There are various other schools for special training or liberal education, some

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The following are the educational statistics in brief outline for 1898:—

Institutions	Number	Teaching Staff	Students and Pupils	Graduates
Common Schools	26,824 2 Government 26,368 Public 454 Private	83,566 73,665 males 9,901 females	4,062,418 2,582,277 males 1,480,141 females	598,881
Apprentice Schools	24 1 Government 17 Public 6 Private	135	1,525	185
Primary Industrial Schools	113 109 Public 4 Private	242	6,975	674
Blind and Dumb Asylums	7 1 Government 1 Public 5 Private	37	291	28
Normal Schools	47 Public	760	10,350	4,916
Higher Normal Schools	2 Government	103	731	106
Middle Schools	169 1 Government 138 Public 30 Private	2,608	61,632	3,067
Girls High Schools	34 1 Government 25 Public 8 Private	406	8,589	962
Higher Schools	6 Government	351	4,664	970
Imperial Universities	2 Government	230	2,560	477
Special Schools	41 6 Public 35 Private	600	11,142	1,657
Technical Schools	91 6 Government 71 Public 14 Private	927	13,286	2,212
Other schools, outside of the classes above named	1,061 17 Public 1,044 Private	2,998	63,178	12,008
Total for 1898	28,421	92,963	4,247,341	626,143
Total for 1897	28,452	87,855	4,168,717	573,796
Total for 1896	28,404	84,014	4,030,973	530,207
Total for 1895	28,228	80,342	3,802,183	488,304
Total for 1894	25,637	69,844	3,622,811	468,299

maintained by the government and others by private corporations, which stand outside of the national system as above sketched, but which form a no inconsiderable factor in the education of the country.

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It is encouraging to note that the attendance at common schools is steadily increasing. In 1898 the number of children of school age (six to fourteen years) who were enrolled in the common schools or who had graduated from the primary departments were 4,910,380, while the number of those who either left the primary departments before graduating or who were never enrolled was found to be 2,215,585. The percentage of school attendance during 1898 may be, therefore, put down as 68.91; while the increase may be seen by comparing the figures for 1898, with those for 1897 and 1896, *i. e.*, 66.65 and 64.22, respectively.

I believe it is not far from the truth that, since 1876, there have passed through our common schools some seventeen millions of children, of whom 30 per cent. were girls. It is no wonder, therefore, that among the army recruits who are drafted annually by conscription from all classes of people, the number of illiterates is rapidly decreasing, as may be seen from the following figures.

Statistics for army recruits for 1897 and 1898.

Year	Graduates from middle school	Graduates from higher department of common school	Graduates from primary department of common school	Illiterates	Percentage of illiterates
1897	26	6,913	19,630	6,464	.28
1898	386	8,117	23,772	5,436	.14

A marked increase in the demand for middle school education is another encouraging feature that should be noted. While in 1892 the number of middle schools throughout the country was but 62 and the students attending them 16,189, both the schools and attendance have since increased by leaps and bounds, until in 1897 there were 156 middle schools and 52,442 students in attendance; and the graduates from those schools have increased from 792 in 1892 to 2,458 in 1897. At the same time it was inevitable that the demand for the education of the higher middle school should increase. Of course, not all the middle school graduates wish to enter the higher middle schools. Many of them give up student life altogether.

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Many others enter various professional schools, such as business, law, medical, polytechnic, agricultural or normal schools. But an increasingly larger number aspire for university education, and these all ask for admittance into the higher middle schools. One of the most pressing questions with the educational authorities is how to make provision to meet the increased demand for the higher school education. There were six higher schools in 1898 and they could accommodate less than half the number asking for admission. The remedy for this painful state of things seems to lie either in greatly increasing the capacities of the present six schools or in establishing some new ones. The latter seems to be the plan in favor with the educational authorities and the public at large.

But the matter is not so simple as it seems. There is an ulterior question that must be decided before the latter plan is adopted. The question is this: Is the higher school a permanent institution or a temporary one? Now the courses of the higher middle school are strictly preparatory to the University, and are mainly devoted to modern languages and mathematics. It is strongly urged by some that the higher school, as preparatory to the university and as a distinct institution, need not be a permanent thing; that by improving the teaching and the grade of studies in the middle school, and, perhaps, by adding one or two years to that school, the preparatory course in the higher school may be dispensed with, so that the young men may be made to enter the university at once from the middle school. When such a reform is accomplished, these reformers contend, the present higher schools may be gradually turned into universities or colleges, which would be greatly to the advantage of the country, since the present two universities will hardly be sufficient to meet the educational requirement ten years hence. It seems, therefore, pending the decision of this question, a much wiser policy for the government to adopt the plan of increasing the capacities of the existing higher schools instead of establishing new ones.

University education has been confined until three years ago to the Imperial University of Tokyo, but since then the Imperial University of Kyoto has been founded. The two uni-

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versities will be found sufficient, provided their capacities are expanded, to meet the requirement of the nation for some years to come. Certain of the political parties have taken up the plan of founding two new universities—one in the northeast and the other in the southwest (Kiu-shu Is.) and considerable pressure is being brought upon the government to adopt this plan. I doubt very much, however, whether the finances of the country will allow the carrying out of any such bold scheme as the one mentioned; for the government is now confronted with the more pressing question of elementary education.

The provisions for common school education are in a very unsatisfactory condition. Not only is the percentage of school attendance not as high as one would wish it to be, but the *personnel* of teachers and the equipment of the schools are far from being satisfactory. If the principle of compulsory education is to be thoroughly carried out, it would be necessary first of all to dispense with the tuition, of which the amount received for 1898 was 4,542,382 *yen*—a no inconsiderable part of the income of the common schools. With the heavy school rates which the municipalities and village communes are now paying, it will be impossible to induce them to pay enough more to make the common school education free. Hence there does not seem to be any other solution but for the central government to increase its annual subsidy to cover that amount. But even more pressing than this is the question of the *personnel* of teachers. Of 79,299 common school teachers of the country only about one-half are properly qualified, the rest being teachers of doubtful qualification whom the schools are compelled to employ. The central government as well as prefectural governments have been giving, for several years past, a most serious attention to this question; but the much-needed teachers are not forthcoming and the prospect is not at all encouraging. There is no question that one essential condition is better pay. The average monthly pay of the properly qualified teacher is ten *yen* (or five dollars) and of the assistant teachers seven *yen*. The principal of the common school gets on an average probably twenty *yen*. Now these sums are miserably inadequate even in Japan where the prices are proverb-

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ially low. An ordinary coolie would get as much as the common school teacher, while skilled artisans, such as carpenters or masons would get as much as the principal of a common school. Ten or fifteen years ago when prices were one-half what they are now, the school teachers were tolerably well off. Besides, in those days there were a large number of needy Samurai, to whom these small salaries were no little attraction. But a great change has since come over the country, not only economically, but in the sentiment of the people. Most young men of the Samurai class, who would have contentedly filled the positions of common school teachers, are now rushing into business, where they get salaries double what they would get by teaching, with the possibility of becoming wealthy. It seems, therefore, that in order to make the profession of a common school teacher more attractive, the first necessary condition would be to raise the pay, and that by the only available method of state aid.

In fact a beginning was made in this direction some years ago, by the enactment of a law for increasing the salaries of teachers as reward for meritorious service. According to that law, a teacher who has served in one school five consecutive years gets his salary increased fifteen per cent., one who has served ten years twenty-five per cent., one who has served fifteen years thirty-five per cent.,—the gross amount thus increased being paid from the state treasury. In last year's Diet (1899) it was voted to set apart 10,000,000 *yen* out of the Chinese indemnity, as a permanent fund,—the annual income from which is to be used partly in aid of common schools in general and partly in making loans to the needy communes toward assisting in putting up suitable school houses. But a much larger appropriation from the state treasury will have to be made in order to secure the services of a sufficient number of competent teachers.

Much good will doubtless result, economically and otherwise, from the employment of a larger proportion of women teachers. At present there are about 17,362 women engaged in teaching in the common schools—a little over two-tenths of

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the entire number of teachers. There is no reason why the percentage between women and men may not be reversed.

A question of vital importance is the attitude of the government toward private schools. According to statistics there were in 1898, 454 common schools, 6 apprentice schools, 4 manual training schools, 5 blind and deaf asylums, 30 middle schools, 8 girls' high schools, 35 special schools, 14 technical schools and 1044 other schools of various grades, all maintained by private individuals or corporations. Now these schools are rendering a most useful service by filling the gap created through the inadequacy of provisions made by the state and the public. There is no question that some of the more influential of these schools, especially those engaged in the higher education, have hitherto been looked upon with little favor by government authorities. These private institutions refused to take official models and be tied to rules and systems prescribed by the government, but by adopting different methods seemed to claim that they could reach the aim set forth in the official programme more easily and more quickly. It is needless to say that this was not liked by officials addicted to the routine duties of the bureaucratic service. There were other features in these schools which were offensive to officials. Some of them had close connections with Christian churches, others were animated by a freer and more independent spirit than was found in government schools, while still others had political aims antagonistic to the parties in power. In one way and another, therefore, hindrances and impediments were placed in the way of these schools. The history of some of them is a series of struggles against official oppression. Yet a change is coming over the entire situation. On the one hand, it is becoming more and more apparent that it would be beyond the present financial means of the government to make at once a complete and sufficient provision for the educational requirement of the nation. On the other hand, the marked success of these private institutions in giving a much needed liberal education, as well as training in special subjects, such as law, medicine, etc., has come to be recognized even by the government officials. Moreover the democratic tendencies engendered by the

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successful working of the Imperial Diet have done much to break down the middle wall of partition between the officialdom and the country at large. The time is, I think, fast approaching when private schools will rank with state or public institutions and be officially protected and encouraged.

In commercial and technical education, the policy of the government—pursued with unflagging zeal for more than ten years—is now being crowned with great success. Much credit is due to Viscount Inouye, the minister of education in 1893-94, for laying the foundations of this most important branch of national education. The numerous schools of this description found all over the country, in increasingly larger number, are yearly sending out trained young men by the hundreds to fill places of responsibility as clerks, managers, mechanics, overseers. It is to these able and ambitious young men that the country must look to successfully accomplish its destined industrial and commercial development in the near future. When it is remembered that within less than a generation artisans and business men constituted a despised class, regarded as even below farmers, and that mathematics and useful arts were regarded as unworthy of the attention of the higher classes, their recent rush into business and industrial pursuits will show how great a revolution has taken place in sentiment and social conditions. In view of these facts, I believe it is not unreasonable to expect that the moral as well as the technical defects of Japanese commercial and industrial methods, now so justly complained of, will come to be remedied before many years are past. And when such a stage is reached Japan will have completed one of the last necessary changes toward her complete transformation into a first-rate modern nation.

The coming into operation of the new, revised treaties with western nations, through which the extra-territorial jurisdiction of foreign judicial courts—a yoke of bondage, however unavoidable, thoroughly rebelled against by the Japanese—has been abolished, is producing a broader and more sympathetic spirit among the people toward things and persons of the outside world, than was the case a number of years back. The effect is seen, for instance, in the importance that is being

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given to the teaching of modern languages in the schools. Last year the government opened a school of foreign languages, where eight modern languages are now being taught, including the Chinese and the Korean. Doubtless steps will also be taken toward making the teaching of English in the middle schools more effective, so that the English language—this being the only foreign language taught in the middle schools, except in the case of one or two—will be more and more the prevailing foreign language in the country, contributing through its rich literature and world-knowledge to the enlightenment and enrichment of the life and thought of the people.

The ethical teaching in the schools remains still the most important unsolved problem with the educators of the country. The various methods that have been tried during the past fifteen or more years, such as the use of Confucian classics or the worshiping of the letter of the emperor's rescript on morals, have all proved inadequate to solve the great problem with which the nation is confronted. The greatest difficulty in the way of its solution is probably caused by the presence of two factors which must be taken into consideration. These two factors are the relation of religion to education, and the bearing of the changed social conditions of the country on the kind of ethics to be taught in the schools.

Secular education in its barest form is the system that has been in vogue; but it is a question, which, I believe, is now beginning to engage the serious attention of many of our leading educational thinkers, whether education in order to be secular must necessarily be so completely detached from religion—or anti-religious—as has been the case hitherto. To Viscount Mori is attributed, whether rightly or wrongly I know not, the dictum which has ruled the educational world of Japan for years past, that the minds of pupils must be kept completely blank as far as religious ideas are concerned, until they attain to years of discretion. It is questionable, however, whether young minds can be kept entirely blank and free from religious bias for many years. Weeds grow and fill up gardens if useful plants are not cultivated. The actual result

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of this policy seems to be that the gain in the form of freedom from bigotry or superstition is counter-balanced by a lack of ethical ideals and intellectual depth among the educated people. Secularism in education, as emphasized by the Japanese authorities, seems to go hand in hand with shallowness and worldliness. When there is no sense of the eternal that maketh for righteousness, when no great and ennobling ideal pervades the thought, when martial glory and national splendor are all that call forth the ambition of youth in a country, who can expect great results from the teaching given in the schools? I am far from thinking that education in Japan should be given over entirely to Buddhist priests or Christian missionaries, or that endless religious disputations should be brought into the lecture room. I believe in secular education in the sense of its separation from sectarian religious systems or bodies. But secularism does not necessarily imply anti-religion, or hostility toward any one form of religion.

It is a question worthy of careful consideration whether some essential elements common to various religions, perhaps in the form of philosophical teaching, may not be introduced with advantage in connection with ethical instruction in the schools, without prejudicing or favoring, at the same time, any one form of religion. Or another method might be possible. While keeping the schools maintained by the government or public entirely free from the introduction even of such philosophical teachings as those suggested, some liberty of religious teaching outside of school hours might be left to the discretion of private schools, which in other respects would follow the government curriculum and receive all the corresponding privileges. If such a liberal attitude were pursued, these private schools would increase in number and help to introduce a much-needed higher ethical life into the school system.

The other factor to be considered is the changed social conditions of the country. It is needless to urge the importance of the historical method in the ethical training of the young. Not only do the acts and sayings of the heroes of history constitute the most important source of illustrations and reference for the ethical teacher, but the teaching of national history itself may

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be turned into a series of ethical lessons, especially in so far as public morals are concerned. It is, however, important to remember that there is a growth in history—in the history of the oriental nations as well as in that of the western—and that the social conditions prevailing *now* are different from those prevailing a century or less than a century ago. No ethical teacher can ignore the fact of such a growth or fail to understand the particular social conditions of his own time, without the risk of failure. It is much to be regretted that the ethical teachers in this country seem to fail to take sufficient note of the time they live in and of the points of difference between this and past times. Some of them at least teach and act as if they were living in the age of feudalism. The time has gone forever when the relation of the lord and retainer formed the supreme factor in a community, so that the one term *loyalty* was sufficient to express the tie that bound the entire social fabric together. The Japanese people are to-day and will continue to be one of the most patriotic of peoples. Never in the past history of the country were the people so devotedly and unanimously loyal to the Imperial house as they are to-day. But, on the other hand, all the multitudinous interests and motives that sway the people of an industrial epoch are asserting themselves here almost as much as in western lands.

There is need of a transformation in the ethical teaching of the country, corresponding to the transformation that is taking place in the social life and ideas. When, therefore, the ethical instruction furnished in the schools is cast in a mould suited only to feudal times, as is so often the case with us, it is not surprising that the effect of such teaching should be meagre. A great work, therefore, awaits the thoughtful teachers of this land: to formulate anew into a system of ethics, fit for the guidance of the young, those truths which have already become the heritage of the nation, and to include also those truths which need special emphasis and insistance, in view of the new order of things which has come to prevail.

It has been possible in this article to give but a very meagre idea of the results of twenty-five years work of education, as well as some of the serious problems that are waiting for solu-


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tion. The work founded by Count Oki, reorganized by Viscount Mori, improved by Viscount Inouye, is now calling for some strong hand to bring it into close touch with the new order of things prevailing here as the results of an "industrial revolution." If a statesman like Marquis Saionji should become the minister of education, it may be that many of the crying abuses will be removed and some of the more important of the much-needed reforms will be at last introduced into the national system of education in Japan.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST OF VIRTUE.

ALTHOUGH many might decry the use of the term "new psychology" at the present day, yet all would perhaps acknowledge that there has been a change of attitude in recent years toward the study itself. It has, in fact, obtained some degree of popular favor, until the epithet "psychological" has become almost a mark of approval, almost a recommendation to the current taste. The doctrines which claim to be psychological have now about them a trace of assurance and superiority which would have been impossible half a century ago.

The confidence which the psychologists have in their method, as well as the deference with which a large body of persons receives their judgment, has even tempted them to carry their researches into fields which have usually been regarded as outside the psychological domain, and to offer solutions of problems there encountered. So we have had Professor James proposing to decide between Theism and the various non-theistic views of the world by a distinctly psychological test, namely, by the different effects the views have upon our active powers,—by the volitional response which each of these conceptions calls forth.* In a like spirit, Professor Dewey offers

*"Reflex Action and Theism," in James' "Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy."

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to solve the main problems of ethics,* and his solution is explicitly recommended on the ground that it is psychological. It is to an examination of this view that the present paper will be devoted; and since it will be impossible to discuss the entire psychological theory which the book contains, I have chosen for particular attention the psychological distinctions which he offers between good and evil conduct. His analysis of this point seems to me to give a fair basis of estimating the general method he employs.

Professor Dewey first traces, with admirable distinctness, the development of conscious action from its lowest level. In its earliest stages, action is impulsive, the impression of the moment calls forth an immediate response; such is the turning of the wounded animal upon his tormenter, or the cry of the bird in pain. The act here is simple and direct. There is no hesitation as to whether this or some alternative act shall be performed, no weighing of considerations *pro* and *contra,* nothing that can be called deliberation or survey of the situation. In the simplest forms of impulse there is no conscious aim. The bird does not cry to excite pity, to summon aid, or to express its judgment on its own suffering. It is a mere impulse, unguided by experience, unmodified by a conflict with other tendencies. The act finds no opposition; it sweeps along frictionless to its end.

Now, we, too, at times approach this simpler form of action. But the higher and more characteristic type of our behavior is quite different. Rarely with us does the cry of pain, for example, come in its simplest, purely impulsive form. If we do cry out, it is not because the impulse has found no obstacles, but because it has swept all obstacles before it. Other sides of our nature have arisen with the main impulse—the thought of its unmanliness, the desire to hide our weakness, the thought of its effect upon others, of embarrassment, or of contempt. Or, if the exciting cause has been a personal affront, there comes, along with the impulse to attack, the impulse to preserve our usual bearing, the thought of consequences, the loss of self-

* "The Study of Ethics: a Syllabus," by John Dewey.

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respect, the recollection that the assailant is, after all, a man; and this reaction of experience, of scruples, of contrary impulses, upon the impulse to attack, weakens it, modifies it, gives it a different turn from what it would otherwise have had, perhaps stops it in mid-course, and drives it back to cover, or even takes it in hand so early that no trace of its existence is outwardly to be seen. But whatever the actual outcome may be—whether of attack or of restraint—there is an interplay of conflicting tendencies and suggestions, and the final act, though it may appear simple enough, is an expression, not of a single side of us, but of several sides. No single tendency comes to perfect expression in the final act, but even the victorious one is dimmed or enhanced or altered in some way by the opposition it has met. The technical term which Professor Dewey uses to describe this influence of other forces of our nature upon the impulse is "mediation." The impulse no longer has the field to itself, as on the lower levels of conscious life, but has been "mediated;" it has become a constituent member of a larger and more complex activity.

The characteristic of the more developed person, then, is that each of his acts is participated in by a wider variety of activities,—is done with reference to a broader range of experience. The isolated impression which, on a lower plane of life, would call forth a simple impulsive response, now is supplemented by a host of ideas. Action is no longer blind, but occurs with foresight, with appreciation of its meaning. From past experience, the consequences of yielding to the impulse have been learned, and they are now ready in the mind before the act is performed. The suggested consequences arouse other impulses, other sides of our nature come into play; there is hesitation, check, deliberation. What the person now does comes not from that side of him on which the immediate impression happens to play, but the various sides of the man have become so knit together, so intimately organized, that they all take part in every act that he performs. On this higher plane, the act shows more of the man, shows the various sides of his character, is a fuller expression of what he really is, than that occurring on the lower level. The hasty, superficial, impulsive reac-

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tion tells of but a single side; it does not reveal the many other sides which go to make up the man.

Our real nature is thus revealed with varying degrees of clearness in our acts; or, to put it otherwise, our real nature is present in our acts in varying degrees. And in this fact, Professor Dewey discovers the true basis for determining the moral value of what we do. An act is morally good, in so far as it springs from our whole nature,—in so far as it is the outcome of our whole experience and of all sides of our character. We act morally according as we express in our act what we really and most truly are. But in so far as the act springs not from our whole nature, but from some mere fraction of that nature, it is no true expression of us; it is wrong.

In this hasty and inadequate presentation of Professor Dewey's view, I have hardly concealed how profoundly true it seems to me to be. In commenting upon it, I do not, therefore, intend so much to criticize the doctrine itself, as to ask whether the criterion here offered of moral conduct is a psychological criterion or not. If I should feel bound to decide that the whole distinction to me seems unpsychological, this must not be interpreted to mean that I thereby value the view the less. It would only indicate that, in my opinion, Professor Dewey sails under false colors, though he nevertheless makes the right port.

I think it can be easily shown that there is a striking contrast between Professor Dewey's doctrine and the merely psychological treatment of the subject. Perhaps the best way to bring this out will be to set over against each other the conflicting results: on the one hand, the facts as Professor Dewey sees them, and on the other, the facts as they appear to one who judges them by the criteria of psychology.

There is perhaps little need to say that in presenting the psychological view I feel both its strength and its weakness. It is the way the facts appear when looked at with a special and narrow aim in mind, and when we employ only those criteria which are found serviceable for that special aim. It leaves out of account all truth that does not meet its limited tests; its results are therefore partial and one-sided.

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But let us now place the two views over against each other, and attempt later to decide their relative value.

The distinction Professor Dewey draws between unmediated or bare impulse and the activity resulting from an interplay of experiences and impulses is, without doubt, psychology of the best kind; in fact, there are whole chapters of the book that one must count a unique and illuminating contribution to the study of our moral processes on the purely psychological plane. I know of no one who has shown a penetration in this way equal to Professor Dewey's. But when he says that only in so far as acts spring from impulses fully mediated do they express what the agent really is, I feel that he has left the plane of psychology entirely, and is making statements which, on that plane, are unjustified. The strict psychologist would, in fact, feel that the opposite was the truth. He would say that the real man is the man as shown by his acts; that we must assume that each act is a perfect expression of the man, and tells the very truth about him. If the actions are impulsive, they show that the man is impulsive; if the action is unmediated and blind, it shows that the man is capable of unmediated and blind behavior. According to psychology, every act, whether it be mediated or unmediated, expresses the man exactly. His character is revealed in everything that he does—by his hasty and foolish behavior as well as by his soberer acts. If we took the nobler action alone as showing what the real man was, we should fail to see that other side of him—his capacity, for example, for hasty and ill-advised action—and this side, for the psychologist, is as real as the other. This, then, is the first contrast to which I would allude, between the psychological estimate and Professor Dewey's estimate of acts. According to the latter, only those acts express the man which flow from all sides of his nature. According to psychology, the one-sided acts are also expressions of the man, and moreover, they express more than one side; they indicate the state of the other sides also, namely, that these are disconnected, dormant, inoperative,—otherwise, they would have prevented the one-sided act.

A second contrast between Professor Dewey's and the purely psychological view will be found, if we ask what is

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meant by the "real man," the man as he "really is," his "true self." This question is forced upon us, because the test of moral value is said to lie not in the mere expressiveness of the act, but in the fact that the act indicates what the man really is. To be moral the act must show his true nature. It is immediately evident that Professor Dewey means by reality, something quite different from the psychological sense of the word. The author declares that the real man is the ideal man. The psychologist, on the contrary, would say that the real man is not the ideal man at all, but the man as he actually is. The real man may be of moderate judgment, whimsical, impetuous, now good-humored, now morose,—far from the ideal man. He may become better; but we cannot say that the man is an ideal man until he actually conducts himself ideally,—until his conduct is no longer moody and vacillating, but has become wise and steadfast. The moralist denies all this; it is for him a mockery, a travesty of the truth. The irritable and selfish man is not really irritable and selfish, but calm and generous. His real self, his true nature, fails to get expressed at the present time; his acts misrepresent and obscure the truth. Not until we can see beneath his actual conduct down into the unexpressed ideal of the man do we see him as he is.

Some might perhaps suppose that the difference between our author's and the psychologist's conception of what the man really is flows from the different degree of importance each gives to the mere acts of the body;—that the psychologist would hold that the real man is the man as he is revealed in his visible behavior, in his muscular reactions, while our author is looking behind this outward show into the very thoughts and intents of the heart. But this is not the case. Both would agree that the bodily movement is a mere fragment of the man's action; the real act is the mental and spiritual process as well. Both Professor Dewey and the psychologist would acknowledge that we never know what the man is doing until we can see the inner workings of his mind—his experiences, his secret resolves, the ideals which he sets before him:—all these must be included in the total act. But here the psychologist would probably say that, if we arrive at these, we have the man as he

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really is. Professor Dewey, however, goes further, and declares that even the act in this deep sense is not an expression of the real man. The inner life, as it actually unfolds, is not the true person. In actual life, the man's experience may not sufficiently control his conduct, or his finer feelings may be trampled down in the rush of coarser passion. In the ideally real man, however, each side of character is given due weight; there is perfect organization and interaction of the different parts, a perfect adjustment of the inner powers. Even the actual spiritual life of the man, therefore, is not the real man, unless it shows this perfection of the inner arrangement.

The psychologist feels tempted to ask at this point: "If the man really is, as you maintain, a nice adjustment of all the different sides of character, and yet the act itself shows an absence of nice adjustment—shows one power overriding the others and coming to undue prominence—from what does this ill-balanced action spring?" It cannot spring from the real man, because he is perfectly organized, whereas the act points to a lack of organization in its source. The real man, as the moralist depicts him, consequently furnishes no psychological and natural and scientific explanation of the man's evil conduct. His conduct is bad; he is good. The act is thus left hanging in mid-air with no reality to account for its existence.

The real man, as the psychologist depicts him, on the other hand, furnishes an explanation of the imperfect act, because the man himself is imperfect. But while the psychological view has this advantage, it has also a grave defect, for it furnishes no basis for truly moral distinctions. Not until we deepen our conception of the self so as to include within it more than the mere explanation of our experiences and conduct (the goal of psychology) is there any ground for demanding of a man that he be any better than he is. In making such demands upon ourselves we at once proclaim that there are realities for us other than those which are manifested in actual experience; we thereby practically proclaim our belief in realities which, in the scientific sense of the term, do not exist. I know of nothing that brings out in sharper contrast the psychological and ethical standpoints than this different meaning each gives to the

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word *reality*. It was absolutely necessary that Professor Dewey should go beyond the merely psychological tests of reality if he was to have any ethical standard at all. For psychology is concerned with the mind as it actually is, while ethics is concerned with the mind as it ought to be.

But, it might be urged, is not the perfect interaction of all our powers a psychological conception? And, therefore, do we not have here a psychological test of goodness? I believe not. For, in order to decide what would be the perfect interaction of our powers, we should have first to decide what the end and aim of life must be. This must first be determined, since the interaction which we counted perfect would vary according to the end in view. And the same would hold true if, instead of speaking of perfect interaction, we say that each side of our character should have due weight. The weight that is due each side depends upon the goal of life. What, for instance, is the value that the impulse to worship should have? What is its due weight? If the end of life were to get the most enjoyment out of this stretch of three-score years and ten, it would receive another rating than if the chief end of man were to glorify his Maker forever. Professor Dewey never defines what would be a perfect interaction of our powers—that nice arrangement of them which would give each its due. And until such a definition is given we can never apply his test of moral worth. The moral act, he tells us, is the act which shows all our powers acting in due proportion, in perfect mutual adjustment, etc. But what is the mutual adjustment that is perfect? Shall it be the one which shows conscience subordinating all else to it? or the mutual adjustment which makes conscience a subordinate factor and puts the impulse to gratify our æsthetic nature in control? The methods of psychology give no answer to such a question; all that the psychologist could say would be that each of these arrangements is actually found. When Professor Dewey speaks of a perfect adjustment, a due subordination of each element of character in the whole, I suspect that he is silently introducing a *moral test* within his test of moral value. The due subordination is the subordination which the *moral life* demands; the perfect adjustment is the

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adjustment which gives the best moral results. But we should still have to ask—What is the arrangement of our mental powers which the moral life demands? What is the adjustment which gives the best moral results?—questions which would carry us far beyond the field of psychology and involve a definition of the moral ideal. The supposed psychological test of moral value, then, really assumes that we already possess such a test by some other means. Unless we already knew what was morally valuable, we could never determine what was the most suitable interaction and adjustment of our mental powers. The ultimate test of moral value, even in Professor Dewey's theory, is, therefore, not psychological at all, but essentially and peculiarly ethical, and must be determined before the psychological test he offers has a definite meaning.

But besides this test of morality by the degree in which the conduct shows a perfect interplay of all our powers, or by the degree (as he often puts it) in which the act expresses the whole man's character, Professor Dewey offers another touchstone of moral value, which is perhaps not intended to be a different test, and yet it has at least a different appearance. Instead of determining the ethical value of an act by its power of expressing what the person really is, he sometimes states this value in terms of its effect upon the person. A basis of distinguishing between conduct morally right and conduct morally wrong is, (he tells us) that the evil acts "tend to narrow the self, to introduce friction into it, to weaken its power, and in various ways to *disintegrate* it," while the right acts "tend to expand, invigorate, harmonize, and, in general, organize the self."* This has all the appearance of a psychological test in the strict sense of the word. But here again, we find that the test is not decisive at all until the terms are interpreted in a sense which mere psychology does not recognize. If we use "expansion," in the strictly quantitative meaning which the psychologist would employ, we shall find, I believe, that our actual experience gives no warrant for saying that morally good conduct and morally evil conduct are distinguished by

*"The Study of Ethics," p. 22.

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the presence of expansion as a result of the one, and of contraction, as the effect of the other. The fact is, that every act we perform, whether it be good or bad, brings expansion, and it is equally true that both kinds of conduct, without distinction, produce contraction. Take, for example, our national life during the past few years. Shall we say that our war with Spain has produced expansion; or that its effect is narrowing, contracting? On the side of expansion, we could point to the heightened national activity, both physical and mental, the hurrying to and fro, the larger interest in new peoples and new problems, as a direct result of the war. On the other hand, we could point to the actual narrowing of the political horizon, the loss of interest in political equality, in government by the consent of the governed, the displacement of the older forces of national conscience and honor by those of commerce and the love of place. Certain national forces that were once active now seem inert and atrophied; the body politic has contracted on that side.

So in our personal life, each act, whether it be good or bad, strengthens and enlarges some of the powers and withdraws something from others. I doubt whether, in the cold and quantitative estimate of psychology, we could assert that the saint is larger or more expanded than the sinner. Each is expanded in his own way; each directs his energies to a different end, each has his own way of organizing and unifying his resources, each has his own peculiar conflicts and "friction." Taken in this harsh and heartless way, (which is the way of psychology) the test which Professor Dewey offers is of no use at all, the evil-doer stands the test as well as the righteous. But when we understand by expansion and organization not mere expansion or organization in general and of any kind, but *moral* expansion and organization—expansion in the direction of the highest ideal, and organization that will stand the test of conscience—then we have a test which really distinguishes the good from the evil. The evil action is seen to bring expansion, but not moral expansion; it brings organization as its result, but not a moral organization. In the evil mind, there is order; each power is given some place in the final arrangement; but

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the arrangement, the relative rank and value, is morally unfit. The organization which results from good action is not quantitatively greater, but it is suited to a nobler end,—an end which we feel is of infinite worth. Unless, therefore, we can already distinguish moral from immoral expansion, moral organization from immoral, we are unable to use the test at all. Professor Dewey's psychological criterion, then, presupposes some other and deeper test of moral value behind it.

By these various illustrations, I have attempted to show that if we can call the author's doctrine a solution of the problem of moral value, it is only by taking his words, not in their psychological sense, but in some larger meaning. For this reason, I would say that it is not a *psychological* solution of the problem at all. Ultimately, this criticism would perhaps be reduced to a difference of opinion as to the most appropriate use of the term "psychological." He would probably say that I deny the right to call his doctrine psychological simply because I have a very shallow view of what psychology is. "Your criticism," he might say, "falls to the ground the moment we understand by psychology, not the mere superficial natural science which today goes by that name, but the science of mind in all its heights and depths." Mind is, after all, the absolute reality, he would hold, so that the science of mind, the true psychology, must be satisfied with no half-truths, no superficial treatment of mere experience; it must be contented with nothing short of the whole. The standpoint of psychology is, in reality, the standpoint of Absolute Idealism.* There is nothing beyond it, no possible corrections from the outside, no carrying of psychological statements on to a higher plane, for the plane of psychology is the highest there is. If the word "psychology" be taken in this sense, the criticism that Professor Dewey's view is unpsychological is entirely without foundation; for what, after all, is the so-called ethical standpoint but a standpoint which the mind itself assumes? It is, therefore, a psychological point of view. It is the psychological standpoint cleared of some of the obstructions which hem it in.

*See *e. g.* his article on "The Psychological Standpoint," in *Mind*, 1886.

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I must, of course, admit Professor Dewey's right to use his terms in this sense. If he prefers to call Absolute Idealism psychology, we have no recourse; only it is misleading, or if it be not misleading, it at least gives the reader who is accustomed to use words in another sense one more difficulty in perceiving what the author really means. We have constantly to remind ourselves that by psychology the author means absolute metaphysics, and therefore has no term at all for what the specialists themselves mean by psychology. For the fact is, that the specialists, almost to a man, prefer to understand by the term, a certain partial aspect of the world, an aspect which needs correction and supplementing in every way, that asks only for natural-science explanations of mental events, and uses, therefore, the limited criteria of reality which the natural sciences employ. While there is doubtless much ground for complaint in the effect of this limitation of the meaning of psychology on the mental vision of the psychologists themselves and on their interpretation of results, yet the success of their work is largely attributable to this very contraction of the field. I feel, therefore, that Professor Dewey's attempt to make the word equivalent to Absolute Philosophy is a turn in the wrong direction. We already have a number of terms for this, whereas we should have no distinctive designation for the special study to which the name psychology is now almost universally applied.

Although a large part of this paper has been taken up with showing that Professor Dewey's "psychological" solution is not psychological in the sense in which that word is now commonly used, yet I would not leave the impression that this is all the paper intends to convey. This would, after all, be but a formal objection, a mere criticism of terminology. Beyond this, there seem to me to be some obscurities in the view itself that require clearing up before it can prove entirely satisfactory. I have already alluded to the fact that Professor Dewey traces no clear connection between the unmediated or evil act and the real self. The real self is a nice adjustment of all forces; and yet in some way, there seems to be another self which lacks such peculiar inner unity,—which is impulsive, and

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fails to bring all its powers into line. An adequate theory would have to show the connection between the real self and this imperfect self, and, in some way, to make it clear that the real self, in spite of its reality and nice adjustment, is capable of passing out into ill-ordered and evil conduct. With the present disconnection, the agent could disclaim all responsibility for evil acts on the ground that they were not his, since their very imperfection showed that he—the real person—could not have been their cause. This is perhaps as difficult a problem as ethics has to deal with—the difficulty of making the act spring from the person himself (thereby preserving responsibility), and at the same time of justifying the condemnation of the person himself, in that his own act is unworthy of him. And this difficulty, it seems to me, Professor Dewey does not surmount, for his view accounts only for good behavior and, by leaving evil actions essentially unconnected with the real person, takes away all moral responsibility for such conduct.

And, finally, there is lack of clear definition as to what really constitutes good behavior. It is not enough to say that right conduct is the outcome of a perfect interplay and organization of our powers—of an organization that is ideal; for it is not until we are able in some way to define what the ideal order is that the truth becomes an intellectual insight and a real criterion of moral value. Certainly, the ideal arrangement is not merely the arrangement which accords with each person's private ideal, as many passages in Professor Dewey's book seem to imply. We find such a view frequently offered at the present day, but it seems to me unworthy; it is, that a man is good in so far as he lives up to his ideals, he is bad in so far as he falls short of them. Perhaps such standards will be permitted us during the days of our ignorance, but the time will certainly come when we shall be called on, not merely to shape our conduct according to our ideals, but to have a care that our ideals are worthy. We must certainly act according to our light, but we must also see to it that the light within us is not darkness. In practical life, we constantly apply such a test: we judge men not merely by the approximation of their conduct to their ideals, but more deeply and searchingly by their ideals them-

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selves. Our friend's life may reveal a greater cleft between his conduct and his ideals, not because he is a less moral man than we, but because his ideals are higher. So then there are higher and lower ideals; and no ethical theory which does not give us a criterion of ideals themselves by some absolute and final ideal will ever have furnished a theoretical test of moral value which will entirely satisfy our common moral sense. Any sufficient theory of conduct always must involve the deepest questions that can be asked. It is, perhaps, because Professor Dewey, in spite of his natural inclination to enlarge psychology, is nevertheless unconsciously hampered by the limit within which psychology actually does remain, that his theory shows the defects which it seems to me to have. His view goes too far to be good psychology; it does not go far enough to be thorough-going ethics. For my part, I feel that, to treat of ethics thoroughly, one must be willing to be metaphysical to the bitter end, and that the attempt to settle such problems by psychological analysis must always end in failure. A psychological discussion of the moral processes may be a useful preparation for an ethical theory, but it cannot in itself be counted as more than an introduction; the solution of the deepest moral problems, if obtained at all, must be obtained by altogether different methods.

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CHILDREN'S ETHICAL CLASSES.

In arguing for or against the definite moral instruction of children, we should always do well to differentiate between class-teaching and private admonition. Everyone will admit the value of the quiet talk by means of which a parent or friend encourages a girl or lad in an honorable pursuit, warns against mistakes and dangers, or reproves wrong-doing. There is an acknowledged value, also, in the semi-private praise or blame which the parent pronounces in the presence of sisters, brothers and other members of a domestic circle. Of these forms of home education I do not propose to speak. I shall not consider methods by which children in public schools may be practically trained in manners and useful habits. Nor shall I discuss the times and occasions when a teacher may legitimately seize upon the virtues or follies of an individual scholar, and employ them as a test of ethical instruction. All these educational processes have their worth, and a complete scheme of moral discipline must take due account of each. But I have found from experience that a general debate rolling over many points of this large subject is extremely unprofitable. I prefer to deal with one department to which I have for a considerable number of years given close attention, viz., the moral instruction of children in classes. I regard this department as the culmination of the rest. It is in the class that all the ethical threads should be connected and woven into a pattern of thought, revealing to the child the meaning of the emotions and experiences which have hitherto been scattered over his family and social life.

By a class I understand a group of not more than thirty children, regularly attached to a Sunday or day-school. It is a very common thing in England to see teachers placed in charge of classes of sixty or seventy scholars. Even this bad practice is an improvement on the past. I shall never forget the agonies I suffered in the hopeless attempt to teach a hundred and twenty lads in a London board-school; and such

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cases were not infrequent. For the purposes of general education, and above all, for the purpose of moral education, it is indispensable that the teacher should be entrusted with only so many children as he or she can deal with on a basis of close personal knowledge and sympathy. It is also desirable (and ultimately it will be looked upon as a profound necessity), that girls and boys should be taught in the same class. In effect, the class should be a symbol of the society which creates morality. The sexes are equally concerned in the study of ethical practice; and no more powerful blow could be delivered at the superstition which makes sex a social disability than ethical co-education. I have taught boys and girls together hundreds of times, and I consider that the objections to this method are not worth discussing. Then, again, the class will contain a variety of types of character and social position. To each and all the moral law appeals; upon each and all the same duties are laid; and the class becomes an admirable aid towards establishing the consciousness of a Norm with which all must comply. This mention of the Norm prompts me to remark that, in a well-conducted class, moral eccentricity receives a silent check. Everyone familiar with children knows how private conversation with an offender often provokes him into pert excuses and pleas for personal exemption from an inconvenient discipline. Such incidents rarely occur in a class. Children respect one another's opinions. Leaving out absurd answers due to misconception of the teacher's meaning, and the like, I can recall no case of an abnormal reply given me by any of my scholars. Nor can I remember many smart or witty answers such as one finds retailed in the apocryphal department of the public journals. Whenever I hear of a ridiculous or extraordinary answer made by a scholar, I at once suspect the teacher of maladroitness or lapse of dignity. The emotions, also, should only be moderately played upon. It is right that a well-told story should stir the imagination and touch the heart, and it is delightful to hear the occasional laughter of the young listeners, at a stroke of timely humor. But the deeper springs should very seldom be meddled with. The scholars themselves mistrust this kind of excess. How it may

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be with Continental children I do not know, but I believe British children regard a tendency to tears with a sort of disdain. It is also a great advantage in class-teaching that the introspective habit is avoided. The children do not (or should not) hear their personal faults reproved by way of illustration. The cases adduced will be general, and held up, as it were, to the social light for social discussion. The minds of the scholars are drawn outwards to their moral environment, and there is no encouragement to brood over interior problems.

"Can morality be taught?" is a very trite question. A denial of the possibility of such teaching appears to some people a mode of philosophic recreation. Nevertheless, the world at large takes the subject quite seriously, and, by innumerable pulpits, instruction-books and daily conversations, proves its conviction that the moral nature can be moved to good action by the power of good words. It is almost amusing to note how persons who object to direct moral instruction themselves engage in the practice when they tell a child of its faults or praise it for its well-doing. As a matter of fact, ethical instruction is the commonest form of education, and the households of the world ring with precept and admonition all day long. The class-teacher simply changes the fragmentary into the connected, and the scattered into the organized. It is, of course, open to anybody to dispute the utility of the pulpit and platform, but if the utility of the pulpit (in the most rational acceptation) be admitted, then the benefit of ethical class-teaching must also be admitted. Child-psychology exhibits no essential difference from the psychology of adults. Naturally, the child-universe, the child-language and the child-experience are more limited than at the later stages of life. That is all. In the fundamentals of motive, intellectual method and moral re-action, children precisely resemble men and women. The popular pursuit of "child-study" is a mere imbecile amusement if it is based on the supposition that the young mind belongs to a separate species. It is a safe rule for the teacher to treat childhood as manhood on a reduced scale. But in appreciation of the phrase "on a reduced scale" lies the whole of the vast art of pedagogy. And if I have reasoned

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correctly, it will follow that the pulpit must find its natural analogue in the ethical class. Having granted that the man or woman may be influenced by the preacher, we must allow that the boy or girl can be reached by the ethical instructor. To this general argument may be added the following detailed considerations:

(1) The theme of moral conduct possesses a natural and perennial interest. Even if philosophers and parents abolished ethical teaching, it would be more or less crudely maintained by the children themselves, for they will perpetually tell each other what is fair and unfair, seemly or unseemly. And what deeply interests the human mind should never be excluded from education. (2) It is understood that this department of instruction calls for the special training of teachers. Not to the amateur should be entrusted the task of sculpturing the fine marble of the child-soul. I do not suggest the creation of an ethical clergy destined for the work of teaching the young. The ordinary elementary or secondary school teacher is a sufficiently loyal and capable workman; only he needs preparation and the guidance of authority. By "authority" I simply mean that the best books, apparatus and professional experience shall be placed at the service of the young student, and that he shall have the benefit of judicious criticism and theoretical lectures. (3) The coöperation of the parent should be ensured. In the present unorganized condition of moral education, it is not easy to define the extent and value of such coöperation. But every effort should be made to impress upon parents the fact that ethical training is not a subject to be dealt with only inside the school-walls; the teacher must be warned against the superstition that his professional lessons can displace the need for home influence; and teacher and parent should maintain such personal communication as will enable each to appreciate the difficulties and opportunities of the other. (4) The imagination is a powerful engine in ethical discipline. It is not in itself a moral element, but it gives right feeling a larger scope of exercise, and brings wider areas of sympathy under cultivation. A narrow intellect cannot possibly have catholic charity. The commandment, "Love one another" must follow upon the com-

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mandment, "Understand one another." This understanding can only be effected by an orderly use of the imagination; and everyone will concede that the imagination can be strengthened by pictures, stories, poetry and dramatic compositions. (5) With as great readiness it will be admitted that the child's judgment can be expanded and regulated under the guidance of a skilled teacher. Plato's dialogues (which may be taken as a noble example of ethical instruction applicable to adults) are intended to educate the reader's moral judgment, and they undoubtedly succeed in doing so. They may not make the reader more virtuous in deed, but they give a new keenness to the consciousness of his sin or merit. This keen consciousness may arrive too late to control the force of old habit in the adult, but. in the case of the child, its formation is timely, and vital.

Moral instruction must have an inspiration and a method.

The inspiration can, in my opinion, only be supplied with fullness and enduring power by the idealization of humanity. By that I mean such a presentation of human relations, activities and character as will arouse the child's admiration for moral purpose and moral conduct. Through carefully chosen illustrations, the mother will be displayed as the central embodiment of love, patience and sincerity. The father will furnish the type of labor and providential care. Incidents of daily occupation and of right aims rightly achieved will show the moral dynamic, and create an interest which should surpass, in depth and purity, the excitement called up by mere exploit and adventure. All these materials will be crystalized round certain ideal axes,—certain leading conceptions, of which it may be sufficient to name Self-control, Veracity, Kindness and Justice. The teacher will never dwell on the abstractions; but, just as the dramatist recommends justice by means of the just man placed in a picturesque environment and clothed with suitable costume, so the ethical teacher will seek to portray the virtues by means of virtuous men and women, or, to speak more accurately, by means of men and women in their virtuous aspects. And here I may advert to a subject which, though apparently a detail, is truly of primary interest, and that is the question whether lessons should ever deal with faults and vices

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as the main themes. I should emphatically say, No. Our first aim is to make right conduct appear beautiful, and not to make wrong-doing appear ugly. It is perfectly true that he who loves the pure will eschew the base; but the repulsion against evil is never really wholesome unless it follows as a sequel to an attraction towards the good. Nothing is easier, even to a third-rate teacher, than to make badness interesting; and interest is the very key to the human will; and he who depicts badness as interesting (and fervent condemnation is often enough to produce this result) may unwittingly smooth the psychological path towards its acceptance by the will. I feel bound, therefore, to disagree with the method pursued by Miss Gertrude Martineau in her "Outline Lessons on Morals" (the list of lessons containing the topics of Anger, Conceit, Covetousness, Cowardice, Envy, Hatred, Hypocrisy, Jealousy, Laziness, Malice, Pretentiousness, Procrastination, Revenge, Self-indulgence, and Vanity), and by Mr. W. L. Sheldon, in his work on "An Ethical Sunday-School" (his syllabus including lessons on Conceit, Laziness, Swearing, Procrastination, Cheating, and Jealousy). I hasten to add that neither Miss Martineau nor Mr. Sheldon would be likely to do any practical harm by their mode of treatment, because they are both too much impressed with the dignity of the positive ethics. But the habit of dealing with negative aspects is educationally weak, and may lead to undesirable consequences in the case of less skilled teaching. And yet another saving clause should be noted. I by no means wish to imply that faults and evils ought never to be touched upon; but the supreme stress should always be laid upon the good qualities, leaving the bad to be treated as subsidiary in importance and interest.

The method will involve certain principles of selection in the gathering of materials, and certain principles of action in the conduct of the lessons.

First, as to the gathering of materials. I put this point first because it has not yet received adequate attention by the general public, and progress cannot be made until it is accepted as a fundamental element. Broadly speaking, the illustrations must be taken from the whole field of sociology, including history

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and biography. One need not stay to complain that the area hitherto drawn upon in popular education has been limited mainly to a few epochs of Jewish and early Christian history. We must now make the area conterminous with the human race. Every nation, every tribe, every family, is capable of yielding examples of the universal morality which is sufficiently represented by Self-control, Veracity, Kindness and Justice. Not only *can* we find examples universally, but we *ought* to do so. How else are we to form the vivid conviction in the minds of children that the laws of right conduct are applicable to persons in all varieties of language, color, class and condition? How else can we prepare the way for the politician of the future, who will proclaim an international ethics and refuse to recognize distinctions of race? I confess I am somewhat staggered at the magnitude of the task I am suggesting. Having searched among the available sources of illustration (stories, fables, etc.), for several years, I am astonished at the poverty of materials. The stories are often hackneyed; they are often obsolete for purposes of the modern ethical taste; and they are very restricted in range. A Swiss lady some time ago kindly offered to supply me with anecdotes culled from French and German juvenile literature, and I confidently expected an accession of new treasures. She sent me an ample batch of prose and poetry. A considerable number were familiar to me from a perusal of British reading books for the young; and a large proportion of the remainder were marked by the same lack of freshness and appropriateness as one observes in so many of our native samples. The story of the wives of Weinsberg may be cited as a typical instance. At the surrender of Weinsberg, the Emperor Conrad, who had conducted the siege, declared that, as a punishment for their contumacy, all the garrison should be put to the sword; the women, however, might carry out any valuables they pleased and retain life and liberty. On the appointed day the gates of the city opened, and, according to one authority, "the throng poured forth, heavily laden indeed, but bearing neither gold nor household goods. Each true wife bore on her shoulders her doomed husband, and carried him out of the city, the safety of her burden being guaran-

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teed to her by the word of an emperor," etc. This story, to say the least, has a semi-mythical air, and I regard the half-myth as a very dubious aid to moral instruction. The whole myths (Æsop's fables, poetical allegories such as Longfellow's "Excelsior," etc., and the classical legends) are free from danger; the children frankly take them as fiction, and easily perceive the ethical lesson. But the half-myth is perilous; it confuses the child's wit, and it suggests that the most important moral situations are to be found in abnormal circumstances. What we should teach is precisely the opposite. We should seek to convey the fact that the moral life is a daily Norm, fashioning all petty occupations and incidents into lines of consistent purpose and character; and that the will which is built up by exercise in normal conditions can successfully grapple with the unusual demands of a crisis. A specific and organized quest for ethical material is greatly needed. Educationists should everywhere examine poetry, history, legend, folk-lore, and biography, in order to unearth fresh stores of illustration; and, in addition to this literary exploitation, we ought to institute collections of anecdotes of passing events in public life and home circles. These collections would be published in educational papers after due assortment and the removal of irrelevant details. I specially prefer the anecdote because it can be handled with facility and readily fitted into the central theme, whereas a long story is apt to master one, consume too much time, and obscure the moral issue by the fascination of its plot. It is right to remember, also, that the illustrations may be concrete as well as literary. Pictures may be frequently introduced. A picture of the Forth railway bridge may evoke admiration for well-proportioned and patient construction, a copy of Turner's *Téméraire* may poetically stand for the reverence due to old age and long public service, and a reproduction of a figure of the ugly Hephæstus may pathetically hint at the association between the physical deformity of the Worker and the beauty and usefulness of his Work.

Second, as to the conduct of the lesson. I suppose it is orthodox to require that the teaching should be catechetical, and, for fear of being suspected of heresy, I recommend the discreet use

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of the question-and-answer method. But the teacher need not be disappointed if he seldom receives ingenious and penetrating replies. There is a prevalent but very absurd opinion that the instructor's office is to *educe* or "draw out" knowledge. It is his office to draw out the child's capacities, but no amount of catechism will educe knowledge which the child does not possess. The advantages of questioning are chiefly indirect. Questioning gives a fillip to the attention; it may neatly demonstrate the scholar's ignorance, and so prepare the ground for explanations; it affords a most useful means of recapitulation; and it provides a running test of the children's acquaintance with incidental but not unimportant facts. Thus, if the teacher should chance to mention Athens, and pause to ask: "Do you know where Athens is?" he is at once able to gauge the children's knowledge of the environment of the story he is relating. And though geographical and historical details must never be allowed to overlay the moral purpose of the lesson, yet precision in minor points will always assist towards a stronger apprehension of the central idea. A blackboard should be the ethical teacher's constant companion. The moralist will not despise accuracy. When he has made clear to the children, by means of appropriate examples, the truth that industry is not spasmodic labor, but a continuous method, he will wisely strengthen the conception by writing up the brief definition, "Industry is the habit of working." If he should mention Socrates or Savonarola, he will assist the memory by placing the name on the board. When he censures or ridicules the fault of exaggeration, he will perhaps, with a few strokes of the chalk, trace how the little "agger" of original fact has grown into a monstrous heap of make-believe. Another factor which calls for the greatest possible care and study is the language in which the lessons are conveyed. A teacher is literally justified or condemned by his words. A strong simplicity is the ideal. Neither words nor sentences should be complex. But simplicity must be allied with strength. Allowing for the difference in range of ideas and knowledge, the language addressed to the young should be as emphatic, direct and logical as that addressed to adults. The same rule (if I may make a very

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slight digression) applies to juvenile literature. Three-fourths of the books ostensibly prepared for children are badly written. Their diction is cumbrous and precocious, and the average child (and one has always to study the average) is led into the fatal habit of taking in words without the corresponding sense. Lucidity is necessary in any subject, and in moral instruction above all. But the most essential quality in the ethical teaching is the dramatic. The drama derives its interest from its moral movements, and morality deserves the finest dramatic presentation which the conditions of class teaching will allow. By "dramatic presentation" is simply intended a lively and spirited manner of telling the illustrative stories—just the manner, in fact, which most of us adopt when we relate to a friend an incident that has affected us with any species of emotion. I select from a children's reading-book the following story which, for neatness and point, may be taken as a model illustration for an ethical lesson:—

"Pliny, the ancient naturalist, relates that the people of a certain district in Italy were much surprised at the fine appearance and great fertility of a farm belonging to one amongst them named Cresin. As their own lands were poor and barren, they conceived that Cresin must employ some magical arts in order to make his ground yield such abundance. Accordingly, they brought him before a judge, and accused him of being an enchanter. Cresin, being called upon for his defence, brought forward a stout girl, his daughter, and also his implements of husbandry and the cattle which drew his plough. 'This girl,' said he, 'pulls all the weeds which grow on my farm. I manure it carefully, to enable the ground to bear good crops. You see that all my implements are in the best order, and that my cattle, which I take pains to feed well, are the strongest in the country. Behold all the magic I use in the management of my farm! Any one of my neighbors may have as good crops as I, if he will use the same means.' The judges said they never had heard a better pleading, and dismissed Cresin with many commendations of his industry."

No capable teacher would begin by saying, "Pliny, the ancient naturalist," etc. Pliny would disappear, or receive only casual allusion. The opening would rather be effected in this way: "Some people stood looking at a fine field of corn. They nodded, they frowned, they pointed, they whispered. 'There is something wrong about this corn of Cresin's,' they said," and so on, the teacher suiting the action to the word, but not demonstratively or excessively. Other scenes in the small

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drama will be furnished by the arrest, the accusation, the calling of witnesses, the quiet sentence of the judges, and the discomfiture of the suspicious neighbors. It might happen that this very story formed the commencement of a lesson on the wonders and benefits of human industry. And just as the teacher would not dream of first saying "Pliny, the ancient naturalist," etc., so neither would he dream of announcing, "Children, I am going to talk about the wonders and benefits of human industry." He would plunge into his narrative in the manner described. The attention of the class is immediately enchained, and, before they are conscious of the process, their sympathy is enlisted on the side of Cresin's diligence, perseverance, common-sense and frank explanation. The instructor will have prepared a clear plan and analysis of his theme, but it will be hidden from the children until he chooses to reveal it step by step.

The instruction should be systematic and graded. Whether the lessons are given weekly or daily, they should form a complete catena. The first necessity is that the ethics be enforced as a practical and living subject, and the second is that it be constructed logically and with regard to proportion. Thus, in expounding the nature of Justice, we shall proceed from the simple cases of the home and playground to the more complex cases of the political, social and religious worlds; from the problems of daily manners to the difficult questions of the industrial life and international relations; from the rights and wrongs connected with property to the subtler claims arising from intellectual and religious conditions. And the regard to proportion will ensure that the interaction of the virtues be kept in continual view. If, for example, we fix our attention on the topic of Kindness, we shall avoid identifying this quality with the whole moral life. The kind man must maintain Self-control, else he may fall into lavishness of gifts, and injudicious servility to another's whim and selfishness. He will respect the Truth, and not hesitate, out of benevolence, to tell his honest opinion. He will adhere to Justice, and refrain from giving praise or material rewards when they are unmerited. This mutual check of the ethical faculties (if I may use a term which

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psychologists now affect to disdain) is of profound importance; it calls out the forces of wholesome criticism; it is perfectly within the compass of the average child's intelligence; and it leads to the conception of the oneness of the moral nature, summing up all good thoughts and deeds into the organic whole which the Greeks knew as Wisdom.

Broadly speaking, the grades of instruction will be three; but I mention the following stages quite tentatively, feeling that we need more experience before we formulate our doctrine: (1) The Rudimentary, for scholars aged from six or seven years to nine or ten. Here I should suppress definitions and formal discussion. The staple of instruction would consist of tales of animal life, talks about pictures, selected fairy-tales (nearly the entire range of fairy-tale literature needs re-writing for ethical purposes), intelligent recitation of narrative poems, and action-songs. These items should not jostle miscellaneously, but follow some exact arrangement by way of preparation for the second stage. Certain tales, songs and pictures would fall under the chapter of Self-control, others under Veracity, and so on. But, except in a quite casual manner, these ethical terms need not come to the surface, and no lesson should wind up with the venerable "Hence we may learn." To put the idea in a short figure-of-speech, I should describe the primary stage by the phrase, the Uninterpreted Parable. (2) The Analytic, appropriate to ages from ten to fourteen or thereabouts. To this stage I have personally devoted most attention. It should pursue the course of moral conduct through the definite divisions of Self-mastery, Truthfulness, Kindness, Duty, Justice, etc., and their many sub-sections covering the facts of life in the household, city and state. The whole of the leading ethical terms should now emerge into discussion, and appear and re-appear in all kinds of examples and synonyms. Definitions should often be cited, not for rigid committal to memory, but in order to impress the necessity for accuracy of thought as an aid to consistency of action. Here we shall require the unlimited drafts upon the world's records of good deeds which I have already pleaded for. The child's knowledge will not yet be deep, but it ought to be co-extensive

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with the great human fraternity. In all the social movement will be seen the gradual assertion and advance of the ideas of Self-control, Veracity, Charity, Honor, Justice, and the like. This stage may be called the Parable Interpreted. (3) The Synthetic, or Historical and Civic. The discrete ideas may now be combined in regular studies of social progress along various lines, as, for instance, the histories of dwellings and cities, of the various arts and industries, of means of communication, of manners and customs, of forms of government, of the fine arts and literature, of the typical religions. These courses would be closed by lessons on the work and problems of the modern state, in all its many aspects of the franchise, police, penal systems, education, coöperation, etc. From a careful presentation of all these details would arise the ideal of the civic life and duty,—of the universal Humanity which we spring from, and which we serve whenever we tread the ethical way. I should name this third grade the Idealization of Manhood.

On all sides one hears the complaint that, amid the complexity of knowledge and of interests, we are failing to grasp the essential moral principles that underlie and unify our manifold experiences. In the individual life this failure causes doubt, laxity of purpose, poverty of moral imagination, and lowness of aim. In the social life, it causes a perpetual conflict of ethical opinions and ideals, and constant difficulty in organizing the moral units and forces of the commonwealth. It is a traditional fallacy of the schoolmaster to suppose that a methodical school-discipline will obviate all the evils of human life. School-discipline makes only one factor among many important means towards the education of the human race. But after we have succeeded in allotting proportionate values to physical training, intellectual exercises, and the regulation of economic conditions, we shall perhaps conclude that the place of honor must be given to the systematic moral instruction of young citizens. Only by this instrument can we fully methodize domestic and public morality, and construct the Ethical Religion.

F. J. Gould.

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THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE.

There is a common notion, spread by the latest school of Neo-Hellenists, that the Greek genius was wholly sensuous. The exponents of Greek ideas that have found most favor with a *fin-de-siècle* audience, have been the poets of the Anthology. Sane and judicious critics have pointed out—but how little attention have they received!—that the thorough sensuousness of a Meleager or a Straton is as exotic as the thorough asceticism of a Zeno or a Cleanthes. The true glory of the Greek spirit is to have reconciled, for a time, the intellect with the senses, and the true Greek ideal is a harmony of the whole powers of man. This spirit and this ideal become fully conscious of themselves, and are most fully developed, in the great philosopher who stands immediately at the parting of the ways, where the Greek intellect fell away into the decadent philosophy of the *Stoa,* while the physical side of the Greek character asserted its supremacy in the decadent poetry of Alexandria.

An irresponsible reviewer, a few years ago, seized the occasion of the appearance of Professor James' "Psychology" for a sneer at an effete authority—the Ethics of Aristotle. True, the Nicomachean Ethics, as a direct contribution to psychological science, are effete. Their results have been long ago assimilated. It would have been strange otherwise, in a work familiarly known for two thousand years. But the Ethics are something else than a contribution to science. They are a national ideal—an ideal, too, of a certain type of mind, rare, but even now not extinct. They treat the most vital and interesting of questions—what can a man make of his life? They treat it, not in any abstract way, but in a peculiarly vivid, precise and concrete manner. "The facts of life" are made "the tests of truth," as "they possess a supreme authority." Aristotle had learned his method from his master's master, Socrates. He took all the solutions that had previously been offered, but especially the generally received notions, the conceptions of life entertained by the average man, and drawing from them all

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their latent conclusions, exposing their inconsistencies, and correcting the irrationality of one by another, he built his own system with the *débris* of all preceding ones. His system is no academical one, spun, like a spider's web, from his own interior; it resumes in itself all the aspects of previous Greek thought.

Concerning the aim of human endeavor, Aristotle says, there can be no uncertainty: every one is agreed that it is happiness. But in what does happiness consist? What are the means which will enable us to reach our end? From current, incomplete notions he evolves a comprehensive idea of happiness which satisfies most of the requirements, both of popular sentiment and speculative analysis. Happiness is the healthy function of all the human faculties, working harmoniously together and at their highest level, and observing the conditions which delimit their sphere. Happiness is not dependent on trivial accidents or material endowment, though without favorable circumstances of wealth and position a complete degree of happiness is impossible.

Aristotle has not succeeded in making his position entirely consistent. Sometimes he appears to make Happiness the activity solely of the highest part of man's nature, and sometimes he defines Happiness as the virtuous activity of all the human powers. He recognizes the composite nature of the human soul. The pleasure of God, he says, is one and eternal. It consists in the contemplation of his own perfection. But human pleasures are various and often conflicting, because man is a bundle of miscellaneous qualities. Something he has of the divine, something, too, of the beast, and something that is neither. While we may say that his true and most perfect happiness is the activity of that part of him which is nearest the divine,—pure contemplation, abstracted from all the suggestions of the senses, and independent of all human relations —it is necessary to recognize that this is not his happiness actually as man, but only as a being who participates in the divine nature. If he could find satisfaction continually in such activity, he would be more than man.

Aristotle's position may be legitimately developed in some such way as this. For the individual, the activity of the intel-

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lectual faculties may be regarded as the requisite end of life. This is the most perfect, because it is the most self-sufficient and independent of activities. Others are pursued for some ultimate end not contained in themselves; this is pursued for its own sake. But for humanity at large it would not be feasible to propose such an aim. Considering human life in a broad and concrete way, we must conclude that the end of life is the right exercise of natural powers, and that Happiness, though not absolute Happiness, results from the right exercise of those powers which it lies within the scope of the average man to bring into play. *"It is the facts of life that are the tests of truth in practical matters."* Let us take the sane and normal state of human nature as our criterion. Happiness is the product of those energies that are most appropriate in each individual case, exercised in such a manner as commends itself to this criterion. Basing our theory of life on this foundation, we arrive at a conception of Happiness "of wide extent, capable of realization in all persons, except such as are morally deformed."

Against this widely extended and elastic definition must be balanced two weighty qualifications. Though the limitations of human nature enforce us to admit many kinds of activity into our scheme, there is a distinction that cannot be overlooked between the activity of the noblest part of man, the activity of the intellect, and the activity of those faculties which have an irrational and animal side. The ordinary citizen, who keeps his passions under control, and has formed virtuous habits of liberality, patriotism and friendship, must have conceded to him the credit of a solution of his own to the problem of Life, but his solution has not the completeness that is attained by the sage, whose attention is fixed, as far as human weakness will allow, on the contemplation of the Divine Perfection. Again, the activity of the sage, and consequently his happiness, not only employs the highest human faculty, but also is as nearly self-contained and self-dependent as it is possible for anything human to be. The practice of the moral virtues depends on circumstances and externals. The exercise of fortitude, of liberality, of magnanimity, of the virtue of friendship, is only pos-

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sible with the concurrence of opportunity. But Wisdom or Philosophy, that is, the contemplation of the most universal truth, the Final Cause of everything, requires the barest provision of externals. The object of its activity is never withdrawn. All that it presupposes is health and leisure.

It is, of course, not the ordinary operations of the intellect, but the direction of it to the most general and purest form of truth, that Aristotle characterizes as the highest of all activities. At the same time, if pressed, he would probably have maintained that any purely intellectual activity was higher than those into which other elements entered. The intellectual rank above the moral virtues. But he would support this thesis by the contention that, in the case of moral turpitude allied with intellectual power, the intellectual activity was obstructed wherever the moral activities are not in healthy function. Those pleasures in which moral conditions are violated, are alien to the pleasure attendant upon intellectual energy, and energy is impeded or destroyed by alien pleasures. If this is the case with the ordinary functions of the intellect, how much more must unlawful pleasures be alien to that employment of the mind which brings us nearest to the condition of God? Thus the sage, who is devoted, as entirely as human nature allows, to this employment, may be assumed to possess the potentiality of all the moral virtues. He does not possess them actually, because external circumstances are required for their realization, and he is, as nearly as possible, independent of circumstances. But if he were called upon for action, in any of those circumstances which bring the moral virtues into operation, we can feel no doubt that he would act agreeably to the dictates of those virtues. The man who is absorbed, as far as the limitations of humanity permit, in the contemplation of God, cannot be supposed easy of access to the promptings of covetousness or malignity, intemperance or meanness.

Still there are two views of life, diverse from each other, though not mutually destructive, which are involved in Aristotle's delineation. These two views may be distinguished as the National and the Personal Idea. The National Idea takes man as a whole, with all his faculties and in all his rela-

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tions, and demands for him the fullest development in every direction. It would place the greatest degree of Happiness in an equable and complete development of the whole man, not in the continuous energy of his highest faculty. It considers man as a member of a community, not in a state of isolation. The perfect commonwealth would be that which drew out to the fullest the possibilities of all its citizens on the physical as well as the intellectual side, the powers which can only be brought into play by the exigencies of society, as well as those which can only be exercised in abstraction and solitude.

This Idea lays as much stress on what we are accustomed to regard as merely ornamental and extrinsic, as on what we have been taught to believe all-essential. It would never rest content with a theory of conduct which palliated or ignored ungraciousness, want of taste, and illiberality. There it strikes unmistakably the note that is characteristic of the race.

The Personal Idea relegates all other conditions to a background of indifference, proclaiming almost vehemently a doctrine of "one thing needful." Sometimes we hear Aristotle's verdict as a Greek, sometimes the expression of his absolute personality.

The feature most immediately striking, to a modern spirit, of such a view of Life, is its cheerfulness and confidence. *"Happiness is of wide extent, being capable of realization in all persons except such as are morally deformed."* Aristotle's pictures of the moral virtues fill us with a more vivid wonder at the brilliant gifts of the Greek nation than do the statues of Phidias. What, we ask ourselves, must have been the sanity and exuberant health of a race which could measure itself without dissatisfaction by such models? In Aristotle's individual idea of Happiness we are astonished, in something the same way, by his unshaken conviction that he has correctly read the secret of Life. He is troubled by no misgivings; he casts no lingering, reluctant glance at other aims. Here is a man who walked in the path of his own selection, and found it not less, but more, attractive than he had anticipated. Here is a man who hesitates not to proclaim that he has seized the elusive dream, and found it reality. The difference between Aris-

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totle's mystic life of converse with the great Final Cause, and the Christian idea, is that Aristotle does not feel any rebellion of the natural man against such a life. He is never constrained to cry out, "What I would, that I do not, and what I would not, that I do." He knows the weakness of humanity, and how far its strength extends, and he feels no repining or discontent. He desires for himself the happiness of a man, not of God.

Between the Greek and the Christian life, beyond all differences of environment and circumstance, there is a salient demarcation made by the absence or presence of sympathy. The Greek was self-centred; the love of friends, of his fellows and his country, made part of his being, but not an integral part. His own suffering he would bear with courage; the suffering of others passed him by. The bulk of mankind he was prepared to treat as intelligent brutes, intended by nature to contribute to his leisure. The culture of Greece was reared on the foundation of an institution of slavery, not cruel but contemptuous. For the class that performed its manual labor it proposed animal comforts as the sole good in life. To its equals it was tolerant, not sympathetic. It was lenient in its reading of what constituted "moral deformity," but it had no compunction for those who over-stepped the pale.

The Greek idea of perfection was the Finite, and Christianity introduced the Infinite. The Christian spirit has taught men to look on Life as giving no satisfaction to the desires, ideals and aspirations of humanity; it fosters an insatiable hunger after the unattainable. The Greek genius tended to make men limit the scope of their vision to what it was possible to attain. The ideal of the Greek spirit is attainment, as the ideal of the Christian spirit is aspiration.

J. A. Nicklin.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ETHICS AND RELIGION. A collection of Essays by Sir John Seeley, Dr. Felix Adler, Mr. W. M. Salter, Professor Henry Sidgwick, Professor G. von Gizycki, Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, Mr. Leslie Stephen, Dr. Stanton Coit and Professor J. H. Muirhead. Pp. ix., 324. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1900.

The brief preface to this volume reminds us that all the writers who have contributed to it have been founders or influential friends in England or America of the associations called Ethical Societies. It is also pointed out that the Essays here collected together "are unanimously insistent upon one point—they urge that an Ethical Society should hold itself uncommitted to any theory of the universe, and should not be primarily interested in the metaphysic of Ethics; they hold that its relation to theory should be that of investigation and construction rather than of advocacy and dogmatic inculcation." This unity, however, is a unity in the midst of very striking differences, as indeed might be anticipated from considering the names of the authors. Sir John Seeley is as usual very vigorous and brilliant—he paints in strong colors and with deep shadows. His paper, entitled "Ethics and Religion," was delivered before the Cambridge (England) Ethical Society, at a very early stage of its existence. He considers that the ethical movement, of which societies like the one he was addressing were an outcome, had a special interest and significance from the fact that they offered "an ethical supply at the moment of an exceptional ethical famine." He took a very gloomy view of the stage of development reached in England at the time of his speaking. "The scepticism which undermines and enfeebles us now is partly indeed but only partly a scepticism about religion. It extends to everything else. We have misgivings about morality; we suspect law itself to be a pedant, government to be a tyrant, patriotism to be an antiquated prejudice, justice and honesty to be Philistine virtues. As to that old English constitution, we have almost reformed it away. . . . . And the old national character seems to have disappeared with the old principles. Instead of a massive strength approaching to brutality, a strong individuality which looked almost like madness, a masculine grasp of reality, a cool contempt for sentimentalism and fine phrases, we

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seem to have acquired all the contrary qualities—loquacity, sentimentalism, helpless confusion and inaccuracy of thought, hysterical weakness and the habit of thinking in crowds. . . . . We have everything except decided views and steadfast purpose—everything in short except character! . . . . We have before us a problem eminently of practical, not of theoretical, ethics. Scepticism in a certain sense is the disease."

He holds that the whole basis of belief necessary for life and character has crumbled away, and in this he sees an "immense opportunity" for the Ethical Societies—an opportunity for the stronger and clearer minds which are dominated by a powerful ethical interest to influence others in matters of practice and practical belief. He thinks that Ethical Societies may help to "liberate education from the yoke of business, and politics from the yoke of party," and that they may and ought to work in sympathy with university life and as harmonious with and complementary to the Christian Church. "My advice is," he says, "that you enter into the heartiest and most unreserved alliance with Christianity. . . . . After all, Christianity is the original Ethical Society . . . . let the new influence blend freely with and even be prepared to lose itself in, the old . . . . the present grows out of the past. . . . . *Other foundation can no man lay.*"

Sir John Seeley's Essay is followed by two from the pen of Dr. Felix Adler, on "The Freedom of Ethical Fellowship" and "The Ethical Bond of Union."

Dr. Adler urges that the combined effort of all who care for moral improvement is needed to meet and stem the forces of moral evil by which the community is threatened, and that the fellowship of ethical life need not be based on or maintained or cemented by any agreement as to philosophical or theological dogma. This is no doubt to a great extent true, and, perhaps, much truer now than it has ever been before—but it is also, I suppose, true that only a very small minority of the many whose moral aspirations are deep, sincere and elevated, hold their ethical opinions in detachment from definite philosophical or theological belief—and again although all men of fine moral nature and lofty aspirations prize and seek the Good in human conduct, it does not follow that they are safe from disagreement as to what the Good is. I do not indeed think that this difficulty need be fatal or disastrous. Probably all of us agree with Butler that Justice, Veracity and regard to General Happiness are highly important rules of action,—still

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there is, or may be, difficulty. And the difficulty cannot be ignored by Ethical Societies, if they apply themselves to practical detail rather than philosophical principles, or fundamental doctrines. The region which most seem to agree in assigning to Ethical Societies, is the region of "middle axioms," and in this connection it is of paramount importance to point out—*not, e. g.,* that the Golden Rule is worthy of acceptance, but how it is to be interpreted and carried out—*not* that we ought to be just, but how in given classes of cases, Justice ought to be realized. For Moral Unity, something more than "practical earnestness" is required, and our "common stock of moral judgments" perhaps wants clarifying and improving. I do not say that Dr. Adler does not recognize this, but I think he inclines to minimize both the difficulty and the importance of intellectual agreement. Morality is as truly an affair of reason as philosophy itself.

In the Essay on "The Ethical Bond of Union," Dr. Adler further enforces with persuasive earnestness and eloquence the view put forward in the previous essay—in this case, however, laying stress chiefly on the sufficiency of an earnest love and pursuit of goodness as the bond of union for Ethical Societies, whereas before it was the unimportance of any dogmatic agreement whether in religion or philosophy, that was made prominent.

The tale is taken up in the next two Essays—"Ethical Religion" and "The True Basis of Religious Union"—by Mr. W. M. Salter, who, with genuine ethical enthusiasm, and a great deal of practical insight, discourses of ethics as capable of providing men with the best sort of religion; by "religion" he means "man's supreme interest"—"man's relation to what is ultimate and supreme"—and this he holds the Moral Law to be. Without derogating from the excellence and importance of devotion to the moral law, it may be pointed out that this is not what would be generally understood by religion. And without denying that the devotion to duty, the unselfish labor for others, the "beauty of holiness," which we see in men, has a supreme worth and an unique attraction, I do not see how we can obtain from acceptance of Duty that completeness of explanation, and promise of perfection, the insatiable craving for which drives men to religion and philosophy.

According to Mr. Salter it would appear that the only truth which as ethical or religious, we are really under an obligation to accept is, that *Duty binds a man.* This, however, does not seem to carry us very far in Ethics, Religion or Philosophy.

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Mr. Salter, like Professor Adler, appears inclined to minimize the intellectual difficulty that may arise in attempting to define the practical details of good living—men who are profoundly anxious to do right, may disagree seriously as to what it is right to do.

The two Essays which follow Mr. Salter's are by Professor Henry Sidgwick, who since the publication of this volume has been taken from among us, to the great detriment of Philosophy, the sincere grief of his friends, and the loss of the whole world, which is poorer by one of the best men that ever lived. He was an ethical philosopher who lived his philosophy, who supplemented his written and spoken teaching by a life of the most flawless uprightness and kindliness, the most unremitting devotion to his ideal, the most genuine moral enthusiasm and an unfailing reasonableness. He was one of those who communicated not only "ideas about morality" in Dr. Bosanquet's phrase, but also "moral ideas"—one of those "who carry the world on their shoulders, and the moral atmosphere of whose endeavors is the true medium of the communicating of moral ideas." "His work was good, but he was better" was said of him by one who knew him well. He had (to use an expression of his own in this book) "an ardent love of goodness," which did indeed not fail to communicate itself, in some degree, to those with whom he came in contact. Of the two papers which are reprinted here, the first—"The Scope and Limits of the Work of an Ethical Society"—was delivered at the meeting at which the Cambridge Ethical Society was started, and the second was read, a few years later before the London Ethical Society. Both have been reprinted with some other ethical addresses of Professor Sidgwick's in a little volume entitled "Practical Ethics," published in 1898. The two Essays which we have here are marked by his usual scholarly thoroughness and finish, and by depth, and charming freshness, of thought. One gathers from them a vivid impression of the unworldliness and moral earnestness of the writer, combined with keen insight into life, and keen appreciation of practical needs and difficulties. He has lived the good life, and knows its difficulties, and how much courage it needs, as well as what lasting attractions it has to offer. He is able to rate at their true worth "the noble and refined satisfactions which experience shows to attend the resolute choice of virtue. . . .

> 'The stubborn thistles bursting
> Into glossy purples, which outredden
> All voluptuous garden-roses.'"

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He considers that the sphere of work of an Ethical Society is a region of "intermediate ethical generalizations," "a secular, but not therefore irreligious region, in which we pursue merely mundane ends, but yet not in a worldly spirit."

In the second Essay, Professor Sidgwick considers chiefly how best to promote the professed aim of the Societies—"To assist individual and social efforts after right living" by trying "to free the current ideal of what is right from all that is merely traditional and self-contradictory, and thus to widen and perfect it." He recommends in particular that "the moral philosopher should study with patient and reverent care the Morality of Common Sense . . . . the moral judgments of those persons to be found in all walks and stations of life, whose earnest and predominant aim is to do their duty; of whom it may be said—

> 'though they slip and fall,
> They do not blind their souls with clay,'

but after each lapse and failure recover and renew their rectitude of purpose and their sense of the supreme value of goodness."

"And," he concludes, "if it be said that after all is done the moral ideal of our age, however purged of inconsistencies and inspired and expanded by a steady self-devotion to the most comprehensive notion of good that we can form, is still imperfect and mutable; and that it must be expected to undergo, in the future, transformations now unforeseen; it yet need not painfully disturb us that the best of our possessions should be thus subject to the inexorable conditions of mundane existence. It need not hinder us from cherishing and holding to the best we have so long as it remains the best. Life is essentially change, and the good life must be essentially life; it is enough if it contain unchanged amid the change that aspiration after the best life, which is itself a chief source and spring of change."

The remaining Essays of the volume are "Ethics and Theology," by Professor von Gizycki, "The Communication of Moral Ideas as a Function of an Ethical Society," by Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Aims of Ethical Societies," by Mr. Leslie Stephen, "The Ethical Movement Defined," by Dr. Stanton Coit, and "The Position of an Ethical Society," by Professor J. H. Muirhead.

Professor von Gizycki points out that morality does not depend upon theology and that we ought to do right for right's sake, uninfluenced by expectations of immortality and the hope of reward

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or fear of punishment. He cherishes anticipations of a future when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into reaping hooks, and all Christian Churches transformed into Ethical Societies. "Churches," he says, "we hope there will always be. Organ and song shall ever resound there, but we hope that the hymns will become purely human and moral, that men will not sacrifice to God or petition him, but will appeal to men and make men better." He condemns in set terms regard for one's own Happiness, but does not notice in how far that care for the happiness of others which he commends, must logically start from appreciation of the worth of happiness to him whose happiness it is. He seems, however, to waver occasionally—recommends doing right as a source of happiness to the agent, and says that people can be happy without the hope in immortality. He tries to show that Death is not to be dreaded for oneself or for others. But though we may admit the force of much which Professor von Gizycki says, I find nothing in his remarks on this head which seems to me to have the least tendency to reconcile men to the loss of those they love, or to console anyone whom death has robbed. Many observations throughout the Essay, and in particular those on page 179, as to the characteristic worth of each period of life, seem to me equally true and wise. A feature of this Essay is the very large amount of quotation from both ancient and modern writers which it contains.

Dr. Bernard Bosanquet's address sets forth in an epigrammatic and suggestive way the superiority of a natural and concrete mode of inculcating good life, as compared with a more abstract and professional method. He is inclined to extol example and instinct in comparison with precept and the conscious guiding of action by abstract rules. "I would never," he says, "tell people that there is a standard which they ought to follow, and a sanction which they ought to value. As a general rule perplexities of conscience are avoided by living out one's own life and attempting always rather to enlarge one's point of view organically than to vary it capriciously." What he recommends to each one is just to "play well his part in life"—to do his own work well, to talk about what he understands, and intervene only in the regions of action that he is acquainted with. According to this view the function of an Ethical Society is to further the best possible performance by each of the social functions that belong to him—the author dislikes all appearance of preaching, of anything like a professional caste of

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ethical workers. In all this there is much excellent good sense, but it sometimes makes one inclined to ask, What after all, is the particular place of Ethical Societies in the plan of the social organism?

Dr. Bosanquet ends with an impressive recommendation of thoroughness in all our doing. "We have to see to it," he says, "that the life which we are communicating is solid and sound. Half-culture, half-insight, half-devotion, half-conviction, are the insidious enemies of our work."

Mr. Leslie Stephen's vivid and picturesque Essay contains some interesting autobiographical reminiscences. He takes a gloomy view of the possibilities of exhibiting the dogma of the Christian Churches in a form intellectually satisfactory to thinking minds. Religion, he says, to satisfy the cultured must be a philosophy, to satisfy the vulgar it must be a superstition. Yet he seems to cherish the hope that the philosopher may learn "the art of translating his doctrines into language intelligible and really instructive to the outside world"—and he holds that "an Ethical Society should aim at supplying a meeting-place between the expert and specialist on one side, and on the other the men who have to apply ideas to the complex concrete of political and social activity," and thus afford help towards attaining clearer views on ethical and social questions, and reaching a creed freed from ancient prejudice and superstition.

Dr. Stanton Coit's short paper is quite in the spirit and on the lines of those contributed by Professor von Gizycki and Mr. Salter. According to him the bond of religious union should be "devotion to the Good in the world"—meaning by "good," good in character and conduct,—he disclaims affiliation to any church or sect, "exalting rather the indwelling ideal in each man." He points out as a second principle of the Ethical Societies, that every man should regard the performance of duty as sacred, and of inevitable obligation, and holds that the idea of Duty for Duty's sake supplies a more than sufficient motive to right doing. He does, however, allow a subordinate place to the Natural or Physical, the Legal, the Social, and the Sympathetic sanctions of right conduct.

Mr. Muirhead, in the last Essay of the volume, discusses "The Position of an Ethical Society," and sums up the fundamental standpoint in three statements, viz.:—

1. Character and Conduct are the most important factors in life;

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2. They are independent of a man's religious and theological beliefs;

3. Material resources, political changes, social institutions are valuable only so far as they contribute to the moral well-being of the community.

He goes on to indicate more nearly the position of such Societies by drawing the line between them and Churches, Halls of Science, and Socialistic Associations. For an Ethical Society, Goodness, the Moral Law, is a law of Nature, not any supernaturally revealed code of rules. We are supposed thus to place Morality upon a firm and immutable foundation. Further, the aim of such a Society is practical as well as theoretical. Professor Muirhead advocates what he calls "intra-mundane" (or pantheistic) as distinct from "supra-mundane" theism, and Christianity, regarded as an embodiment of the "great constructive ideas" which we owe to Christ, and after him to St. Paul and St. John. Similarly he does not disclaim Socialism of the kind which aims at transforming primarily the sentiments and habits of the people. Finally Professor Muirhead holds that Ethical Societies ought to concern themselves both with *ideas about Morality* (including—as Mr. Leslie Stephen also would do—consideration of ethical "first principles"), and likewise with *moral ideas*, and practical sympathy and fellowship—offering a "common ground of work and hope" to those who have ceased to find in current creeds and churches moral support and companionship.

E. E. Constance Jones.

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Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. By George Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. Pp. x, 290.

It is not easy to summarize the contents of this remarkable book —as remarkable for the beauty and distinction of the style in which it is written as for its order of ideas. The central thought is that of the essential identity of poetry and religion. Poetry deals with imaginative conceptions, and religion is poetry taken to heart, believed in and applied to life. The error of religion is in pretending to deal with matters of fact. It brings itself thereby into conflict with science, and moreover soils its own purity—for its proper concern is to express the ideal. "Its function is to draw from reality materials for an image of that ideal to which reality

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ought to conform, and to make us citizens, in anticipation, in the world we crave" (p. vi). The actual world is a somewhat sorry scheme in the author's eyes; he speaks, with apparent sympathy, of a certain writer's "passionate pessimism about the natural world," even of "the speculative pessimism inevitable to an intelligent being," and says, "That Nature is immense, that her laws are mechanical, that the existence and well-being of man upon earth are, from the point of view of the universe, an indifferent incident,—all this is in the first place to be clearly recognized" (chap. ix). Yet man to whom Nature is thus indifferent can also turn his back on Nature and care for her only as she fosters the free life of his mind and imagination. He is apparently, in the author's eyes, a plus in relation to his phenomenal antecedents, and in reacting on his environment gives back more than he receives. He conceives the "light that never was on land or sea," and on slight hints from nature pictures bright and beautiful gods, and with scant warrant from history fashions social ideals. He raises, too, searching questions overtopping the power of his experience to answer—so that he ventures beyond what "the understanding, with its present resources," can give in framing replies. "The imagination, therefore, must furnish to religion and to metaphysics those large ideas tinctured with passion, those supersensible forms shrouded in awe, in which alone a mind of great sweep and vitality can find its congenial objects" (p. 6). It is by such imaginative effort that wholes are made of these sorry fragments we call our life. Ideas and ideals are the complements by which experience is rounded out. The otherwise incomplete, trivial or even empty hence gets a meaning; a standard of value, a "principle of correction," becomes fixed; and a goal is set for our life—or even, as Aristotle thought, for all nature. To worship nature, *i. e.*, the world we know, is consequently inpossible, and for natural religion, ancient or modern, the author has little praise; the true objects of religion are "supernatural"—"ultramundane" is the phrase used in an admiring account of the Aristotelian conception of God. Man himself is above nature, and above man is only the ideal world, the world of "immortal forms." But the ideal is not to be objectified, natural as it may be to do so in certain stages of culture. "Existence," the author reminds us with delightful frankness, "is something quite irrelevant to an ideal" (p. 72).

In harmony with this view, which finds a semi-formal statement

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in the opening and concluding chapters of the book, Professor Santayana gives us fascinating studies of the Greek religion and of the Christian system ("The Homeric Hymns," "The Dissolution of Paganism," "The Poetry of Christian Dogma"), keen criticisms of Shakespeare ("The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare") and of Whitman and Browning ("The Poetry of Barbarism"), and a sympathetic account of a certain contemporary Frenchman's reconstruction of religion in harmony with modern conditions of thought ("A Religion of Disillusion"—the reference being to Jean Lahor's "La gloire du néant").

Possibly owing to the literary rather than philosophical form of the book, varying standpoints seem to be taken at different times, which may puzzle even an attentive reader—or, perhaps we should say, *only* an attentive reader, since the charm and flow of the style, and the luminousness of each thought by itself, tend to make one oblivious to aught else. For instance, the ideal is spoken of as something "to which reality ought to conform," and the general attitude to reality might be called a quite disdainful one. We hear of the "niggardliness of Nature," and of the "irrational forces" amid which we live (p. 100). Yet in another connection the "laws of the world" are spoken of as "fixed and unchangeable conditions of our happiness" (p. 249), and Nature appears as a "temple," even as a "house of prayer" (p. 22). These different attitudes may be reconcilable, but they are hardly reconciled. Again, the author speaks of the ideal constructions of religion and metaphysics as possibly true (p. 7): but if so, they are ideal in a different sense from that in which the ideal is a standard for reality—they may be reality. In the same way poetry, though contrasted with science, is spoken of as "an approach to the highest reality" (p. 289). Evidently there are different senses of "reality" and different senses of the "ideal"—and they are not clearly distinguished. Still further the view of religion varies. In general its objects are ideal, supernatural—the natural becomes divine only as it is transfigured into the human or superhuman (see particularly pp. 64, 65); yet in Greek tragedy, the religiousness of which is dwelt upon, the dominant ideas noted are such naturalistic conceptions as fate, and the eternity of nature and law (pp. 157, 158). He speaks, too, with sympathy of the idea of "a cosmic order, of general laws of life," and "of an impersonal religion" (p. 283); indeed, "an austere and impersonal religion" would appear, in one passage, to be the highest type (p. 197). It is

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evident that one must be careful in drawing inferences from single statements of the author—even repeated ones. The ideal itself, which is at times so sharply contrasted with reality, is after all, if we may accept Jean Lahor's view as the author's own, "a function of reality" (p. 246), and may be destined—at least ideals in society, art and science—to become reality; nay, in some hardly-to-be-defined sense may be reality (pp. 7, 289). Moreover, how can ideals be distinguished from the "illusions" which the author reprobates (p. 250), save as they fit into the possible conditions of reality? Somehow, as he is quite aware, terms must be made with reality, else his idealistic view is in danger of passing into " a mere idealism"—of becoming, like the later Greek mythology, not "a natural interpretation" of the facts of life, but "an artificial addition to them" (p. 57). A philosophical statement of his position those interested in this rare and beautiful book would welcome.

As to the present religious outlook, we are hardly in error in thinking that though as between orthodox and liberal religion the author would prefer the former as richer in content (pp. vi, vii), and is fearful about the immediate future (p. 116), his real interests are with those who are trying in some such manner as Jean Lahor to work out, in theory and practice, a purified idealism. Of the liberal school he says, "Mythology cannot become science by being reduced in bulk, but it may cease, as a mythology, to be worth having"—which reminds one of Matthew Arnold's thrust at the "dead horses" of natural theology. But to do without mythology altogether would seem to be the highest thing to his mind. The closing paragraph of the chapter entitled "A Religion of Disillusion" is as follows:

"We cannot change the world, even if we boast to have made it [this after arguing that "to subjectify the unwise is not to improve it, much less to dissolve it"]; we must in any case learn to live with it, whether it be our parent or our child. To veil its character with euphemisms or to supply its defects with superstitious assumptions is a course unworthy of a brave man and abhorrent to a prudent one. What we should do is to make a modest inventory of our possessions or a just estimate of our powers in order to apply both, with what strength we have, to the realization of our ideals in society, in art, and in science. These will constitute our Cosmos. In building it—for there is none other that builds it for us—we shall be carrying on the work of the only race that has yet seriously attempted to live rationally, the race to which we owe the name and the idea of a Cosmos, as well as the beginnings of its realization. We shall then be making that rare advance in wisdom which consists in abandoning our illusions the better to attain our ideals."

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We shall do a service to our readers in calling their attention to two little books of poetry by Professor Santayana: "Sonnets and Other Poems" (1894), and "Lucifer, a Theological Drama" (1899), both published by Herbert S. Stone & Co., Chicago. They will find in them much of the same union of elevated thought with refined literary form. We quote one passage:

> "For long ago I taught my thoughts to run
> Where all the great things live that lived of yore,
> And in eternal quiet float and soar;
> There all my loves are gathered into one,
> Where change is not, nor parting any more,
> Nor revolution of the moon and sun."

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

LA MORALE UTILITARIA DELLO STUART MILL. Esposizione della Dottrina. Memoria del S. C. Prof. Giuseppe Zuccante. Milano, 1899. Quarto. Pp. 113.

In this Memoir, which forms part of the proceedings of the Lombard Royal Academy of Science and Literature, Dr. Zuccante continues the study of English hedonism which he began in the monographs reviewed in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for January, 1899. [Vol. IX., p. 236]. The present work is the third of a series which he is devoting to the theory of J. S. Mill. In two earlier pamphlets Dr. Zuccante discussed the origin of Mill's ethics, he now expounds the doctrine itself, and in a future work he intends to criticise it. Even in this memoir, however, there is a good deal of criticism, and elaborate comparisons are made between the views of Mill and those of Mr. Spencer, Professor Bain and others. The main substance of the volume is a very elaborate exposition of Mill's "Utilitarianism," and in addition there is much quotation and discussion of the passages bearing on ethics in the "Logic," the "Examination of Hamilton" and the "Dissertations and Discussions." Apparently there is no Italian translation of the "Utilitarianism," and Dr. Zuccante's work will be useful as a substitute. He refers frequently to Le Monnier's French translation, mainly to point out its errors, and his own renderings seem to me to be almost always accurate. The only exceptions are such slight errors as that on p. 61, l. 25, where the point of the English sentence is lost, viz., that the tax should not merely be in proportion to the amount of a man's possessions,

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but that it should increase more rapidly the more a man has *to spare.* Dr. Zuccante adopts the sensible plan of giving occasionally original English phrases along with his translation; but the proof-reading of these has been badly done and there are errata in almost every one of them. The exposition is clear, fluent and full, and the criticisms, although they can hardly be regarded as profound, are always acute and often very interesting.

From the author's general treatment of his subject one gathers that his own position is somewhat as follows. He regards the development of utilitarian ethics in England as taking the form of an endeavor "intrinsecare l'estrinseco," to pass from the "external" determinism of Bentham to the more and more "internal" or "psychological" determinism of Mill and Spencer. "L'interiorità, il psicologismo," that is the new element which Mill tries to introduce into utilitarianism. But this endeavor is only very imperfectly carried out. It is fundamentally an attempt to get rid of a purely mechanical (and ultimately fatalist) view of human nature and conduct; but Mill succeeds merely in substituting an "internal mechanism" for the "external mechanism" which had satisfied his predecessors. Apparently Dr. Zuccante regards some form of intuitional ethics as the real goal towards which Mill is blindly striving and he frequently points out how Mill, with his candor, his openness of mind and his way of developing his thought in a "sinuous curve," rather than in a straight line, comes to conclusions which are infinitely near to the views of the opposite school. Thus Mill's hesitations and contradictions, his "saying and unsaying" are repeatedly pointed out. Mill's object is regarded as having been to vivify utilitarianism by bringing within it all that is best in the intuitionist tradition. And it is evident that this harmonizing tendency is carried a stage further in the writings of Mr. Spencer. But one gathers from Dr. Zuccante's comments that, in his opinion, even Mr. Spencer does not do full justice to the "freedom," "spontaneity," "activity" of the individual. Doubtless the author's own position will be more definitely stated in the critical memoir which he has promised.

The contents of the volume may be briefly indicated. Chapter I. is concerned mainly with Mill's position regarding the quality of pleasures and with the relation between individual and general happiness. These matters are discussed on familiar lines, and the same may be said of Chapter II., which expounds the general objections to the utilitarian position and Mill's replies, as they are

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given mainly in Chapter II. of the "Utilitarianism." The chief interest of Chapter III. is the elaborate comparison between Mill's view of moral obligation and those of Spencer and Bain. Dr. Zuccante prefers the position of Spencer because it makes moral authority primarily "internal," while according to Bain, on the other hand, this "internal" moral authority is merely the reflection of an authority that is originally external. In Chapter IV., Mill's view of the nature of virtue is expounded, as well as his account of the function of habit in transforming desire into will, etc., and Mill's account of habit is contrasted unfavorably with that of Aristotle. Chapter V. deals with Mill's theory of justice, which it compares first with the views of Bentham and afterwards with those of Spencer. Bentham, Helvetius and Hobbes would, according to Dr. Zuccante, have disavowed Mill's doctrine as not really following from their own, and indeed Mill's argument is glaringly inconsistent with itself. The earlier utilitarians attributed to justice a right which is fundamentally external and legal. Mill draws a distinction between moral and legal right, attributing to justice distinctively a moral right, and yet he defines this right in a way which makes it indistinguishable from legal right. Again, while admiring the "wonderful subtlety of psychological analysis" in Mill's statement, Dr. Zuccante regards the position of Mr. Spencer as more satisfactory, especially in view of his explanation, through heredity, of the "transcendence" of the idea of justice. Chapter VI. is devoted to a very long discussion of the question of free-will and determinism, with reference to the views of Mill as given in the "Logic" and in the "Examination of Hamilton." Dr. Zuccante finds two opposite currents in Mill, which strive to combine or overcome one another, but never succeed. On the one hand, Mill is inclined to grant to man a provisional personality, a kind of liberty and control over his actions, while on the other hand, this personality is entirely denied and the human mind is reduced to a series of states of consciousness. The criticisms of Mill in this chapter can hardly be regarded as profound or satisfactory. At best Dr. Zuccante makes some clever debating points, which will not stand a steady examination. His reply (p. 88) to Mill's attack on the intuitionist theory, which justifies the belief in freedom by the "witness of consciousness," is a plain begging of the question, and his suggestion (p. 100), as against Mill's theory of punishment, that the good of the guilty and the protection of society might (if that were all) be better obtained by rewards than

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by punishments, is more amusing than sound. The unbeliever in "retributive" justice need have no difficulty in pointing out that a legalized system of blackmail can be for the good neither of the blackmailed society nor of the blackmailing individuals. It is but right to remember, however, that Dr. Zuccante reserves his main criticisms for a later volume. Yet it is not encouraging to find (p. 97) that he regards the objection implied in the question: Is it just to punish a man for an action which he was "determined" to do? as giving "il colpo di grazia" to the system of determinism. In the concluding chapter there is a brief estimate of Mill's position as a whole, and the large function of association in his system is emphasized. Mill is further criticised for attributing too much importance to the state and not insisting enough on the inner morality of the individual. Similarly, Dr. Zuccante argues that, on Mill's principles, education becomes too much a process from without inwards and the mind is apt to be regarded practically as a *tabula rasa*, to the neglect of its germinal capacities. In all this Dr. Zuccante is, of course, proceeding on familiar lines, and the expression of his own views is as yet too vague for profitable discussion.

R. Latta.

University of Aberdeen.

An Introduction to English Politics. By John M. Robertson. London: Grant Richards, 1900. Pp. xxvii, 515.

The purport of this "Introduction to English Politics" cannot be better stated than it is by the author himself in his "Preamble:"

"The following treatise originated remotely in a lecture delivered as preliminary to a course on 'Modern English Politicians' (from Bolingbroke to Gladstone), the aim of the prefatory address being to trace in older politics, home and foreign, general views which should partly serve as guides to modern cases, or at least as preparation for their scientific study. . . . . It makes no pretention, nevertheless, to a complete or systematic treatment of political history, or of political forms and theories. The object in view from the first has been, not the technical anatomy or documentary history of institutions, but the bringing into light of the ruling forces in all political life, ancient and modern alike. . . . . It is in the express treatment of problems of social evolution that there is need for new developments."

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Mr. Robertson, in fact, would substitute for the partial and exclusive inquiries of political, social, and economic historians a more organic method: and it is in this light that his essay must be judged.

"To this end it has broken up the total problem into a variety of special inquiries, taken up in different countries and different ages, striving always, however, to indicate the organic connection of all social processes, mental, moral, and material, and to reach through analysis or synthesis."

As Mr. Robertson is aware, his undertaking runs the gauntlet of specialists and experts in the different fields it traverses. But he disclaims the intention of composing a "manual of historical fact for the use of specialists."

"Rather it is a process of reasoning that seeks to bring home to the reader the nature of the historical developments dealt with, in terms of human life, of average human happiness, of culture, of moral and social science, with a view of qualifying him in some degree for the great but little-regarded task of forming his own political and sociological opinions."

Mr. Robertson remarks that the line of specialism in political science has been "rather away from than towards a practical use of the research accumulated." "Scholarly study grows more exact, more extensive, more burdensome to the student; but there is hardly a proportional advance in the thinking brought to bear on the facts established." There is, in fact, a decline amongst historians in "the energy of the speculative reason." "The earlier writers investigate slightly, but reason vigorously; the later writers investigate many details, but reason feebly or timidly on general principles." From this point of view, Mr. Robertson passes a somewhat violent judgment on historians such as Hallam, Stubbs and Mommsen; but he is still more severe upon the writers who have approached historical problems with the "patriotic or racial bias"—a phenomenon he traces to special political conditions of the age. Mr. Robertson, indeed, suggests that historical thinking stopped, or was at least suspended, after the French Revolution; that modern sociology (by which Mr. Robertson presumably means philosophy of history) is affiliated to the Scotch and French sociologists of the last century; although he freely acknowledges the contributions of Adam Smith and the economists to the foundation of a social science. They produced, at any rate, "many isolated works of unsystematic social science which compare very

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favorably with the whole output of to-day." Mr. Robertson has also a good word for the social observations of Laing, Kay, and Cobden, as well as for the philosophy of the Manchester school generally. His judgment, indeed, on the latter is so much to the point as to be worth quoting:—

"English politics, fifty years ago, had in Richard Cobden a kind of popular publicist who, for his combination of comprehensive principles with really relevant knowledge, is not surpassed by his more literate successors on his own side. These men had a clear and arguable philosophy of conduct, national and individual; and we may say broadly of the Manchester school, so-called, that it was much more rationally conscientious, and therefore more truly humanistic, than the school now in the political ascendant, which really develops and exaggerates all the defects of the Manchester school under names which nominally repudiate its ideals."

Mr. Robertson concludes that "the accumulated knowledge of the last generation has not been even partially assimilated in the sphere of practice;" the process of generalization at the same time that it becomes more cautious "is passing altogether out of use, leaving us mere masses of facts that do not instruct us." Historians, to judge from their comments on modern political questions, seem to "have gained no political wisdom from their research." "Students, roughly speaking, are apparently ceasing to be practical, and practical men are apparently ceasing to be students," and "such lop-sided development cannot but be harmful in practice." Mr. Robertson even goes so far as to say that, "by the very fact of his attitude and spirit of specialism," the student "is in no expert attitude to the living problem, which he too often faces in what Professor Mahaffy calls the 'elderly' temper." Professor Mahaffy is himself treated (rather out of proportion) as a type of the partisan and anti-progressive "sociologist." "With such mere fulmination of class bias, social science can have little to do. If sociology stands for anything, it stands for the approving recognition of developments, of betterments, as well as of declines, in human affairs." Mr. Robertson will not accept the "see-saw" theory of progress.

As might be expected, Mr. Robertson is more sympathetic towards the sociological literature of which Professor Giddings' "Principles of Sociology" is a characteristic type: he hints, however, that it tends to "discuss theory *in vacuo* or in abstraction as regards at least the higher civilizations," and "the forceful ex-

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ample of Mr. Herbert Spencer in seeking the principles of sociology among the lower societies" has brought it about that "neither is our history truly sociological nor our sociology avowedly historical." Neither "sympathetic quasi-sociological" historians, like Green, nor "judicial" historians, like Gardiner, quite achieve what is wanted. What *is* wanted Mr. Robertson suggests in his account of his own aims:—

"Holding with Mr. Lester Ward that sociology runs a risk of becoming a dead science if divorced from instinctive purpose, and holding with Buckle that history without scientific generalization has little intellectual value. I have here aimed at turning history to sociological account, and at making sociology yield social guidance."

Mr. Robertson has also some not inappropriate remarks on the negative directions (such as "Back to Aristotle") characteristic of the school which Sir Frederick Pollock, among others, represents—the school which "handles only problems of political ethics." As Mr. Robertson observes, the formula of the "good life" by itself is rather vaguer than any formula about "the Rights of Man," and Sir Frederick Pollock does not even suggest how much of the Socialism of Aristotle would be "good life" for us. The "Social contract" may be as dead as the sociology of Genesis, but "the spirit which drove our predecessors to *a priori* formulas for grounds of social reconstruction is apparently as vigorous to-day as ever," albeit much less turbulent for the time being; the formula of the Rights of Man "has a great deal of adaptability, and is really not to be fought by the mere reiteration of Aristotle's 'good life,' which on the contrary would serve very well to the same end." It is obvious that the ideal of historical instruction for which Mr. Robertson pleads is on a line with the end that Seeley put before historians; but in Mr. Robertson's judgment, the "Expansion of England" is rather a miscarriage than an application of the principle in hand. "With much brilliancy and suggestiveness in narrative, it yields neither an induction nor a deduction, . . . even Freeman is at times more fruitful." Mr. Robertson prefers to seek the cause of Seeley's failure not in the undertaking itself, but in his academic environment. "The application given by university thought at present to any critical method is not in my opinion decisive of its possibilities"—an observation which Mr. Robertson supports by a reference to "the singular judgments on modern politics disclosed to us in some

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of the collected letters of the late Professor Jowett," and to the fact that a college tutor (if we mistake not, of the same college) recommended as books to read for an essay on socialism and evolution, Mr. Kidd's "Social Evolution" and Mr. Mallock's "Social Progress"—certainly a significant, if not conclusive, symptom of academic habits of thought. Such books, however, as Mr. Robertson observes, hold the field of English political thought as apart from "the (latterly) dwindling" literature of Socialism, "Liberalism so-called being almost destitute of scientific propaganda." Against alike the "obscurantist" and the "verbalist" forms of doctrine, Mr. Robertson's essay is directed. By verbalist forms of doctrine, Mr. Robertson seems to mean the tendency to materialize abstractions ("imaginary entities") like "nation," and to speak *e. g.*, of the will or the purpose of the nation. M. Taine is cited as a type of those writers by whom "the past course of nations, when it is sought to be explained at all, is . . . . accounted for by certain supposed qualities of character in the given nation as a whole, instead of by the specially conditioned play of forces common to all nations." As against this explanation Mr. Robertson sets what one may call the realist or naturalist view of political evolution. "Politics, in its most general and fundamental character, is the strife of wills, on the ground of social action." "Politics, we formally say, is the process of the clash of wills, sympathies, interests striving for social adjustment in the sphere of legislation and government." The only true synthesis which (after a preliminary analysis) "may safely be brought to bear on the study of practical politics . . . . is the simple principle that all energy divides ostensibly into forces of attraction and repulsion," though the *forms* in which these primary forces operate change with the development of political and social conditions.

I have endeavored to state Mr. Robertson's aims as much as possible in his own words, so that the reader may form some judgment as to the method of his "Introduction." It would be impossible to appraise its execution in detail. The author's discussion of historical problems is always fresh and virile; and he brings to their treatment a considerable amount of miscellaneous reading. But it cannot be said that he shows discrimination, or indeed the most recent knowlege, in his use of authorities; and his judgments (all allowance being made for perspective) are often perverse, and untrustworthy. Nevertheless, his discussions are never without interest and suggestiveness.

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As regards what one may call the first principle of Mr. Robertson's sociological doctrine, it would appear to be the direct antithesis of Mr. Bosanquet's "Philosophical Theory of the State:" it seems, that is, to deny the reality of the General Will and the validity of a teleogical attitude towards social phenomena. The student's disposition toward Mr. Robertson's book must be inevitably affected by the value he is likely to attach to the organon employed. He may think, for instance, that the method is one that would vitiate any result attained; would not, in fact fulfil the requirements of a "true synthesis." But Mr. Robertson seems to find a difficulty in putting off the old Adam of metaphysical abstraction—"the verbalism of Hegel and his school." He affirms, indeed, that "the courses of nations are in the main ruled as of old, not by their wisdom but by their unwisdom; not by the science of the few, but by the instincts and passions of the many." The course of England, for instance, is being taken at this moment "with no more of scientific foresight or individual provision against future social disease than there was in the Rome of the emperors." But at the same time he does not despair of the ultimate sovereignty of a spiritual power, the distinct emergence of which he has traced in English politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century in the shape of the "spirit of science, which rare and transient in ancient times, seems destined to inherit the later earth, which slowly transmutes politics from an animal to an intellectual process, raising it from the stage of mere passional life to the stage of constructive art, and from the social relation of rule and subjection towards the relation of mastership and corporate intelligence . . . . the conscious progressive art develops in course of time." The general will seems, then, to be a force, if an intermittent one: and would seem to be the only force that is truly progressive. But progress is only in our own century beginning to be conscious or calculated; "it has truly been, so far as most of the actors are concerned, by unpath'd waters to undream'd shores." It would be interesting to inquire in what ways the course of thought has tended to the realization of Plato's and Comte's conception of a "spiritual power," as also to consider more closely what rudiments of its actual operation can be discovered. But Mr. Robertson is content to end upon a note of resolute, if cautious, idealism.

"An Introduction to English Politics" is a book which most students will count it a gain to have read, even if they cannot regard

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the method as wholly satisfying in regard either to its conception or to its results.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE HOUSING QUESTION. By Alfred Smith, L. C. C., late Chairman of Housing Committee, London County Council. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1900.

This little book deals in a thorough and sensible way with a question of urgent importance. The great and increasing evil of overcrowding is due to the lack of house-accommodation for working people within reach of their work and at rents which they can afford to pay. Mr. Smith shows the gravity of the present situation, and describes the attempts—legislative, administrative and philanthropic—which have been made in recent times to abate the evil. After all that has been done there is still an "utter want of proper dwellings," and Mr. Smith sets to work to analyze the causes of this, with results that are very interesting. His book refers chiefly to London, but the situation is similar all over the country, and Mr. Smith's arguments are of general application.

He begins with some figures showing the growth of population in London during the century and the increasing number of persons living under conditions of overcrowding; and he reminds us of the connection of overcrowding with disease and drink, lunacy and crime. Then comes a summary of the legislation prior to the famous Royal Commission which sat from 1884 to 1889, and made an elaborate report as to the causes of overcrowding. The outcome of the recommendations of the Commission was the Housing Act of 1890. Mr. Smith deals fully with the provisions of this Act, and describes, as he is well able to do, the work of the London County Council under the Act during the last nine years in clearing and rebuilding insanitary areas, in building tenement and cottage dwellings, and in carrying out street improvements. The part played by the Artisans' Dwelling Companies and Trusts is also described and some interesting details are given of the Model Lodging Houses in London and Glasgow.

But Mr. Smith rightly insists that "the paramount necessity of to-day is increased accommodation," and that "it is doubtful whether if all the slums of London were cleared away and replaced by healthy dwellings, the amount of house-room would be mater-

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ially extended." The clearance of insanitary areas should be regarded rather as a necessity from the public health point of view than as a means of relieving overcrowding. The only possible relief of overcrowding appears to lie in providing a further supply of dwellings at reasonable rents in the suburban districts. If this is to be done it is essential that there should be greater facilities of transit. We must put further pressure on the Railway Companies to provide workmen's trains, and we must look for the extension and unification of the tramway system and the building of light railways. But Mr. Smith warns us that such increased facilities would not by themselves increase the supply of house-room. One-fifth of the land within the boundaries of the County of London is now vacant land—a fact which indicates that the crux of the housing difficulty lies in securing the utilization of vacant land, and that improved means of transit, although of the greatest importance, will not by themselves avail to solve the problem.

The question then has to be asked, "What hinders the utilization of land for building purposes?" Mr. Smith's answer is: "The reason is one quite apart from the question of facilities of communication, and one of a far more fundamental character—namely, the present system of levying local taxation." The last section of the book is headed "The Reform of Local Taxation—an Important Remedy," and it contains a striking argument that the levying of local taxation on the present rateable value of property impedes building enterprise.

According to Mr. Smith we ought to levy local taxation not on the present rateable value—*i. e.,* the value of the premises as a whole, land and buildings together, if occupied; but on the site value —*i. e.,* the value of the ground apart from anything in the way of buildings or improvements upon it, and the rate ought to be levied whether the land be occupied or not. The advantages of this change may be summarized as follows.

On the outskirts of growing neighborhoods we often see land which is suitable for building but which is left idle year by year. Under the present system of rating, such land is classed as agricultural and rated on that basis, at say £3 or £5 an acre, while it could be let for building at £50 or £100 an acre. But as soon as houses are built and occupied, the rateable value goes up suddenly a hundredfold—from £3 or £5 to £300 or £500 an acre. The underrating of the land before it is built on of course encourages owners to "hold it for the rise" longer

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than they would if it were rated all the time at its real value; but it is also true that the crushing burden of rates which is imposed when the houses are built operates in itself to postpone and to prevent building. Our present rates immensely increase the cost of occupying the houses that are built, and effectually prevent more from being built; and it has become impossible for anyone—private builders, philanthropic companies, or public bodies—to provide houses for working people at reasonable rents. If land everywhere were rated on its real value whether built on or not, and if the erection of buildings did not make it liable to any increase of rates, there can be no doubt that we should have more and cheaper houses.

Mr. Smith proves quite clearly that the result of substituting site value for the present rateable value as the basis of local taxation would be a re-adjustment of the burden of local taxation as between different districts in such a way as to stimulate building enterprise. Heavier taxation would fall on the fully developed sites of the centre, while the outer districts would be relieved from the burden which now hampers their development. By way of illustration he takes the case of business premises in the West End of London. The rent is £1000 per annum. The structure represents an annual value of £150. The site therefore is producing £850 per annum. The taxes at present levied on the premises (at the rate of 25 per cent.) are £250 per annum, or about 30 per cent. on the annual value of the site. Compare this with the case of a small house in an outer district. The rent is £30 per annum. The structure represents an annual value of £25. The site value as paid in ground rent is £5. The taxes at the same rate on the house are £7 10s., or 150 per cent. on the annual value of the site as against 30 per cent. paid on the annual value of the West End site;—a burden five times as great.

The argument may be illustrated even more clearly perhaps by supposing the case of two properties, each of the present "rateable" value of say £100, one of them in a central position, the other on the outskirts. If we were to separate the £100 rateable value in the two cases into its component parts, we should find that the site value and the building value bore a different proportion to one another in the two cases. On the outskirts the site value would be say £20 and the building value £80. At the centre the site value would be £80 and the building value £20. At present both properties would be rated on the same value—£100. If site value were

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substituted for "rateable" value for the purposes of local taxation, the central premises would pay on £80, and the suburban on only £20. The advantage of this change would be twofold. The increased burden would do no harm to the fully developed central site, which ought, indeed, equitably to bear it. So far from hindering such sites from being developed, the pressure of the site value rate would be salutary in securing that they should be properly utilized. On the other hand, by freeing sites on the outskirts from a burden which ought not to be imposed on them we should remove the main hindrance to suburban development and it would be possible for houses to be supplied steadily to meet the demand for them at reasonable prices.

This is Mr. Smith's argument as we understand it, and it deserves the serious consideration of everyone interested in the Housing Question.

CROMPTON LLEWELYN DAVIES.

LONDON.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. An Introduction to the Philosophical Study of Politics. By Alfred H. Lloyd, Author of "Citizenship and Salvation" and "Dynamic Idealism." Ann Arbor: George Wahr, Publisher, 1899.

Professor Lloyd conceives it to be the duty of the philosophy of history "to examine the fundamental data of history, the general facts or the general principles that every historian takes for granted or is very likely to take for granted, and in the examination to determine how far they are really and consistently thinkable" (p. 12). "Determine what time is, what an event in time is, what causation and individuality and progress are, and what society is, and universal history is bound to stand before you" (p. 13). And this universal history is of interest because the knowledge of its laws liberates the life of the present from the bondage of necessity. To know the laws of the life we live is to live that life spontaneously. Knowledge can turn a necessary result into a motive and "where motive and result are one, freedom need not be questioned" (p. 15). But to find the laws of our present life in the events of the past is to presuppose a unity of present and past. "Not those that are now gone once lived and we live, but they and we are living; they in us and we with them. When, looking over the past, we think of freedom or spontaneity or responsibility as

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belonging to the makers of the past, we are in a very real and a very important sense, in a sense that is not a poetic fancy but a wholly prosaic experience, turning the creatures of yesterday into our own contemporaries. More than one writer has been keen enough to see that contemporaneity sets the temporal bounds of history, and a more important principle for the philosophy of history would be hard to find" (pp. 16, 17). Time is thus not an independent quiddity; it is not a framework within which reality is accidentally set; it is "an abstraction of some *essential* character in the sphere of the real" (p. 27). "Time is an element in experience that expresses abstractly at once the necessity—the past—and the opportunity—the future—that a world of related differences naturally affords" (p. 35). This view of time does away with all sudden beginnings and endings; every event is organically connected with every other event" (p. 27). We seem thus committed to a particular view of causation. "To identify cause and effect is to contemporize past and future" (p. 41). "No antecedent is cause apart from its whole environment and relating it to its whole environment is exactly what effects its contemporization with its effect" (p. 44). "Causation is nothing more nor less than organic differentiation" (p. 47). "Change of any sort, finally, is of the same character" (p. 50). "If reality is organic, unity and difference being essential to each other, no other conception of change is necessary than this that makes it consist in the permanence, the expression and maintenance, of that which is" (p. 53).

Now, this whole conception of time and causation is philosophically important as offsetting an atomistic view of the world. But there is danger that the offset may be in itself as sadly lacking in balance as its counterpoise. A reader of this book might very easily get the impression that Professor Lloyd, in his reaction against the view of time as a disjointed sequence, has gone over to a view of time as not being a principle of sequence at all, and this simply because time is a principle of continuity and coherence. This impression, if I can read aright between the lines, would be a false one, but the fault would not altogether lie with the reader. Professor Lloyd is nothing if he is not obscure. He has a passion for paradox. He believes that "there are times when clearness is a fault" (p. 207), and without question it is at such times that he writes his books. His general point of view is that the world, whether in space or in time or in any other of its features, is one; and this unity is to be found in the fact that every part of the

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world is what it is by virtue of its organic relation to every other part. In general outline, this view seems to me to be eminently satisfactory; but what is needed is to work this view out in detail, and in this task, or rather in the exposition of its results, Professor Lloyd does not seem to have been successful. No doubt the fault is in the expression and not in the thought. But books presumably are intended to bring thought to expression. The opacity of all Professor Lloyd's writing, and the offhand way in which, in this book, he refers to historical events as proving abstract formulas, when the connection between event and formula is what one wishes to have made out, lead to despair rather than to enlightenment. Without denying the profundity of the author's view or the smartness of his paradoxes, I should seriously protest that a philosophical book should not sacrifice clearness to paradox, or insight to mystification.

EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

CRANMER AND THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. By Arthur D. Innes, M. A., Sometime Scholar of Oriel College, Oxford. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900. Pp. xix., 199.

WESLEY AND METHODISM. By F. J. Snell, M. A. (Oxon.) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900. Pp. x., 243.

These two volumes are the first issues of a new series entitled, "The World's Epoch-Makers," published under the editorship of Mr. Oliphant Smeaton. The subjects of the twenty-eight volumes, which make up the series, are, for the most part, well chosen. But at times the selection of the "epoch-makers" seems arbitrary and artificial, and we may reasonably hope that editor and publishers will yet add others to make the series less abrupt and more satisfying. Why, for example, should place not be found for Plotinus? And why not for Abelard and for Aquinas? Why not, too, for Melanchthon and for Knox? Why should the "Herschels" appear, and neither a Kepler, nor a Galileo, nor a Newton, nor a Darwin? Then, again, we have Descartes, but not Malebranche, Spinoza, but not Leibnitz. We have Rousseau, too, and neither Maine de Biran, nor Cousin, nor Comte, nor Renouvier. Besides, there are many other names, some of which at least might have been included, as, for example, Berkeley, Hobbes, Fénelon, Locke, Butler, Rosmini, Carlyle, Vinet, Mill, Schopen-

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hauer, Lotze, Ritschl, etc. "A valuable conspectus" of the most prominent movements "in theology, philosophy, and the history of intellectual development" to the "present day," had need to supplement largely the twenty-eight volumes that make up the series as announced.

The first volume in the series, on "Cranmer and the Reformation in England," has been written by Mr. A. D. Innes with considerable ability, and in a spirit of carefulness, we might almost say of enthusiasm. He has attained not a little success in the rather difficult task of imparting freshness to matters that are stale and well-worn. His mode of marking the stages of the English Reformation is not that which we think the most helpful. However, Mr. Innes adapts the divisions he has chosen very well to his treatment of the subject. After dealing, in an interesting fashion, with the unrest of the time and the work of the Oxford Reformers, Mr. Innes touches on the Lutheran revolt. It is, to say the least, rather misleading to take away from Luther (as on p. 27), the glory of being lonely "prophet" and path-breaking "pioneer." To say (as on p. 28) that "if Luther had died in 1521, nine-tenths of his work would have been already accomplished," is to tax our faith rather heavily. When Mr. Innes comes to deal with Cranmer, his position is, in one important respect, correct. He does not think Cranmer's "conduct while he was archbishop ever verged on the heroic." Two points in his treatment of Cranmer are of especial interest. These are, his attempt to justify a more than usually favorable estimate of Cranmer, and his endeavor to make out a case of "unique" distinction for Cranmer in respect of his having "preserved" what Mr. Innes calls "comprehension coupled with historic continuity" for the Anglican Reformation. Despite the skill with which his contentions are put forward, we think Mr. Innes is, in both cases, far from convincing. He is too prone to take optimistic views of Cranmer, and seems rather bent on making an "epoch-maker" out of him. Despite the good hopes we had formed of his performance, we are at last left with an uneasy feeling that he has not escaped the snare of the special pleader, without being in the least aware of it. The usefulness of the book is enhanced by an excellent index, and some useful chronological tables.

The second volume, on "Wesley and Methodism," consists mainly of an outer narrative concerning the men and movements with which it deals. Its presentation of facts is marked by a

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certain piquancy that rivals much of our ordinary fiction writing, but is scarcely well adapted to themes like "Wesley and Methodism." Mr. Snell claims to "record history philosophically," and, if all that is required for doing so is non-adherence to the exact sequence of events, his claim may be allowed. But we had always thought such a claim purported more—even some philosophical grasping and grouping of principles, sources, and issues, and some unifying of events and occurrences. It cannot be said there is much of that power displayed in the book before us. It is, in fact, the absence of such a mode of treatment that we mainly miss. No collation of facts, and no clustering of incidents, will suffice to present and explain either a great personality or a large and vital movement. Not all his reading in pursuance of his task has given Mr. Snell the sympathetic appreciation and insight necessary for doing justice either to the man Wesley or the movement Methodism. We miss, in the Wesley given to us here, those grand spiritual and inspiring qualities without which Wesley could never have been the man he was. We miss, too, any save the most indifferent sort of theological appreciation of Methodism as part of religious world-development. If Wesley was a "king of men" (preface), a "glorious being" (p. 42), and "preeminently a man" (p. 243), then one would naturally have liked, not simply to be told these things, but to find John Wesley live in Mr. Snell's pages in somewhat of the regal beauty, lustrous splendor, and super-eminent humanness of character which these fine phrases suggest. So far from that, the Wesley we are there left with is a rather small man, of somewhat curious and contradictory character, incapable, of all things in the world, of being an "epoch-maker." And if Methodism was what even Mr. Snell allows it to have been, and "arrested national decay and infused new life into Christianity" (p. 242), then it deserved better at the hands of the church of its own time, and of Mr. Snell to-day. Neither from the one source nor the other has it received the large, comprehensive, and sympathetic treatment born of deep insight, wide outlook, and rich experience. The style is clear, forcible and readable, but lacking at times in dignity. There is no index to this work.

James Lindsay.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: An Empirical Study of the Growth of the Religious Consciousness. By Edwin Diller Starbuck, with a Preface by William James. London: Walter Scott, 1899. Pp. 423. Price, Six Shillings.

The second title of this volume gives us a much more accurate idea of its contents than the first. A book describing itself as the Psychology of Religion would lead us to suppose that the author meant to deal with the origin, development and contents of the religious consciousness in the individual and in the race. But the scope of Professor Starbuck's volume is much more limited. It is confined to a study of the growth of the religious consciousness among a certain number of American Protestants. Professor Starbuck got his material for this study by sending round a list of questions to people who would be likely to answer them asking them to detail their religious experience. The book consists for the most part in classifying and summarizing the answers and in attempting to draw conclusions from them.

Professor Starbuck in the first part of his work deals with the awakening of the religious consciousness, or as he calls it, conversion. Here are some of the questions which he put to his correspondents in order to get material to work with: In what ways were you brought to a condition to need awakening? What force or motive led you to seek a higher and better life? What were your circumstances and experiences preceding conversion? Had you any sense of depression, smothering, fainting, loss of sleep and appetite, etc.? How did relief come? Was it attended by unnatural sights, sounds or feelings? In what did the change consist? How sudden was the awakening? Did the change come through your own choice? What part of it was supernatural or miraculous? What were your feelings and experiences after the crisis? What changes did conversion make in your life? Were there any relapses? Professor Starbuck received a hundred and ninety-two answers to these questions and to a few others of a somewhat similar character. Of the people who answered a hundred and twenty were women and seventy-two were men. Almost all of them were Protestants and members of the Methodist community preponderated. What we get as a result of Professor Starbuck's questions is an account of the dawning of the religious sentiment as it is understood by certain typical American Protestants. This account Professor Starbuck sets forth in a series

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of chapters dealing with such matters as the age of conversion, the motives and forces leading to conversion, the experiences leading to conversion, the mental and bodily affections accompanying conversion, the character of conversion, and a few other points. Professor Starbuck confesses that he could get no very clear account from his correspondents of what conversion consisted. There was enough talking round the subject here and there, he says, but they were usually unable to describe the process or set it forth in words. And he arrives at the conclusion that on this point his goal has not been compassed and that the explanation of the process has escaped him.

It is probable that Professor Starbuck's inquiries would have been facilitated if they had been preceded by a study of what theologians call the *Ordo Salutis*. Orthodox Protestant teaching is framed on the lines of the *Ordo Salutis,* and the expressions used by Mr. Starbuck's correspondents are attempts to express their ideas and feelings in the language of the teaching to which they have listened from childhood. According to Orthodox Protestantism conversion is only one stage in a process. It represents the critical point at which the Christian enters the New Life. What takes place at this point is of a twofold character—in part the work of God and in part the work of the individual. In the individual, conversion is composed of two things—repentance and faith. The law produces repentance, the Gospel produces faith. Repentance and faith are the contents of conversion. When we examine the answers of Mr. Starbuck's correspondents we find that they revolve round these two points. They are attempts to express the processes of repentance and faith as these processes are understood by scholastic Protestantism. These processes are essentially subjective; they represent states of mind, and it is doubtful if they are capable of being accurately described. One cannot help admiring the patience with which Mr. Starbuck has collected his materials on the subject of conversion and the care with which he has worked them up. But the results, as he admits, are somewhat disappointing. We do not get beyond the fact that conversion is an incident which generally occurs at the age of adolesence, when the mind as a whole awakens to a wider view of the world and of the individual's place within it. In adolesence, consciousness reaches a higher stage. It is therefore at this age that a mind trained in a Christian community and indoctrinated with certain forms of Christian

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teaching, acquires a keener ethical consciousness and begins to deliberately regulate its actions in accordance with Christian standards of life and conduct. Conversion, in short, is the starting point of the subjective development of the individual Christian. It is the beginning of his conscious ethical life. It belongs more particularly to the ethical side of the Christian faith, and by many modern theologians it is dealt with as a department of Christian ethics.

In the second part of his book Mr. Starbuck deals with what he describes as "lines of religious growth not involving conversion." In this part the religion of childhood, of adolesence, and of adult life is discussed in a series of separate chapters. He finds that credulity is the most marked feature in the religion of the child. Next to this is the child's belief in the nearness of the supernatural world. Religious fears are common, though they occur less frequently than the sentiments of love and trust. One of the most pronounced characteristics of the religion of childhood is that "religion is distinctively external to the child rather than something which possesses inner significance." The period of adolesence is much more complex, as far as religious emotions are concerned. Mr. Starbuck considers that he only possesses materials for a fragmentary account of the religious life of the adolescent. In this account he deals with the awakening of religious ideas in the adolescent; the origin and development of religious doubt; the rejection, sometimes temporary and sometimes permanent, of the religious conception of the world; and the substitutes for religious feeling which are most usually resorted to by the rejectors of religious ideals. The final chapters in the second part of the book are devoted to a description of the place of religion in adult life. In all these chapters the material is drawn from statements of Mr. Starbuck's correspondents and is marshalled together in accordance with statistical methods. To apply statistical method to religious conceptions and religious emotions is somewhat of a novelty, and in so far as it is possible to get success in such an enterprise Mr. Starbuck has probably got it. The book, whatever its shortcomings, is an ingenious attempt to arrive at the original development and contents of the modern Orthodox Protestant religious consciousness. It does not reveal much that is new. But that is not the fault of Mr. Starbuck. His business was to analyze and combine the materials which lay before him. This he has done in a most painstaking

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and sympathetic manner. For this alone he deserves our warmest thanks. It is also to be hoped that his labors may be the means of inducing others to enter upon a more exact study of the somewhat obscure domain of religious phenomena.

LONDON. W. D. MORRISON.

PRACTICAL AGITATION. By John Jay Chapman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. Pp. viii., 157.

"We can always do more for mankind by following the good in a straight line than we can by making concessions to evil." This theme, which was the burden of "Causes and Consequences," is reiterated in this book in Mr. Chapman's courageous, sometimes reckless epigrams. "All the world loves a lover," even a lover of truth, and the author as such is one of our most stimulating writers on contemporary politics. His analysis of the political situation is accurate, his conception of the sphere of politics is philosophic, but his sense of perspective seems limited to the historical.

To most of the metropolitan political scientists the sun rises in Coney Island and sets in Hoboken. Mr. Chapman draws his illustrations from New York politics chiefly, but one feels that he is building on personal experiences and observations, and he can on occasion make scientific generalizations. He divides the New York struggle for reform into three periods: "1. The frankly corrupt era (fighting the devil with fire). 2. The compromise era (buying reform). 3. The educational era." His fear of compromise obscures the fact that every election may bring various practical issues to the front on which men may not be able to agree, though all may desire honesty. This confusion appears where he says, "Now if a piece of your land has an uncertain boundary, you have a right to compromise on any theory you like, because you own the land. But if you start out with the sole and avowed purpose of upholding honesty in politics, and you uphold anything else or subserve any other interest whatever, you are a deceiver." But why uphold honesty as the sole and avowed purpose? We have elected "honest" aldermen to the council in Chicago, who block the wheels of municipal progress because their only qualification is honesty. Why should the education of the citizen be confined to a struggle for honesty? Admit that this is the chief need of the hour, can we secure it by making it the only goal? How shall we know honesty if we place no purpose before our candidates?

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"Reform is an idea that must be taken up as a whole. You do not want any specific thing." This is fortunately qualified if not denied later by the assertion, "You may preach to a congregation by the year and not affect its thought because it is not called upon for definite action. . . . You can get assent to almost any proposition so long as you are not going to do anything about it."

We cannot be too grateful to Mr. Chapman for his startling assertion that one ought to tell the truth in politics and business and that the chicanery of business is responsible for the corruption of politics, but having urged this with so much force in his first political volume we were entitled to expect not merely an elaboration but an advance in this second book. We can no longer deny his well supported claim, "The first discovery we make is that the worst enemy of good government is not our ignorant foreign voter but our educated domestic railroad president, our prominent business man, our leading lawyer. If there is any truth in the optimistic belief that our standards are now going up, we shall soon see proofs of it in our houses. We shall not note our increase of virtue so much by seeing more crooks in Sing Sing, as by seeing fewer of them in the drawing room." It may be some time before society ostracises its crooks, but the workingman has to some extent already ostracised them. He is moving very slowly toward higher ethics, but more rapidly than the club man, and he is peculiarly susceptible to a form of education to which our author gives too little attention in treating his third phase of reform, namely, objective accomplishment. The splendid conflicts for honesty which Mr. Chapman has led against municipal, state and national corruption have not accomplished the work of education in the country which Colonel Waring's "white wings" have done in demonstrating at once the possibility of clean streets and the feasibility of clean administration. If our chief sources of evil are the personal interests of our ablest citizens, surely we need democracy as much as honesty. If we wait for the leading citizens to grow honest, we are not honest with ourselves, for in the meanwhile we are trifling with the public interests. If economics determine politics the aim must not be simply honest business or honest politics but more public business. Mr. Chapman is right in calling "Practical Agitation" the struggle for an ideal, without which the temporizing of the hard-headed business man is purely reactionary, but there is a higher ideal than individual honesty, social welfare.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. CHARLES ZUEBLIN.

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THE MORAL ORDER OF THE WORLD, In Ancient and Modern Thought. By Alexander Balmain Bruce, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. viii., 431.

This book forms the second series of Gifford lectures, delivered by Dr. Bruce, in Glasgow, in 1898. The main object of these twelve lectures is to show that, whether the existence of a personal Providence be believed in or not, there can be no doubt in regard to a moral order as a real and essential fact in nature. The method of proof takes the form of a historical survey, "not exhaustive, but fairly representative," of "what the wisest have thought" upon this subject. As the result of this survey "we see that the sages of various lands, in far past ages, unite in the emphatic assertion of a *Moral Order* as the thing of supreme moment for the faith and life of man." This consensus, being associated with the most discrepant theological positions, demonstrates that "the common faith in an eternal august moral order may be regarded as the fundamental certainty, the vital element in the religion of humanity."

The estimate which the reader will form of the success, or the value, of this book will depend upon whether he looks upon it as a *survey* of the faith of the ages in a moral, *i. e.*, by implication a providential, government of the world, or as a *proof* of the validity of this faith. Regarded as historical survey it is very good indeed, full of clear, sympathetic, penetrating insight into the underlying thoughts, as contrasted with the outward expression, of the thinkers reviewed; as philosophic or scientific demonstration, on the other hand, it will not be of much help to the doubting but anxious seeker after truth. For example, in answer to the question, what is the source of this common belief in a moral order, Dr. Bruce writes as follows (page 381):

"The root of this basal faith is an intense moral consciousness. Men believe in a moral order in the cosmos, because they have found a commanding moral order in their own souls. The prophets of the moral order on the great scale—Buddha, Zoroaster, Æschylus, Zeno, Isaiah, Jesus—have all been conspicuous by the purity and intensity of their own moral nature. In the clear authoritative voice of conscience they have heard the voice of God, or of what stands for God. It is ever so. For no man has a moral order in the universe been a dread, awe-inspiring reality for whom the sense of duty has not been the dominant feeling within his own bosom. Only the pure in heart see God."

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It may be so, but the thought will bring cold comfort to the man who finds no "commanding moral order" in his soul, and is haunted by a sickening doubt as to his being pure even in heart.

The reader who, on the other hand, possesses this minimum of faith, and who cares to accompany Dr. Bruce in his "pilgrimage through the ages," will find himself amply rewarded. The first five lectures deal with pagan thought as exemplified in Buddha, Zoroaster, the Greek Tragedians, Stories, and Oracles: the Hebrew Prophets, Job, and Christ, form the subject matter of the following three lectures; then, leaping over a gap of eighteen hundred years, Dr. Bruce interprets Browning, together with several writers whom he classes together as "Modern Dualists." The final lecture is devoted to a "retrospect and prospect."

The exposition of such widely diverging doctrines necessarily varies in merit, and Dr. Bruce is stronger, because more sympathetic, in his analysis of ancient than in that of modern thought. But all the lectures (except Lecture V.) will repay careful study, and should be compared with the summary statement of the strength and weakness of the various systems given in Lecture XII., pages 384-393. The one exception is Lecture V., on "Divination." The contrast here drawn between the Soothsayer and the Prophet is not only repeated, but very much better worked out, in the following lecture upon the "Hebrew Prophet." If Dr. Bruce had given us, instead of the obvious (comparatively speaking) commonplaces of this chapter, an analysis of *e. g.*, Plato, he would have added to the debt of gratitude we owe him for the remaining eleven chapters. The book is accompanied by an excellent index.

W. W. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

AN ETHICAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL: A Scheme for the Moral Instruction of the Young. By Walter L. Sheldon, Lecturer of the Ethical Society of St. Louis; author of "An Ethical Movement." London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900.

The editor of *The Ethical Library* is to be congratulated upon this his latest issue. Whether we approach the book as students of modern movements or as disciples who would learn from a master, we shall equally be arrested and informed. The book is an account of an Ethical Sunday-school. It is written with

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enthusiastic faith in the movement, with prolonged personal experience of the kind of work described, and with the modesty and frankness which real knowledge and faith are apt to produce. An Ethical Sunday-school is an attempt to teach young people the fundamentals of morality, by direct instruction in classes, apart from every-day school education, and apart from dogmatic religious instruction. The methods and matter employed in the St. Louis Ethical Sunday-school are described with great fulness, the failures and successes of nearly twelve years chronicled with engaging and instructive frankness.

To many the orthodox Sunday-school has become increasingly unsatisfactory, not only because of divergence of creed, but because the good boy of the Sunday-school is apt to be a pitiful prig, while the ineffectiveness of the most accurate knowledge of catechism, creed, or scripture, to influence conduct is daily demonstrated.

On the other hand it is contended with much truth that the boys and girls of our big cities often grow up with a painful absence of moral ideas and moral sentiments, while experienced teachers complain that the moral side of life is not emphasized enough in school teaching. Can the Ethical Movement with its moral instruction classes avoid the old grounds of error? Can it meet the expressed need? Or, is it making the old mistake in new form—the mistake that separated the sacred from the secular, that thought of the religious life as something apart from the everyday life of ordinary humanity? These questions will be differently answered by different minds. Mr. Sheldon's book should help all those who want to form a rational judgment in the matter.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

THE CITY FOR THE PEOPLE. By Frank Parsons. Philadelphia: C. F. Taylor, 1420 Chestnut street, 1900. Pp. 597.

This is a valuable book, published in cheap form, for circulation among municipal students. It is distinctly the joint product of the author and the publisher. Although encyclopædic in character and possessing an excellent index, it contains too much. The chapters on Proportional Representation and Direct Legislation have been recently elaborated and republished and make a thorough and useful treatment of these important themes, but as incor-

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porated in this book they make it cumbersome; they are illogical because treating of national quite as much as municipal matters, and they destroy the unity of what would otherwise be a comprehensive treatment of municipal economics. The volume is still further burdened with as many obtrusive morals as an old Sunday-school book, is marred by an excessive use of footnotes and a confusing rather than emphasizing repetition of facts, and is open to suspicion occasionally by the large generalizations.

When these criticisms have been made there is still room for abundant praise. While it contains too many gaps for an encyclopædia and too many subjects, tables and references for consecutive reading, it repays careful study. Professor Parsons has brought together an immense mass of valuable material from both original and secondary sources. His tables of statistics and comparative statements are invaluable and represent an astounding amount of work for which the municipal student must be truly grateful. The pity is that so much careful investigation should still show signs of haste in revision and publication.

One can only wish that the increasing number of students of municipal reform may evidence their appreciation of this strictly educational endeavor to circulate as widely as possible this volume, and that this patronage may warrant its early revision. The constant increase of data would warrant this if there were no other cause. The ethical phase of the work is manifested in its zealous defence of the popular interests as evidenced in the title and its consistent advocacy of the enlargement of the municipal life.

CHARLES ZUEBLIN.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE LOGICAL BASIS OF EDUCATION. By J. Welton, M. A., Professor of Education in the Yorkshire College, etc. London: Macmillan, 1899. Pp. xvi., 288. [Macmillan's Manuals for Teachers.]

In spite of attempts by Prof. Welton to justify the title of his book one cannot help feeling that it is somewhat of a misnomer. We are led to expect a work similar in plan to Prof. Sully's "Teacher's Handbook of Psychology," where every piece of psychologic doctrine is expounded with special reference to education, and its educational bearing is explained in detail from chapter to chapter. But in the present work the reference to edu-

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cation is very slight; is, in fact, confined to the preface and the final chapter which contains a few general remarks on educational method. What Prof. Welton has attempted is to write a book something like Dr. Bosanquet's "Essentials of Logic." In his "Manual of Logic," written for the University Tutorial Series, he has treated the subject in the way in which antiquated tradition demands that it should be treated. In the present volume he is more in harmony with his own bent. He has selected from his "Manual" such matter as he considers truly important and, omitting "all useless ballast from formal logic," gives us that amount of logical doctrine which he thinks a teacher ought to know. The idea is excellent and the execution deserving of much praise; but the detailed criticism of it obviously does not belong to an ethical publication. Meantime there is an opportunity for some one to undertake the task which Prof. Welton has scarcely performed. Logic in general is the doctrine of truth. Logic in relation to education should be the doctrine of truth with special reference to the process of acquiring it by the young and of imparting it by the teacher; and special emphasis should be laid on those points where teachers and taught usually go wrong. This still remains a desideratum.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD.

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ZEDEKUNDE: LEIDDRAAD TEN GEBRUIKE BIS HET HOOGER ONDERWISS: Tweede Stuk, Eerste Deel, Eerste Afdeeling.—De Phænomenologie van het Zedelyke Leven. By G. H. Lamers. (Nieuwe Bydragen op het Gebied van Godgeleerdheid en Wysbegeerte, door Dr. G. H. Lamers, Hoogleeraar te Utrecht. Vroeger Dr. J. Cramer en Dr. G. H. Lamers. Twaalfde Deel. Vierde Stuk). Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1900. Pp. 198.

THE LIFE, UNPUBLISHED LETTERS AND PHILOSOPHICAL REGIMEN OF ANTHONY, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY: Author of the "Characteristics." Edited by Benjamin Rand, Ph. D., Harvard University. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900. Pp. xxxi., 535.

THE SCIENCE OF CIVILIZATION, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY. By Cecil Balfour Phipson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1900. Pp. xv., 512.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A DIALOGUE IN UTOPIA. By Havelock Ellis. London: Grant Richards, 1900. Pp. 166.

COMMERCE AND CHRISTIANITY. By the Author of "Life in Our Villages," etc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900. Pp. 205.

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PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION. By William H. Winch, B. A. (Cantab.), Inspector of Schools for the London School Board. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1900. Pp. vi., 157.

SOCIAL JUSTICE. A Critical Essay. By Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Political Science in the Johns Hopkins University. New York: The Macmillan Company, London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1900. Pp. 380.

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FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE. By Alexander Thomas Ormond. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900. Pp. 525.

THE ETHICS OF JUDAISM. By M. Lazarus, Ph. D. Translated from the German by Henrietta Szold. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1900. Pp. 309.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE, And Its Bearings on International Law and Policy. By Frederick W. Holls, D. C. L., A Member of the Conference from the United States of America. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1900. Pp. 562.

THE AMERICAN SLAVE-TRADE, An Account of Its Origin, Growth and Suppression. Illustrated. By John R. Spears. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. Pp. 223.

THE RELIGION OF A GENTLEMAN. By Charles F. Dole. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., Publishers. Pp. 219.

THE PROBLEM OF DUTY. A Study of the Philosophy of Conduct. By Charles F. Dole. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., Publishers. Pp. 38.

THE WOMEN OF THE RENAISSANCE: A STUDY OF FEMINISM. By R. de Maulde la Clairère, translated by George Herbert Ely. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1900. Pp. xvii., 510.

PLAYS AND THEIR SUPERVISION: A speech by Samuel Smith, Esq., M. P., in the House of Commons, May 15, 1900, and the reply of The Home Secretary, with an Appendix. London: Chas. J. Thynne. Pp. 23.

EXPLORATIO PHILOSOPHICA. Part I. by John Grote, B. D., Senior Fellow of Trinity College and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. (Published 1865; reissued 1900). Part II. by John Grote, B. D., etc., edited for the Syndics of the Press by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, M. A., Hon. Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, Hon. Litt. D. of Dublin University. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1900. Pp. xlvii., 258; xiv., 340.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ, with an Appendix of Leading Passages. By Bertrand Russell, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1900. Pp. xvi., 311.

IN CAMMINO: Agli Uomini di buona volontà. Periodico Mensile. Anno I., No. 5, 6 (in one volume) and 7. Milano: L. F. Cogliati. Pp. 193-288, 289-336. [Contents of some nature as those of Nos. 2, 3, 4 recorded

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in October number. The first page of No. 7 is dedicated to the memory of the late King Humbert, who is spoken of as "Re buono, leale, generoso, vero padre del popolo."]

FATE MASTERED—DESTINY FULFILLED. By W. J. Colville. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., Publishers. Pp. 52.

LA CONSTITUTION DU MONDE. Dynamic des Atomes; Nouveaux Principes de Philosophie Naturelle. Par Madame Clémence Royer. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1900. Pp. 786.

PROBLÈMES DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE. L'Enseignement Integral—L'Inconnaissable. Par Guillaume De Greef, Professeur à L'Université Nouvelle de Bruxelles, President de L'Institut International de Sociologie de Paris. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1900. Pp. 169.

LEÇONS D'ANTHROPOLOGIE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Ses Applications à la Morale Positive. Par Daniel Folkmar. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1900. Pp. 333.

EXAMEN PSYCHOLOGIQUE DES ANIMAUX. Par P. Hachet-Souplet. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1900. Pp. 160.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE H. TAINE. Par Giacomo Barzellotti. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1900. Pp. 438.

CONDUCT: A Monthly Journal of Ethics. Vol. I., No. 1., October 1, 1900. Printed for the South London Ethical Society, at South London Mail offices, opposite Vestry Hall, Camberwell, S. E. [A penny paper of four large pages, of which the last is occupied with advertisements, mainly official; half of it being devoted to the South London Ethical Society, and one column of the remainder to a list of the meetings of other similar societies. The first three pages are largely made up of news, and the articles are of an extremely popular character.]

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Published Quarterly for the Oxford University Branch of the CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION: Vol. x., No. 3, July 16, 1900. London: Rivingtons; Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht. Pp. 289-416. [Contents as usual, including six articles out of seven, which have a considerable ethical interest, and several reviews, among those of a more purely economic type, of which the same may be said.]

THE INDIAN REVIEW: Vol. I., No. 9. September 1900. Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co. Pp. 393-448. [A miscellaneous monthly, somewhat similar in type to a good English weekly. The motto "Absit Inuidia," under a portrait of the Queen with an Englishman on one side and a native of India on the other seems significant of the paper's aim. The present number contains an article on "The Problem of Personal Identity," by Julian James Cotton, P. A., I. C. S., and a review of W. S. Lilly's "First Principles of Politics," by G. Venkataranga Row, M. A.]

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. A. Moore, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.



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SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1901

THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF WAR.

It is not easy to say formally what would be a quite scientific way of handling the general question of the comparative justifiableness of wars, or even of any war in particular. An ostensibly complete inquiry would involve not only much examination of "classic" doctrines, but a good deal of moral metaphysics, which would tend to resemble in point of duration the catching of De Wet; and meantime *the* war under special notice might be brought to an end by haphazard. One should therefore be slow to object to such an interesting essay as that of Professor Ritchie, on "War and Peace" in the last number of this journal that it is not exactly scientific. Its author, however, takes occasion to make among many other flings this, that some people "like to trace the origin of a war to the intemperate language of some diplomatist or statesman or to the interested schemes of some self-seeking financier. . . . . But such explanations are not very scientific." Now, it seems to some of us a plain historical fact that a number of wars have been "determined" in some such fashion as is put in the above-cited phrases, and that therefore the propositions in question may be in the ordinary sense of the term quite scientific. And as Professor Ritchie sees fit thus to stigmatize perfectly relevant propositions in regard to a given case, one is moved to avow in reply one's impression that his own method is considerably less scientific than that he impugns. And one may even

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make bold, in this tentative fashion, to sketch a relatively scientific method for a given case.

As having meditated the matter a good deal before the appearance of Professor Ritchie's essay (to which, however, I desire to acknowledge obligations) I am disposed to reproach him with reintroducing a number of negligible issues—issues, that is, which need not be reopened in connection with those which he obviously recognizes as more actual. But inasmuch as he does re-introduce, for instance, the question of the morality of the trade of soldiering, he ought, I submit, to have gone a little further into it than he reaches by exposing the inconsistency of Dymond. The inner problem as to the soldier is surely this, that seeing all reasoning men admit the possibility of their nation's making an unjust aggression, it is obviously questionable whether a scrupulous man can fitly take up a function which may mean his having to kill people whose cause he knows to be just. Some officers and private soldiers, to my knowledge, find themselves in that dilemma in the present war in South Africa. On the general issue the best practical answer, I believe, consists in pointing out that the problem involves the policeman, the judge, the jailer, and the civil servant, and even implicates a great many people in private employment. While the pressure of this difficulty does not dismiss the problem from the field of practical ethics, it suggests the inexpediency of putting it in the front of any dispute on a question of immediate public action. But *a fortiori* the issue ought not to be broadened by a random discussion in such a connection.

What Professor Ritchie does sufficiently indicate is that few people are to be influenced by a polemic against war on either *a priori* or theological grounds—that every war, in short, had need be discussed on its moral merits. It is, in fact, after following many such discussions that many of those who are called "peace people" have come to the conclusion that almost all wars do more harm than good even to the winning side; that many are the result of sheer defect of wisdom on the part of statesmen on both sides; and that where a war is "justifiable" as being one of defence, the aggressor is in the terms of

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the case deserving of utter reprobation. Inasmuch as he has spared us the rhetoric so customary among apologists for given wars, as to the moral education yielded by warfare, Professor Ritchie is entitled to our thanks; but it is disappointing to find him, when expressly bent on a study of the effects of wars, making a much less thorough inquiry on that head than has often been made by some of the people of whom he speaks with varying degrees of disrespect. And this shortcoming has the very serious result that he has virtually advocated or encouraged wars of conquest under certain conditions, on the score of certain benefits to mankind which he quite erroneously implies to have been the result of conquest.

The problem cannot be better broached, for present purposes, than by taking up one of Professor Ritchie's central propositions. "If," he writes (JOURNAL, January, 1901, p. 157):

> "If we wish to know how war is to cease, we should ask ourselves how it *has* ceased. Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? Why did Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though they had fought each other only four years before? The rise of modern nations meant the suppression of private and tribal wars and of wars between rival cities. The absorption of smaller nations into larger political bodies means the prevention of war within great areas."

The form of the argument here seems to me to show that after all Professor Ritchie has *not* asked himself how war "*has* ceased," as he loosely puts it, even within given areas. No one, so far as I know, has hitherto objected to the extension of national systems by the peaceful and voluntary union of states; and by reasoning as he does Professor Ritchie has inevitably the effect of contending that a forcible unification by conquest, however desperate, is in the end as good a thing as a willing federation. War between England and Scotland was greatly limited by the peaceful union of the crowns in 1603; though the two countries were again virtually at war as such in the period of the Commonwealth. The last case of war as between Scottish and English sections was the rebellion of 1745, where that Scottish section which had *not* been consulted at the union of the Parliaments made all the trouble. When then we further note that the attempt of Edward I. to *force* Scotland into union at the end of the thirteenth century

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led to the humiliation of the greater power, and to a state of chronic strife between the two kingdoms for three hundred years, our conclusion must surely be that, so far, unification seems to be beneficial or desirable only in so far as it is accomplished without violence. Now, such a conclusion is practically the contradiction of what is insinuated in many passages by Professor Ritchie with regard to the present war in South Africa.

The different case of Hanover and Prussia is really no less subversive of the position he appears to frame on it. The very fact that Hanoverians, after their forcible absorption by Prussia, fought on the Prussian side in 1870, is so far as it goes a proof that one forcible assimilation of a small state by a greater may be for the latter a stepping-stone to a great and lamentable war. It is odd that any one should say war was prevented "within great areas" on the strength of the fact that after a small war between Hanover and Prussia, ostensibly preventive of future wars between them, but in itself actually the first breach of the peace between them for over sixty years, Prussia got up (as is admitted by Professor Ritchie, p. 147) the tremendous war of 1870. If the Professor is driving at anything practical, it is at a vindication of the forcible absorption of Hanover as a means of making war "cease." But the only previous risk of war between Prussia and Hanover lay in the Prussian desire to dominate Hanover. On Professor Ritchie's theory, that desire was thus a sufficient excuse for its own gratification. Meantime, though Prussia did *not* absorb Austria when she absorbed Hanover, there has since been peace between Prussia and Austria, as between Prussia and Hanover. Thus the proof is beside the case. It is significant that what is in effect a plea for forcible conquest in our own day should land its framer in such paralogisms as these.

I am not concerned here to ask whether the absorption of Hanover by Prussia has been of such immense moral benefit to Germany as to countervail the immense evil of the new militarism caused by the Franco-German war. The case of Hanover—a German state absorbed into a larger Germany—is past and done with; and it yields us no light whatever on the

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case at which Professor Ritchie constantly points his remarks without naming it—the present Boer war. For partial parallels to that war we may rather look to the English attempt to conquer Scotland, the conquest of Ireland, the partition of Poland, and the revolt of the American colonies. In every one of these cases the lesson is patently contrary to the opinion that the unconditional conquest of the two republics should be persisted in, or that such a conquest, if ultimately effected, will make for peace and civilization.

Let us take it either way. Should the attempt fail, as I think it may, the situation will be analogous to that set up as between Scotland and England from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, and between England and the United States from, let us say, 1774 till 1874. There are of course no true parallels in history; but we are entitled to predict, under similar leading conditions, similar broad results—in this case a steadfast ill-will, always liable to explode in active hate. But we may go even further as regards South Africa. The special impolicy of the present war on the British side, it is argued, lies in the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of our own Cape Colony are the immediate blood relatives of the Boers, and in strong and natural sympathy with them; whence results the probability of an anti-English coalition among the whole Dutch population. The utmost stress of racial malice has now been set up through all South Africa; and the prospects are black even to the optimists of imperialism. I may remind Professor Ritchie that in Scotland about the year 1550, after the second English attempt to coerce the smaller state into union, "It was told how the Scots, poor as they were, would buy from the French, at ransom price, English prisoners, for the sheer enjoyment of putting them to death. . . . . The Scots gave freely whatever was demanded, and if they had not money for the purchase, would part with their arms or horses for the object of their desire. . . . . When the Scots" thus got a prisoner "they placed him within a circle of their horsemen, who galloped up and lanced him, and then cutting him to pieces, they carried off portions of his flesh on their lance-points" (Burton, iii. 279, citing Beaugué). To such ex-

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tremity of savagery could a fresh attempt at conquest bring civilized men of the same race as their assailants. The Boers of to-day, doubtless, are much better men than the Scotch of the days of Knox; but if they are half as "backward" as our war-mongers allege, they must be capable of a tolerable stress of resentment for the handling they have had. And if they are not thus backward, one requires to have it shown wherein the war is a moral gain.

Let us suppose, on the other hand, that the war ends in their subjection, and that thenceforth they are to be governed, as far as possible, on normal British principles. The analogy here will be with the cases of Ireland and Poland. I do not find that Professor Ritchie has anything to show for the gains from absorption in these cases, though, raising another issue, he suggests that Poland by her anarchy brought partition on herself. Putting that issue aside, we may surely say that there has been at least no discoverable gain to mankind that can be set against the long evolution of abnormal evil in Poland under Russian and in Ireland under English rule. And when such has been the sequence in the historic cases most nearly analogous to that under discussion, we are entitled, I think, to express surprise that an inquirer who professes to be discussing the policy of conquest in terms of the effects on civilization should leave such sequences unmentioned.

It may not be unserviceable thus to place a concrete utilitarian discussion in the front of a discourse on the Moral Problem of War. It is in the nature of things that any attempt in such a connection to challenge a moral verdict in terms of acquired habit of moral feeling will be met by appeals to utilitarian tests. Professor Ritchie in particular, of whom it may be said in the manner of one of his own phrases that he has a "special horror of what he calls sentimentalism," will on such a challenge make play with what some of us in turn call sentimentalism *par excellence*. He fears above all things to appeal to what all ethical experience pronounces to be the highest generalization of normal duty—the law of reciprocity: rather he will plunge every moral case into the cumbrous crucibles of hypothetical evolutionary utility. To this course, in

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the interests of healthy discussion, no objection can ever be made; indeed the appeal to utility must on occasion be made by every one of us as against the appeal to lower habits of feeling than the principle of sympathy. But it is essential that, in the case of appeal to utility as against sympathy, above all others, the tests should be whole-heartedly applied. I have sought to show that in the instance before us they have not been: that on the contrary the argument from experience has been so loosely managed, and the inferences often so superficially drawn, as to entitle us to call them sentimental in both the literal and the popular force of that term. It will now be technically fitting to face the problem from within. In the case of any war of aggression, people who are normally concerned for right action tend spontaneously to apply the test of reciprocity. Is the aggressor doing as he would be done by? No time need be spent over the point that the formal aggressor is at times not the real aggressor: Professor Ritchie expressly admits that the formal aggressor may at times be acting in self-defence. But it may be worth noting on that head that whereas the Boers have been pronounced by the great majority of Europeans, and by many Englishmen, to have been morally "justified" in beginning the war, seeing that the enemy was avowedly preparing to attack them, they themselves are now frequently found to admit* that their course was both a political and a moral error. That is to say, even where a menaced state secures an immediate military advantage by taking the initiative, its course may set up on the other side so much extra energy of animosity, and so much positive necessity for action, as to alter the previous balance of moral impulse no less than the previous equation of available forces. The argument here is both ethical, in the sense of appealing to established habits of moral feeling, and utilitarian. It may be better, in short, to bear a measure of wrong, and the relative disadvantage of being attacked, than to forestall the enemy's purposed wrong by making him suffer.

The central problem, however, is that of real aggression.

*I have lately conversed on the subject with a number of Transvaalers in South Africa, and in *all* cases the admission was freely made.

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In view of the line taken by such a moralist as Professor Ritchie, there can be no exaggeration in saying that many less instructed people in these days are ready to justify a war of conquest, involving immense destruction of life and property and enormous suffering on the part of non-combatants, on the score that in the long run it will promote "civilization"; and that they consider this plea sufficient to override all appeals to what they call "sentiment"—such as the exhortation to do as you would be done by, and to respect in another people that passion for political independence which we avowedly cherish for ourselves. Many go still further, nakedly arguing that "might is right," and that small states may count on being conquered by great states as small business concerns may count on being beaten and absorbed by big ones. But though this naked negation of ethics is a very significant phenomenon, taken in connection with the other lines of the argument for conquest, I am content here to put them aside as being repudiated by the more scrupulous people on the same side, and to take that side as it is represented by the latter.

In the belief that I am thereby simplifying as well as shortening the discussion, I shall go straight to what seems to me the decisive or practical issue, namely, In what cases may we consistently set a limit (or *quasi* limit, by way of definition) to the admittedly reasonable law of doing as we would be done by, even in its more limited and more practicable negative form? Personally, I incline to think that we should do much better to break down accepted limits than to set up new—that is to say, that forbearance with criminals will do far more for moral civilization than any introduction of new forms of social reprobation. But let us take a practical or middle line, and say that, even as the test of utility warns us not to forgive all wrong-doers on the mere ground that we should like to be forgiven if we did the same wrong, so it may conceivably warn us against treating another nation as we should want it to treat us if our rôles were reversed. To my own thinking, all ethics turns and will continue to turn on the dual principles of the acquired habit of feeling (supposed to be purified to the point of recognizing the law of reciprocity) and the test of

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objective utility, the latter coming into play of necessity where the former either fails to direct or seems to supply conflicting prescriptions. Where, then, or why, ought we begin to restrict that general prescription, Do not do to others what you would deeply resent their doing to you?

It is so much to have the Confucian rule generally accepted, that though it seems to some of us a bad sign when new restrictions are seriously mooted, we may consent to much debate about its restriction rather than face the risk of its wide rejection, which would mean moral anarchy. Professor Ritchie, in the name of ethical science, argues (p. 156) that a special restriction must begin when we pass from the relations of individuals within a state to the relations of states. "A war . . . is one form of natural selection . . . civilized sovereignty does not mean the same thing as ownership of property. It is mere careless rhetoric when acquisition of new territory is spoken of as 'robbery' or 'burglary.'" One might have thought that it was mere careless rhetoric, in an ethical discussion on war, to argue that a war is a form of natural selection; for that ostensibly means, if anything, that it is outside the purview of ethics. But as Professor Ritchie is expressly repudiating careless rhetoric he must be taken to be arguing seriously and, in his own view, relevantly. One must then put the obvious question, Is not a private struggle a form of natural selection? And if I murder or rob my enemy, am I admitted to have made any defence if I plead that his extinction or spoliation is a form of natural selection? Further, if it may be good for civilization to let one state confiscate another, may it not be good for civilization that one man should "rob" another? In all seriousness, I do not see how Professor Ritchie can answer off-hand in the negative, though he seems to assume that "a person" is subject to an absolute moral law and that a nation is not. "A nation, *after all*," he writes (p. 144) "is *only by metaphor* an individual organism or person"—as who should say, "Of course, if it were an individual organism, no such question could arise." But let us pass the assumption and ask whether a corporation or company, as not being save by metaphor an individual organism or person, is not entitled to legal

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protection where an individual is? Obviously the words "person" and "organism" have no question-begging privilege in ethics that is denied to "nation"; and every question Professor Ritchie raises about aggressive war may fitly be raised on behalf of theft and murder. All he can plead is that general experience has settled the point about theft and murder, whereas he and others hold the question open as regards aggressive war, or rather, hold aggressive war to be at times distinctly a right because a beneficial course. I answer that *by such tests as he applies,* robbery and even murder might often be made out to be beneficial, as transferring wealth from a fool or a rascal to a clever man bent on helping the deserving poor, including himself.

If, however, we waive the dilemma as against Professor Ritchie, and grant him the common consent that murder and robbery must be vetoed in every community, the next step is all the simpler. There were certainly stages in social evolution in which homicide and robbery were much less stringently vetoed than they are now; and in those stages, in all likelihood, a number of people deprecated or denounced proposals to promote the repression of homicide and robbery, on the grounds above indicated. Either we agree to-day that such virtual vindications of occasional homicide and robbery were morally wrong and politically fallacious, or we re-open that issue for our own day. And exactly so is it with Professor Ritchie's plea for occasional wars of aggression. The general human attitude towards war has modified in course of time as did the general human attitude towards private and personal war and rapine. The present war has been perhaps more widely and earnestly demanded than any other war in all history. The movement of civilized feeling is clearly more and more towards the vetoing of all wars of aggression, and to the denial that war makes for civilization in any way whatever. The plea for the beneficence of conquest at the present stage is on all fours with a conceivable mediæval plea that an able man should be free to fight for the possession of the lands of a neighbor less able, or to confiscate the lands of a widow or an orphan.

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To such pleas, we can easily supply a retrospective answer, in terms of both psychological and political tests, or of what we may term external and internal utilities. Had the ruler chosen to wink at the license craver, not only would the able spoliator set up against himself a host of new hatreds, aiming at fresh violence (all men disputing his title of superiority), but he himself, if successful, would be so far demoralized, and could not in the least be trusted to make a good use of his lawless gains. And this brings us to one of the most glaring oversights in the ordinary argument for "empire," even as expounded by Professor Ritchie. Not once, in all his summaries as to the effects of given conquest on civilization, does he directly face the problem of the effects of conquest and empire on the conqueror. Once he does touch on it incidentally. "The *pax Romana,*" he concedes (p. 151), "proves, *perhaps,* that the blessings of mere peace are over-estimated by those who realize the horrors of war, but have had *no experience* of the evils of stagnation and torpor." On which it may be observed (1) that the *pax Romana* (*qua pax*) is one of the great illusions of conventional history; (2) that the blessings of that are grossly over-estimated by many who have before them the vast object lesson of the political and intellectual ruin of the Roman Empire; and (3) that such an easy dismissal of "the evils of stagnation and torpor," which mean the negation of all moral prosperity, almost caps the theorem of De Quincey, that the practice of murder leads inevitably to incivility and procrastination. It seems the more necessary to point out that the *pax Romana* was of old a plea for the kind of policy defended by our imperialists to-day; and that the pursuit of that policy meant the final conquest of Rome by its own brutality and moral barbarism as surely as the conquest of the surrounding world.

It cannot be too often repeated that the vindication of democracy lies, not in any superiority of wisdom on the part of the many to the few, but in the principle that the least wise among us has a right to a voice in the legislative shaping of his life, on the ground that none, broadly speaking, can be trusted to make laws justly for those who have no power of check on

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their ruling. In other words, it makes for "civilization" to recognize the reciprocal claims of all citizens and the danger of irresponsible power. Oddly enough, this seems to be taken for granted by Professor Ritchie. One would expect him to ask how we can be sure that self-government is a good thing for civilization. But, for reasons which may be inferred, he is on that head soundly "sentimental." When, then, a democracy or a *quasi* democracy proceeds to coerce another self-governing community on the plea of advancing civilization, it is giving the lie to its own fundamental principle, and the professed democrats who justify such coercion are men forsworn. And the sequel is historically so sure that we may call it a law of political evolution. The principle of democracy, negated at its source, suffers paralysis; and the ruling community comes to be ruled by the brute force it had created and sanctioned. The negation of reciprocity, become a habit in the international relation, becomes a habit in the national relation to the point of introducing and helplessly maintaining absolutism; and tends to become a habit in the social relation to the limit of the socially possible, save for the pure chance that the autocracy may restrain it. "Natural selection" thus becomes the determinant all round, in a multiplying ratio to the disuse of ethical selection, and the state is strangled by the principle of empire.

For the present purpose, it is needless to deal at length with Professor Ritchie's suggestion (p. 151) as to the probability that "a few great empires, in which self-governing communities control the less advanced races," may "represent a higher stage" than one of *laissez-faire*. The sufficient comments are (1) that no empire whatever is now doing anything for the healthy development of the lower races; (2) that the ethical course is not such control as is now employed but an unselfish leading such as imperialists are unfitted to give; and (3) that if the argument about lower races be transferred (as it is by some) to the case of a rapidly advancing community such as the Boers, there has occurred merely a bad abuse of language. It is nothing to the purpose, in this connection, to argue that "the nation, especially the nation which represents only one

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homogeneous race," is not necessarily the "highest and final type of political society." That may readily be granted. The question is, is a higher type now to be reached by wilful conquest and coercion? And when Professor Ritchie loosely and vaguely contends that "the nation which not merely conquers but maintains its conquests," setting up a *pax Romana* and spreading "civilization over a larger part of the world," has "justified itself in the judgment of history," he reveals once for all that his undertaking to make a utilitarian test normally override the test of such a principle as the law of reciprocity (or the rule that honesty is the best policy) is at once formally and practically futile. For on his own showing a given conquest cannot be "justified" till long after it is accomplished; and even then the justification is in terms of constantly varying conceptions of civilization. To the eye of Dante, the dead Roman Empire was the topmost triumph of civilization; to many modern eyes it represents the gradual paralysis and destruction of civilization.

Now the term "justified," so often used by Professor Ritchie with no apparent misgiving, turns out to be the ground of a contest on which depends the fate of his whole thesis. Justified for whom, to what sense, by what test? Whose judgment is the judgment of history? Wherein lies the true measure of civilization? As against Professor Ritchie's constant tacit assumption that the tests are the mere majority vote, the mere formal "success" of the larger aggregate, the mere geographical spread of competitive commerce and certain social usages, I submit that his own use of the word civilization implicitly negates such assumptions. While disparaging the spirit which sympathizes with small states as against great,* and even disputing the moral "right" of nations to defend themselves when attacked; while staking the whole moral issue on an unverifiable and unspecified gain or loss to "civilization"

*Here Professor Ritchie ignores the obvious presumption that a small state will rarely seek to attack a great one; and the usual belief that in the given case it is the great state that is the aggressor. "Small," of course, is to be construed broadly, as sometimes a large state may be visibly decrepit on the military side.

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in terms of non-ethical phenomena, he all the while shows that for him civilization means among other things an advance in the tendency to set the law of reciprocity in general command, and keep utility as its check or advisory colleague, rather than to make the latter a capricious autocrat with its feet on the other's neck. Thus his very conception of civilization is in continual conflict with his formal method of measuring its progress.

The charge of perversity is so often lightly made without even a show of justification, that a scrupulous criticism will perhaps hesitate to advance it even on the basis of a body of ostensible proof. But it is fair criticism to say that Professor Ritchie's habit, in ethics, of reopening the question whether honesty is the best policy wherever national or corporate perversity gives him the license, seems to be injurious to the very faculty of moral logic. In a discussion elsewhere he repeatedly insinuated that the shortness of an opponent's stay in South Africa discredited his opinion (though that was fully reasoned) as against the opinion of Sir Alfred Milner, who had been there for a longer period. On that footing, any litigant might contemn the opinion of a judge who in a few weeks disposed of a suit on which the litigant's mind had been fixed for twenty years. The principle, in fact, leads us to look for the decisive opinion on the South African question from the mouth of the oldest inhabitant. Men with far longer and fuller administrative knowledge of South Africa than Sir Alfred Milner possesses, pronounce him lamentably wrong. Yet the habit of formally subordinating the claims of every order of moral feeling to a class of experimental tests which in the nature of things can be applied only with endless difficulty and uncertainty, can lead one of his partisans into setting the weaker measure of experimental authority above the stronger, in the very act of making the argument from personal authority grotesque by putting on it a chronological measure.

And the unfortunate practical effect is that Professor Ritchie's just personal authority as a philosophic disputant will be taken by the most disqualified disputants on the same side as having supplied a truly sociological justification for a war

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of aggression where he has really given no sociological argument worthy of the name. He will be quoted and echoed when he writes (pp. 147-8) that:

"If we do not exactly (!) say that all successful wars are just wars, we admit that no nation is *justified* in engaging in war unless with a *reasonable prospect* of success. We may forgive or admire the courage of desperate men fighting for a *lost cause;* but *we* should *condemn* a government which *knowingly* led a people into a *hopeless* contest, or continued it after it became *clear* that a prolongation of bloodshed and suffering could not affect the ultimate issue except by inducing the victor to impose harder terms."

It would surely be difficult to write on an ethical problem more sentimentally, more laxly, more unscientifically. Every term I have italicised is used arbitrarily and uncritically. It ought to be needless to point out that no people or government ever went "knowingly" into a "hopeless" struggle; that some always have hope; and that a hundred struggles which have often seemed hopeless to onlookers, and even to many of the fighters, have ended in triumph. It was so with the seven years war of the American colonies for their independence; it was so with the war of Bruce against Edward I.; it was so with the far longer war of the Netherlands against Spain. Thus all the vocabulary of conditional reprobation comes to nothing in the present case, on which Professor Ritchie's bearing can be seen between the lines: his judicatory "we" has not yet emerged, and will probably never emerge, unless the very spirit of moral courage disappears. All the while, the Professor has omitted to put this really indisputable proposition, that "we condemn" any government which is seen to have grossly miscalculated the nature, cost, and duration of a great military enterprise, good or evil. Such, once more, are the singular practical oversights of an ethical method which appeals solely to the test of experience precisely where that is the least peremptory test, and then ignores all the experience that happens to be really relevant.

When the general aspects of the problem, objective and subjective, have been thus faced, there remain to be made some particular inquiries at which, as at the others, Professor

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Ritchie has glanced very superficially. Take in particular that raised in the following passage (p. 140):

"Moral precepts such as 'Love your enemies' are addressed to individuals, not to nations, which are only metaphorically persons: and such precepts are, perhaps, more often fulfilled by the brave soldier who has no hatred in his heart against the individuals of a hostile nation, than by those preachers, politicians and journalists, who seem to think the commandment means, 'Take the side of the enemies of your country and prove your righteousness by imputing corrupt motives to her statesmen.'"

The purport of this infelicitous passage seems to be that love of enemies is commanded, and is desirable, as between fellow-citizens but not as between nations; but that nevertheless a soldier may love the members of a hostile nation more than the opponents of the present war love the war-mongers. As the soldier is thus declared to be perverting the commandment, it is not clear wherein his merit consists in the eyes of his eulogist. But if we put aside the confusion and the irrelevant animus, there remains the practical issue, Is this war seen to promote good-will or ill-will and good or bad habits among men; and does the resistance to it make for good-will or ill-will, or for good or bad intellectual habits? I should answer thus:

1. There are doubtless soldiers who slay without hate, though it is far from clear whether they have any special gift for loving either their enemies or their neighbors.

2. But the normal effect of war on the soldier is certainly to heighten his lower passions *of all kinds;* and in the present war we have frequent record of (*a*) ferocity towards the vanquished Boers, and (*b*) the practice of robbery (looting) as against women and non-combatants. This is in the normal way of all wars of conquest.

3. Among civilians, it is the advocates of the war who alone have resorted to domestic violence as against opposing propaganda; but this violence has been so frequent and so gross as to suggest new developments of incivilization under the auspices of the ideals maintained by Professor Ritchie.

4. The phrase "enemies of *your country*" is a question-begging formula unworthy of discussion. But the imputation of

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corrupt motives to statesmen is in the ordinary way of political strife, has always been common, and certainly stands for no greater stress of ill-will than is manifest in gross aspersions by popular statesmen against the character of opponents who have not charged them with personal corruption. For the rest, charges of corruption against statesmen are perfectly fit where they are believed to be true; and their ethical condemnation is to be compassed only by disproving them—a process alien to the purposes of this journal, where, it seems to me, such a point should not have been thus introduced.

7. On the other hand, war-mongering in the case before us has visibly involved an enormous amount of racial malice and racial arrogance, habits of mind plainly unpropitious to civilization; and, in the opinion of some of us, an immense demoralization in the way of reckless credence, reckless vilification, and unscrupulous argument. If the opposing attitude involves even bitter censure of such vices, it makes none the less for a state of international tolerance, and sets in the intellectual life an example of national self-criticism, broadly favorable to moral improvement.

If, however, it should actually turn out on the contrary that the anti-war spirit meant a multiplication of partisan malice, it would be the merest inconsistency on the part of Professor Ritchie to make that a ground for discrediting it. On his principles, massacre and rapine and devastation may be good things as leading to the spread of constitutional government, which, as aforesaid, he seemingly takes to be a form of good needing no recommendation and admitting of no cavil. Unless, then, he can show that partisan malice cannot possibly lead to the spread of constitutional government, he has done nothing, in terms of his own code, to impeach it. It is surprising with what confidence a thinker who rejects as arbitrary the most considerate assumptions of serious ethics can take his stand on the most conventional assumptions of the political platform.

But that, when all is said, is the common course of most who go about to read the problems of ethics backwards. In order to put in doubt the moral principle of reciprocity, they must

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needs assume to put out of doubt at once some of the most disputable of speculative propositions and some of the commonest popular convictions. In an old discussion with Professor Ritchie, I argued against a doctrine which seemed to me to open the way for endless degradation of living men and women on the hypothesis that by that means their or our posterity could be benefited. As such a hypothesis in the nature of things is absolutely incapable of proof, or even of logical support from a scientific scrutiny of experience, I entered a protest against overriding the moral claims of contemporaries on the score of "superstitions about posterity."* That protest I would here repeat, as being the formal upshot of the foregoing examination of Professor Ritchie's conditional plea for wars of conquest. A theorem which justifies the negation, whether as between individuals, between classes, or between nations, of the moral principle of reciprocity, on the score that such negation may somehow make for "civilization," is to my thinking as truly a superstition as any barbaric cult which ceremonially sacrifices human victims to appease the unknown gods.

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*In a footnote to his work on "Natural Rights," Professor Ritchie has quoted the phrase without context or elucidation, thus conveying to most readers the notion that I had derided the concern for posterity. This I never did, under any circumstances. But Professor Ritchie had repeatedly made light of sympathetic concern for predecessors and contemporaries.

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THE MEANING OF SOCIAL WORK.*

THE movement which has brought us together to-day may be regarded as a positive stage in the effort of a national mind to organize itself. The educational institutions of Wales are the envy of the educationist in England. He sees in them the realized conception—the living machinery—which focuses the life of the people into an intelligence that all may share. Such an organized intelligence, a popular mind, supported by a duly graded system of schools and colleges, and a University, in touch with the life of the people, is an enormous social force. Strictly speaking, if it could fulfil its conception by assimilating into its own tissue all the wants and impulses of the population, it would be the entire and the only social force.

It is not surprising that those who are immediately connected with the centres of this great social force should to-day be turning their attention systematically to social work. It is an inevitable movement of the public mind, which may be compared with what is constantly happening in private life. Men of literary or academic pursuits may be brought by one cause or another to devote their attention to the management of a household and the social needs and duties of a neighborhood, among rich and poor. When this happens they have a two-fold experience. They feel, no doubt, that in as far as they master the situation, life becomes more interesting, and, so to speak, more securely founded, than it was before. They feel that they know where they are, in a way which is new to them. Their neighborhood and even their household become to them a drama of living and human characters, no longer a background of mechanical and mysterious agencies. They feel themselves at home in the foundations and surroundings of their life, instead of floating in the community, as it were, on an unknown sea. That is one side of the matter.

But there is another side to it, and it is this. They find that they have a great deal to learn, and a good deal probably

*An address delivered to the Association of Past Students of the University College, Cardiff, on January 4, 1901.

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to unlearn. They have to train themselves in seeing and feeling social forces which they have hitherto known, if at all, mainly by reading and reflection. They have to understand what subtle problems are hidden under the apparently simple routine of the peasant's or workman's life. They have to unlearn many of their notions as to what influences are good, and what are bad, in a neighborhood, and to realize that to introduce reforms into a district may need as much hard thinking as to remodel a scientific theory, and much more patience, courage and tact.

It is much the same, on a larger scale, when the national mind is roused to apply itself to social work. And it is for this reason that I ventured to ask you to-day to consider with me the meaning, the significance, or purport, of what is commonly known by that name.

Of course, work may be social work in a single or in a double sense. It may be social in its aim only, as in the case of efforts to make the higher literary and scientific education the common possession of the people. It was this, I think, that was mainly present to Mr. Owen in his presidential address to this association. Again, work may be social not only as aiming at the ultimate benefit and elevation of society, but as occupying itself more especially with subjects which concern the structure and function of the community, and with the immediate relations between the classes of which society is made up. Much may be said, very much indeed, in favor of directing the work of such an association as your own mainly on the lines which Mr. Owen has prefigured. The present address, however, presupposes that a doubly social work is in some degree before the members' minds, and it is intended to explain what the serious undertaking of such a work should involve. I shall be well contented if thus much only is effected by these suggestions, that the members of the association become perfectly clear in their own minds what course they intend to adopt, and by what means they intend to pursue it. I only trust that if they propose to deal with social subjects and relations, they will count the cost and adopt the highest standard of work.

In the deepest sense, then, it may be, all work is directly or

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indirectly social; but, important as this truth is, we will not dwell on it just now. Social work is to-day commonly interpreted in contrast with industrial or professional work. It is what we have spoken of as doubly social work. The "Worker" is one thing, and the workman is another. "Women Workers," in the title of the National Union of Women Workers, means something quite different from "working women." Social work is thought of as something spontaneous, human, sociable; an effort to gain direct contact with the human nature of those around us. In it we devote to others not our peculiar acquired skill, but ourselves, our heart and soul. Perhaps the attractiveness of social work partly consists in the escape from our particular groove,

> "So to be the man, and leave the artist,
> Gain the man's joy, miss the artist's sorrow."

It involves, indeed, like the return to Nature of which we hear so much, a refreshment and reinforcement of our intellectual life; the return to Nature is a great idea, but the return to Man is perhaps a greater. We are often reminded how Plato proposed that philosophers should be kings—*i. e.,* that power to influence society should be confined to those who are endowed with the true student spirit; but it is less often brought to our notice that the same passage is decisive for excluding from the ranks of genuine students all who are indifferent to social work.

So, then, our doubly social work, however human and spontaneous, dealing however directly with persons and class-relations, is not to be set in contrast with the spirit of the true student. It too has an aspect of being an art and science; a clear purpose with a reasonable method. There is nothing in this against the strength and freshness of human feeling which it embodies. We are not to make our social work victim of the foolish opposition between heart and head. It is impossible to utter profound and serious feeling except by the instrumentality of thorough brain work. A great drama or a great piece of music show us both feeling and intelligence at their highest pitch, and each of them at a pitch which can be attained solely by their fusion, and in no other way whatever.

Thus we are prepared for the question Plato asks even about

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morality, and which he certainly would have asked us about Social Work.

I know what you mean, he says in effect, by the art or science of medicine; it is that which gives appropriate drugs and diet to people who are ill; and I know what you mean by the art and science of cookery; it is that which applies proper preparation to the food we eat; but now, what, he would ask, what is the art or science of social work; what things or principles does it make use of, and to what things or persons does it apply them?

Or again he might have extended to it a remark he is fond of urging about statesmanship, which ought, I suppose, to be social work in its highest form. It is a curious thing, he loves to point out—if we may paraphrase him in modern terms—that in every other art or science or industry a man who practices it can say where he was apprentice or undergraduate, and who was his teacher, and when he obtained his degree or passed Master of the Art; but in statesmanship alone of all arts and industries there is no such qualification; no apprenticeship, no undergraduate career, no degree and no Mastership of the Art. Perhaps this is in spirit not absolutely true of all statesmanship to-day; but it is still true enough to be exceedingly suggestive. And of social work it is terribly true. If we ask how many people doing social work have really been trained, and how many places there are where they can get any methodical training, the answer, I think, would make us open our eyes. When the reserves or irregular forces of social workers have to be called upon for a bit of real extra duty, as was the case in connection with the relief funds made necessary by the war, a most extraordinary spectacle of absolute helplessness is revealed.

Now it seems to me pretty certain that many of those who are here to-day will be asking themselves what all this has to do with the simple matters in which at present they intend to find their social work; workmen's clubs, I have been told, perhaps boys' and girls' clubs, and some simple functions in connection with a C. O. S. Surely one may help in an entertainment, or take part in a club to keep young folks out of the

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streets in the evening, or take round an allowance to an old woman, without having, so to speak, passed an examination in social objects and methods. Is it not a little pedantic to set the standard so high for every social worker? Well, there are two things to think of. First, you will always spread the spirit which you are of. I don't mean to say you need a system of social theory and practice to go and sing a song at an entertainment. The smaller your point of contact is the less harm you can do and the less good. Though if you come to that, I do remember a thorough musician, well skilled himself in managing concerts for the working class, who said to me, "When a music-hall artist sings a vulgar song at a music hall, we know he has his living to make, and we pardon him; but when a volunteer gives vulgar stuff at a people's concert, he does it out of the sheer unnecessary iniquity of his heart, and it is . . . ." and the sentence ended in strong language. But this is an extreme case, no doubt. I only wanted to show that really it always matters what sort of thing you do. In the general life of a workman's club, however, or in that of a boys' and girls' club, the sort of thing you have in your mind about the working class must make just all the difference. They must see where your heart is and where your hopes lie for society; when you come to talk, and, among the young folks, to give advice, your ideas must permeate and spread, or your want of ideas produce a deadening effect. But in the second place you have to remember that *things will happen.* You won't be let alone. You will have to act, to help, to manage. Your friends will fall into trouble, perhaps get into trouble. Crises and emergencies will arise in their lives, especially with respect to the choice of industries for the young, or how they are to spend their money. Your club and its influence may set them just straight or just crooked for a lifetime. I need not speak of what C. O. S. work involves; I shall have to recur to that below.

So far I am only trying to make the point that "social work," like everything we do which is to be of any service, demands that we shall know our own minds; that we should know what we mean by it, and act consistently and with purpose.

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Now we will try to come closer, and see what sort of purpose is implied in social work. Social workers take many different lines, but they mostly come back to these two: they want to brighten the lives of the people, or to improve the conditions in which they live. If you follow up these clues they will bring you to the same centre. Brightening their lives, when you work it out, means making them happier; and happiness, of course, means the mind or disposition which makes the most of life. Improving the conditions in which they live, if you work it out, means changing matters in such a way that those concerned become able to make more of their lives than they did before; and this again means, so that their character may be able to master their circumstances.

The final test and purpose, then, is mind or character. This is so, simply because every other test or clue leads you back to this one. It is the only point of view which includes everything in life. This does not mean that circumstances, houses, and wages, and such things, are unimportant. But it does mean that they are unimportant except in their relation to mind and character, and because of this it is only mind and character that can either make them contribute to happiness or secure them with certainty. I know this sounds like moralizing. But it is not spoken in that sense, and it is the conclusion to which sociology has slowly and inevitably, and with much reluctance, been driven, and which social philosophy has upheld from its inception. Every social fact, when you pursue it with a view to complete explanation, leads you up to a mind, because this is the only central point of view. The official statistician tells us that drunkenness has been rising for the past five years, and that this "is due to the prosperity of the country." Ruskin, in his wildest mood, never said anything more humorous. Obviously, we have had so to speak more circumstances than our character could control. Again, all passenger-traffic returns in France are lower on Fridays. Why? In order to give the answer you must find out why people in France dislike traveling on Friday. In this way every fact comes alive in your hands, and is unexplained till you have referred it to the one centre of life.

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Here, then seems to be the true meaning of social work. Wherever it may start, its goal is the same: to bring the social mind into order, into harmony with itself. Social disorganization is the outward and visible form of moral and intellectual disorganization. This does not involve saying that it can only be combated by directly moral and intellectual means; but it does involve saying that it can only be combated by means, which, *all things considered* (this is really the important point) make for moral and intellectual ends. And it therefore involves saying that any who undertake to combat social disorganization will certainly increase and not diminish it unless they clearly apprehend the moral and intellectual purpose of their work, and the relation of the means which they employ to this purpose.

The great question of principle affecting social work, on which the social order now reflects the disorganization of the social mind, seems to be this: Does our social idea imply the perpetuation of dependent poverty, or the extirpation of it? In other words, are "The Poor," as a dependent class, as you have them in the church offertory, an element of our working social conception? Until we are clear on this point, our social work will always be aimless, and therefore a hotbed of abuses. We shall never know whether we are working literally for the *support of poverty*, or on the other hand for the improvement of the condition of the poor. It is important to realize how deep-rooted in the English mind is the notion of a sort of tithe or benevolence, a contribution to the sustentation of poverty, as a good thing in itself; it is a point in which the social mind seems to be wholly at loose ends, or rather to inherit a terribly false and powerful tradition, and not in any way to be knit up into a purpose or unity. The first thing is then to be clear in our own minds what we really want and are working for, and further, I would say, to be clear as to the frightful evil caused by the mere fact of aimlessness in social work.

We may illustrate this point, the evils of aimlessness, by the confusion which prevail in the out-department system of the hospitals in London at the present day. I think it would be true to say that no sane man with the facts under his eyes

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could purposely give his money to support such a system or non-system as that which has grown up, by which the hospital staff are overstrained, the patients ill-attended to, and the general practitioners in a fair way to be ruined. Nobody wants it who is directly concerned; the hospital doctors don't want it, the patients don't want it, the medical profession are largely against it. It goes on because the public mind is not on this subject in the condition of a plain sane man with a clear purpose before him. So far from demanding a better system, the public would very probably withdraw support from any hospital which should relax in the present system—the suicidal competition for work which it cannot do and which others could live by doing. A similar evil is the true ground of objection to raising money by bazaars and entertainments for benevolent purposes. The very point of this practice is to get people to contribute their money whose interest in the purpose to be attained is insufficient to make them contribute. The result is that the rational connection between interest and purpose is broken; support of an institution ceases to have any connection with understanding or approval of its aims. Frequently, of course, the entertainment is projected for its own sake, and an institution is subsequently hunted up to serve as a pretext for it. What is wanted, a true democratic basis of work, is the precise contrary of this. It is that the support accorded to institutions should be a definite reflection of an intelligent interest and purpose entertained by the public mind, so that the supporters of an institution should always be pressing it towards its right and specific function, as much as the shareholders of a company press it to pay a dividend. We only want subscribers to care as much for the efficiency of a benevolent institution as shareholders do for that of a joint-stock company; and, in general, that social work shall be managed as intelligently as business or industry.

Now to grasp the full significance of social work, conceived as applying the idea of purpose and character in the sphere of our voluntary relations with others, needs a special training. And here I must propound a heresy. I cannot think that the material for such a training is to be found in economic

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science, as it at present stands, judging by its leading text-books, and favorite methods of research. Individual students of economics have probably done and discovered more than has as yet passed into the body of the science. And I think they would probably agree with me, that when we look to political economy for a recognition of the central social forces, on which the social worker has really and practically to rely, we shall find comparatively little to help us. The idea of society as an embodied mind and character, on which recent sociology lays stress, and which the experience of social workers had long previously established, seems to be approached by economic science so timidly as to give little guidance to the practical man. One might take as a text in this matter the work of Chalmers in his Glasgow parish, the memory of which has been revived by a recent publication.* I do not know, and I should be only too glad to be corrected, that any economist has disengaged from fallacies and controversies belonging to the time the central significance of that wonderful achievement, and of the views upon which it was founded. It is true that Chalmers was opposing in Scotland the introduction of a compulsory poor-rate, and that the existence of such a rate and of the Poor Law was even in his time in England a settled system of long standing. So the very ground on which he stood may seem to be cut away. But this has not much to do with the remarkable significance of his work. His central principle was in essence that of democracy. I know well, of course, that many of his views, reflecting those of his time, could be urged on the other side. His principle in social work was, however, I repeat, that of democracy. The "sufficiency of the people" was his watchword. This is grossly misconstrued if it is taken to mean that a respectable man can usually find work and support himself. What it meant was rather this: A community of the people is a living mind. It has its affections, its duties, its obligations, its foresight, its pride and its delicacy—his constant reiteration of the term delicacy is a striking proof of his insight. It has its own innate strength, its own variety, its own recuperative power. If you wish to help it to make the

*Chalmers on Charity; Masterman, Constable & Co.



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most of itself, you must understand it, sympathize with it, and meet it on the right path. You must not thrust in the iron hand of the unskilled social worker, tearing to pieces the delicate living tissues of filial and parental obligation, of neighborly kindness and of the standard of right conduct, foresight and honesty. "It was the people who did it," he would reiterate, in reference to his administration of the poorest parish in Glasgow for four years, through exceptional hardship, without a poor-rate, and without external aid. "It was not we who did it; it was the people who did it." This seems to me the very core of true democracy. The people felt that they were understood, and met halfway, and their life put forth its strength. Only a democratic church, perhaps, could use Chalmers' method with the fullest effect; but the essence of his principle is a permanent gain to the economics of social work; the only serious advance, it might almost be said, since Aristotle. The sufficiency of the people is a social force measurable in the crudest way by enormous sums of money. It is measurable also, and most remarkably, by the incredulity of critics confronted with the results achieved. An immense financial result is attained, for which to the average critic there is simply no cause. Their efforts to explain it are amusing. "Chalmers," they said, "had private command of large sums of money." He answered that he had not a penny beyond the small collections whose amount was publicly stated, "the halfpence of the poor." "But his deacons were rich men, and gave surreptitiously out of their own pockets." Two of them did, once or twice, and almost broke down the system by the resulting disorder. As a rule they were quite poor men, and these succeeded best. "Chalmers starved the poor and drove them out of the parish." He counted heads, and found the truth to be that the poor came into the parish; the system, in fact, was popular. "Chalmers was such a wonderful man." This argument made him furious. It was, he thought, as if you said that the fact of the circulation of the blood depended upon Harvey being such a wonderful man. Anything rather than believe that you have hitherto been blind to a simple necessary truth! And this controversy is always repeated, in all its

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phases, whenever this simple truth has again been successfully relied on; notably in the Bradfield case, almost word for word, where the question was one of restricting out-relief. This could not continue to happen, if recognized teachers and text-books really grasped the point that the sufficiency of the people, the fabric of mind and character in a coherent society, is an economic force of the first order; and that by ceasing from piecemeal interference with it you are not transferring a pecuniary burden from stronger to weaker shoulders, but are releasing a power of growth which your interference alone has held back.

Here, again, is a very simple instance in a small compass of the way in which mind and character are central facts, and because central facts are in practice unique forces. I allude to the case of underfed school children. It is plain that an ill-fed child is not fit to be taught in school. It is plain, too, that a meal given to an ill-fed child so far makes him better fed. And to many this simple physical relation seems conclusive. Food nourishes, nourishment is desirable, therefore feeding is desirable. But omitting the probability of malnutrition from other causes than lack of food, still a factor is overlooked. In dealing with the body of the child you can affect one, two or perhaps three meals in the week. But at the same time you are doing something else—you are dealing with the mind of the parent. Now the mind of the parent is the force to which the child must look for all his meals in the week, and all his home surroundings and prospects in life. The least relaxation in the sense of responsibility in the parent's mind very much more than cancels the nourishment given by one or two meals a week to the child's body. People start a feeding scheme, and then observe to their surprise that there is no change to speak of in the children's appearance. And this is the explanation. Not with any wicked intention, but naturally enough accepting the situation, the parents have just slacked off at their end of the rope as much as the feeders have tightened up at theirs. If you want to do any real good, you must go to the parents and find out what is wrong, whether they can't or won't feed their child properly; you must consider the

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family life from their point of view, and see if it cannot be put upon a better footing. Then you take the strong, central point of view, affecting all the child's meals and health and prospects, and not merely the bit by bit point of view affecting one or two meals a week. This is a very simple instance of the two points of view which may be called respectively that of circumstance and that of character. Character is a name for life as it looks, when you take it as all connected together; circumstance is a name for life as it looks when you take it just bit by bit. The action of character, compared with that of circumstance, is like a process of multiplication compared with one of simple addition. It does not deal with different things; that is a mistake of principle; it deals with the same things, but by a complete method, instead of an incomplete one.

The current economic training, then, it is my heresy to suggest, will not take you far in understanding the deeper forces with which social work will bring you into contact. If so, where are you to get your training?

In the main, I feel pretty sure, you will have to create it for yourselves. It is a magnificent opportunity, worthy of a country which has so perfectly organized its educational institutions. There is indeed a very inadequate but steadily increasing literature of the subject. A central library and smaller dispersed libraries of this literature would be a necessary auxiliary to the training. There are also a few institutions where such training is methodically carried on. I could mention a University settlement and, so far as I know, only one in the world, where a student can be directed in a regular course of social work on its various sides and branches, practical and theoretical, the theory being such as has grown out of practice, and is inseparably interwoven with it. There is also, as I am more especially bound to remember, a Committee in London which exists for the purpose of providing courses of lectures, whether in or out of London, on practice and practical theory, with regard to any special type of work, for intending social workers. And there are the various Charity Organization Societies; your own here in Cardiff, and the old Society in London, which is always ready and eager to give

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any help either by advice out of its now lengthening experience, or by receiving volunteers to train in its offices, which is by far the best practical plan. All these institutions, with their literature, their daily practice, or their lectures, would be available to you for help and for suggestion. But there is no question that to a great extent the educational apparatus of the subject has yet to be created, and a generation of compeent teachers has yet to appear. I do most earnestly hope and entreat that if anything should seem paradoxical or unconvincing in what I have been saying to-day, you will not for that reason fail to make trial of the conception that social work demands and will repay a special and serious study and training. Every special point of view demands a special training. Familiarity with certain phenomena apart from a special point of view is useless for the purpose to which that point of view refers. For example, it is often maintained that the working class know most about the Poor Law, though they have the least influence in its administration. But this is not true. They have not been led to study the Poor Law as a force affecting society as a whole; and apart from such study mere contact cannot be said to confer knowledge. Happily, moreover, the solid working class does not much rub shoulders with the Poor Law. With genuine knowledge they might indeed *become* the completest experts, but that is a question for the future.

A great opportunity is before you. You are here in the forefront of popular education; you are also, as all of you are no doubt aware, in the forefront of something else. No part of England or Wales indeed can compete with my own native county of Northumberland in the number of persons charged with drunkenness; but in referring to the latest criminal statistics* for another purpose I could not but notice the position both in drunkenness and in general crime occupied by Monmouth and Glamorgan. I have not the local knowledge which would enable me to get behind these figures, which might even mean in part the activity of your police; but whatever reservations may have to be made it seems clear that in

*For 1898, published 1900.

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the immediate surrounding district you have very grave evils to contend with. To make paler the patches which represent these countries on the maps of crime distribution would surely be a noble ambition, and ought not to be beyond the influence and intelligence of such a body as that which I am addressing. Much, for example, is being attempted elsewhere in public management of the drink traffic. Could not some well-contrived experiment be initiated here?

I have reserved for my conclusion a few words about the typical example of what is meant by organization of the social mind, in the work of a Charity Organization Society. The duty of such a society, as I understand it, is by no means to grasp at power, or at exclusive control, but to take a stand for definiteness of plan and purpose, and endeavor to promote them throughout all the social work, both public and private, of the neighborhood; to organize, in a word, the mind of the district about social work.

First of all in importance comes the administration of the Poor Law. Unless the Poor Law Guardians are brought to adopt an intelligent division of labor with the other social workers of the district, the C. O. S. has made, and can make, but little progress in its task. The study of Poor Law history, experience, and practice, is at the root of all rational organization in the charity of a district.

Next comes the attitude of the ministers of religion. It is a question, I repeat, of ideas and not of interference. Are they, whether of their own motion or through the influence of the C. O. S., in the habit of dealing with charity from the point of view of a definite purpose, and a conception of eradicating and not of perpetuating the dependence of the poor? What are the parochial charities about, and, if any, the endowed charities of the entire district? Has the C. O. S. "charted" the district, and formed for itself a definite conception of the way in which all its agencies should coöperate for the good of the whole? I may say that for all social workers to "chart" the district in this sense is an excellent beginning. Do the trustees of charities take the advice of the C. O. S., or act on their own motion as if they had taken it? Are old age pen-

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sions, for example, in cases of need which the parties could not provide against, organized by contributions of relatives, and others who are responsible, supplemented where needful from parochial and other charities? Here is the old-age pension scheme, unknown to statesmen, but practicable, already largely in work, and almost easy. Is the C. O. S. fulfilling its true function of utilizing for every case of helpable distress the contributions of the persons and institutions primarily under obligation, and has it largely banished aimlessness from private charity, or is it adding to the disorganization of the district by collecting a general relief fund in addition to existing agencies? Has Provident Collecting been started with the view of impressing on those, who fall into distress every slack season, the possibility and necessity of looking at life somewhat more as a whole? Are volunteer workers continually being trained in resourcefulness, in thoroughness of work and of purpose, and in experience of the true social forces on which the social worker has to rely? Do the social workers, visitors and philanthropists, all of them know what the life of a first-class workman is, and, therefore, what they want the "poor" to become? These are a few of the directions in which it is the duty of a C. O. S. to promote completeness and definiteness of purpose throughout the mind of its district. Many more will suggest themselves as the work grows and ramifies; for teachers and school managers in particular it can find endless opportunities of usefulness; such as aiding the judgment of parents and children with reference to the entrance upon industrial life. Study in the shape of reading should go hand in hand with the experimental study involved in social work, and the leaders of the C. O. S. should always be ready to point out a line of reading, as well as to supply practical training under experienced workers, with regard to any province of social work which the district calls for; sanitation, for example.

These are imperfect suggestions, made, as was inevitable, without that knowledge of the neighborhood which is the foundation for any sound and definite theory of its possibilities. But I hope that in some degree they may have conveyed an idea

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of the spirit, which, as I believe, should animate all social work, or may have contributed to your own reflections some elements out of which better suggestions may spring.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY, ENGLAND.

THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF ETHICS.

IN the larger and historical present, no more vital question is broached than that concerning the ultimate nature of ethical ideas; among English and American thinkers is such especially the case. Teutonic thought with all that is meritorious about it, has never in its history produced any such wealth of discussion as that which has grown out of the endeavor among English-speaking thinkers to adjust the respective claims of Hedonist and Intuitionist. But this dispute, which has so long been current, is to be continued with only meagre satisfaction. The student of modern ethics reads the fervent eloquence of a Martineau and the judicious logic of a Sidgwick half-wishing that such superior efforts might have been expended in some more worthy cause than that of combatting theory with theory, of adjusting claim to claim. Something more fundamental is to-day demanded. The *unum necessarium* of ethical science is some concept whose vitality has not been sapped by mere disputation. In a theory of value such a principle may perhaps be found.

Other sciences than that of ethics have already taken up the theory of value. In economics and theology, in popular thought and systematic speculation this may be observed. So far as economics is concerned, the pertinency of this theory is immediately apparent, as the practical application of the same is specific and technical. But no less vivid is the use made of the valuational idea in the Ritschlian theology. Here, it is systematically applied, filling the breach made by the extraction of speculation from theology. In addition to these particular

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applications of the idea stand out the more general and speculative treatments of Nietzsche and Lotze. What a contrast between the lurid, epileptic utterances of the one and the calm, mysterious method of the other! "Transvaluation" (*Umwerthung*) is Nietzsche's *bon mot.* To his vision are disclosed "new values," gleaming on an old world. Lotze looks upon the world as a "complex of all that has value." Thus it comes about that, in a general and speculative way, as well as in a more practical and definite manner, the idea of value has already received considerable attention. Now, ethics should be the science best calculated to appreciate such an idea. But, in its history, ethics has not been ready to develop a theory of value.

By a comparison of ancient and modern ethical systems, as well as after an examination of current ethical schools, the lack of the valuational principle may best be seen. Then, the limitations of these schools and systems may be noted and the importance of this principle more thoroughly appreciated. From quite alien standpoints, the antique and modern views of life unite in a common confession of want, where the principle of value is concerned, and such must be the conclusion when present-day tendencies are examined. When it has been shown that the valuational idea is the one thing needful in the adjustment of historical ethics, it will remain to determine the nature of such an idea as well as the proper method of expressing it in ethical thought. Ancient and modern views of life may be compared by regarding them respectively as æsthetic and dynamic. Where plastic form and artistic method prevailed in the one, the ideas of mechanism and organism dominate the other. These general differences are paralleled by characteristic methods of ethics. Ancient ethics was a doctrine of the good and of various virtues; modern ethics proceeds from principles of right and duty. In both cases, the principle of value is wanting.

That light which enabled the ancient to develop the ideas of virtue and the good likewise led him to regard the world as complete in itself. All that is real is given; all that is essential has been accomplished. So far as the needs and demands of life are involved, penetration and insight serve to reveal the

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reality of the good, as well as to elaborate the different virtues. Believing in the imminence of ethical facts and relations, ancient thought never rose to the idea of obligation, never directly felt the need of struggling to accomplish the imperative. There is lacking the principle of performance as well as the feeling of obligation. The ethical spirit of Greece was that of complacency, deepening into resignation. Not so modern thought; here, it is man's duty to perform that which is right and this at once implies a struggle. That which is right must be wrought out. To obtain happiness is possible only by virtue of an effort on the part of the individual and the race. Ethical facts must be created and moral relations set up. Modern moralism is thus the counterpart of the plastic ethics of the ancient world. In the latter, ethical relations are looked upon as deducible by thought; in the former, all that is essentially right must be created.

With its idea of objective good and subjective virtue, the ancient method of ethics may be criticised as lacking in life and force. Nothing is accomplished nor need anything be wrought. All that is necessary is to assume the proper attitude whence the world may be beheld. Now the trouble consists in the fact that no end is set before the ethical subject, whereby value may be obtained. The good is only an intellectual product, just as virtue is a scholastic attitude. In modern thought, all is life and motion. The world is not yet finished; man is yet uneducated; society is still undeveloped. As in a process must all be regarded; nature is being evolved. Such a dynamic view of things results in regarding the world as a system of energies; man, as a complex of faculties. So far as practical thought is concerned, the essential aim in ethics would seem to consist in setting these faculties in motion. Perfect functioning is the ideal of modern life; in ethical science, this applies to both the individual and society. That which is wanting is the idea of a finished product. In ethical science, there is sought the right method of life; at the same time, the proper spring of action is investigated. Hereby, the modern ideals of conduct are influenced. Right becomes the proper method of attaining some undefined end. Ought is a senti-

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ment calculated to initiate action, but it is only an initiative. Such results as are taken into account consist in the adjustment of the individual's own faculties within him, as also his relation to his fellows. Still, essential results are wanting, or fail to be taken into account. In this way, it might be said that, where ancient thought perceived no real ethical problem, modern thought is all problem and no solution.

Value, as an ethical principle, has been wanting in both ancient and modern systems. Before the special demand of this principle is felt in current ethical schools, the general lack of the concept must be taken into account. Good and right, as ethical ideals, are unable to make up this want. The valuational idea seems to make up this deficiency in formal ethical principles and thus enters as a competitor among the concepts which have been current in ancient and modern thought. If the Greek, even in the sublime instance of a Socrates, failed to rise to the idea of obligation, the modern shows no inclination to return to the ancient idea of the good. Where ethical writers refer to the *summum bonum*, their spirit is not that of constructive speculation but is only archæological. By making ethical relations inner and individual, modern thought has unnecessarily sacrificed the antique ideals of the abiding and universal character of the ethical. Thus, current ethical thought is guilty of a subjectivity which is by no means essentially modified by the social view of the ethical life. But, cannot the best of ancient and modern ethics as well be found in the concept of value? While it possesses the inness demanded by modern views of the soul, the valuational idea does not fail to contain somewhat of the spirit contained in the idea of the good. The principle of value, as a reconciler of ancient and modern morals, may not be wholly in vain.

A comparison of present ethical tendencies likewise exhibits a want which may be filled by the valuational idea. The breach between the principles of duty and happiness is in some way suggestive of that between the ancient and modern ideals of good and right. In the former case, the aptness of the value-theory will be more apparent. By a brief analysis of both Intuitionism and Hedonism, the service as well as the limita-

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tion of each will become apparent; at the same time, the importance of value as a corrective may be observed.

Intuitionism is a term which may, perhaps, most readily identify, but which does not best describe, an ethical theory of an immediate intrinsic and imperative ethical principle. In outlining and defending this theory, two distinct methods are followed. As an intellectual doctrine, Intuitionism proceeds from the idea of conscience, as the source of the principle of right; from the volitional standpoint, this theory, in the form of a sense of ought, gives rise to the idea of duty. Butler and Kant respectively are typical of such tendencies. Thus stated, Intuitionism may be estimated accordingly. In marking out the distinctly ethical province, as well as in surveying all its problems *sub specie boni,* Intuitionism has the distinction of having made of ethics a distinct science, founded on its merits. As an independent study, not as an appendix to metaphysics nor as a part of political science, has this theory regarded its subject. "Common morality" has thus been justified. Intuitionism has attempted far more than this, but this service may be admitted and its scientific merit approved.

The source, the sanction and the practical significance which Intuitionism alleges deserve some examination. A "faculty-psychology," and all the ills which it is heir to, has not failed to find shelter in this school. For the sake of identifying a special, isolated moral function, the unity of conscience has been broken up. The sanction which is here offered, couched as it usually is in quasi logical forms, can hardly escape the difficulties of circular argument. To be sure, it may be possible for Intuitionism to construct judgments of right as independent forms of ethical thought; but the service of these is rather formal and there is still room for other similar forms as judgments of beauty, of utility and also of value. When the moral significance of Intuitionism assumes the form of a motto, "duty for duty's sake," the practical force of the theory would seem to be vitiated. It would seem as though, in itself, conduct could have no value, and the moral life no concern beyond normal ethical functioning. The merits of Intuitionism as a

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theory of moral activity may still be seen when that activity is turned toward an end and conceived of as valuable.

By using the term Hedonism in a general way, two different forms of this theory may be expressed: utilitarianism and social evolution. Hobbes based the former upon politico-economical principles; in opposition to him, Hume regarded the proper standpoint as being social and historical. If the service of Intuitionism has been scientific, that of Hedonism was, in its beginning, historical. By virtue of the principles of Hedonism was the emancipation of modern life made possible. When Grotius deduced from reason his concept of *jus humanum,* he freed humanity from the yoke of mediæval tradition and authority. Modern man became a living soul. The effect of this deliverance was felt, not only in jurisprudence and ethics but also in art, as the "corporation pictures" of Rembrandt clearly attest. At the same time, Hedonism has been of more than historical service; it has ever shown that moral conduct is something desirable. In various ways has this been brought out; pleasure and utility, happiness and benevolence are principles which Hedonism has employed in approximating to this general idea of conduct's value. Unfortunately, such principles are insufficient for this purpose.

The proper criticism of Hedonism cannot be the same as in the case of Intuitionism, except that in a general way the valuational standpoint may be assumed. Questions of practical sufficiency and of moral merit are most appropriately to be brought up, where Hedonism is concerned. As a theory, is it sufficient unto the problems which life presents? Feeling is the sphere in which this theory lives and moves; here, no little difficulty is encountered. Not only has the Hedonist found value in the affectional process, but he has also assumed that such a form of value was realizable. Thus, an unguarded optimism is one of the chief dangers to which such a construction is exposed. Perhaps the original antipathy to the Hobbist pessimism has brought about this easy-going view, but the history of Hedonism manifests a heedless optimism. Pleasure has been regarded as certainly attainable; happiness as possible; benevolence, as a likely

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tendency in human nature. But how differently does evolution interpret Hedonism! This method of explaining man and society genetically arose under pessimistic auspices. Not happiness, but life; not pleasure, but persistence in the world is the true end and aim. When the struggle for existence has made life possible, when some endurable social condition has been evolved, then the Hedonist may begin to consider the question of happiness and the possibility of altruism. Thus far, pleasure and happiness, instead of being ends in themselves, are by evolution viewed as symptoms of individual and social health. If evolution as a theory be correct, nature is plainly impatient with any such optimism as has characterized Hedonism.

The emancipation of the affectional process in consciousness, by virtue of which psychology passed from the ancient bipartite to the modern tripartite form, has never been seriously taken into account by Hedonism. Ever moving in the realm of feeling, this theory has failed to appreciate some of the most significant elements of the conscious process. It is the eighteenth century psychology which has been retained by Hedonism; the progress made in the last hundred years has not been seriously taken into account. By confining its attention to pleasure and pain alone and (except in the case of Mill) by looking upon distinctions which might be made in either half of this dualism as purely quantitative and not qualitative in their nature, Hedonism no more than any other theory may lay claim to the process of feeling, when the latter is viewed in its unity and completeness. Now, it is just here that the idea of value may be found. Overlooked in the historical development of ethics, this idea has not been discovered in the analysis of consciousness.

Historically viewed, value, as an ethical principle, would seem to occupy a position overlooked in ancient formalism and modern dynamism, as well as in the ethical schools of the present. The valuational principle may be regarded as the ground of conduct, just as, from a metaphysical standpoint, it may be one of the methods of studying reality. Value, as here employed, is not urged simply as a means of reconciling

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opposed systems; that would be a bit pedantic; nevertheless, both Hedonism and intuitionism have this concept in common and thereby may their extreme conclusions be moderated. Although somewhat of an innovation, the value-principle has not failed to make its presence felt in history. In the ethical systems of Bentham and Kant are to be found characteristic and, accordingly, imperfect considerations of the valuational form of ethics.

Bentham antedates Kant in bringing out the idea of value; at the same time, his peculiar interpretation of this is, more than Kant's, an aberration from the essential notion of value. A devout and consistent hedonist, Bentham, in developing his arithmetic of pleasure and pain, introduces the element of value as the significant factor of the hedonist calculus. Thus he does not, like the Cyrenaic, consider the intensity of the pleasure merely as felt; nor, like Epicurus, regard the duration of the feeling simply as continuing and persistent. But Bentham looks upon intensity and duration, as well as the other attributes of feeling, as making up the value of a feeling, so that, in his Hedonism, the end to be sought was not pleasure or quantity of pleasure but value as incorporated in these. Not only does Bentham continually employ value as a term, but his ethical system continually involves the idea. Unfortunately, the method of interpreting value is not purely valuational, but is rather a mixture of mathematics and traditional psychology.

Rigorism, not Hedonism, was the method according to which Kant made his determination of value; more successfully than Bentham, he expressed the inner nature of the principle. "Talent has a market price; temperament, a fancy-price; character, an inner value." In addition to making this serviceable distinction, Kant likewise showed how judgments of value may be made, independently of other forms of judgment. Such judgments were looked upon as being quite distinct from those of taste and were regarded as determined by reverence for ethical ideals. But, just here, Kant failed to advance beyond the rigorism of the Practical Reason. Having adjusted ethical relations in a scholastic manner, Kant then sought to deduce the valuational principle, but this could only be warped by the

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ethical system which sought to determine it. While he certainly advanced beyond Bentham, Kant, in distinction from the latter, cut aloof from any possible psychology of value; he did not see that, to exist, value must be felt and thus his imperfect conception of the principle is but the counterpart of Bentham's. Hedonism as well as Intuitionism may have some affinity for the valuational principle, but neither of them fully expresses its import.

To have any kind of completeness, a valuational theory should be regarded from the standpoint of psychology, of ethics and of metaphysics. Hereby may be determined the nature and character of the concept as well as its ultimate validity. Facts of value are facts of consciousness; by virtue of the independence of the affectional process, these may be expressed in value-judgments. Ethically viewed, value is a principle calculated to interpret moral law as well as likely to influence conduct; while, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, it remains to be shown how a world of values is thinkable.

1. Facts of value, as well as those of pleasure, pain, desire and the like, are included in the psychology of affection. As desire is to be distinguished from pleasure, so is value to be differentiated from desire. Mill's attempt to identify the experiences of "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant" may be regarded as a lost cause and just as futile may be considered the endeavor to regard value as the equivalent of desire. At the same time, the independence of the valuational process may be maintained, even when the relation of the latter to desire is acknowledged. For the experience of desiring, value has a most certain affinity; the two, however, are distinct. What then is the essential difference between them? Such a general question may partially be answered by another and particular one. Do we desire things because they have value? or, do things have value because we desire them? By asking such a question, Ehrenfels, in the answer to it, has introduced his own theory of value. "Nicht deswegen begehren wir die Dinge, weil wir jene mystische unfassbare 'Wert' in ihnen erkennen, sondern deswegen sprechen wir den Dingen 'Wert' zu, weil wir sie

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begehren."* Meinong, whose value-theory is by no means alien to that of Ehrenfels, takes the opposite point of view, urging that, since desire can relate only to what is not present, value must be looked upon as prior and more fundamental. The futurity which is ever essential to desire seems to make it secondary to the valuational principle. Meinong, accordingly, connects value more closely with feeling, so that a thing whose existence gives pleasure has value, while one which involves pain the contrary.† Now, in the case of either theory, the value-idea is at the mercy of purely hedonist considerations.

The relation of pleasure and desire to value is not organic but symptomatic. As a feeling, value is by no means commensurate with the amount of pleasure or the intensity of desire. Masked as it often is by feelings and impulses incident upon certain features of the object in view, value manifests itself as the most fundamental element in the out-going tendencies of the soul. When a course of action has been decided upon and an object is sought, pleasure may be imagined just as desire may be involved; but that which constitutes the essential motive of the act and which gives character to the conduct is a sense of the object's value. Pleasure, in itself, has reference to the present; desire, to the future: value is hampered by no such temporal limits and is thus an unbroken current passing through the act, making conduct what it is. Whereas the enjoyment of pleasure and the satisfaction of desire may be associated with the valuational principle, the cardinal idea does not consist in either of these, but rather is a feeling that some positive gain is to ensue. Everyday experience reveals the fact that that which inspires desire is not the pleasure which the object pursued may bring but some feeling of the object's worth to the soul.

When value fails to be realized, the disappointment which results reveals the peculiar nature of the sentiment. How may this absence of value be expressed? Pleasure fails of enjoyment, but such a fact is, in the calculation, only an imaginary quantity, (V-1), just as unsatisfied desire is a purely negative

*"System der Werththeorie," I. S. 2.
†"Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie," S. 14-24.

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effect. Now, the significant thing involved in the process is to be explained only in terms of value. It is felt that something is lost; an opportunity is gone. And this loss does not consist in pleasure, nor is it expressible as unsatisfied desire, but is rather a loss of value. He who allows to escape unimproved an opportunity to realize something, is stung by the thought that value has been lost. The resulting regret is quite independent of pleasure and desire but is closely connected with the valuational principle.

Value is essentially volitional. Difficult as it is for introspective analysis to identify any conative quality in consciousness, enough is known about the will to make possible its connection with the value-idea. The independence of valuation over against both pleasure and desire is justified by the independence of the volitional quality, even though such be an indeterminate. Volition is distinct from desire as the arbitrariness of human nature well attests; at the same time pathalogical cases in volition show how the will may act in opposition to desire. Experience reveals a more or less complete bifurcation of affection and conation. Now, the normal determinant of the will would seem to consist in the value-principle. Impulse seeks to realize something; volition issues forth as though somewhat were to be gained. The will, it is true, may in its functioning be closely associated with desire and pleasure; nevertheless, by virtue of value-illusions, volitional activity may become distorted in its arbitrariness. That which thus seems to guide conation is some sense of value.

With its affinity for the two other forms of conscious life, valuation may also be expressed in quasi-intellectual forms. These make up judgments of value. By virtue of the independence of the affectional process are these formed; in them, the essential nature of value is to be found. Such judgments are judgments of feeling. But feeling, in consciousness, is more than felt; it is appreciated and such an appreciation is made possible by means of a judgment. The validity of these judgments may better be urged when there is presented the analogy of æsthetic rather than of logical judgments. Just as facts of value are facts of consciousness, so, judgments of

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value are to be included within the precinct of reason. Such judgments are formed in every-day experience; wisdom literature everywhere expresses them; common morality idealizes them. According to such judgments, conduct is guided. Here is involved the transition from the psychology to the ethics of valuation.

2. The character of value may be expressed by saying, "the valuable is the desirable." But what is meant by "the desirable"? Ehrenfels, in order to overcome the difficulty involved in the futurity of reference in desire, has, in his definition of valuation, used almost the same language. "Der Wert eines inges ist seine Begehrbarkeit."* But this simply means that an object would be desired were it not present in consciousness; as a result, the principles of Hedonism are not transcended. In order to invest value with an ethical character, the idea of the "desirable" must be otherwise interpreted. For value to be realized, desire must be idealized; that which actually is desired is by no means the same as that which should be desired. Not at all commensurate are the desirable and the desired; experience often reveals the fact that the thing desired is not at all desirable. One springs from impulse; the other from judgment. In order to determine the character of value, the Hedonist principle of desire must pass through the alembic of what should be. An exquisite portion of the Hebrew Psalms has made the nature of value distinguishable from both desire and pleasure and, at the same time, has made it as intrinsic as the principles of Intuitionism. "The judgments of Jahveh are true and righteous altogether (Intuitionism.) More to be desired are they than gold (valuational idea). Sweeter also than honey and the honey-comb (Hedonism)." That which is "to be desired" is not deducible from desire as a fact of experience but must be determined by valuational principles.

Vanity is an idea the very opposite of value; by comparing the two, the character of the latter may thus be set in positive relief. As a principle, vanity reveals itself as the natural result of non-ethical conduct; again, it serves to express the apparent inability of moral conduct to bear fruit. Non-ethical

op. cit., S. 53.

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conduct is to be looked upon, not only as wrong or as involving injustice, but as vain or valueless. Ethical conduct, on the other hand, may seem, in spite of its good and just character, to be of no esential value but rather may appear as in vain. This two-fold conception—of things of vanity and things in vain—serves, by antithesis, to bring out the peculiar nature of the valuational principle. Moral consciousness looks upon immoral conduct as vanity; at the same time, it may be tempted to doubt the positive value of good conduct. So far as non-ethical action is concerned, whatever may result from it may only be looked upon as altogether vanity. Though pleasure be produced in consciousness, though the individual's desire be satisfied, it does not follow that value is realized. Rather by such a state of things is the vanity of the principle seen. On the other hand, to conclude that, after all, good conduct may be in vain, as is sometimes the tendency with the reformer and the religious believer, reveals an attitude of mind in which the logical tendency of ethical relations is involved. For, it is thus seen that the natural expectation concerning moral conduct is that it should produce results and quite natural is the disappointment at its seeming resultlessness. Such a condition of mind may be seen when again the Hebrew Psalms are referred to, this time the seventy-third. The soul which here was undergoing a serious storm and stress was tempted to say, "surely I have cleansed my heart in vain and washed my hands in innocency." Such was the Psalmist's temptation. However he may have overcome it, the sharp contrast of value and vanity cannot fail to be seen nor the valuational character of ethical relations fail to be appreciated.

If desire, in its ideal form, serves to express the inner character of value, destiny, as a secondary principle, likewise enters in to determine the idea. That which modern ethical thought lacks may now be supplied; a goal. Not pleasure, nor yet the satisfaction of conscience makes up the essential nature of ethical relations, but some end conceived of as of value. By virtue of such an interpretation, Rigorism is tempered and Hedonism transfigured. For the true aim of life is not to gratify desire or to perform duty but to realize destiny. That

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has value. At the same time, through the valuational determination, both Rigorism and Hedonism are in some sense justified. The desirability of an object as well as the imperative demand of its pursuit are justifiable by that object's value. Value may further be determined by bringing in the idea of result. That which is resultful has value; vain is that which is resultless. But such result cannot be summed up in terms of pleasure or identified with happiness; it must be expressed in terms of value. Such a determination of the valuational principle assumes a theological form and hereby is made possible the transition from the ethical to the metaphysical view of the concept.

3. The essential nature of value is seen when a metaphysical determination is attempted; at the same time, the superiority of the valuational view over Intuitionism and Hedonism is again observed. Both the subject and the object of valuation may be regarded as ultimate and essential. The subject of valuation is none other than the personal ego viewed in its totality and unity. Intuitionism, in its ultimate reference to the ethical subject, fails in the point of unity just as Hedonism is guilty of incompleteness. The one exalts a faculty, the other a process. But the development of the ethical has ever been signalized by new views of the soul: such was the case in ancient and modern as well as in Christian ethics. In ancient thought, the Socratic dictum, γνῶθί σεαυτόν, is only a parallel to the modern *jus humanum* of Grotius. Here and there, the foundations of ethical science were laid in a theory of the soul. By separating the soul from the world, Christianity, in the words of its Founder: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" has made possible the union of valuation and its metaphysical basis. Such a union is inevitable. According to Intuitionism, moral facts and relations are indicated; according to Hedonism, they are felt; but, by the valuational view, they are constituted and rendered valid. This is possible by the connection of the principle with the idea of the soul, which determines the principle. Some notion of an ethical realm is the indispensable counterpart of the valuation subject. Here, again the history of ethics in its various stages

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affords many an example of such a notion. The world of ideas of Plato, the moral world-order of Fichte and the New Testament Kingdom of God are brilliant examples of the moral realm. Thus is determined a world of value, as the basis of the subject of value. In this valuational cosmos, value is not abstractly represented but actively conserved, so that the determination of such a realm is to be shown not so much by speculation as rather by evincing the fact that ethical consciousness of the individual soul ever postulates such a conservation of value. Such valuational faith relates the subject and object.

The conservation of value shows that ethical relations are something more than norms or ideals; they rather are to be conceived of as constructive and real. Religion thus regards the Kingdom of God as seed sown in the earth, just as moral conduct is looked upon after the analogy of sowing and reaping. Ethical performance should be looked upon as producing results or as bearing fruit. It is true that doubt may often be entertained as to the success of moral conduct so that the subject is tempted to say, What boots it then to do well? but the full consciousness of moral relations involves the idea of conservation. Then it is seen that no moral endeavor is lost, no real gain made by wrong-doing. For the more complete determination of such conservation, Religion becomes necessary. Nevertheless, the essential of this conservation is ethical and, being such, would seem best to be represented as a conservation of value.

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THE ETHICS OF THE KORAN.

A MAN without any imagination may be just and upright, in obedience to law or custom. But he can never see the full beauty of justice and truth. For him the ideal side of ethical realities does not exist, as for the one who is color-blind, the rare beauty of the Oriental sunset is as though it were not. He is only conscious of the bare fact of the disappearing sun.

The Koran is a book apparently without imagination, and with little literary beauty, from an occidental standpoint, and its ethics are stern and unrelenting. They present, however, absolute justice as the standard of morality, from which there can be no departure. In this presentation there is grandeur, but there are no softening influences for the seeker after ethical rectitude. There is no hint of any such element as the beauty of love presented by Plato, or the reality of a spirit world like that in which Jesus lived, or the intellectual love of God, that was the highest virtue according to Spinoza, and constituted the blessedness and beauty of the soul.

To the impartial student of the Koran, therefore, a great problem presents itself. Was Mohammed a man without spiritual ideals? Could any one evolve a religious system, either alone or with the help of others, which should from beginning to end be consistent in measuring all actions by the test of abstract justice, and yet have no idea of the beauty of eternal justice? Could a man be devoutly impressed, as was Mohammed, with the unity of God, and the reality of a future life, and yet have a knowledge of that God form no part of his picture of heavenly bliss?

The grand ideas of the Koran are the power of justice, the oneness of God, and the exaltation of worship, and these are ideas which might well form the foundation of a deep spiritual experience, but of such an experience Mohammed himself gives no trace. He constantly demands of the faithful belief in the life to come, but the descriptions of the joys of the future are thoroughly materialistic, and express no conscious-

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ness of the grandeur of the conceptions upon which he bases the moral law.

All the elements of theoretic and practical ethics are contained in the Koran. The utilitarian motive is very strong, and is presented in a simple näive form. The believer must do right in order to be received into paradise, at the time of the resurrection. That is evil which is contrary to justice, and justice is an eternal truth, binding upon God and man. The justice of God is absolute, to reward and punish in the day of judgment, at which time all the good deeds of the believer will be remembered in his favor.

"He who brings a good deed shall have better than it: but those who bring an evil deed shall be thrown down upon their faces in the fire. Shall ye be rewarded save for what ye have done?" (Sura XXVII.)

The power attributed by the Koran to justice, is the keynote to be found in all its teachings, and gives us the psychical explanation of the hold which Islam has upon its people, and of the rapid increase of its domain under the first Caliphs.

The Koran teaches absolute freedom of the will. Man is morally and physically responsible to God, to others, and to himself, and is free in all his actions. The popular opinion is very strong among those in European nations, who give any thought to the influence of the Koran, that it has taught fatalism to the Mohammedans. This is an error and an injustice, and cannot be sustained by a careful examination of the pages of the Koran.

If the Koran recommended fatalism to the faithful, could it demand justice and charity? A book which states in more than one place that man is free, and which makes him responsible for his salvation or damnation, which says that he can be good or bad, and thus open to himself the gates of paradise or of hell, and that God will do only that which is fully merited, does not deserve such a reproach. There is nothing in the Koran that could justify this error. A good Mohammedan never loses his confidence in himself, and his confidence in God is no less certain, but this confidence re-

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mains within exact limits, and never wanders into the labyrinth which is called fatalism.

It is true that the Koran exaggerates a little, so to speak, the belief in the power of God. It gives a significance a little large to its expressions of divine omniscience and omnipotence, but yet not a sufficient exaggeration to serve as the origin of the doctrine of fatalism.

Furthermore, although the Koran recommends submission to the divine will, and especially forbids rebellion against that will supreme, yet this submission refers entirely to those events which are supposed to take place in consequence of the rulings of divine providence, and in no degree to the development of individual character, for which the individual alone is responsible. The ground of the spirit of submission is that God is just and merciful, and will always ordain what is best for the future.

> "Shall man have whatever he wishes?
> The future and the present are in the hand of God."

The believer resigns himself to God and commits all his life to him. (Sura LIII.) A thoughtful, well-educated Mussulman once remarked, that the submission which the Koran prescribes, was for him the only consolation possible in time of trouble.

Barthélemy-Saint-Hillaire, the celebrated *Savant* who translated the Koran into French, says on this subject, "The Koran recommends to the faithful to be absolutely submissive to the will of God, and such submission is imposed upon them by the very name they bear, and in which they glory. (Muslim means submissive, and Islam submission.) But one never finds in the precepts or in the examples given by the Prophet an abdication of the most noble faculties of the soul. Fatalism as one imagines it, is only an insurmountable slothfulness, and dullness born of debauchery. It is more a physical impossibility to act well, than a doctrine, and in any case it is not authorized by the Koran. The true meaning of Islam is nothing more than a profound conception of the weakness of man before a powerful and merciful God, and the necessity of submission. It is not a culpable renouncement of the most

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beautiful gift the Creator has given us, the power to act freely."

If the fatalism which is so widespread among Mussulman people, is in any degree to be traced to the influence of the Koran, it has come about because of a gradual misapprehension of its teachings regarding submission, or it may be through an unconscious recognition of the philosophical inconsistency of extreme submission, or acquiescence of spirit, to the decrees of God, and the extreme freedom of the will, that makes a man responsible through his actions on earth, for his future state in the paradise of the blessed, or in a hell of fire and torment.

The spirit of submission to the decrees of Allah in all matters, both small and great, is very firmly implanted in the Mohammedan people. The boatmen on the Bosphorus whose occupation well facilitates the keenness of observation that develops the ability to foretell the weather, can never be betrayed into expressing an opinion on the subject. If asked if it is likely to rain, they will invariably reply, "God knows, I do not know." If pressed for an opinion, one elicits an answer like the following: "It is not for me to think about the weather, for the weather is in the hands of God, who is a God of mercy, and will do well."

The Koran, like the books of all monotheistic religions, places the first principles of the natural law in the divine power, but it does not suppress the moral law by making the divine will supreme. In regard to the fatalism to which Mohammedans are so prone, we can certainly say that other Oriental nations show the same tendency, and it is more than probable that biological and climatic influences have had a large share in its development.

The laws of practical ethics in the Koran rest largely upon the principle of justice, but charity, philanthropy, generosity, gratitude and sincerity are also recommended. Strict honesty is demanded in business dealings, with just balances, and upright intentions. Lies of all kinds are condemned, the taking of bribes is strictly forbidden, and faithfulness to trusts is commanded. This is especially the case in regard to trusts concerning orphans. The references in general to duties towards

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orphans, are exceedingly numerous, and one cannot but admire the extreme forethought shown in the Koran for such unfortunate children. Wrong to the orphan is held to be a grievous sin, and in many of the Suras of the Koran there are one or two verses which say in effect, "Do not touch the property of orphans."

The precepts of charity and philanthropy occupy a very important place. One meets with commands like the following on almost every page of the Koran: "Pray, give alms, and the good which you do you will find with God, who sees all your actions." Profanity is forbidden, and obedience to parents is enjoined.

As an essential element of duty to self, the Koran demands sobriety and patience. Alcoholic drinks are strictly forbidden, and all games of chance are condemned. Furthermore, the virtues of modesty, prudence and discretion are enjoined.

Prayer and fasting and reciting the Koran are decided obligations of practical morality. A fast is prescribed for the whole month of Ramadan. This was the month when the Koran was given to Mohammed, as he himself had the habit of seeking solitude and thought every year at that time. The fast of Ramadan is still kept with great strictness, and no food, and sometimes, even, no drink, is taken all day long, but after the sunset gun, the faithful are free to eat till the dawn of the morning light. As the Mohammedan year is measured by lunar months, Ramadan gradually makes the circuit of the year, and when the time of fasting comes during the long summer days, under the heaviest burden of the year's work, the strain upon the system must be very great. The devotion of the working class to their religion, as for instance among the simple village peasants, is very impressive. They go manfully through the duties devolving upon them, from sunrise till sunset, without allowing anything to pass their lips.

The virtue of prayer rests principally upon repeating a certain number of prayers at fixed intervals. Prayers should be repeated five times a day, and in case any are omitted, they must be made up at another time. Ablutions are demanded

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before each prayer, and prostrations before God have in themselves ethical value, and constitute an act of virtue.

It is a question for the student of Psychology to consider, what the ethical effect upon a nation would naturally be, of centuries of outward expression of devotion to God, accompanied by physical cleanliness, and given in architectural surroundings suited to develop a devotional spirit. The slender minaret points up to heaven, the form of the mosque is grand, the interior is undivided and unadorned. Absolute cleanliness is demanded not only for the worshipper, but in the building, and the gestures that accompany the prayer are arranged in detail to express humility and dependence upon God, and must be repeated again and again. Moreover, it is a form of worship in which there can never be insincerity, as its virtue consists in its outward expression.

Judging the Koran from a sociological standpoint, we find an attempt to reform society as it existed in the time of Mohammed, on the plan of laws rather than principles, with the result of making some of the customs of a barbarous age, fixed elements of a social system. In order to have an exact idea of the social and moral value of the Koran in past history, one must take into account the social *milieu* over which it has exerted an influence. The customs of the Arabs before the rise of Islam were of a very perverted character. The marriage laws were very loose, without any regard to consanguinity, and it was a common custom to bury children alive to escape the burden of their support, without pity and without scruple. These horrible usages were entirely abolished by the Koran, and the laws of marriage were regulated on the basis of polygamy and free divorce.

The statement has sometimes been made that the Koran does not attribute any soul to a woman, or offer her an equal share in paradise with men. This idea is utterly incorrect, for all the promises to the faithful include men and women alike, with a statement of the fact. Men and women are held alike morally responsible to God. In regard, however, to the comparative social responsibility of men and women, there are inconsistencies in different places. We read, for instance, in

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Sura IV., that if a woman is untrue to her husband she is to be punished for life, while if he commits the same fault, he is to be forgiven if he repent. According to Sura XXIV., however, both the man and the woman committing this sin are to be punished with a hundred stripes.

The marriage laws are based on a supposition of the superiority of men, over women, which is from two causes. (1) Because God has gifted men with superior qualities. (2) Because the support of the family comes upon the man. Wives must therefore be obedient and live largely in seclusion, and if they give occasion for offence, they must be scourged.

The law of inheritance grants a double portion to male heirs. (Sura IV.) The woman has, however, full control over the property which is hers in her own right, after marriage, and if she dies, her husband does not inherit it against her expressed will. The fact that marriage is not necessarily permanent for a Mohammedan woman, has been a reason for giving her a fuller control of her property, than is enjoyed by the women of many other countries. The wife always has full control of her property unless she wills otherwise, and can buy or sell or alienate it without consulting her husband. At the time of marriage the husband settles a certain sum of money upon the wife, which is called her dowry, and if he divorces her, this money must be paid over to her, in addition to the property which was hers in her own right, over which she may or may not have kept control. There are no other restrictions upon divorce, except those concerning property, and the husband is not only free to divorce his wife, but on the other hand he has no right to compel her to remain with him against her will, if she demands a divorce, or under those conditions, to refuse to pay her her dowry.

Slavery is taken for granted as a natural element of social customs, but any slave can demand his freedom, according to the Koran. Marriage with slaves is approved, and justice in all dealings with them is demanded.

As giving to the poor is a direct virtue, to be rewarded at the last day, according to an exact amount of the alms given, suffering on account of poverty seldom occurs, and during a

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long residence among Mohammedans, I have never seen a beggar repulsed by one of that nation.

The teachings of the Koran are also very strong in their general influence against love of money. We read the following words in Sura XCII.:

> "But as for him who gives alms and fears God,
> And believes in the best,
> We will send him easily to ease;
> But as for him who is niggardly,
> And longs for wealth,
> And calls the good a lie,
> We will send him easily to difficulty,
> And his wealth shall not avail him,
> When he falls down into hell."*

Niggardliness as a national fault could never be imputed to the faithful, but on the contrary, they are proverbially free and open-handed in their use of money, and in practicing hospitality.

Mohammed knew no distinction between church and state, and the laws which he gave as a revelation from God, were for the civil, moral and religious development of his people, and have since been so regarded.

War on infidels and hypocrites is a virtue, for hell is the abode of such, and the more wretched their passage to it can be made, the better. There are certain conditions, however, under which clemency, and even friendship, is allowed towards unbelievers.

The Koran gives very little scope for the development of an aristocracy among the faithful, but decidedly favors a democratic order of society. There is no priesthood designated, and no opportunity given for the legitimate development of a religious aristocracy. The possession of money is not a virtue, and the poor have the right to ask of the rich, and to receive from them. Labor is enjoined on all, and the rich and poor stand together in the mosques to pray, and go together on pilgrimages, and eat together of the holy sacrifices, of which an especial share is given to the poor.

In seeking for a satisfactory explanation of the power of

*Translated by E. H. Palmer, in "Sacred Books of the East."

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the Koran in the past and present, over a large portion of the human race, we find it in the simplicity of the categorical imperative, the justice displayed in the details of the law, and the despotic character of the religion.

God is all powerful to punish or reward, and demands absolute obedience, and reverent worship. Worship is an act of virtue, and the details of Mohammedan worship are such as to strengthen the impression of its simplicity, and to exalt it in character. Change of religion is punishable by death, but the faithful believer has the sure promise of everlasting bliss, in the gardens, beneath whose shades the rivers flow forever.

Allah Akbar, God is Great. Islam, We must submit to Him.

MARY MILLS PATRICK.

CONSTANTINOPLE, TURKEY.

FACTORS IN THE EFFICIENCY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

FOR many at the present time their belief in the traditional theology is being more or less completely dissolved, but as yet it is by no means clear what form of creed is to take the place of that which is being dissolved, nor indeed whether any new form of creed is able to take the place of the old with anything like the same efficiency. And it thus becomes a matter of very practical importance to inquire in what the efficiency of the traditional creed consisted, and what means a creed which conforms to the conditions of modern thought can employ to make itself effective as a moral force.

In the traditional creed two really heterogeneous factors were combined in a very intimate way. On the one hand the creed expressed a great religious or ethical conception—that of a suffering saviour-God. Such a conception appealed directly to faith: it was a gospel of salvation, that told of a divine love and pity greater than it was possible to hope for, and summoned men to strive with all their energies to be worthy of their God. Such a gospel was worth believing: it was a true object

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of faith; and its moral grandeur was a legitimate motive for faith.—On the other hand the traditional creed set forth certain miraculous or supernatural facts which guaranteed the reality of its ethical conception: the conception was shown to be realized in a system of supernatural but historical events. Thus the conception was not merely impressive and cogent in itself, but had a foothold in the common actuality of history. It was not merely a great idea. It was also a thing that had happened, and the facts about its happening could be told and known.

In this peculiar combination of a great spiritual content or idea with a quasi-physical knowledge or belief of its reality, lay the power of the traditional creed. The doctrines of the creed made a powerful religious appeal to those in whom a genuine faith demanded an adequate object; and, again, the supernatural history was there as an incontrovertible fact for those who did not have it in them to ask for any higher assurance. To those who responded to the appeal of the creed it was supremely worth believing, and even by those who were indifferent to its truth and averse to meeting its claims it could not be lightly denied or set aside. The average believer, however, belonged to neither of these two classes exclusively, but rather united in himself the characteristics of both and alternated between the two states of mind. And in his case, therefore, the factors which gave the creed its double power coöperated with a subtle effectiveness. When his faith was vivid the supernatural history was illumined with a marvelous and profound significance. When his faith was weak, and the spiritual content embodied in or connected with the supernatural facts failed to work upon his spirit, still the facts themselves were there to testify the presence and the claims, not to be evaded, of a divine might and purpose. Thus even when faith was weak, and the spiritual content of the creed was no longer apprehended in its spiritual truth, there remained a belief—lower in kind certainly, but still positive and constraining—in the reality of what the creed asserted.

It may be objected that this lower belief, which only gave an external and constrained assent to truths not really apprehended as such, is in no sense faith, and has no real connection

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with true faith at all. The objection is partially, but only partially, valid. In the first place, it assumes a sharp division between true faith and this lower belief, a division which does not really exist. The two extremes are linked by many intermediate phases of belief in which the characters of both are blended with varying intensity. Nay, what we should otherwise call the lower kind of belief may be present in great strength but so transfused with spiritual meaning that it belongs indivisibly to the contents of faith itself. What is true in the objection is this, that the two factors in the creed represented by the two kinds of belief were in reality heterogeneous: what the objection overlooks is the fact that they were not then *felt* to be heterogeneous. Only when one of the factors was singled out for separate investigation could the difference of kind between them be fully appreciated. And this separation was not decisively effected until the historical science of this century began to investigate the actualities of Christian history for their own sake and independently of dogmatic preconceptions. But when once this purely historical standpoint was established, the difference in kind between historical conclusions and religious convictions could not fail to assert itself. The two factors in the creed *are* heterogeneous, and as soon as the difference in kind between them is pressed they fall completely apart. Consider, for instance, the Christian's belief in the resurrection of Christ. The essence of this belief on its religious side is the conviction that the personality of Christ has a spiritual value which constrains us to think of it as eternal. A universe in which it passed away and lesser things remained would for the Christian be irrational. Now this conviction can as little be proved by any ghostlike appearances of Christ after his death as it can be refuted by their absence. If such appearances counted for anything in themselves, they would be as important in the case of any other man of whom they have been asserted. But the difference between the belief of the Christian and the credulity of the spiritualist is ultimate and complete. The truth is that the Christian's religious conviction about Christ craves for some visible sign and confirmation of its truth, and the resurrection seems to faith to be such a sign.

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The error lies in turning a symbol which only faith can apprehend into the very premise by which the faith itself is proved. Whereas the connection between the faith and its symbol is æsthetic rather than logical. Thus when the symbol begins to be used as a logical premise we may be sure that faith has lost its intrinsic certainty, and is seeking to quiet itself with some outward and inferior guarantee. Or consider, again, the belief in the miraculous birth of Christ. The absence of any strictly logical relation between the supernatural event and the religious doctrine which is connected with it is here more patent than ever. That Christ was born into the world in a preternatural way is in itself no proof at all that he was an incarnation of the deity; although, of course, to one already convinced of his divinity the miraculous birth has a certain fitness as a symbol. In short, spiritual realities that appeal to faith on the one hand, and, on the other, more or less historical events that can be debated by the historian, belong to different orders. And the belief which attaches to the one is different in kind from that which attaches to the other. But then, as I have said above, we must remember that it is only within quite modern times that this difference has been fully and truly appreciated. The two factors that entered into the traditional religion were always in themselves heterogeneous, but they were not always *felt to be heterogeneous,* because the nature of the distinction between them was little, if at all, apprehended. In fact for many even now the distinction does not exist any more than it did then. Therefore, as I said, we cannot assume that sharp division between a higher and a lower kind of belief which is implied in the above objection.

And, in the second place, the objection fails to take account of the service which the lower kind of belief could render to faith, not indeed by virtue of any intrinsic quality, but, so to speak, as a *locum tenens.* It is no easy thing to sustain true faith continuously at its full intensity. And in the intervals when faith weakened and declined, it was a great gain that a strong persuasion of the reality of the objects of faith should remain, even though the persuasion was produced in a more or less external way. This persuasion kept open the place

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which faith had formerly held and which, if revived, it would hold again. It kept the mind accessible to the influences by which faith could be revived. It made the Christian whose faith had grown weak attribute his lack of faith to himself as a fault, because he did not doubt that the objects of faith were there to be apprehended, although he could no longer feel their reality and truth for himself. Whereas, if he had had no independent persuasion of the entire reality of the objects of faith, the decline of his faith would have carried with it (as happens with the faith of so many now) an inevitable doubt or disbelief of their very existence.

Thus the traditional creed, with its combination of a spiritual content and a supernatural history, possessed a subtle adaptation to the needs of the ordinary religious man, and consequently a great effectiveness as a moral force. On the other hand, the whole virtue of the combination that gave it its efficiency depended upon this, that the supernatural history was accepted without question or dispute. And it is just in this respect that the situation has nowadays become wholly altered. The point of the whole matter is that the supernatural facts embodied in the creed do not need to be *disproved* to lose their peculiar value: this value is already lost if they can reasonably be *doubted*. Their peculiar function is gone from the moment that they appear to be doubtful. For they are then powerless to check the process of faith's decline, and even infect with their own uncertainty a faith, which, strong in itself, is only weakened by its union with facts that have ceased to be certain and yet must be believed with as much assurance as before.

That the situation is thus wholly altered is a consideration which the ordinary apologist completely fails to understand or allow for. He persists in laboring his worn-out proofs of the actual occurrence of a bodily resurrection of Christ without ever realizing that the very fact that such proofs are needed is fatal. What he needs to prove in this laborious way has obviously ceased to be a genuine conviction of faith or even a useful support for it, and has rather become a burden which faith has to carry to the danger of its own good health and vigor. For many minds to-day the mere miraculousness of

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the resurrection is enough to make it, *ipso facto*, for ever incapable of any strictly historical proof. Indeed the scientific proof of a miracle is a contradiction in terms. But even if we suppose that a historical proof is possible, and can be made out with a considerable degree of plausibility, still the fact remains that the proof is so open to dispute, that any conclusion attained by it is of little or no use as a guarantee of faith. The stories of the bodily appearances of Christ after his death that are given in the gospels are full of discrepancies of greater or less importance. Who, for instance, would be willing to give implicit credence to facts, about which it was impossible or difficult to determine, owing to a direct conflict of evidence, whether they happened here or sixty miles away? And even when we pass to the much more valuable evidence afforded by St. Paul's epistles, we are beset with difficulties of interpretation which render any conclusion as to the nature of Christ's appearances to his disciples extremely uncertain. In these circumstances it becomes sufficiently evident that, whatever value the physical miracle of the resurrection may have as a symbol for faith, it certainly ceases to have the value of an ascertained and indisputable fact of history. And a miracle which has not this latter value can hardly serve as a guarantee of faith, however apt it may be as a symbolical expression of faith's content and purport.

Such, then, is the situation which the religious thinker of our own day, whether theologian or preacher, has to face. And it is a situation which is grave enough. The difficulty of sustaining an assured and vigorous faith is certainly not less now than it was before. And it is a very considerable aggravation of the difficulty that the support, external indeed but powerful, which was given to faith by the unquestioning acceptance of the supernatural facts set forth in the creed, is no longer available for those who appreciate the present position of scientific thought. It may, however, be said, and said with truth, that for those who appreciate the scientific position the discarding of these external supports of faith is a relief, and so far an advantage to their faith itself. For unless their faith could become independent of such supports, it would share their de-

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struction. But then we must remember that religion, like morality, is a thing for the plain man, and that the number of religious people who are troubled by scientific questionings and doubts is comparatively small. To the great majority of religious people it brings no relief at all to be able to dispense with miracles, while the loss which they suffer by having to surrender their belief in the supernatural facts set forth in the creed is very sensible and may even be disastrous. For they have not learned to distinguish between the two diverse factors which are combined in the traditional religion, and the destruction of the one seems to them to involve the destruction of the other. Thus the religious needs, on the one hand of the plain man, on the other of the man who understands and accepts the scientific point of view, seem to be directly opposed. Nor is it possible to escape the practical dilemma by presenting religious truth in a double form, esoteric and exoteric. For, in the first place, the boundary line between the two classes of religious people concerned is becoming increasingly vague, and, in the second place, the preacher, just in proportion as he is intellectually competent,* is almost certain to share to a considerable extent the scientific attitude to history, and therefore cannot adopt any frankly exoteric mode of presenting miraculous facts without insincerity.†

Thus a great responsibility is thrown upon the thoughtful and competent preacher. He cannot appeal to the supernatural events set forth in the creed as if they were unquestionable facts of history. And yet he must not fail to present religion as a reality in human life, a reality which the plain man can appreciate. His problem is to find some means of appealing to the plain man's sense of reality, which shall not involve the acceptance of the orthodox tradition of supernaturalism. Now

*Of course for those who have no doubts there is also no practical problem.

†The predicament of the preacher who feels it necessary to state doubts and refute them is unfortunate indeed. For he thus awakens doubt and alarm in the minds of those who were previously secure, without producing any conviction in the minds of those who are more thorough-going and consistent than himself, while it is as likely as not that he will fail to satisfy the waverers to whom he specially appeals.

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it must, I think, be admitted, that such an appeal is possible only in the medium of history. Even though a moral or religious conception can be proved on abstract grounds, still it is thoroughly convincing only when we see it operative in life, *i. e.,* in history. In practical matters like morality and religion abstract reasoning is not by itself enough for most men: what moves us most is sympathy with others. The truth of a moral or religious conception comes home to us with a far more convincing force when we see how it moulded the life of a great spiritual hero or saint. For we see then all that its truth means for us. We see that it raises those who accept it to a higher plane of life.

Is there, then, a means of appealing to a reality of faith in history other than its embodiment in a fixed number of supernatural events? Yes. Surely faith has a historical reality of a far more intrinsic kind, a reality to which we can appeal without any of that hesitancy and looking backward that mars every thoughtful appeal to a questioned supernaturalism. There is the reality which faith had for those who lived by it, that reality of faith which is there for us to see in the lives of its prophets, its heroes, its martyrs, its saints. To this reality of faith the preacher can appeal without hesitation and without the fear of rousing contradiction. For he no longer stakes his case on a few doubtful and questioned supernatural events, but on the existence and import of a great spiritual force in the history of the race. Let historical research make what it will of every individual fact of history, it cannot deny or question this reality: it cannot blot out the actuality of Christian religion.

Let it be remembered that it is not a question of *proving the truth of religion.* The power of religion in history is not strictly a proof of the truth of religion any more than the occurrence of supernatural events is a proof of it. Both the one and the other are verifications rather than proofs, though there is all the difference in the world between them as verifications, the one intrinsic and established by history itself, the other external at the best and contradicting from the very outset the fundamental assumptions of historical science. But in any case

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the proof of the truth of religion lies, strictly speaking, neither in the one nor in the other, for both really presuppose its truth. The truth of religion can be found only in the content of religious conceptions themselves. And that appeal to history for which I am now contending is an appeal to it, not as proving the truth of a belief which has no evidence in itself, but as helping to strengthen our grasp of a truth which we too faintly hold. The appeal to history seeks to combat not so much doubts of the intellect as faintness of the imagination and the will.* Its foe is not any active disbelief which asserts religious conceptions to be unworthy, but a spiritual inability that would fain believe if it could, but can give no substance to the things of faith, things hoped for and unseen. And my contention is that this spiritual need must be met, not by vain efforts to revive a declining supernaturalism, but by the presentation of faith as a reality in human life, as a truth that has inspired and sustained the lives of men whom none can fail to revere.

That such a method of presenting and enforcing religious truth has its own difficulties must be admitted. It may be objected, for instance, that by far the most of those who have shown by their lives the power of faith have themselves been believers in that very supernaturalism which we would now set aside. Have we any right to take only half their testimony? Is it possible in this way to distinguish and divide beliefs, and to accept some, rejecting others? The answer is simple: if the beliefs are in reality heterogeneous it is impossible to do otherwise. And as for our right to do it, there is surely no ground for assuming that, because no such distinctions were present in the minds of those who held the beliefs, the distinctions do not exist at all. The fact that there was no occasion for making any distinctions then need not prevent us from making them now. And what I would urge is that the preacher can train his hearers to appreciate the distinction between the enduring substance of faith and its passing forms with far less risk of mental disturbance and alarm if he is dealing with a historical subject-matter, than if he dealt directly and immediately with the beliefs which are held by his hearers themselves. For he

*I do not mean by these distinctions to preclude an underlying identity.

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then remains within the calm region of exposition instead of plunging into the heat and irritation of polemics. And yet he attains his end no less securely; since the faculty of appreciating the distinctions in question, once it has been trained, will infallibly come to operate on the beliefs which his hearers themselves hold, and cause people to receive without dismay conclusions from which they would otherwise have shrunk with the greatest dread and repugnance. A couple of examples will suffice to show what I mean. The doctrine of a second coming of Christ can hardly be said to have any significance at all for the Christianity of our own day. It has quite ceased to be vital for faith, and its discussion is incapable of rousing any genuine feeling in the minds of sensible people. And therefore when the preacher has shown in a purely historical way the great importance which the doctrine had in New Testament times—a thing which he ought to be able to do without giving offence—he has every opportunity to press home the distinction between what is permanent and what is transitory in the faith of the early disciples: in fact he has the feeling of his hearers entirely in his favor. Again, a great deal of the irritation which has been caused by controversies about Inspiration would have been avoided altogether if the doctrine had never been openly attacked. For the mere diffusion of a better historical knowledge is enough to make the more impossible forms of the doctrine plainly appear impossible, and such knowledge can usually be presented in a form which renders any objection drawn from the doctrine of inspiration arbitrary and absurd. Whereas, when the doctrine is attacked directly and particular historical instances are given by way of proof, a violent prejudice is aroused from the outset, which the proofs in question are powerless to overcome, because when they are thus quoted apart from any context they make little or no impression, unless indeed the impression of pedantic fault-finding.

But there is another objection to the method here advocated which is not so easy to meet. When the preacher has thus time after time set before his hearers the blending of truth and error in all religious belief,—and it is in the very nature of the case that no absolute exceptions can be laid down—will there not

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grow up in their minds a doubt whether there is any certain and enduring truth at all? Now, of course, it may be replied, that it is the business of the preacher always to emphasize the truth in contrast with the error, and to show how the errors fall away and leave the truth unaffected, and how continuous change does not exclude progress and advance, and how it is the truth and not the error which has been the true cause of the power and the progress of religion. All this is very true, but I think it hardly meets the case. With the old supernaturalism there went also a conviction of the absoluteness of a certain system of religious doctrine. And when we abandon the supernaturalism we abandon this absoluteness too. Our religion, therefore, in a sense is still in the making, and the perception of this fact is liable to induce a feeling of doubt and a despair of ever finding truth, against which the old supernaturalism was able in its own way to secure its adherents. I know there is a great theological school in our own day which would keep the absoluteness without the supernaturalism, but I cannot myself see how such a position is capable of any completely logical defence. If, for instance, the fact, that the disciples of Jesus were firmly persuaded of his speedy return to earth to end the present system of things and inaugurate a new one, is a reason for discounting some part of their doctrines and even of their precepts, and if there is not a little ground for attributing a like persuasion to Jesus himself, it is hardly possible to deny that a similar discounting may have to be made in his own case. Indeed it is obvious enough that such a persuasion could hardly fail to affect pretty deeply the moral teaching of one in whom it was strongly present. And yet the recognition of such a possibility cannot but carry with it for those brought up in the traditional religion a feeling of hopelessness and miserable doubt. If a mind like that of Jesus, so wholly given up to divine truth as to appear its very image and expression, was not exempt from error, what hope have we left of any certainty? It cannot be denied, I think, that we are worse off in this respect than the old supernaturalism *if supernaturalism had been both true in itself and a true part of faith.* But then it is no use shutting our eyes to facts. And the facts in this case are,

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that both from the side of religion and from the side of history men are coming to see that the old supernaturalism is neither the one nor the other. And may we not urge, too, with a good deal of truth, that the religious despair which is apt to accompany the surrender of the absoluteness of the traditional system is largely an excessive reaction due to this previous absoluteness itself, and not wholly a result of any inherent necessity? After all, it is not so much absolute truth that is in question as a faith sufficient for our needs. And it will hardly be disputed that, whatever may have been the shortcomings of primitive Christianity in respect of absolute truth, it was sufficient for the needs of the early Christians. And if from their day to ours religion has never failed to respond in measure to man's need, may we not hope that to us too will be given a faith that is strong enough to live by? At any rate the more we can be convinced by a sympathetic understanding of the Church's faith and life in the past that its faith was not in vain, the more shall we be assured that there has remained to us of that faith some truth that has a permanent significance and value.

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ON THE RELATION OF SETTLEMENT WORK TO THE EVILS OF POVERTY.

We are often told that poverty is due to three chief causes: lack of employment, vice, and crime. Undoubtedly these are determining causes, but are they, or is any one of them fundamental? If there be a more fundamental cause of poverty, underlying all others, it is obviously important that it be widely recognized publicly. Efforts to diminish poverty by creating artificial and otherwise unneeded channels for labor, or by forcible restriction of intemperance, or by attempts at prohibition of certain forms of crime and various forms of vice, are undoubtedly at times efficacious, particularly as temporary expedients where more effective methods are either unknown or for

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the time being inapplicable. But such expedients usually serve chiefly as palliatives, alleviating various distressing outward symptoms, rather than as preventive agents restraining and subjecting the underlying, predisposing cause. I wish to emphasize the fact of the existence of an underlying, predisposing cause, responsible for the vast majority of the suffering that is ascribed to poverty, and responsible also, in the vast majority of cases, for poverty itself; and to point out the appropriateness and importance of Settlement work, as in its way, an effective remedial agency.

I have nothing new to disclose; but I claim that the importance of the underlying cause to which I refer, should be more widely recognized and considered. I refer to *undeveloped or defective personality,* as being, directly or indirectly, almost universally responsible for the poverty that confronts us, and suggest that no measures directed to the reduction of the world's poverty will ever prove successful, unless so devised as to reach and develop the personalities, the characters, of those in poverty or on its verge, and of those through whose greed, neglect, or ignorance, poverty has come to others.

Of course poverty is often due to misfortune, or to circumstances beyond human control. Undoubtedly much poverty is due to sickness and death; but sickness is most often due to impairment of tissue vitality, to defective *physical* personality, which results either from unhealthful occupations or environment, or from violation (conscious or unconscious) of the recognized laws of health. For instance, specialists tell us that tuberculosis causes, directly or indirectly, about one-seventh of all deaths in civilized communities, and that tuberculosis is highly communicable among persons whose power of resistance is impaired; but they also tell us that the large majority of the community are not, under ordinary circumstances, susceptible to its attacks. It is further demonstrable that this diminished power of resistance, or, as it is at other times called, this predisposition, or tendency, or *diathesis,* is most often a result of unhygienic living, or of unhygienic environment, or of inherited constitutional taint, the latter being a result of carelessness, ignorance, neglect or wrong-doing in a previous generation.

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The susceptibility or immunity of individuals to tuberculosis, is typical of the susceptibility and immunity of individuals to almost every form of disease. And this susceptibility is with ever-increasing regularity traceable to human error of some or other kind. Even unhealthy environment is generally the result of human error. It is man that makes and maintains the slums. And it is defective personality, manifested in the selfish greed of citizens, that too often interposes effective barriers in the way when plans for the cleansing, and aeration, and general physical improvement of poverty-stricken districts, are put forward. As an example, a year ago a project for the creation of a small park in the most densely populated tenement district of New York, was presented to the State Legislature, and met with a vigorous protest from the office of a large private estate which owned many of the tenements facing the selected block; the claim being advanced that the creation of the park would result in the raising of taxes on the adjoining lots, and that this would result in much loss to the land-owners, for the tenants in that district were exceedingly poor and could not pay higher rents to compensate the owners for the anticipated raise in taxes. And there were many other protests of a correspondingly selfish nature. The bill for the creation of the park was passed by the Assembly, but defeated in the Senate; and the park that would have brought increased health and strength and disease-resisting power to the people of that section, was lost.

Some people say that the chief cause of poverty is lack of employment. Now there are two conspicuous causes of lack of employment: First, limited effective demand for labor, and, second, limited ability of the laborer to perform skillfully and well the work required. (A third important cause has been shown to be the failure of the labor supply and the demand for labor to meet. But I shall confine myself for the present to consideration of the two causes first mentioned.) There is ever in the community a vast surplus of unskilled men and women for whose labor there is little call, and it is of course these who constitute the majority of the very poor. When the demand for labor is but moderate, the more intelli-

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gent or more highly skilled members of the community hold all, or nearly all, the available situations; there is no need apparent for the less skilled or for the less efficient. Now the unskilled are unskilled either because they lack the wisdom or the intelligent earnestness that would have enabled them to learn to do something well, or else because they lack some other attribute of efficiency (for *opportunity* to do *something* well that is useful and worth doing, is seldom lacking.) In each of these cases *defective or undeveloped personality* is at the root of the difficulty. As the personality of the individual gains in strength and character, the demand for his services increases. Well-developed, well-rounded, personality is rarely found among the ranks of the "unemployed." A man or woman or boy or girl possessing character and ability, rarely becomes a subject for charitable "relief," unless the victim of ill-health or physical disability, and among the poorer classes ill-health and physical disability are (in our cities at least) too often the effect of a congested, disease-fostering, tenement or industrial environment, created by man, and permitted to persist in its iniquitous condition for the sake of the exorbitantly large profits derivable from it by citizens of defective personality of a different type, who live in comfort and perhaps in physical luxury on the proceeds of the wretched habitations and workshops they maintain.

The poverty that is ascribed to drunkenness and to various forms of vice and crime, can similarly be traced to defective personality as its cause and fountain-head. For drunkenness and wrong-doing are but evidences of moral weakness; are but manifestations of defective personality. The precept of Solomon is suggestive of the direction in which the remedy should be sought, and applies with cogent force: "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." More intelligent and universal application of this advice is what civilization needs to-day, for the alleviation of most of its woes.

But now as to the limited effective demand for labor. It can be fairly questioned whether there has ever been in any large community, considered as a whole, an over-supply of efficient,

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potential producers. There is everywhere an over-supply of shiftless or inefficient people in whom defective or undeveloped personality is a conspicuous characteristic. For the services of people of this latter class there are comparatively few demands, other than of temporary nature. Such people are replaced as speedily as circumstances allow, by workers of more efficient personality. Under ordinary circumstances it is chiefly persons of inefficient or undeveloped personalities who swell so largely the ranks of the unemployed.

Awakening the personality, and its development along lines of intelligence and honesty and unselfishness and thrift, is the prime essential to the overcoming of the evils of poverty and to the lessening of its extent. Develop in children healthful, effective personalities, and they will grow up efficient, able people, able to face and bear more successfully the hardships of life, and better equipped to share its responsibilities.

There is a fundamental principle of Nature, that has been enunciated by various scholars, to the effect that organisms grow by their exercise of inherent creative faculties; and to the effect that the direction of that growth, and whether for better or worse, depends on the nature and trend of the underlying creative activities, and on the nature and character of outside influences in the environment in which the growth takes place. The fundamental aim of the Settlement is to help prepare children and young people for lives of self-respecting, self-sustaining, useful, social citizenship; and the success of its efforts in this direction is due chiefly to the operation of that *fundamental principle*. By the judicious exercise of childish and youthful tendencies to action, whether in play or in simple work, dispositions, habits and resultant characters can be modified, developed, and formed. Develop in young people more widely, a fondness for healthful, fair-minded exercise and recreation, and for simple, useful occupations; and an interest in acquiring knowledge; and an appreciation of honesty, unselfishness and right; and they have been prepared for habits and lives of industry and thrift, and for truer, more useful citizenship, and the foundations of society and of civilization have been rendered safer and more enduring.

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As undeveloped personality becomes more widely developed, poverty will diminish, and the evils of poverty will become less pronounced. In the process, the suffering in existent poverty will diminish; for by the process happy, resourceful dispositions are developed; and happy resourceful dispositions conduce powerfully to happy lives in spite of poverty and in spite of misfortunes. For, as a philosopher of former days has told us, men are not so much troubled by conditions, as by their thoughts concerning those conditions. The truest happiness is often found amid the simplest surroundings; while complaint with life and its many blessings is not uncommon in homes of the greatest affluence.

But entirely aside from the influence of a Settlement among the people of its neighborhood, must be considered its usefulness in a somewhat different sphere, as a "social clearing-house," as it has been called, where the more and the less educated in various classes of society can and increasingly do meet together on a friendly equal footing, for the interchange of knowledge and experience and thought; and where young men and young women, regardless of "social" distinctions of an extremely *un*social kind, can and increasingly do work together harmoniously and hand in hand for the study of social problems and the investigation of social needs. The encouragement of voluntary social service, in such and other channels, is an important Settlement function. Education which develops the individual for purely individual ends, fosters selfishness, sets each man in rivalry and often in enmity against his fellow, and promotes inevitably harmful social distress; leading at times to violence and every crime. The *social* nature of the child must be developed, and selfish tendencies replaced by the spirit of fairness and right, if that spirit of brotherhood is to be secured, which in the city as in the nation, is essential to the ultimate prosperity of the people, and to their social happiness and peace.

J. G. Phelps Stokes.

New York.

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THE EVOLUTION OF LUXURY.

MANY things in modern society have been subjected to a profound transformation; political institutions, moral ideas, arts and sciences, industries and commerce, are to-day very different from what they were in the past. A similar revolution has also taken place with regard to luxury, whose character has undergone a radical transformation in this century, which the historians of manners have barely noticed, but which is of great importance in the history of civilization. It has been said that nothing is more needful to man than that which is popularly called the superfluous, that without luxury the human species would in no wise be distinguished from the animal. The remark is correct, even if this need of the superfluous has been differently felt in different historic epochs.

Leaving aside minor differences of detail, the diverse forms of luxury may be divided into two large categories which represent two types of luxury in the development of civilization that mutually exclude each other; the class of luxury which we might call *barbaric-æsthetic* and the luxury that might be called *civilized-utilitarian*. The first form of luxury is named barbaric-æsthetic, although at first sight the two words seem contradictory, because while it is also found among civilized peoples, it is the first form of luxury that is encountered in human society and best shows its true nature among barbaric peoples, and because, on the other hand, this luxury presents an eminently artistic character. Its essence lies in the fact that this first form of luxury, the first known among men, rather aims at producing pleasure than at avoiding pain. Civilized-utilitarian luxury, on the other hand, which is the attribute of a people who have attained a high grade of development, loses a certain amount of its artistic character and rather strives to defend men against causes of pain than to procure them pleasures. According to some authorities, the cultus of beauty and joy in æsthetic directions is almost an essential characteristic of civilized peoples, among whom artistic tendencies are ever assuming greater proportions. This, however, is an erroneous view which springs from confounding the greater delicacy of

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our æsthetic enjoyments with the important parts they play in the totality of our existence. Civilized man enjoys æsthetic pleasures which are infinitely more refined than those of the barbarians, but, in the moral and intellectual life of the barbarian, æsthetic pleasures of a ruder nature have a far greater importance; because the barbarian, in order to enjoy that which is beautiful, according to his rude tastes, submits to discomforts and defies torments which civilized man no longer has the strength to endure, just on account of his more refined artistic sense. According to our views the possession of a house is by no means a luxury but an elementary necessity of existence, of which only the most miserable members of our society are obliged to deprive themselves. Instead, in certain extraordinarily uncouth forms of barbaric-æsthetic luxury, a house is considered as a superfluity, while the necessary things are saddles and weapons studded with precious stones, ornaments of gold, and fine clothing. Such is the case with the Tanaregg, a nomad population of the Sahara desert, which is composed of an aristocracy of warriors and brigands living almost entirely by war and rapine, and a plebs of serfs of the glebe, who cultivate the earth and pay to this aristocracy a part of the product of the fields. Now the serfs have houses, humble and poor though they be, but still a plastered abode, while the nobles live under the movable tents of nomads. Even when resting between one expedition and another in a village which is inhabited by their serfs, the nobles disdain to inhabit a house and prefer to live in tents, exposed to wind and weather. Their luxuries, those which distinguish them from their servants of the glebe, as the palace and the cottage distinguish among us the noble and the peasant, are their bright colored garments and cloth of gold, their weapons incrusted with jewels, set with more or less good taste, their saddles adorned with the most fantastic ornamentation; in short, the richness of their ornaments, not the commodity of their dwellings, in which the servant is superior. All nomad peoples who have made themselves into a large military state and have taken possession of wealthy and uncivilized lands, as the result of fortunate wars, have hastened to take over with these lands

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and with their subjected inhabitants the taste for artistic luxuries in the gross form in which they most attract a rude people; that is to say, they make a great display of showy objects, before appropriating those which to us seem the fundamental and elementary comforts of life and a fixed stable house. Indeed, they have often remained nomads for a long period of time after such conquests, restricting themselves to carrying into their camps all the garish luxuries of the sedentary tribes, which must have often been a serious inconvenience to their movements, covering their vestments with gems and the bare earth under their tents with rich carpets. This was done by the Mongols who conquered Persia in the fifteenth century. The capital of the Kingdom, Audjar, long remained the camping place of the Khan, which was continually changed from one site to another, in fact was a true movable capital or *ordou* as they called it in their speech, and which is the origin of our word horde. In the ordou the Emirs, the princesses, the grandees of the Empire, as well as the large following of merchants who hung round the court, lived in large tents made of horsehair and felt, separated from each other by hedges and rosebushes. Each spring and autumn the whole immense city was transplanted, the rich decorations, the provisions, the merchandise, were loaded on wagons, and the tents were burnt lest they should become the nesting-place of too many snakes. Then the whole procession moved, and changed its site. Yet from the description given of the ordou by Rasch-eldin it would seem that the city of tents harbored fabulous luxury, such as perchance is not found in the richest metropolis of the civilized world. Under the tent of the nomad shepherds the grandees of the Empire had carried their most costly carpets, their most sumptuous furniture; even all the utensils necessary to common life were made of pure gold. Here were found priceless perfumes, in fact all the magnificence, all the glitter and pageantry, that civilization had created for the sedentary peoples of the plains.

Yet it is easy to understand that nomad life was rarely very comfortable. Even when the luggage owned by the nomad was small and very light, it necessarily became most cumber-

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some when the chiefs of the horde kept under their tents the numerous and complicated appliances that pertain to the house of a great lord; and, in fact, the changing of this movable capital was carried on in the midst of an indescribable confusion and general discomfort. Nevertheless, this people who were very rich, who were dominant, who had before them the example of the vanquished, this people who were in such a hurry to follow the example of the vanquished in all that pertained to show, remained perfectly indifferent to the teachings of ease which they might have learned at the same time from the sight of the stable habitations.

If, among these barbarous peoples, luxury was regarded only as an ornament, as a means of display, and not as serving in some measure to diminish the harshness of an existence which did not know ease; luxury preserved the same character, though much attenuated, among many civilized peoples. Comfort assumed an increasing importance with the developments of civilization and the habits of daily life, but we must not suppose that in all civilizations it held the important place that it has in the nineteenth century. Above all, in the great military civilizations, luxury assumed in part that character which we found to be essential in the luxury of barbarians; it is reproduced in a modified and tempered form, combined with a certain research after comfort, but still the primary characteristic is so strongly marked that we can recognize even in this luxury an infinitely greater preoccupation with æsthetic adornment than with physical ease. In fact, in these societies luxury serves rather to procure pleasures of various kinds, sensual, ostentatious, vainglorious, or artistic, than to defend the human organism against inimical external nature. This is the capital difference between the private life of the rich in the Europe of our century and the rich of the older societies. The essence of modern luxury is display and artistic beauty, which evince themselves in the splendor and the costliness of the materials employed, in the elegant refinement of ornament. The houses of the Roman aristocracy were monuments of art; the ceilings were ebony and incrusted with ivory; the pavements were inlaid with the most precious marble; the walls were covered with

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the most priceless paintings; the rooms were adorned with splendid statues, either original or copied from the great works of art of the Greeks; the furniture was sumptuous; the vessels of gold and silver, even the kitchen utensils such as pots and pans in the great houses were often artistic objects finely chased by skillful hands. Yet these houses that harbored such splendors were ill-lighted, because in the Roman halls there was lacking that clever organization of windows and sky-lights to which we owe the ample illumination of our abodes. Still more primitive were their means of defence against the cold. The richest Roman could eat on a silver table from gold plates, but he could have nothing which even distantly resembled those convenient furnaces which every modest burgher of our day can permit to himself. It is difficult to imagine the great luxury that was to be found in the houses of the rich nobles of northern Gaul, of Romanized Britain, of Treves, of Cologne; but it is doubtful whether with the climate of those countries, and our customs, a modern man could have lived in them without suffering from inflammation of the lungs.

In the same manner the development of Renaissance civilization, which had its birth in the midst of a military society, aimed at refining the æsthetics of private life rather than at producing ease and conveniences. Who has not admired in the great museums of the world, or in some old noble palaces of Italy, those monumental marble chimney pieces, often more than two metres high and three metres wide, which became fashionable in the sixteenth century in the houses of great lords? Many of these chimney pieces are exquisite works of art, whose marble friezes have been ornamented with the most delicate bas-reliefs by artists of the rarest ability. But these chimney-pieces, so splendid to behold, were of the very smallest use toward warming the houses. The heat they could throw out never exceeded ten per cent. of that produced, and in order to obtain a degree of warmth which to-day would not satisfy the simplest demands of a sturdy laborer it was necessary to burn half a forest. All the intellectual strength of the day was directed toward embellishing the external appearances of mantels rather than toward rendering them more capable of accom-

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plishing their useful function. The same was the case with many other branches of luxury and departments of artistic adornment. Thus carvers and inlayers thought far more of embellishing chairs and beds with beautiful ornamentation than of rendering them comfortable to those who should sleep or sit therein. The chairs, arm-chairs and beds used by rich families in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are often, according to modern ideas of comfort, perhaps even less adapted to produce ease than the heating appliances. Although they are miracles of art and beauty to look upon, they are, or seem to us, for daily use only instruments of torture.

Whoever visits some great historic, princely palace of Florence, such as the Pitti for example, cannot fail to be impressed by two facts; the small amount of light that penetrates all the rooms, and the irrational disposition of the chambers, rendering them of scant convenience to those who were obliged to inhabit them. Alessandro Manzoni, speaking of Federico Borromeo, makes one of those acute observations that are often equivalent to an entire historical treatise. He notes that Borromeo while dressed quite simply took great care to be clean. "A rare thing," he says, "in that age of dirt and display." This remark concerning the Spanish-Lombard aristocracy of the seventeenth century, which reflected the customs of the Spanish aristocracy, may be applied to all civilized societies of the past as compared with those of the present. Display was there united, even in the richest classes, with great dirtiness,—personal dirtiness and dirt in the houses, the streets, and the cities. To wash seems to us a most simple habit, yet it required time before men were brought to regard it in this light. In the society of the past there was little love between men and water, even in the highest and most refined classes. It may be objected that in the days of the Roman Empire baths were of general use, but they served rather to gratify a sensuous pleasure than for the purpose of personal cleanliness. The baths were constructed for diversion; it gave a delightful physical sensation to be immersed in tepid or cold water, and to vary by subtle artifices the temperature of the body. So true is it that the need for personal cleanliness had little to do with the pas-

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sion for baths, that in the Thermæ many people bathed together in receptacles that were by no means large and in which the water necessarily quickly became dirty. Baths were simply a sensuous diversion, like the dance, like wine. In that epoch when all sensuous pleasures easily became morbid passions, there was also a Sybaritism of the bath which had its votaries who abused its use and would take as many as five, six and seven immersions a day. This is also confirmed by the modest Cinderella-like place that was assigned in the world of the toilette, even in the most civilized societies of the day, to an object which is now regarded as of supreme importance, namely soap. In all the ancient world the place now occupied by soap, was held by perfumes and substances destined to procure a sensual pleasure, and while the commerce in perfumes led to an enormous traffic, hardly a trace is found of any commerce in soaps. It seems that the Romans did not know of it until the days of Pliny, deriving it, it would seem, from the barbarian peoples of the North. Even the Arabs, who quickly formed a rich aristocracy after they had become dominant in Europe, men fond of all luxuries and display, to whom merchants bore all the refinement and conveniences of the toilette from all the world, from India as well as from distant Scandanavia, were unaware of the product called soap, until some two or more centuries after the foundation of their empire, an evident sign that less need was felt for it than for perfumes.

It is therefore beyond question that if we confront the luxury of past times with that of our own days, ours presents a much more common and material aspect. By a curious contradiction luxury follows an evolution exactly contrary to that of other great social movements, such as religion, morality, art. While these become spiritualized as they progress, and seek to satisfy more and more the nobler sides of man, his thoughts and his conscience rather than his senses, endeavoring to procure for him spiritual ecstacy rather than voluptuous sensations; luxury, on the other hand, becomes materialized, and grows more and more the humble servant of the body, bending itself to pandering to man's lowest needs and almost relinquishing any idea of satisfying the pleasures of his soul. To shelter the body

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from cold or heat, to save it as far as may be from muscular fatigue, to eliminate all sensations disagreeable to our refined senses, to produce comfort when we walk, sit, read, eat or sleep, such is the supreme ideal of modern luxury. Only an eccentric person would choose nowadays to sleep in an old comfortless bed because it had been inlaid by a great artist.

This increasing materialization of modern luxury is one of the favorite arguments by which the too ardent adherents of art maintain that our age is the most prosaic and commonplace that can be found in history, and that if the world has made material progress as a counterpoise, a great vulgarity of tastes, of habits, of sentiments has become universal, rendering private life almost devoid of any æsthetic character. Such an interpretation is however too unilateral and takes a too limited conception of life; for this transformation of luxury, even if it may be considered artistically as a retrogression, socially it is one of the many forms which illustrate the great moral progress of our age. Indeed this transformation of luxury does not merely indicate a change of tastes, it indicates even more forcibly, a moral evolution, a great augmentation in social solidarity. In fact bodily comforts and health, even if in themselves they seem entirely selfish, comprise instead a rudiment of social solidarity, because health and strength are essential conditions requisite in order that a man may contribute his quota of work toward society. Whoever fritters away his own health not only wastes himself but robs society, inasmuch as he diminishes his own capacity to fulfill his duties toward his fellow-men. An aristocracy, like nearly all those which dominated in the past, which in the manners and actions of private life only considered display, pomp, artistic beauty, without giving thought to the right of the human organism to be protected against the numerous exterior causes of pain, shows the fundamental principles of its ethics to be very egotistical and its search after pleasure to be stronger than every other consideration.

In the same manner the evolution of luxury, whereby cleanliness and decency have largely usurped the place of importance that was formerly given to display, is only one of the

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many aspects in which the great moral evolution is made manifest, and an infinitely larger sense of human solidarity has developed. Cleanliness is for the body what dignity is for the soul, and display is for the body what vanity is for the mind. Display is an egotistical waste of an enormous quantity of labor directed to satisfy the vanity of a few; cleanliness, on the other hand, is a social duty. The man who merely endeavors to be dressed sumptuously is an egotist whose only aim is to make an impression; the man who attends to his own cleanliness is a man who has attained to a finer sense of his physical dignity, and who begins to carry into effect the principle of solidarity, the principle that a man must contribute by the care of his own body to the decency and hygiene of all society.

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DISCUSSIONS.

MR. HAYWARD'S EVALUATION OF PROFESSOR SIDGWICK'S ETHICS.

In the January number of the International Journal of Ethics, Mr. F. H. Hayward devotes an article to setting forth the "true significance" of Professor Sidgwick's "Methods of Ethics," and I should like to be allowed to make a few observations on his view.

Mr. Hayward begins by describing Professor Sidgwick as in aim and sympathies an empiricist, "unconscious perhaps that the irruptive forces [of Idealism] had broken into the citadel of his own thought"; "unconsciously influenced" [by Kant, and his school.]

But it is I think undoubted that there has never been a teacher who has exhibited more clearly, thoroughly, and unsparingly the utter incoherence of empiricism. It would be a sheer impossibility, one would imagine, for any intelligent pupil of Professor Sidgwick's, or student of his writings, to be an empiricist in ethics. Again, substantial acceptance of Kant's Categorical Imperative as far as it goes, is explicitly set forth, in the "Methods of Ethics" (*cf.* p. 386, etc., 5th Ed.), and "the leading *motif* of

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Idealism" (according to Mr. Hayward) *i. e.*, "emphasis on rationality of conduct," is the declared starting point of the "Methods." See, *e. g.*, the Preface to the first edition, where the author speaks of the "assumption (which seems to be made implicitly in all ethical reasoning) that there is something under any given circumstances which it is right or reasonable to do, etc." And on page 1 (of the fifth edition) we are told that by a "Method of Ethics" is meant "any rational procedure by which we determine what it is right" for human beings to do, while the explicit identification of *Right* with *Reasonable* conduct runs through the book.

And how far from "unconscious" was the admission of "Kantian Elements," is shown by the account which Professor Sidgwick gives of the development in his thought of the view which he had reached and which is set forth in his book. We learn from it (*cf.* Preface to sixth edition) that a careful re-consideration of Kant's ethical theory and acceptance of his fundamental principle as self-evident and important, was an essential stage in the author's thought. "He has admitted," says Mr. Hayward, "that the reasonableness of an act supplies a motive to its performance"; and, in another place, "Here the emphasis on Reason is even startling." But why *admitted,* why *startling,* when the announced purpose of the whole book is to show how by a rational procedure, rational action may be ascertained? Still the recognition that the ethical end, method and criterion must be reasonable, however fully admitted or strongly emphasized, can no more furnish a code of maxims, a rule of procedure, or even a criterion of right action, than the full admission that some statements are true, and an emphatic announcement that we seek the truth, can furnish a standard of truth, or concrete laws of science. We are still left asking, in the one case, *What* is it that it is reasonable to do? in the other, *Which* are the statements that are to be believed?

It is the answer to *this* question which shows whether an Ethical thinker is an Intuitionist or Perfectionist, or Egoist, or Utilitarian, as the case may be.

To identify rightness with reasonableness (p. 179) is no bar to Hedonism, Egoistic or Universalistic. The position of any Ethical Hedonist who is a reasoning being is, that being both rational and sensitive, he recognizes the presence of happiness and absence of misery as an end which, because he is sensitive, it is right and reasonable for him to seek. Would a sensitive being act rationally in disregarding pain and pleasure? A Dogmatic Intuitionist

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may similarly say with Butler, that what is right and reasonable, is to do justice, speak truth, and promote the happiness of others. A "Perfectionist" may say that the general perfection of human society is the right and reasonable end of individual action. Of course the question, What does Perfection consist in? still remains to be answered.

In § VII., on *Utilitarianism,* (it is to be remembered that Professor Sidgwick is a declared Utilitarian or Universalistic Hedonist) Mr. Hayward makes no reference to the distinctive principle of Universalistic (as opposed to Egoistic) Hedonism, the principle, that is, of Rational Benevolence—that "General Happiness is the right end of action." The principle here referred to by Mr. Hayward, that "Whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances," has no special applicability to either system of Hedonism, and is merely a principle of impartiality, an expression of the universality of application which is a characteristic of any and every Law.

In § VIII. (*The Summum Bonum*), Mr. Hayward says that to the question, What is Rightness? there can only be two answers—the Hedonistic (that it is Happiness)—and the Idealistic—that it is Rightness generalized—that is, that it is *Perfect Life,* Rightness everywhere.

This is indeed to make Ought or Right an *ultimate* notion in the sense of being both *first* and *last;* and to offer, as the end of action, the unanalyzable notion which is also our starting point. It gives us no guidance, no criterion. We are still at the acknowledged point of departure of all ethical inquiry. What we want is the content, as well as the form, of Right Conduct. By what characteristics are we to recognize or test *Right,* or its superlative, *Perfection?* However willing and anxious we may be to do what we ought, of what use is that, unless we have some means of recognizing what it is that we ought to do?

If we cannot point to any characteristic, cannot give a reason for the faith that is in us, but proceed merely instinctively and take as our motto *Solvitur ambulando,* then of course we may be good men and true, but we can lay no claim to ethical science or practical philosophy.

I should quite agree with Mr. Hayward that to the question, What is Rightness? there can be but two sorts of answer—(1) the Hedonistic (that it is what contributes to Happiness)—

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an answer which is significant and indicates a content; (2) the Idealistic (in Mr. Hayward's sense of Idealistic) that it is Rightness—which is frankly tautological, of no more use than the Law of Identity expressed as *A is A*, regarded as a test of truth.

Mr. Hayward thinks that the idea of *Desert* is a fatal stumbling-block in the way of the Hedonist because (as Kant says), "A good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being worthy of happiness," and "the sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never *give pleasure* to an impartial rational spectator."

How strange—the bar to Hedonism is found in the imperative demand that righteousness should be rewarded by *pleasure,* and this because otherwise the rational impartial spectator will not be *pleased.* Is not this the very quintessence of Hedonism, taking pleasure both as ultimate good and as moral criterion? Why should Desert be rewarded by mere happiness if happiness is the "sorriest of social ends"? If Perfection is so much better why is it not its own reward? A reward is that which is valuable for its own sake. And why should the demand be enforced by reference to the *pleasure* of the spectator? Again (to mention a small point) how is Desert to be described, measured or recognized, if all we know in Ethics is that Right is Right? And why, again, should we hope as Mr. Hayward does, p. 185, that Happiness is to be "Man's ultimate lot"? And further, how does even the "Idealist" moralist prove that Desert *will* be rewarded?

I understand Mr. Hayward to say on p. 185 that in Kant's view, it is not a man's duty to seek happiness for himself *or for others*—but Kant certainly does argue that it is our duty to take the *Happiness* of others as our end.

Cf. Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason, etc.," Abbott's translation, 1879. "It is impossible to *will* that such a principle [that of not concerning oneself with the Happiness of others] should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, etc." p. 58.

"To be beneficent when we can is a duty," p. 18.

"The natural end which all men have is their own happiness . . . . the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be *my* ends also," p. 69. And in the Canon of Pure Reason (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's translation, 1876), Kant clearly makes Happiness the end of all

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action—"all hoping has happiness for its object," p. 488. (*cf.* "To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly").

The answer to the great question, *What ought I to do?* is, "Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness," p. 490. "Happiness therefore in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness) constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason," p. 493. And in the Scheme of Duties in the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics he gives as "my Duty," the promotion of the End of others (their happiness).

If there is a great gulf fixed between Hedonism and any so-called *Idealistic*—that is as here explained *Rational*—System of Ethics, why does Mr. Hayward, on p. 183, speak of Hedonism as a *reasonable* system? There seems on his view to be nothing whatever to be said about the "Idealistic" view except that it is reasonable—and nothing to be said about *reasonable* except that it *is* reasonable—if so, and Hedonism is "reasonable" too, what is the precise point of distinction? It is not that Philosophy has presented the world with a self-consistent system of Idealistic Ethics, while it has "failed to present the world with a self-consistent ethical system based on Pleasure," (p. 186)—for where have we such an "Idealist" system?

Professor Sidgwick shows how Intuitionism develops to the Philosophical form (as in Clarke, Butler, Kant), one of the fundamental axioms of which is that Principle of Rational Benevolence that is seen to furnish an Intuitional basis of Utilitarianism; and this articulation of Intuitionism with Utilitarianism—of Rationalism with Hedonism—seems to me to be one of the most brilliant, profound, and undeniably constructive, achievements of modern ethical thought.

With reference to Mr. Hayward's complaint that Professor Sidgwick, in his "Methods of Ethics" "never faces the weighty metaphysical arguments of Green and Green's successors," that he devotes so few remarks to Green, and does not treat his view with sufficient seriousness and respect, it may be said (1) that while the "Methods of Ethics" was published in 1874, Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" did not appear until 1883 (the third edition of the "Methods" came out in 1884); (2) that Professor Sidgwick expressly confines himself in the "Methods" to the consideration of Ethics *as a Science*, regarding detailed examination

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of questions that are distinctly metaphysical as beyond the scope of his work, as conceived by himself; (3) he does in the later editions of the "Methods," devote some three or four pages at least to a discussion of Green's view *eo nomine* in as far as it bears upon his own treatment. And (4) since according to Green "the one unconditional good is the good will, and 'when we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear' our answer must 'follow the lines of the Greek classification of virtues,' " it appears that it is not only in the passages which refer to Green specifically that the views held by him come under consideration.*

Further it may be observed that *amount* of criticism is not so important as its quality; and finally every sentence in the "Methods of Ethics" in which Green is referred to seems to me to be marked by the most perfect "seriousness and respect."

"As a constructive ethical work," says Mr. Hayward, "the 'Methods of Ethics' is confessedly a failure." But by whose confession? Certainly not the author's, (*pace* the epigrammatic Postscript) and I think it would not be rash to add, Certainly not that of any one who has taken the trouble to master the relation between Intuitionism and Benthamite Utilitarianism which is worked out with such insight, patience and completeness in Books III. and IV., and in view of which the maintenance of any theoretical opposition between Common Sense Morality and the principle of Rational Benevolence must, I imagine, be regarded as a mere matter of unintelligence.

With respect to the author's own conception of the relation between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism—in other words the reconciliation of Duty and Self-Interest (which for any practice or any theory is no mere problem of words)—he states his view to be, that while the reasonableness of Self-Love and of Rational Benevolence appear self-evident† he has no similar "intuition, claiming to be clear and certain that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished." But even if the best ground that can be given for believing in such a reconciliation of Duty and Interest should be that without it we are

*Green's metaphysical view is fully and carefully discussed by Professor Sidgwick in two articles in *Mind*.

†Mr. Hayward allows (p. 176) that these maxims "have made out a good claim to validity."

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left with a fundamental contradiction in Ethics, it may, he holds, still be maintained that ethical science is no worse off than physical science, in which "propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs."

From which it appears that Professor Sidgwick considered the logical foundation of Rational Hedonism to be at least as trustworthy as that of Physical Science.

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A REPLY.

Miss Jones, whose long acquaintance with the late Professor Sidgwick has given her unusual facilities for arriving at a correct view of the "Methods of Ethics," has criticised my interpretation with considerable vigor. Readers of Sidgwick's work seem fated to differ as to its import, a result for which that aspect of the writer's philosophy which I have ventured to call "eclecticism" is, no doubt, responsible.

The impression which I received on first reading the "Methods of Ethics" was that the writer's sympathies (perhaps the result of early training) were probably empiricist, but that he had become acutely conscious that Empiricism had to be supplemented by constructive principles drawn from other sources. That impression may have been entirely mistaken, and based upon the common association between Hedonism and Empiricism. It is dangerous, I admit, to infer a writer's general Philosophical attitude from his ethical work. Still, Sidgwick's scrupulous avoidance of metaphysics, the closeness of his touch to common consciousness, the admission of different *prima facie* rational methods of ethics, and above all the almost point-for-point agreement and the emphatic approval of an undoubted empiricist like Dr. Bain (*Mind,* 1876, p. 179) suggests certain affinity with Empiricism. If English philosophy is empiricist in tone; if the words of Falkenberg quoted by me correctly describe that philosophy; and if those words are to some extent applicable to Sidgwick also, then my description of him as possessed of empiricist sympathies was not so absurd as Miss Jones appears to think. On the other hand we find

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in *Mind*, January, 1900, an explicit disavowal of empiricism, and in the "Methods of Ethics" much, as I pointed out, that is anti-empiricist. Obviously I could not refer to the preface of a non-existent 6th edition. But if, as Miss Jones asserts, Sidgwick's acceptance of the fundamental principle of Kant was "an essential stage in the author's thought," what, I ask, was the preceding stage? Was it represented by the philosophy of Mill? If so (and this is confirmed by some remarks in *Mind*, 1877, p. 411), then surely Sidgwick started in empiricist company, and it is more than probable that traces of the earlier stage remain in his work.*

The point upon which I would mainly insist is not that Sidgwick should be classified as this or that, but that it is extremely difficult to classify him at all.

All speculations about "unconscious influences" are, I admit, dangerous and may, with advantage, be avoided. Still, I think that Sidgwick's identification of "Right" with "Reasonable" and "Objective"; his view of Rightness as an "ultimate and unanalysable notion" (however connected subsequently with Hedonism); and his admission that Reason is, in a sense, a motive to the will, are due to the more or less "unconscious" influence of Kant. Miss Jones appears to think that these are the common-places of every ethical system, and that real divergences only arise when we make the next step in advance. I should rather regard this Rationalistic terminology as somewhat foreign to Hedonism. I do not think that Miss Jones will find, in Sidgwick's Hedonistic predecessors, any such emphasis on the Reason (however interpreted). It was not my intention to discuss what exactly was Sidgwick's view of the Reason, an enormously difficult question (*vide* criticisms of Bradley and others). I did little more than point out the presence, in a Hedonistic work, of an imposing Rationalistic terminology. This I still regard as somewhat novel and significant, though my critic, I am sorry to say, is not of my opinion.

Miss Jones objects, as Sidgwick has done, to the interpretation of Rightness or Duty in terms of itself. This gives us, she says, "no guidance, no criterion"; it is not enlightening to tell us that

*If Miss Jones will refer to the third of Sidgwick's lectures introductory to Philosophy she will find that to define "good" as "desirable feeling" or "consciousness" is declared by Sidgwick to be an "empirical procedure." If then, at the very core and crisis of Sidgwick's book there is an enthronement of this very definition, why Miss Jones's attack upon an insignificant individual who thought he had detected in the "Methods of Ethics" a *Soupcon* of Empiricism?

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"X is X." It is interesting to note, however (though I lay no stress upon it), that to tell a man to "be a man," or a woman "to be womanly" does apparently convey some meaning. Let us, however, admit, for a moment, the validity of the objection raised by Miss Jones. I contend that Hedonists are every whit as open to this objection as their opponents. The *Summum Bonum* is "desirable consciousness"; yes, but the word "desirable" however carefully we define it, always *suggests* the very notion of Rightness, Oughtness, Worth or Dignity, which we are trying to specify more distinctly. ["Consciousness," too, is a treacherous word, and implies a concrete state involving far more than feeling; hence "desirable consciousness" might stand for the *Summum Bonum* of *every* school, not excluding the stoic. But this by the way.] Or let us define the Summum Bonum as Happiness; this word commonly implies not mere pleasure but feeling accompanying the normal activity of a "healthy mind in a healthy body"; in other words the notion of *rightness* is not absent even here (Methods, p. 93). No doubt Sidgwick is far clearer in his treatment of this part of his subject than any other writer, and he *means* to say that pleasure-tone of conscious states is the only ultimately valuable element; but I doubt whether he or anyone else has ever been able to disabuse the mind of the belief that somehow the pleasurable state must be *worthy*, or *right* before it can be judged as morally good. Mill's doctrine of the "quality of pleasures" was true to moral facts, though false to a consistent Hedonism; and the same may be said of his condemnation of the "contented pig," a condemnation repeated by Sidgwick ("Utilitarianism," p. 14. "Methods," p. 112).

In point of fact, Right, Truth and Beauty, must ever be in a sense, their own criteria. These three concepts appear to represent, in different forms, the Ultima Thule of the universe. We cannot go below the bed-rock. We may study its nature as much as we like, and see how it passes upward into the common soil of vulgar judgments and notions. That is all. What is Truth? If Miss Jones can answer this question in a way which does not somewhere involve the very notion she is defining and at the same time does not evaporate it away, then perhaps some similar success may attend the efforts of philosophers to define Beauty and Right. "Conformity with Reality," "Harmony," "Conducivity to Desirable Consciousness" are mere *circuli in definiendo*, to which personally I have no objection, but to which Miss Jones, at any

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rate, ought to object. "The common judgment that a thing is 'good' does not, on reflection, appear to be equivalent to a judgment that it is directly or indirectly pleasant" ("Methods," Book I., chap. 9. Summary of contents). Exactly. We have to depart from common morality in order to establish Hedonism. This is not an insuperable objection, perhaps, provided our arguments are satisfactory. But on my view the concrete notion of Perfection rather than the abstract notion of Pleasure lies at the basis alike of common and of philosophical moral judgments. "Perfection," no doubt, comes close to the notion of Happiness unless we unnaturally limit the latter and mean by it "mere-Pleasure" or "mere-Happiness." The moral judgment to be "objective" at all cannot deal with an altogether "subjective" principle. It is in the objective conditions of the Pleasure that the moral judgment attaches itself. Here come in the "Rightness," the "Dignity," the "Elevation," and so forth. There is no need to deny that Pleasure is Pleasant. Pleasure is very nice indeed. We should like to have plenty of it. But can it give us an *ought?* The whole history of the latter notion is connected, I believe, with pain rather than with pleasure.

I cannot deal with all the points raised by Miss Jones, but must make a selection.

She asks, "Why should Desert be rewarded by mere happiness, if happiness is the 'sorriest of social ends'?" I answer, the word "mere" should precede the second "happiness." Desert always *is* rewarded in one sense: it always involves a refined pleasure of its own (Happiness) which however cannot be separated even in thought from the total Deserving (*i. e.* Right) state. In this sense we are all Hedonists. Whether Desert, Perfection, Moral Rectitude, etc., will ever be *so* rewarded as to be a passport to maximum Pleasure, is doubtful. We hope so, but we cannot be sure. Miss Jones appears to regard this "hope" as from my point of view unreasonable. "If Perfection is so much better (than Pleasure) why is it not its own reward? A reward is that which is valuable for its own sake." Again I say, Pleasure is undoubtedly pleasant, and we should *like* to see merit rewarded with maximum gratification, and we *dislike* to see demerit rejoicing. In the same way we are sad when lightning or tempest extinguishes a worthy life. But what has all this to do with morality? Nature may be immoral or unmoral. Man has a standard of perfection which is not connected in any clear way with increase of gratification just as he has

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a standard of Truth which is its own justification. Ultimately there may be no divorce between moralty and pleasure, but we cannot be sure of this.

Again, when I spoke of Hedonism as a "rational" system of ethics, my meaning was obviously a "reasoned-out" system. Miss Jones also understands me to say that Kant denied Universal Happiness to be an end; I cannot see how my words could be so interpreted.

Miss Jones complains and I admit, with some justice, that I did not make a sufficiently explicit reference to the principle of Rational Benevolence which lies at the basis of Sidgwick's "Utilitarianism." It must not be forgotten, however, that this principle is a *derived* one ("Methods," 5th Edition, p. 382) and is closely connected with the principle of impartiality or equity. Exclude "respect of persons" and Rational Benevolence follows. I certainly referred to this principle of equity, and therefore, by implication to what is deduced from it. Still I admit that, in my desire to come to the "Dualism" which I regarded as so significant in Sidgwick's work, I did but scant justice to one of the members of that Dualism.

On the matter to which we have now come I must beg leave to differ uncompromisingly from my critic. Miss Jones regards Sidgwick as a "declared Utilitarian or Universalistic Hedonist," and, no doubt, she there voices the popular judgment. I dissent altogether from this view. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism is a thin veneer upon an underlying and invincible Egoism. How comes it, otherwise, that genuine Utilitarians like Gizycki [INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1890, p. 120] criticised him for leaving Egoism standing? Where would be the significance of Sidgwick's own explicit reply to a previous criticism of that moralist? "'I' am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals. . . . . To me this seems self-evident, although it *prima facia* contradicts the equally self-evident proposition that my own good is no more to be regarded than the good of another." (*Mind,* 1889, p. 483-5). Where, too, would be the significance for this "Dualism of the Practical Reason" in the introduction of a *deus ex machina?* How could the closing paragraphs of the "Methods" be dealing with a matter of "life and death" for the Practical Reason, if all were such plain-sailing as Miss Jones seems to think? Why reply to

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an able Egoistic critic that Egoism is not "confuted" but only "contradicted" (*Mind*, 1877, p. 411)? Why write the Preface to the Second Edition?

I contend that in Sidgwick's work Rational Egoism *alone* comes out of the critical mill as an ultimately rational principle, though as a *method* it has been shown to have many drawbacks. Utilitarianism appears as rational only on the assumption that it is Egoism in disguise.

The last sentence in Miss Jones's criticism appears to me to miss entirely the gravity of Sidgwick's closing words. From her close acquaintance with his work and teaching (an acquaintance surpassing ten-fold that which I possess) she may have sources of information which sanction her optimistic interpretation. Unfortunately, from my reading of the "Methods" I cannot draw the conclusion she draws. The problem to be solved by the author was one whose magnitude it would be impossible to overestimate. Is a "strong disposition"—we might almost say, Is an element of *faith*—a valid basis for a system of thought? If so, then Ethics, Theology and their sister studies are secure. Or is logical self-evidence absolutely necessary? If so, then the hopes of humanity, of Hedonistic humanity at least, wither and die. Sidgwick as I read him, gives no answer. The curtain falls on an unfinished drama; the voice of the speaker who so long has charmed us, is heard no more; a fierce doubt runs through our minds.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL JUSTICE, A Critical Essay. By Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Johns Hopkins University. New York and London: Macmillan. 1900.

Dr. Willoughby's object in his recent work is to ascertain the general principles of right that should underlie our social institutions, and to apply these principles to the more important facts of economic and political life. Accordingly, he begins by analyzing the idea of justice in the abstract. Having found and enunciated a general formula of right, he outlines the extent to which the principle of equality is valid. After that he criticises the chief theories concerning the distribution of property and economic rewards, and then states and defends his own theory. All this is done in the first part: in the second part, he examines the right of the state to exist, to restrain liberty, to regulate economic activity, and to inflict punishment.

In his search for a formula of abstract justice, the author takes as a first principle the Kantian dictum that the individual reason is the legislative source of obligation and right. Each man's practical reason bids him realize his highest ethical self. To obey this categorical imperative he needs and possesses rights, that is, certain moral claims to freedom of action. In so far as his rights are essential to the development of his personality they may be called *natural*, but they are not natural in the sense that they actually exist when he is born. Since all rights originate in the ethical needs of the individual, they must be determined by individual conditions. To express it in another way, all rights are relative, not only to persons but to circumstances. There are, consequently, no absolute rights, that is, no rights that persist in all possible conditions. Hence the only general formula of right that can be enunciated is that each individual should have, so far as possible, the opportunity to realize his highest ethical self (pages 21, 24, 25).

This formula of justice is untenable because, in the first place, its ethical basis is unsound. The categorical imperative lacks the essentials of an authoritative command. The practical reason does, indeed, judge between right and wrong, and *declare* obligation, but it is not the creative source of obligation. It is not

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"originally legislative," but only the messenger and interpreter of the commands of the Supreme Lawgiver. When a private soldier receives instructions from an orderly he recognizes them as binding, but he knows that their obligatory character lies not in the orderly who brought them, but in the superior officer who issued them. When my practical reason tells me that I ought to do something that happens to be disagreeable, I naturally ask, "whence arises the obligation implied in this ought?" If the practical reason can furnish no other authority for its command than its own "sic volo, sic jubeo," I shall appeal from this usurper, called the "autonomous reason," to my saner reason, which assures me that the wisest rule of conduct is to seek the good in whatever form it approves itself to me. If I am an end unto myself I see no good reason for recognizing those claims of my fellow-men called rights. They are, in fact, incapable of rational justification.

In the second place, even if we concede the validity of the categorical imperative, its two chief postulates can never constitute an adequate standard of justice. The first of them, "be a person and respect others as persons," is a noble sentiment, but it is not of the highest practical value. The section hands of a railway might interpret it as giving them a right to realize their personality by appropriating the company's goods. And this could be a correct interpretation, for the employers might still have greater opportunities of self-development than their ambitious employés. The latter would be using their employers as means, to be sure, but this would be no violation of personality: we are allowed to treat others as means, if at the same time we treat them as ends (page 332). On the other hand, since the claims of personality vary according to disposition and capacity, a man having immense power might deem his personality of such overmastering importance as to justify the exploitation of multitudes of his fellow-men. All that he would be bound to do would be to have some little regard to them as persons, as ends unto themselves. Nor does the second postulate of the categorical imperative, "act externally so that the free exercise of thy will may be compatible with the freedom of others according to a universal law," give more definite guidance. Men could accept this rule of equal freedom as an authorization for mutual crime. Husbands and wives could agree to violate their conjugal oaths; money lenders and captains of industry could crush the needy borrower and the moneyless worker

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under the cover of free contracts. All of these actions would be ethically good, since each man would act consistently with the equal freedom of others. Again, this universal law which is to be the maxim of individual conduct is not a universal law in any true sense. Guided by it, the majority of men would in all probability claim rights that would be mutually irreconcilable. Yet the amount of freedom claimed by each, provided only that he deemed his standard universally capable of enforcement, would be the true measure of his rights. If to escape this difficulty, recourse be had to the principle of reciprocal rights and the social weal, and if it be urged that the individual estimate must be modified by the social need, then the standard is no longer subjective. The judgment of the individual reason is set aside, and rights are determined by the requirements of the objective order.

In the third place, Dr. Willoughby's principle of justice leads in his own hands to conclusions that are repugnant to the moral sense, and fatal to the sacredness of personality. In case of conflict, he says, the right of the individual must yield to the general good. Thus, an individual has no strict right to subsistence if the welfare of humanity will not be advanced by his continued existence (pages 207, 208). For the sake of the social good an individual though innocent might be put to death (page 333). And this would not be a violation of his right to be treated as a person: as an individual, indeed, he would be used as a means, but as a *socius* he would be treated as an end; for his social good demands that someone should suffer, and when someone does suffer his "rational and universal self" is served (pages 332, 375, 246). Social life would be impossible without the constant subordination of the claims of individuals to the like claims of a greater number of individuals (page 333). These deductions seem to me to be the *reductio ad absurdum* of the author's principle of justice. That an innocent man may be deprived of life for the social good, is a proposition little short of inhuman, and its inhumanity is not much softened by the assurance that socially the victim is treated as an end though the means to that end be the annulment of his individual personality.* Finally his approval of Rashdall's declaration that the rights of one must yield to the rights of many, subordinates personality to mere numbers, and places the final determinant of rights in a false social utility.

*I have tried to interpret fairly Dr. Willoughby's reasoning on this point, and should be very sorry to do him any injustice.

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The Schoolmen would agree with Dr. Willoughby in deriving rights immediately from personal obligations and in making them an ethical means to an ethical end, but they would not accept his view of the nature of the end and the source of the obligations. Personal perfection for its own sake can never become an obligatory end of conduct. In the absence of Divine guidance, the primary and ever-insistent law of human nature is to seek the good and the only good that is rationally desirable for any man is that which seems so to him. It is not necessarily that which we call ethical, for ethical good supposes obligation, and obligations, as we have already seen, can never be produced by the practical reason. Man's ultimate end, therefore, and the source of the obligation to seek it, lie outside of himself, in the purposes of his Creator. According to these purposes, man will reach the full perfection of his personality only in the sphere of existence that comes after death. Toward this final end he is morally bound to move. In order that he may be able to obey this obligation, may have the means to reach his final end, he is endowed with those moral powers that we call Rights. Consequently, the ultimate end of human conduct, the efficient cause of human obligation, and the final determinant of human rights, is God.

Rights, however, have a specific field, and a specific proximate purpose. This specific field coincides with the field of man's social relations. If he were not a social being, destined to live in society, he would have no rights. The very concept of rights supposes a relation between the subject and some other man; hence to predicate rights of man unrelated would be to empty this word of meaning. Rights are social, not in the sense that society creates all of them, as Dr. Willoughby holds, but in the sense that the reason of their being is the social nature of every individual, and in the sense that they come into actual exercise only in society. Their specific proximate purpose is the social order. Accordingly, the general principle of justice may be thus expressed: "Maintain the right order of social life."

The proximate purpose of rights is the social order, but the purpose of the social order itself is the welfare of the individual. Hence the ultimate reason of rights, is, as we have said above, to enable *the individual* to attain his final end. More specifically, it is to afford him the means to obey that law of his Creator which he finds written in his reason, the Natural Law. Not all the rights that any individual enjoys at any time will be absolutely necessary

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for this purpose, but as many of them as are absolutely necessary at all times will be the natural heritage of all individuals. These indispensable rights are logically prior to, and independent of social ordinances. They arise primarily out of the individual's relations to his Creator. Such are for instance, the right to life, subsistence, freedom of contract, freedom of conscience. They are *absolute,* inasmuch as their *existence* is not conditioned by any human power, individual or social. While absolute as to their existence, they are conditioned in their extent. They are limited in each individual by the rights of his fellow-men. Again, though they cannot be annulled by others, some of them are alienable by the subject himself; for instance, a man who has committed, or is actually threatening murder has already forfeited his right to life. He himself has terminated its existence. But these absolute rights may not *per se* be subordinated to the good of any number of men. The apparent welfare of all humanity would not justify the killing of one innocent man. I say, "the apparent welfare," because its true and permanent welfare would never be promoted by such a means. The Allwise Creator who wishes every man to attain the creative purpose of his being, has not defeated His own will by allowing contingencies in which some men can be successful only through the utter failure of others. In the order of reality there is no such thing as a conflict of rights. Apparent conflicts are frequent, but they are all subjective, resulting from human inability to fix the mutual limits of various claims. Hence we say that while natural rights are limited in extent, they are absolute in existence, being like the individual's personality, sacred and inviolable.

In this chapter on the scope of equality in distributive justice, the author reaches conclusions to which there can be no valid objections. All men are equal in the spiritual order, *i. e.,* as rational creatures, but they are not, and cannot be made equal physically, mentally, legally, politically, or economically. Passing on to consider theories of ownership, he says that first occupation does not give a valid title to property, since it may have been accomplished by chance, fraud, or force. We reply that first occupation *under proper limitations* is one of the just titles of ownership. In so far as every inhabitant of the earth has a natural right to live upon its produce, all property is common; but for the adequate realization of this common right, the social institution of private ownership is necessary. Every man, then, has a natural right to *some* private

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property, and may fix the concrete limits of this right as he pleases, so long as he does not interfere with the rights of others, or the good of the social order. Hence whenever a first comer can appropriate goods, of whatever kind, without injuring the social order, which, as we have said, is the proximate determinant of all rights, occupation alone will give him a valid title. As to existing legal titles, Dr. Willoughby is right in saying that they are not necessarily valid in ethics. As a matter of fact, we find that the civil law often sanctions unjust possession, and often neglects to sanction claims that are just. Yet it is going too far to say that the law takes little account of the ethical character of the claims on which it does confer titles, and makes no attempt to secure to each individual the amount of property that he should have according to the principles of abstract justice. In the matter of property as in other fields, the civil law usually tries to conform to the principles of the moral law, at least, in so far as these make for the common weal. Its titles are ethically valid when it sanctions definite rights already existing; when it decides justly between the conflicting claims of individuals, that is, when it determines indeterminate rights; and finally, when, consistently with the social order, it *creates* rights, by assigning to an individual goods to which he has no previous claim.

Having rejected both the occupation theory and the legal theory, the author takes up the theory that determines all property rights on the basis of labor performed. He reviews at some length the doctrines of Locke, the Physiocrats, and the later English writers, and then examines the question of the morality of interest. In his brief historical survey of the doctrines concerning interest on money, he tells why usury was condemned by the Schoolmen. It was because of the Aristotelian view that money was by nature barren. While this explanation of the Scholastic teaching has the merit of age, it is nevertheless unfair. A defence of the Mediæval teaching and legislation on usury is not called for here, but since I am striving to set forth the view of the Schoolmen on the leading points treated by Dr. Willoughby, one or two observations will not be out of place. As to teaching, the Schoolmen did, indeed, say that money was infertile, but they did not make the same statement regarding capital. Neither was the infertility of money the principal, much less the only argument that they used against the taking of interest. As to the expediency of the anti-usury legation that they defended, I take the liberty to quote a few words from

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a specialist in this field, the economic historian, W. J. Ashley. Speaking of the economic conditions that obtained up to the middle of the fifteenth century, he says: "So far as wealth was intended to some as capital, it found ways open to its employment—ways which were adequate for the time, and against which the Canonists had not a word to say" ("English Economic History," II., page 438). Noting the fact that the Church's chief concern in this legislation was to protect the great masses of the people, he continues: "When the Canonist doctrine is accused of muddle-headed stupidity, all that is meant is that it had not already arrived at that sharp, clear-cut principle distinguishing between the legitimate and the illegitimate use of money power, for which modern economists and jurists are still seeking" (Ibid., page 439). There is consequently a wide difference between the Scholastic objection to the payment of interest to the money lender in Mediæval society, and the Socialistic objection to the return of a part of the product to the capitalist in the industrial society of to-day. In his reply to the Socialists, Dr. Willoughby is on surer ground. Adopting the Austrian theory of interest on capital, he concludes that Boehm-Bawerk and his co-laborers have demolished the labor theory of value. All the wealth resulting from economic processes does not belong to labor, and even if it did it should not be apportioned in exact accordance with the amount produced by each laborer. The physical and psychological differences existing among men should be taken into account in distributing rewards; for it is a principle of justice that unequals should not be treated equally. Finally, to distribute goods on the basis of the labor theory of value and property would require an organization of the state, the Socialistic organization, that is impossible of realization. Being impossible, it cannot be ethical.

Explaining next the labor theory as applied to property in land, the author cites the opinions of George, Mill, Wallace and Spencer, and shows that there is no good reason for regarding property in land as essentially better or worse than any other form of private property. George's proposal that in the event of the establishment of the single-tax system, the existing land owners should receive no compensation, is unjust. It would deprive many of property for which, as a rule, they have exchanged honestly acquired values. But if society could find a way to appropriate the "unearned increment" without affecting present market values, no

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ethical justification would be necessary, for society would be merely taking its own.

Coming next to the effort theory, which would distribute rewards in proportion to the effort expended in producing them, he points out the insuperable difficulties that stand in the way of any fair and accurate measurement of this factor. Accordingly this theory must go the way of those already considered; it will not do for a universal principle of distributive justice. Now I maintain that effort, in so far as it can be measured by a balancing of time, sacrifice and results ought to be taken into account in apportioning the value of the product among the various factors of production. But Dr. Willoughby has an objection to the effort theory that is fundamental. Rewards, he tells us, ought not to be apportioned on this basis because "every individual is under a moral obligation to employ his talents to the fullest extent for the benefit of humanity" (page 197); he cannot therefore claim a reward for performing a duty. Both of these propositions lack validity. A man's first duty is to himself, or rather to his God. As between himself and humanity, he is bound to employ his talents as well as he can, primarily for his own sake, and secondly for the sake of his fellow-men, whose human nature is the same as his own. And there are cases in which a man may claim a reward for performing a duty; for instance, if the duty has been assumed in virtue of an onerous contract. I deny also the right of society to compel an innocent man to work, except in extreme cases when the social order would suffer notably in the absence of such compulsion.

Finally, he outlines that theory which holds that goods should be distributed according to intensity of needs. Those who can use goods best should receive most. To this doctrine, he says, no ethical objection can be made. But an ethical objection can be made, for the simple reason that the principle which this theory supposes, namely, that each individual must render mankind the greatest benefit within his power, has already been proved unsound. At the same time the principle of needs, like the principle of effort, will have some place in any just scheme of distribution. Continuing, he refers to the right-to-subsistence theory, and traces it in legislation as far back as the English poor law of 1601, and in Socialistic thought to Fichte. Neither of these sources is original. The right to subsistence was enunciated in scientific form by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and hundreds of years previously it had been taught in all its essentials by the Fathers of

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the Church both East and West. As to the validity of this theory, Dr. Willoughby holds that every individual will have a right to subsistence so long as he contributes what he can to the welfare of humanity, and so long as humanity is benefited by his continued existence. Against this exaltation of humanity and effacement of the individual, I place the dictum of Aquinas that, in case of urgent need a man may, if no other means be at hand, save himself from starvation by seizing some of the goods of his neighbor (2a, 2ae, q66, a7). This principle, I think, is more in accordance with common humanity and right reason than Dr. Willoughby's assurance that in actual practice the right to subsistence will *almost* always be valid. If the right to subsistence, which is at bottom the right to life, be not absolute, if it be subordinated to the welfare of humanity, then the end and measure of rights is no longer the personality of the individual, but a personality "conceived as universal," a standard which to the mind not dominated by Hegelianism becomes in the concrete the welfare of the majority.

This, then, is the only specific rule of distribution that Dr. Willoughby can furnish: goods should be distributed according to intensity of needs, and intensity is determined by ability to use rationally. He holds that this principle gives a deeper moral sanction to private ownership than any empiric facts; for all property now becomes a trust to be utilized by the owner for the benefit of himself and of humanity. If some complain that the principle is vague, all that can be said is that more efficient guidance is beyond the power of any ethical system (pages 212, 213). Now this moral sanction attaching to property is not, as Dr. Willoughby seems to think, a new concept in ethical thought. Aquinas declared in substance that property was a trust when he said that, in the possession of riches the order of reason must be observed, which is to say, that a man must possess justly what he owns, and use it in a proper manner for himself and others ("Contra Gentiles," book 3, § 123). And in the Scholastic principle of the supreme right of all men to subsistence, we have at least one rule that affords more explicit guidance than Dr. Willoughby's principle of needs. It is not the only specific rule to be found in the Scholastic system, but of itself it goes a long way toward meeting the urgent demands of the hour. If it were recognized and enforced by society the problem of distribution would be infinitely nearer solution.

Thus far of the author's application of the principles of justice to economic problems: we shall now examine very briefly his

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chief conclusions on the rights and functions of the State. There is no abstract right of the state to exist, he says; each political organism must be judged by itself; if its influence as a whole tends to promote moral ends it is justified. It seems to me that this is not the best possible statement of the question. Although instances may be conceived in which the existing government might be worse than no government, such a condition would be abnormal and temporary. As a general proposition, we can say that some degree of political organization is essential to the welfare of mankind everywhere, and consequently that the state is an ethical necessity and has a right to be. It has also the right to issue such ordinances as are necessary to attain the purpose of its existence. Concerning the character of this latter right Dr. Willoughby's refutation of the Utilitarian theory of the state's coercing power is conclusive. But when he states positively the conditions in which the state may exercise its coactive power he minimizes somewhat the rights of individuals and of the lower political nations. Public authority, he says, may force an individual to change his course of conduct if it is convinced that the change will be for his good. This rule applies even to the matter of religious belief. And a higher nation may compel a less civilized one to adopt such policies as will benefit the lower nation itself, or humanity at large. Now while these rules are valid in a general sense, they affirm too much; some further distinctions must be made. First, as to individuals, we must distinguish between internal and external acts. If the act be internal, that is, an exercise of opinion or faith, and if this belief be sincere, the social authority will never have a right to interfere. So long as the individual injures only himself, a direct exercise of force against his honest liberty of conscience can never be justified, no matter how disinterested the motives of the coercing power. In the case of external actions, where the individual does not harm others, compulsion may be used only to prevent self-injury of the gravest kind. The problem here is to harmonize the individual's right to liberty of action with the state's right, nay, its duty, to rescue him from his own folly, to prevent him from destroying his very capacity for rights. For, since social authority exists for the good of the individual, its province surely includes the work of deterring men from such grossly irrational conduct as is tantamount to self-destruction. We find this principle recognized to some extent in the state's treatment of lunatics and those attempting suicide.

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Practically, then, the harmony that we are seeking may be best obtained by the rule that, the social authority has the right forcibly to intervene whenever an individual is pursuing a course of conduct that proves him to differ only in degree from suicides and fools.

Secondly, with regard to the lower political nations, the same principle will hold as has just been enunciated for individuals. That is to say, when an inferior state is acting in such a way that it fails utterly to attain the end for which it exists, when it is destroying those interests that are essential to social well-being, when it is scarcely better than no social authority at all, then a higher nation will have the right to use coercion for the good of the people coerced. I say, "for the good of the people coerced," because it is obvious that any nation may interfere with another for its own good, for the protection of its own rights. The practical difficulty in the case of the higher nations will be to know just when their rights have been actually violated by the less civilized peoples. When Prof. Burgess says in substance that a civilized state has a right to impose a better social order upon an inferior people if the latter is impeding that degree of progress to which the higher nation or humanity at large has a right, he is correct theoretically. (Quoted in "Social Justice," page 267). In practice, as the world's experience has abundantly proved, the higher nations can not always be trusted to decide when intervention should take place and how to exercise it. And it certainly remains to be proved that the determination of the time and manner of exercising this "world-duty" to-day ought to be left solely and unreservedly to the Teutonic nations (page 268).

In his chapter on the Ethics of the Competitive Process, the author has an extended and thorough refutation of Herbert Spencer's contention that human progress depends upon the free play of the biologic law of the survival of the fittest, and that government functions should accordingly be reduced to a minimum. He shows that the biologic process, which would efface the individual for the sake of the species, is not only immoral, but hostile to true progress. Rightly understood the ethical and the cosmic processes are in harmony. It is admitted, indeed, that present social conditions are not all that they should be, that the individual is in too many cases used as a mere stepping-stone for social advancement; but it is not admitted that this conflict is essential to progress. He denies therefore Benjamin Kidd's contention that the interests

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of the social organism and the interests of a majority of the individuals composing it at any one time, are irreconcilable. The absolutely competitive régime is the ideal one, but it must be maintained on a high ethical plane. Practically, state activities should be multiplied wherever they would be certainly followed by beneficial results.

Taking up the subject of the state's punitive power, Dr. Willoughby rejects the retributive theory on the ground that the exact degree of moral guilt, and consequently the adequate measure of punishment, can in no case be accurately determined. Besides, the state has not the right to interpret and avenge the Moral Law. The criminal law, being concerned merely with the general weal, is not called upon to punish guilt, as such. The rational theory of punitive justice, then, is the utilitarian, which aims solely at some future good, whether of the individual or of society. True, this principle justifies the infliction of punishment without reference to the degree of guilt; yet, "the criminal is not treated merely as a means when his good is given equal consideration with the good of others in determining the general welfare" (page 362). This reasoning, as I have already shown, is unsound because it sanctions the violation of individual personality. The plain truth is that the utilitarian theory of punishment will allow men in authority to visit the heaviest chastisements upon the lightest crimes if they think that the social good will be thereby advanced. On the other hand, the argument that the retributive theory must be discarded because criminal courts cannot determine to a nicety the degree of guilt, is far from being conclusive. The degree of guilt attaching to the average criminal can be approximated with as near an approach to ethical requirements as is possible in any other sphere of legal administration. As a matter of fact, men everywhere attempt such estimates, and agree substantially as to the varying degrees of malice to be attributed to different crimes. If the moral judgment may not be trusted here, neither is it reliable in any of its other decisions concerning right and wrong. Moreover, the concept of wrong-doing includes necessarily the concept of a sanction, of punishment. If this moral conviction is ignored in the administration of punitive justice, if guilt is not punished as such, and according to its degrees, then the moral sense of humanity is outraged, and the social weal correspondingly injured, because of this direct official contempt shown to the Moral Law. For we must remember that the Moral Law is the

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one permanent guide of social well-being and human progress. Hence the state does not assume unwarranted powers when as the Vindicator of the Moral Law it metes out such retributive justice as it can. It is the chief guardian of the social order, so constituted by the Divine Author of the social order, and must in all reason be endowed with such powers as are essential to the proper discharge of its functions.

Summing up this appreciation of "Social Justice," I find that the author has done his best work in the second part, where he treats of the province of the state. His formulation of the abstract principles of justice, and his application of them to economic problems, are faulty because built upon an unsound ethical basis. From the practical point of view his work is likewise unsatisfactory. The introductory chapter assures us that his practical aim is to contribute to the solution of that problem which arises out of the wide-spread popular demand for a more just distribution of rewards. Yet his *summum principium* of distributive justice affords but an uncertain light to those, be they scholars or toilers, who are seeking an answer to this demand. It is too general, too vague, too meagre, to furnish much positive guidance. Dr. Willoughby believes that he has made the most comprehensive application yet attempted of transcendental principles to the concrete problems of life; and yet his work falls far short, both in extent and thoroughness, of that done in the same field by the Schoolmen and some of their modern interpreters. (See especially the monumental work of Theodore Meyer, recently completed, entitled, "Institutiones Juris Naturalis," St. Louis, B. Herder). In this connection, I cannot refrain from noting some serious defects in the historical portions of "Social Justice." Although he professes to have examined the chief theories of social and political philosophy that have been formulated in the past, he has but one meagre mention of the systems of the Schoolmen. He seems to hold that the doctrine of the moral responsibility of rulers first became general in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that the idea of the strictly ethical character of conduct was generally extended into the industrial order only within the present century (page 2). If by the doctrine of the moral responsibility of rulers he means the doctrine that sovereigns were bound to administer their offices in accordance with the principles of justice, he is guilty of an historical error when he makes its origin so recent. It was common in the teaching of the Schoolmen, and

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in all the political thought of the Middle Ages. The Schoolmen likewise insisted on the ethical character of all economic activity, and defined the duties of each social class with a minuteness that the world has not seen since. In the words of Prof. Ashley, "No such sustained and far-reaching attempt is now being made, either from the side of theology or of ethics, to impress upon the public mind principles immediately applicable to practical life" ("English Economic History," II., page 388). When, therefore, Dr. Willoughby pleads for such an application to-day, he is not taking the newest view-point in the evolution of ethical thought, but merely returning to the position of the Schoolmen.

JOHN A. RYAN.

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THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF. By E. M. Leonard (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1900.)

For the future student of the early history of poor relief the volume before us will be an indispensable book of reference. Apart from the action of the legislature, we have hitherto had but scanty information from contemporary sources as to the execution of the early acts, or as to other attempts to grapple with those problems of pauperism which became increasingly pressing during the sixteenth century. Before the state definitely recognized its responsibility, and enforced compulsory assessment, many attempts were made both by the central and the local authority, by corporate as well as by individual effort, to meet the difficulties of the times. For this period as for that which immediately followed when the experiments tried in scattered centres were incorporated into the national system Miss Leonard has collected an enormous mass of material. With this before us we understand more clearly than before how every fresh step in Elizabethan legislation had some experiment as its justification. All sorts of methods were adopted in different places. Some failed, some would seem to have been successful in certain places at certain times, some have survived to our own day. As the writer points out, three main features have contributed to the building up of the English system of relief, viz., municipal regulation, national legislation, and the orders issued by the Privy Council to secure efficient administration. With the legislation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we are all familiar: the main interest of this volume consists in the light it

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throws on municipal action, especially during the earlier period, and on the steady pressure of the central authority, more particularly during the later period. The municipal records of London, Norwich and other towns, the reports of the justices of the peace, the Privy Council register, and various orders issued by the council and by the justices have been diligently worked and have yielded a rich harvest to the worker.

We connect the reign of Edward VI. primarily with a poor-law so stringent in its working, that it was quickly repealed: no less notable, however, are the other experiments tried in London. For fatherless children Christ's Hospital was founded, for the sick and impotent St. Bartholemew's and St. Thomas's Hospitals were refounded. Voluntary collections in churches, as sanctioned by law, proved insufficient to meet the obligation incurred by the citizens; an order was therefore issued by the Common Council (in 1547) for the levy of a compulsory assessment of a "half-fifteenth,"—a quarter of a century before Parliament made such assessments compulsory (1572). Not only in this matter are the city fathers shown to be in advance of public opinion. Before the death of Edward VI. they recognized that the best method for dealing with that third and numerous section of the poor known as "sturdy beggars" was to give them work rather than punishment. Very interesting is the account sketched for us of the steps which finally led to the foundation of Bridewell (before 1557) "for the relief, employment and discipline of sturdy beggars" (p. 34), and of the organization of an institution which must have served as a model for many sixteenth century Houses of Correction. Before the Civil War, as Miss Leonard points out, these were not nearly so much like gaols as they afterwards became. Often they were "also a hospital for the old, and an industrial school for the young" (p. 113). The risk of competition between pauper-made goods and those of free citizens was recognized, and great efforts were made to prevent it. But the London Bridewell was not successful, probably because it was on a municipal not a national basis, because it attracted the poor from other places, and the funds collected to meet local requirements were inadequate to satisfy a wider demand. Various measures for coping with the problem of pauperism are illustrated from London and other places, *e. g.*, the licensing of beggars, pensions, compulsory rate (Ipswich, 1557), the provision of corn in years of scarcity, boarding out of the young as at Lincoln in 1551. Action on the part of the cen-

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tral authority was comparatively rare before 1569, but a few cases are noted of instructions issued to meet temporary emergencies. Of these the following may be cited as an illustration of the general policy of the state at this time. In 1528 war led to the closing of foreign markets, and the cloth merchants required smaller quantities of cloth. There was therefore reason to fear that a large number of workers would be thrown out of employment. To avert such a calamity Wolsey summoned a number of merchants, and informed that unless they continued to buy cloth as usual he would open the cloth trade to foreigners. The crisis was soon over; the Cardinal's policy was successful in staving off temporary distress for the workers, though at the expense of the merchants. On some later occasions, however, when a similar device was adopted, the result was, as might be expected, less fortunate (p. 147).

From 1569-1601 Parliamentary action was more important than that of the municipal authority. The time had come for gradually incorporating into our law the practice of scattered centres, and more pressure was exercised to ensure due administration of the law. Each step was thought out carefully. Miss Leonard shows how many were the discussions, how great was the division of labor, how careful was the consideration of the subject. "The English Poor Law did not come by chance, but was the result of the thought and experience of the greatest men of the time" (p. 68). Bacon, Raleigh, Whitgift, Burleigh and Coke all sat on one or other of the committees that discussed the matter before the passing of the Act of 1597, which with few alterations was reënacted and henceforth known as the Act of 1601. Miss Leonard has done well to draw attention to the earlier statute for, as she says, "it was in 1597, not in 1601 that the whole question was discussed and that the main features of our English system of poor relief were legally established" (p. 78). Nor was the Privy Council slow to act when occasion required, although until the Stuart period its action was apparently more or less irregular. Instructions designed to safeguard the interests of the poor were sometimes issued, *e. g.*, to equalize the distribution of corn, to minimize fluctuations in price, and to prevent the possibility of monopoly.

A good deal of light is thrown on the working of the system during the early Stuart period. In some places, at any rate, the whole of the Elizabethan law would appear to have been enforced.

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Various steps were taken to provide work for the unemployed as well as relief for the impotent, and expedients unmentioned in the law were also tried. Thus, James I. appreciating the evils of absenteeism, issued more than one proclamation through his council ordering the return of country gentlemen to their homes "persuaded that by this way of laudable and ancient housekeeping of this realme the poore . . . . will be much releeved and comforted" (p. 146). Miss Leonard lays great stress on the period of unparliamentary government as one of striking importance in the history of poor relief. She holds and is probably right in her contention that "these eleven years are remarkable for more continuous efforts to enforce socialistic measures than have been made by the central government of any other great European country, ... and these infringers of individual liberty were also, in intention at least, the protectors of the poor" (p. 164). More than ever we realize that there is nothing new under the sun. The most advanced reformer to-day can suggest little that his Stuart predecessor did not attempt to carry out in more or less systematic fashion, and from this point of view the sketch of seventeenth century administration is of considerable interest. At the same time we must not exaggerate the importance of this period at the expense of the sixteenth century. The evidence collected merely shows that the principles laid down in sixteenth century legislation as the result of experiment in isolated centres, and administered with varying success by local and central authority, found more complete expression in national practice during nine years of the seventeenth century. Towards the close of the volume we almost wonder whether the writer, interested in the later period, has forgotten how much light she herself has thrown on the earlier time.

Invaluable as a storehouse of material for future historians, the book is too narrow in scope to serve as a complete history. That still remains to be written, and we could wish that a somewhat different title had been chosen for this work. In form it is tedious; sub-division has been carried to an extent which threatens to diminish interest, and here and there we are conscious of exaggerations and inconsistencies. But notwithstanding these defects the student who is prepared to make the mental effort of tackling the volume will be rewarded. For though we may sometimes find ourselves bound to differ from the conclusions, there can be no doubt of the value and importance of many of the

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facts now presented for the first time, and we sincerely hope that the writer will be able to continue her work on this subject.

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THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA. By Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, Ph. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1900.

Nine years ago, Mr. Oberholtzer made a useful contribution to the problem of Direct Democracy ("Law Making by Popular Vote," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*), and two years later, his work on the Referendum helped very considerably in giving accuracy to an impulse then beginning to seize upon some sections of advanced politicians in favor of the Swiss method of government by the people. In the volume before us, he returns to the subject, but confines his attention to American experience and constitutional theory.

We are not sure that he has been well advised in placing in the forefront of his book two chapters on the contest between the French constitutional views of Benjamin Franklin and the English views of John Adams—chapters, as he tells us, which were planned as the opening of an unfinished volume on the constitutional history of Pennsylvania. They are interesting as a study of the American political soil; they are a background for the subsequent chapters, but it is so evident that they have been written for another purpose that they are a grave blemish in the construction of the volume.

The work really begins with the third chapter which deals with "what is unquestionably one of the most remarkable manifestations in the field of popular government in the United States today"—the growth of the function of the constitutional convention at the expense of the legislatures. The town's meeting as an expression of sovereign authority lies historically at the basis of American constitutional practice; but subsequent developments in the practice of limiting the authority of legislatures by fundamental law are due mainly not to conceptions of what democratic government should be, but to fears of what political majorities might do. Hence the American tendency has been to add to the scope of fundamental law certain provisions restricting the liberty of legislatures to meet, spend money and pass enactments; and

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these restrictions, as a rule, having been referred from the constitutional convention in which they originated, to a popular vote, are not merely the checks which one representative authority imposes upon another, but the reserves which the sovereign populace makes when delegating its sovereignty to a legislative assembly. This disposition on the part of the people, at first casual and fragmentary in its exercise, is always inclined to become systematic and to be elevated into a conscious method of government. This is what has happened in Switzerland, and what sections of "advanced" (in the main) political parties would like to see happen both in America and Great Britain.

It is one of the most significant indications of the confusion in current political thought, that what active support the Referendum as a method in government has met with, has come from people who confess that they are looking forward to greater complexities in our social life and an ampler recognition on the part of the state of its duties to the individual. The fatal incongruity in a body of social doctrine which includes to a large extent the ideas of the modern Socialist and the political methods of the atomic individualists of the *Contrat Social* school, is hidden by the claims made for the Referendum as a piece of democratic machinery; and it is necessary at the outset to understand clearly what the Referendum is. This is one of the most important results which should follow from a study of this book. The Referendum is only a power of veto; it is the ability to say "no"; when it says "yes" it is useless. It does not express the popular will, it only expresses the popular opinion on a certain matter—and not even that always. In countries where the legislatures are hopelessly corrupt, this power of veto may appear to be of value. But even then, it may be argued, that to meet such political degeneracy by a means of circumvention is the worst possible way, as it not only tolerates the evil but invites it to devise hundreds of ways for the exercise of its genius, and discourages heroic attempts to exterminate it altogether. The most unsatisfactory of all pleas for the Referendum is that the legislature is corrupt. The Referendum will encourage it in its corruption whilst it will compel the adoption of new methods of corrupt dealing. In fact, nothing has given a greater impetus to the Referendum in both England and America [pp. 159, 161, 303, etc.] than a lowering of the sense of responsibility on the part of legislators, and this is always the beginning of the sway of corruption. "The legislature will become an irresponsible cabal," said Mr.

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Justice Willard [quoted p. 212] "too timid to assume the responsibilities of law-givers, and with just wisdom enough to devise subtile schemes of imposture to mislead the people."

Evidently, the successful plea for the Referendum must be the claim that by referring bills to a popular vote the general line of political intelligence is advanced, the average elector is quickened in his political instincts, and the desire for progressive change enlightened. In other words, the Referendum must be defended as a method of democratic education rather than as a piece of democratic political machinery. What assistance does Mr. Oberholtzer's study give us in judging the claims of the Referendum in this respect?

Here, one shortcoming of this interesting political study must be pointed out. Mr. Oberholtzer has been too sparing in his information regarding the use to which certain constitutional privileges have been put. But still, it is possible from the results which he gives, especially when the Swiss experience is kept in mind, to come to certain important conclusions regarding the working of the democratic mind when it is asked to pass its own laws.

The old difficulty of deciding what is really a democratic majority again presents itself to us, but upon that we need not dwell [*cf.* pp. 131 *et passim,* 153, etc]. A similar difficulty lies in presenting to the people an issue so simple that the voting upon it shall be decisive and shall relate to the question itself and not to some minor and even petty matter mixed up with it. It is all very well to submit a proposal to the people. But every proposal of law which has passed a legislature has become complicated by a method and detail, and when it is referred to the people it is no simple issue that is placed before them, and the voters may find in one short bill half a dozen or more questions upon which to vote. It is not always possible to put clauses separately, and what appears to be a simple and straightforward reference is really quite the opposite. Under such circumstances a referendum vote is worthless both as an indication of popular opinion and as an exercise in political intelligence.

In comparison with Switzerland, America is far behind in direct democracy, and a list of the subjects generallg referred to the votes of the electors by the legislatures, is significant only in so far as it shows the opinion of the professional politician regarding the value of this method of law-making. Temperance legislation has been submitted to a referendum most frequently, and the explana-

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tion is, that legislatures have been most unwilling to incur the responsibility of deciding finally upon this awkward subject. Other subjects—some of them suggestive of the motives behind the temperance referenda, others indicative of suspicion against the legislatures—which have been most frequently referred to the electors directly are, the regulation of trusts, the leasing out of convict labor, a tax on sleeping cars, the age of school attendance, the sites and names of capitals, expenditure, taxation and the custody of public lands and franchises [*cf.* p. 227, etc.] but none of them suggest that the Referendum in America has become common for any reason beyond an idea that there should be a check upon a misuse of legislative authority. The recent introduction of the Referendum into the State Constitution of South Dakota stands apart as a new beginning. The check as an educational method, is not only misleading to the electors, inasmuch as it starts them on a wrong road towards political perfection, but is of no value because it is an exercise of power rather than of political sagacity.

From the kind of subjects usually submitted to the vote of the people we naturally pass to consider the decisions given. And in the first place we want to know what proportion of qualified electors vote. In this respect the American is the usual experience. So true is it that "greater popular interest is felt and expressed in the success or defeat of individual candidates than of laws and measures" [p. 153] that there is now a tendency to take a referendum vote at the time of an ordinary election and to print the question upon which a vote is asked at the bottom of the ordinary ballot papers. This is a surrender of the idea that the referendum vote should be taken apart from the influence of a personal candidature, which is one of the most reasonable claims made by the advocates of direct democracy. But even then, the votes cast on the referendum are much fewer than those cast for the candidates. In Pennsylvania a referendum drew out 781,261, whilst the Presidential contest drew out 1,000,000; in Colorado 24,173 voted on a taxation referendum, whilst 93,843 voted at the same time for President (1892). A great many similar cases are given [pp. 166-168, etc.]. "When the elections are held on special dates, that is, separate from the elections of men who are to represent the people in legislatures and in executive positions, it is impossible to get out even half the vote, unless it be on a proposition to deprive a citizen of his beer and gin. Even a proposal to enfranchise an entire new half of the race, or to double the electorate, or to ally the state

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openly with lottery men and gamblers, will awaken from their lethargy a relatively small number of those who come out from their homes and places of work and business, to help a Republican or Democratic candidate into the 'White House'" [p. 169]. So that two essentials to the referendum if it is to be a method of democratic education—simplicity of the issue and some preliminary interest being taken by the electors in the power it confers—are wanting.

Nor, when we examine the nature of the decisions, are we led to conclude that what evil influences are at work in connection with candidatures, are absent from votes on subjects and projects. We get Louisiana on the one hand deciding most promptly against state lotteries, and New Jersey coming to the same conclusion on a meagre vote and an alarmingly narrow majority. We discover that when more than one question is voted upon, one is either very popular or very unpopular and pulls through or defeats all the rest —a common Swiss experience [pp. 169, 170]. The cases of discrimination are rare [p. 171]. Mr. Oberholtzer makes no attempt to explain the motive behind these curious votes of "universal yea" or "universal nay," but they appear to indicate two things:—first, that a referendum does not afford good opportunity for an effective political educational campaign; second, that it does not lead to wise and careful thought on the part of the electors. This latter point is forcibly urged home by a consideration of the votes cast at referenda on taxation and finance. We could wish that in his chapter on "Loan Bills and Financial Proposals," Mr. Oberholtzer had been more of a political student and less of a constitutional guide and had told us more of results. But these words indicate his conclusions: "[The average voter] will look on indifferently while bonds are issued in large sums, but it is another matter altogether when a direct proposal is made to him for an increase of the tax rate" [p. 283]. "They vote money away with little thought as to how the debt shall be paid" [p. 246].

Whoever wants to understand the whole working of the Referendum in a single instance should turn to pp. 349-352, where the story of the struggle to decide a charter for San Francisco by referendum is told. For eighteen years the attempt was carried on—from 1880 to 1898. The defeat of the first charter was brought about because the Roman Catholics opposed one of the provisions that after 1885 no human body should be interred within six miles of the city hall. The second charter was defeated "after the polls

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were closed." The fourth charter was voted at the same time as the general election and less than 34,000 people voted for and against it, whilst 64,815 voted for candidates [pp. 349-351].

On the whole, Mr. Oberholtzer's study confirms the belief that it is a mistake to expect the referendum or the initiative to be outstanding features of modern democratic methods, and an error to regard democracy from a point of view which necessitates an approval of the Swiss example. If representative government is a failure, there is no future for democracy.

J. R. MACDONALD.

LONDON.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. By Stewart D. F. Salmond, D. D., Free Church College, Aberdeen. Third Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. 709.

This book is in many respects a significant indication of the ethical life of our time. Though sufficiently intelligible to any person of good education, its elaborate details, with the careful and judicious manner in which these are treated, adapt it for the scholar more than for the general reader. Nor is there the slightest attempt to win for the subject any illegitimate attraction by the questionable artifices that are too common in its treatment. Even the devout imagination is not allowed the amiable indulgence in fictitious, though they may be ennobling, pictures of the reward to which virtue may look forward in a future life. Still less is there any suggestion of penetrating beyond the veil of futurity by the methods of contemporary spiritualism. The work of the Society for Psychical Research, its results or its hopes are not even mentioned. When all this is borne in mind, when it is further observed that Dr. Salmond's book is a stout volume of seven hundred pages of library octavo, it will be admitted to be a fact of significant interest, that it has entered into a third edition within eighteen months. Amid the almost despairing complaints that are often heard about the literary tastes of our day, it cannot but be encouraging to find that a work, appealing to so much that is best in the mental and moral life of the world, should meet with such a cordial reception.

This gratifying encouragement is enhanced by an examination of the book itself. As already stated, it is a book which appeals to the scholar. It is probably in fact the most scholarly contribu-

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tion to the subject in recent literature; and it justifies the generous recognition it has received, not only from the reading public in general, but from men of competent critical power in particular. For its scholarship is not merely an outpouring of such erudition as sheer industry can accumulate. It is throughout imbued with that spirit of historical criticism, which has been the most potent influence in enhancing the results of scholarly research in the century that is gone. For is not the historical spirit, in the study of the past, an extension of the moral consciousness in the sphere of intellectual work, and thus a clearer view, a fuller mastery, of the moral task undertaken by the student? Is it not in fact a more honest endeavor to be just to our fellow-men of former ages by understanding them more truly, to estimate their achievements by the conditions under which they worked, and not by the distance which separates them from our ideals?

This spirit of historical fairness gleams through the whole of Dr. Salmond's inquiry, but is particularly conspicuous in his treatment of non-Christian religions. For though by its title his work is specially devoted to the Christian doctrine of immortality, yet more than two-fifths are occupied with pre-Christian ideas on the subject. He is led to this by the fact, that, though he does not obtrusively parade the ideas or methods of evolutionism, he yet recognizes that religious beliefs are, in some sense, products of a more or less gradual process of growth. The heathen, as well as the Hebrew, conceptions of immortality are, in his view, "preparations" for the Christian doctrine.

The First Book describes the various forms of the "ethnic" preparation. Here, after an introductory chapter, the ideas of the lower races are examined, then in succession those of India, of Egypt, of Babylonia and Assyria, of Persia, and finally of Greece, a separate chapter being given to each. These chapters afford, on every page, a fine illustration of the marked difference in the treatment of such subjects by the Christian scholar of the present day from that which was common at no distant period. Of course this is due in part to the vast extension of our knowledge in regard to religious beliefs, especially outside of ancient Greece and Rome; but it is impossible to ignore the more exacting moral sense of recent scholarship in regard to both thoroughness and candor. The old attitude of unsympathetic hostility to every non-Christian phase of religious life, and the easy method of dogmatic assertion or sweeping generality, have disappeared. Instead, there is the

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kindly search after any trace of truth or goodness, there is conscientious industry in the endeavor to grasp obscure details, and to estimate all with critical insight into their real significance. If there is any fault to find with Dr. Salmond's account of non-Christian beliefs, it is a fault that is almost inevitable. The writer, who undertakes such an account, must do his best to make it intelligible; that is to say, he must make the beliefs he describes as clear as possible to the mind of a reader. But this can hardly ever be done without representing each article of faith as characterized by a definite uniformity which rarely belongs to any, and construing all the articles of a religious creed as forming a far more harmonious whole than they ever become in actual life. This is forcibly illustrated by the religion of ancient Greece. It is the product of a clearer intelligence than that of any other ancient people. It received brilliant treatment from artist, from poet, from philosophical allegorizer; and yet it remains a bewildering chaos of unconnected fancies which cannot be marshalled into intelligible order along any line of logical or natural law.

The general lack of logical clearness or harmony in actual religious beliefs is noticeable in regard to ideas of the future state in particular. Even Christian thought on the subject shows all gradations from a good-natured Universalism, which virtually eliminates moral retribution from the government of the world, to a hideous Pessimism which represents the moral history of man as an appalling failure. If such divergences occur within the domain of Christian doctrine, it seems a hopeless task to look for anything like fixed or consistent views of the future life in those phases of religious thought which lie outside of Christendom. It is but due to Dr. Salmond to say that he recognizes fully the difficulty of his theme. His statements are characterized in general by just caution which does not ignore the extreme uncertainty that obscures many points in his sketch. Probably the study of religions will increase this spirit of caution, and come to a more explicit recognition of the fact, that the religious consciousness in reference to futurity is often but an undefined sentiment that hardly tries or dares to shape itself into thought, and still less into any language that can admit of logical analysis.

There is, however, one fact which can with reasonable probability be gathered from Dr. Salmond's review of non-Christian beliefs on the subject; and that is the tendency to connect them more intimately with the moral consciousness by projecting into

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a future life the realization of a perfect moral development for the individual and a perfect moral government for the race. By the very conditions of earthly life the retribution of human conduct appears to be hopelessly concealed, if not absolutely baffled; and this illusion must perplex the moral consciousness as long as retribution is sought in natural events that may lie outside of the moral life altogether. It is therefore an exceedingly natural evolution of thought, which points to an existence beyond the conditions of earthly life as a scene in which there will be a complete reconciliation of physical and moral well-being. This movement of thought seems indeed so logical, that it was regarded even by Kant as an irresistible postulate of practical reason. Among the various phases, which the movement assumed outside of Christendom, probably the Egyptian faith will in general be regarded as the earliest and most pronounced; and this fact raises an extremely perplexing problem with regard to the relation between the Egyptians and the Hebrews. The idea of a future judgment appears in very distinct form in recensions of the Book of the Dead belonging to the later reigns of the eighteenth dynasty, and there can be little doubt that it must have become a feature of religious thought in Egypt long prior to that period. [See Budge's "Book of the Dead," Vol. I., Introduction, p. xciii.] But the Hebrews cannot have left Egypt before that period; and yet the outlook towards an immortal life in any part of the Old Testament is so exceedingly vague, that many critics have gone the length of maintaining that it formed no part of the Hebrew religious creed. Dr. Salmond has devoted two or three pages (188-191) to a consideration of the subject, and these are characterized by his usual caution and fairness. But it must be acknowledged that there is here an unsolved problem in the history of ancient religions. Yet it must also be said that perhaps the problem may be found simple enough, if we get a few more historical data; for it seems to present merely one phase of the general fact, noticed by Renouf and other Egyptologists, that the Hebrews appear to have taken with them extremely few of the distinctive features of Egyptian civilization.

Perhaps the Hebrews had already begun to realize, in a dim way, that real retribution is not an act of divine judgment postponed to a period after the death of the individual or at the close of human history,—that, being involved in the eternal order of God's world, it is eternally going on; so that any future retribu-

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tion can be but a continuation of the moral process which is already realized in earthly life. Dr. Salmond seems to indicate that that may be his own interpretation of the peculiar attitude of the Old Testament towards the idea of immortality. "It may be," he says, "that in it" (the Old Testament), "for the most part, piety has its field in this world, and faith its satisfaction in present relations to God" (page 191). In this respect the Hebrew attitude may be regarded as in truth the historical preparation for the teaching of Christianity, and as giving a clue to the interpretation of that teaching. It is scarcely necessary to say that the historical method of interpretation, which Dr. Salmond has adopted as his general guide, is applied specially in his interpretation of the teaching of Christ and the Apostles. Some critics would enforce that method more fully. Certainly in the interpretation of the language of the New Testament on the subject it seems almost impossible to make too large an allowance for the unavoidable forms of thought which are imposed upon all descriptions of moral retribution, not merely by the peculiar ideas of the Hebrews, but even by the ideas of men in general with regard to the forms of legal procedure in pronouncing and executing judicial sentences in human life. The divine judgment on the moral actions of men can have nothing of the arbitrary and artificial character that attaches to human judgment by the conditions of time and space within which all human activity is restricted; and if the necessities of thought and language compel us to describe divine judgment under human forms, these must not be allowed to blind us to the fact, that every man at every moment of his life stands truly before the judgment seat of God, and that he can never escape the irrevocable sentence which is pronounced on the deed done at the moment.

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Christianity and Mythology. By John M. Robertson. London: Watts & Co. Pp. xviii., 484.

There is much in this volume which one can heartily admire. It shows large learning, great industry, and much critical skill. It consists of "three treatises," at each of which we shall glance in turn. Before doing so, however, one ought to say that Mr. Robertson claims to have been "more obedient to scientific canons"

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than previous workers, and that he treats mythology as a "science." Accepting all this, the most serious objection we have to his work must be stated. It is that he does not pursue the method of science, does not assume and maintain the true moral attitude of such a scientific inquirer, and give us the results of truth as he has found it, without concern either as to "rationalist" view, on the one hand, or "ecclesiastical" view on the other. When we want "science," we want it as "disinterested science," and Mr. Robertson's work would have gained immeasurably in scientific merit and value, if, discarding these two aspects or bearings of his work, he had sought and given truth simply as "science." That is the prevailing weakness of the book, and it obtrudes itself at almost every turn. I therefore pass over his diatribes against ecclesiastical connections of every sort, as being, before the scientific issues, so many irrelevancies. Only, it must be said that Mr. Robertson has missed a great opportunity, that, namely, of showing the followers of "Christism" that he had not fallen from the greatness of "science," but stood superior to rationalism and every other "ism" in the pursuit of science *qua* science. Disclaim as he may, the facts of his procedure cry aloud against him, since these never allow us to forget for long that, in his own chosen style of phraseology, he has a rationalist "axe to grind."

The first "treatise" or part deals with "the progress of mythology," and consists of four chapters, which make extremely interesting reading. Mr. Robertson's strictures on Strauss (p. 15) are severe, and possibly not undeserved. And yet here, as so often, Mr. Robertson seems over-confident and too dogmatic, for the possibilities of the case are both larger and more reasonable than Mr. Robertson has been able to see. Apart from these belated censures on Strauss, Mr. Robertson might have had the possibilities of the case a little more opened up to his view—assuming him not to be "past argument"—if he had studied some similar phenomena in our Neo-Hegelians of to-day. The references to "theology" (p. 16) do not seem very penetrating or discriminating. But Mr. Robertson's faith in what Comparative Mythology is going to do for religious development is admirable—not the sanest of supernaturalists could attain unto it; he would not find it rational to do so.

The second chapter deals with modern systems, and is ably written. Here and elsewhere, Mr. Robertson is fond of polemic directed against Mr. Andrew Lang, against whom he scores a

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point at times, though inclined to make too much of verbal criticism. Mr. Robertson's statements (p. 48) about "old myths" and the history of the God idea do not advance us much, for the reason that they are left so much as bare assertion. We fear his comforting view as to the philosophic separation of the idea of God is somewhat mythological. His statement is either a truism—one of those "platitudes" he dislikes so much in others—or it is the result of so defective an apprehension of the real bearings of the philosophic situation as to afford ground for some amazement. What Mr. Robertson calls "the separatist fallacy" is next dealt with. I find myself in agreement with his polemic against Mr. Andrew Lang at important points; at other points I take serious exception to his modes of statement. More important are Mr. Robertson's denunciations—they are nothing more—of both religion and ethics. A Creator God (p. 61) is "irrational" because "illogical," and "itself as much myth" as other absurd myths with which Mr. Robertson has been dealing. This jaunty dogmatism nowise surprises us, but, if he means more than a summary dismissal of certain traditional representations of the Creator God, we should take leave to question whether he understands the deeper religious and philosophical issues involved. Hardly would any one who really does so, write as he does. Again, on the same page (p. 61), we are informed that the latter-day Christian's "God remains the Cause of Evil, and his ethic is thus incurably unsound." Is this to be taken as a sample of Mr. Robertson's rational and ethical thinking? We could desire none better, if we had the least care to have it shown to be "incurably unsound." We had thought this style of argument well-nigh obsolete, even in pot-house dialectics. When he almost instantly tells us that "in fine, all theistic ethic is flagrantly mythological," we can only wonder at the ease with which Mr. Robertson reaches his conclusions. He has no trouble as to the way in which, as matter of fact, the idea of God has possessed the spirit of the human race. He takes no trouble to inquire as to whether or what significance attaches to the God idea in pre-scientific times. For anything that appears in this book, Mr. Robertson has never thought such matters to any broad-based or adequate philosophical conclusions, before making his sweeping theistic assertions. The book is quite as much handbook of rationalist apologetics as a manual of mythological "science," but what it will most convince many readers of will be—

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at this part—that "the theistic presupposition" is a far deeper thing than Mr. Robertson has seen or understood.

When he deals with "the metaphysic of religion," Mr. Robertson gives us only some critical remarks on well-known writers like Goldziher, Max Müller, and one or two others, but the remarks are not particularly new or impressive. At length, after having touched on Mr. Grant Allen's positions, he sets down the attempts to separate developed religion from all mythological credences to some form of "acquired or inherited prejudice—what, it is not necessary to ascertain" (p. 77). Why not? What if the supposed "prejudice" turned out also a myth? What if these separations proved due to "scientific attitude"? Mr. Robertson tells us (p. 77) that "scientific form" is to be had for the facts here only by taking the term "religion" to include "all the credences and practices by which men ever supposed themselves in touch with or aware of what they conceived as Gods, extra-human personalities, intangible lives, and the doings of these." Such is a sample of Mr. Robertson's "careful" comprehension of facts. "Scientific form" will be given to astronomy and physics when, in like manner, these sciences to-day are made to include, as "generically extensible" to these, every remote legend of a physical bearing and every antique notion of a motion of the sun round the earth, under penalty of the terms physics and astronomy being rejected "altogether, as having no accepted significance." Mr. Robertson might be expected to see the unredeemed nonsense of his self-styled "scientific" procedure, but then, as he says significantly of so many others, "that is never to be counted on." So much for Mr. Robertson's peculiar "scientific" modes of recognizing "essential continuity and coherence" of the phenomena.

Chapter the fourth deals with "the stand for the Bible." Mr. Robertson seems rather lacking in judicial calm when dealing with Hebrew mythology, and is too ready to dismiss as "past argument" those who do not share his own views. Mr. Robertson rather plays into the hands of his antagonists here by a mode of treatment that does convey an impression of cleverness and superficiality. On many important points and aspects we find not the slightest evidence that Mr. Robertson has studied and weighed the judgments of Semitic scholars at home and abroad, beyond the few authorities he cites. This is the more important, as some of the more recent mythological assumptions in this connection appear to rest on a very flimsy basis. There is here none too much in the

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way of scientific argument, to which the discussion had been better more confined. Even the later history of Judaism might have more to say for itself than Mr. Robertson seems to be aware (p. 95).

Dealing with "Christianity and Degeneration," Mr. Robertson informs us that it is "the European economic system" which maintains the mythology of Christism "in popular credit," in spite of the "plain" bearings of "the latest mythological researches"—a mythological statement, of course. The whole mythological fabric reared by Mr. Robertson rests on so precarious a foundation that it will not greatly satisfy "serious" thinkers.

In opening the second part of his work, Mr. Robertson speaks of the nature of the problem—"Christ and Krishna." It is seldom one meets with so much moral and intellectual arrogance as Mr. Robertson has set down in pages 130 and 131. Were Mr. Robertson's reviewers—to institute a comparative myth—to treat his work as he here does that of all inquirers on the Christian side, Mr. Robertson would instantly turn and rend them for their normal unfairness. But his own moral and intellectual consistency would have vanished into myth. I submit such a style of writing deserves no great praise in an *ethical* journal. Is Christianity in all its exponents devoid of an ethical *spirit?* Is that spirit not its strength and characteristic, teaching them to seek "truth" before the acceptance of any particular system, Christian or other? Does it not bid men seek the "truth," that thereby they may be "free" from every bias and prepossession? Mr. Robertson, who professes to be casting down *apriorisms* on every hand, most inconsistently and unfairly sets up one against us here. Mr. Robertson should also free himself from the prepossession—and vulgar sophism—that Christianity is chargeable with the defects and vices of its exponents, as he is victim of it again and again. It is a glaring anachronism to import such methods into "science"—mythological or other. Those who do not, in "lawless credulity," accept the conjectures and conclusions of Mr. Robertson are again, at page 299, sweetly told that their "customary" frame of mind is "the negation of reason." In what other realms of "science" is this the "customary" mode of discussion? Mr. Robertson has, in brief, made up his mind that "Christianity so-called" has been—he says, "we know"—"wholly manufactured within historic times," and therefore the world must accept his dictum, or "every claim" to the contrary will recoil "more or less forcibly"

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on our own creed. All which may be very appalling, but is not yet "science." Space limits forbid us to follow the separate chapters of the second part, and of the third, which deals with the "Gospel Myths." Needless to say, everywhere that details of the Gospels can be construed in any mythical direction, Mr. Robertson displays a splendid faith talent. Similar analogies found in comparative mythology for similar problems are to be treated only in one way, Mr. Robertson's, since he possesses an ever convenient short cut to certainty. It seems a pity that, where there are so great abilities and learning and powers of research, there should not also be wise and discerning powers that should keep the rationalist cause from being wounded in the house of its friends. For it, too, should have a credit to maintain.

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THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG IN "THE REPUBLIC" OF PLATO. Translated into English with Notes and Introduction by Bernard Bosanquet, M. A., LL. D. Pp. iv., 198. Cambridge University Press, 1900. [Cambridge Series for Schools and Training Colleges.]

This little book is made up of three distinct portions; (1) a translation of the greater part of Books II., III., IV. of the "Republic"; (2) a running commentary upon this translation; (3) an introductory essay upon Greek education with special reference to the views of Plato.

Like all Dr. Bosanquet's work, the treatment of the subject is, throughout, suggestive, stimulating, thoughtful; but the real value is not always on the surface. The Commentary and the Introduction are both open to the criticism applicable to those other "booklets" (the author's own epithet) of which Dr. Bosanquet has given us so many in the last twelve years, viz., that neither the subject-matter nor the method of dealing with it admits of adequate treatment in so small a space. Without exaggeration it may be said that there can be no real student who would not gladly exchange them all for any single one of them worked out on the scale of (*exempli gratia*) the first volume of the "Logic." On the other hand, few students, when they have once relieved their feelings by grumbling because the author has not given them more, but will be grateful to him for having provided so much.

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The "Translation," Dr. Bosanquet modestly explains, is not intended for comparison with "those which have found their recognized place in English Literature," but merely "to set before students a definite type of renderings and conceptions, which otherwise could only be conveyed by a greatly extended commentary." In other words, it is a "version," not a "translation." Dr. Bosanquet need not, however, deprecate comparison with the work of other scholars. The conscientious critic, going carefully through it line by line will, of course, find a phrase here and there he may not quite like (*e. g.*, the use of the word "potency" on pages 366, 367, or, again, "inflexion" as a rendering of Page 397), but, as a version for English readers, those will commend it most who are most capable of estimating the difficulty of the task. It fulfils admirably the author's purpose and will form an excellent introduction to the study of Plato as a whole, apart from its more special bearing upon his theory of education.

The "Commentary" consists partly of short explanatory notes, elucidating for the English student the meaning of some Platonic expressions, or explaining some Greek custom alluded to in the text. These notes, though very short, are clear, and often illustrated by modern parallels in Dr. Bosanquet's happiest manner. The other, more important, portion of the commentary presents a critical estimate of the Platonic theory, as far, that is, as short disjointed notes upon points as they arise in the text can give such presentation. They cannot do it in any adequate sense, and it is no discredit to Dr. Bosanquet to say that he fails to achieve the impossible. The earnest student who will take the trouble to compare scattered—often widely scattered—notes, and will, above all, devote time—a long time—to honest thought upon their inner meaning, will find suggestions and ideas of the highest value on almost every page; but it is to be feared that few of the "pupil teachers and candidates for certificates," for whom the book purports to be written, will possess the necessary leisure.

The majority of readers must be content to find what benefit is attainable by them in the "Introduction." This portion of the book, though raising, without discussing, in an almost tantalizingly suggestive way, questions of the greatest difficulty and importance, yet contains much positive teaching that is practically valuable for the ordinary reader. In a few pages a clear historical sketch is given of the method, object and scope of Greek education. While recognizing the narrow limits, to our eyes, within

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which this education moved, the author is both sympathetic towards it and appreciative of its great merits: its national color, its insistence upon balance and moderation, its attempt in both mental and physical spheres to attain sound health instead of special capacity for special feats, its love of "nurture" as opposed to mere "instruction" and, above all, its firm conviction that the goal of true education is the formation of civic character.

Finally, Dr. Bosanquet estimates truly, and states lucidly, Plato's real attitude towards the education of his time, as far as it is expressed in the first four books of the "Republic." He points out (what the modern critic too often forgets) that Plato does not condemn that system as such but, on the contrary, warmly approves of it. Plato pleads only (1) that the underlying principles should be made manifest; (2) that each item should be consciously referred back to them—a condition which involves several alterations in detail, but only in detail. These principles are of eternal value; they may be seen in application today in every refined English-speaking household. But Dr. Bosanquet wisely deprecates any attempt to "place" Plato. Our duty is not to label him with some party catchword, but rather "to learn his great ideas sympathetically and trust our own sense for their application." The difficulty, without question, as well as the value, lies in the application. Yet the modern reader will heartily agree with the conclusion that, "it is worth thinking of, how far in education the idea of the growth of a mind can be made the central point, so that the things which are considered worth teaching may really have time to sink into and to nourish the whole human being, morally and intellectually alike. In as far as this problem is solved we shall attain a higher result than was attained by the Greeks in proportion as our resources for appealing to human nature are more varied and profound than theirs."

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A History of Modern Philosophy. By H. Höffding, translated from the German by B. E. Meyer. Two Vols. Pp. xvii., 532; ix., 600. London: Macmillan & Co., 1900.

It is, to the present reviewer at least, a great temptation to dismiss the work before him with the single remark that Professor Höffding has written quite the best, if not the only really worthy History of Philosophy that modern times have produced. A com-



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parison of even the most satisfactory of the previous works on the subject will at once suggest to an inquiring mind what a History of Modern Philosophy ought *not* to be. Some of the very best suffer from the inevitable tendency of the historian, who is also a philosopher with theories of his own to recommend, to treat the course of previous speculation as a mere prelude to the appearance of a final or absolute system of truth; some, like the otherwise excellent manual of Schwegler, are planned on an unduly limited scale; nearly all take the form of handbooks for the student who needs for university purposes a neatly tabulated account of systems and doctrines, rather than that of a continuous history of European thought addressed to the cultivated public at large; finally, one and all mutilate and misrepresent their subject by treating the development of speculative thought in abstraction from that simultaneous development of physical science which has at every stage reacted upon and largely determined the course of metaphysical construction. Prof. Höffding has, for the first time, produced a History which is singularly free from all these grave defects. His work is, to begin with, a sympathetic and thoroughly "objective" narrative which abstains from the futile attempt to read the ideas of any single system into the facts of history. Not that he is without definite views of his own or that those views do not occasionally make themselves felt in the course of the exposition, but he possesses in an eminent degree the true historian's power of entering into the thoughts of other ages and surveying their problems from their own standpoint in a way that enables him to do reasonable justice alike to Descartes and Locke, to Fichte and to Mill. The scale upon which his task has been executed again has made it possible to bestow adequate treatment upon many interesting thinkers who are commonly dismissed in the manuals with the mere assignment of a couple of dates and a line or two of, frequently inaccurate, summarization. In particular, the interesting series of Italian Renascence philosophers whose labors prepared the way for the more reasoned out constructions of the seventeenth century are probably for the first time restored to their real significance for philosophical history. The account of Bruno, for instance, is by far and away the best and fullest description of that singularly felicitous and acute, though unsystematic, thinker, accessible to the English reader. The avoidance of the over-systematizing and tabulatory style of the ordinary manual is another feature of Prof. Höffding's work

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which calls for the highest commendation. At last we have a History of Philosophy which fairly meets the demands which would be addressed to a historian of Art or Science or Political Theory; I mean, a History from which the reader of general culture who wishes to know what the main lines of development in the particular branch of human thought under investigation have been, as distinguished from the student who wants dates and tables for examination uses, may get what he comes for. But the greatest merit of the book, to the mind of the present writer at least, is the constant care that has been taken to exhibit the way in which the great ideas of mechanical and biological science have influenced the course of metaphysical thought. It is mainly because this connection has been neglected by previous historians of the subject that the development of metaphysics has too often appeared to hang in the air and to be quite out of relation to the line of really fruitful and vital scientific progress. Prof. Höffding strikes the right note in this respect from the very first. He has rightly seen, for instance, that no history of philosophical thought in the seventeenth century can set the facts in their true proportions unless the growth and development of the mechanical view of nature from Galileo to Newton is made the central point of the narrative. In restoring Galileo in particular to his rightful place as the real founder both of the mechanical theory and of the true mathematico-experimental method of interrogating nature he has not only corrected a grave injustice, but has for the first time put the development of seventeenth-centry thought in its true light. From Hobbes and Descartes to Leibnitz and Newton the whole movement of thought centres round the ideas and methods of the "Dialogues on the New Sciences," and yet historians like Ueberweg and Windelband have not thought the founder of dynamics worth more than a fraction of the space they have devoted to the theosophic fancies of Jacob Boehme! The note rightly struck in the careful treatment bestowed upon Kepler and Galileo is maintained throughout Professor Höffding's narrative. He has properly treated the mechanical physics of Descartes' "Principia" as of little less importance for the history of thought than the metaphysics of the "Meditations," and his account of the philosophical consequences of Darwinism and of the doctrine of the conservation of energy (the two really great scientific ideas of our own century) in contemporary thinking is a model of lucid exposition. I do not know whether I shall equally express the opin-

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ion of all readers if I go on to say that a second almost equally striking proof of the author's sense of historical proportion is afforded by his treatment of the Post-Kantian German Idealism. But to my own mind at least the real course of philosophic history has always appeared to be woefully distorted in the current works on the subject by the undue importance attached to the Hegelian system. The notion is far too prevalent, in England at least, that there is but one legitimate line of development from Kant, and that the line which culminated in the "absolute" Idealism. In Prof. Höffding's narrative the facts fortunately appear in a truer light. Hegel finds his real place by the side of Schopenhauer as a representative of one particular development of Kantian ideas, the "Romantic" philosophy, but the equal legitimacy of the descent of Herbart and Beneke and Fries from the sage of Königsberg is no less fully recognized. It is only when it is thus made clear that the thought of Kant is not exhausted by the movement to Hegel, that the real significance of the critical philosophy can be properly appreciated. Or to put the same thought in another way, Prof. Höffding's second volume will explain to the attentive reader why Hegel is dead or dying, but Kant a living force in the philosophic thought of to-day.

I have said that Prof. Höffding does not fail, as a philosopher of his eminence can hardly fail, to indicate his own intellectual preferences, though they are nowhere unduly obtruded. His openly expressed preference for the constructive thinkers of the seventeenth century over their successors of the eighteenth century will be readily understood, and probably shared, by readers in harmony with his own sympathetic attitude towards empirical psychology and exact physical science. The strongly sympathetic account of Mill and Spencer, which is also presumably indicative of personal leanings, is naturally interesting to English readers. In the case of Mill, Prof. Höffding shows himself fully alive to that eminent man's truly remarkable inconsistencies and contradictions, while explaining them, fairly enough, as largely due to the struggles of a singularly candid and open-minded nature to free itself from early prepossessions; in dealing with Spencer—and this is the only instance of serious bias that I can call to mind in the whole two volumes, personal admiration seems to have partially blinded the writer to the really wonderful mistiness and ambiguity which besets that philosopher's treatment of the cardinal terms of his own theory.

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Of course there are bound to be a number of special points as to which any reader of a comprehensive "History of Philosophy" will differ from his author, but it scarecly seems worth while in a general notice like this to allude to such matters of mere detail. There is, however, one point which is more than a matter of detail and which I cannot pass over altogether in silence. Prof. Höffding tends too much, I think, to write as if the mechanical theory in its final elaboration at the hands of Newton were the last word of physical science as to the universe. He scarcely seems alive to the degree to which the elements of that theory still remain matters of hypothesis nor to the extent to which the hypotheses have been of late years subjected to criticism by a growing and important school of scientific thinkers. At least he seems to regard mechanism as being somehow more than a descriptive hypothesis, though how much more we are never told. We should like to know what is his attitude towards the tendency represented in physics by Mach and Kirchhoff, and in philosophy by Avenarius, but the limits imposed upon him by his choice of 1880 as the *terminus ad quem* of his "History" have perhaps prevented his gratifying our curiosity. Probably it is well that Prof. Höffding has drawn the line where he has done. There are signs that with the wonderful growth of experimental methods in Psychology, with the emphatic return of Nietzsche to individualism in ethics, and the widespread revolt already referred to against accepting mechanism as more than a partial description of phenomena in physics, we are standing on the threshold of a new philosophical era, which will produce a new intellectual synthesis along lines as yet undreamed of. It may be that it is yet too early to attempt taking stock of the philosophical position of the present. Meanwhile it is well that this much be understood; if with Prof. Höffding's luminous narrative before them our writers of popular scientific essays continue to repeat the parrot-cry that modern metaphysical thought has revolved without progress round the same circle of ideas, and that its speculations have stood out of relation to the concepts that have guided fruitful scientific advance, they will henceforth be without excuse. It should be added that the English version is idiomatic and usually accurate, though somewhat disfigured by the retention of German forms like *Frankfurt,* etc. In one place Descartes' patroness, Elizabeth of the Palatinate, is gravely called Elizabeth *von der Pfalz,* as though the translator had taken the last three words for a proper name. There are also

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a few ugly misprints which point to careless proofreading, *e. g.*, "finite" cause for "final" cause (Vol. I., p. 231), "*there* (for their) *esse* is *percipi*" (Ibid. p. 420).

A. E. Taylor.

Owens College, Manchester.

Educational Aims and Methods. Lectures and Addresses by Sir Joshua Fitch, M. A., LL. D. Cambridge University Press. 1900.

The title of this book scarcely conveys a correct or adequate idea of its contents. A book bearing the name "Educational Aims and Methods" is apt to raise expectation of systematic and critical treatment of the aims of education, followed by a discussion of the methods whereby these may best be attained. The student who is acquainted with the German Literature on the subject would also probably expect to find in a book of this description copious references to the sciences of Psychology and Ethics which are rightly held to supply education with some of its main principles. The purpose of the present book, however, is far simpler and less ambitious. The author's statement in the Preface that "the lectures and addresses collected in this volume have been given at various times within the last few years before academic audiences in England or America" is a sufficient explanation of the absence of systematic and continuous treatment. The lectures have for their subjects some question bearing on the general aims and method of education, or the life and policy of some educational reformer or some interesting phase of the administration of education.

In spite of the title, the aims of education are nowhere explicitly defined or synthesized. This omission, however, one scarcely regrets; for in indirect ways and by gradual accretions a lofty and cumulative conception of the purpose of education is gradually formed in the reader's mind. Equally satisfactory in our opinion is the author's exposition of general method. "We are safe in taking for certain this one truth, that human character whether we look at it from its ethical or from its intellectual side is the result of growth and not of manufacture. It is a living organism, and not a highly delicate and curious machine." It may, indeed, be said that the chief merit of the lectures on general method lies in the impressiveness and cogency with which from ever-varying standpoints the organic character of true instruction is demon-

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strated. Socrates, Scripture and Science are made to sanction what the writer rightly calls "the main principle of all true pedagogy." The lecture on "Methods of Instruction as Illustrated in the Bible" is suggestive of Ziller's famous "culture epochs" theory based on the supposition of a correspondence between racial and individual development. Our author in this lecture starts from the kindred position that "what is true in the infancy of society and of nations is true also of the childhood of every human being." He does not, however, press the analogy unduly far and the suggestions he is able to extract are thoroughly sound and acceptable on other grounds.

The Historical lectures deal with Ascham and the schools of the Renaissance, Edward Thring, Joseph Lancaster and Pestalozzi, and seem to us the most valuable section of the book. The writer fastens unerringly on the salient and distinctive features in the theory and policy of each reformer. He is moreover always awake to the difficulties and temptations which beset the schoolmaster. His treatment is thus characterized by the insight which is bred of sympathy as well as that which is due to wide and varied experience. The resulting estimate is a rare combination of criticism and appreciation. It is important that the approved practice of a great schoolmaster, such as Arnold or Thring, should as far as possible become generalized into doctrine and explained in its relation to fundamental principles. And one feels in reading the chapter on Thring that Sir Joshua Fitch could render splendid service to education by writing the history of our great English schoolmasters. The lectures on Ascham and Lancaster afford a clear conspectus of the condition of education in two important periods in the history of our country and throw a flood of light on certain features and anomalies which belong to our present system.

The book is one which may be read with great profit by teachers. It deserves, however, a wider audience—the people who are responsible for or who exercise any control upon the education of the young. These would profit considerably from contact with the robust common sense and the illumining enthusiasm of this book.

The allusion to Psychology is very slight and leaves the reader uncertain as to the author's view on the value of a knowledge of mental science for the teacher. Those who look in this direction for help in the solution of educational problems may be grati-

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fied to learn that Sir Joshua has elsewhere admitted that "rules and methods of teaching, if they are to be worth anything must ultimately be based on mental Philosophy and on acquaintance with the laws of thought and with the constitution of human nature." (Preface to Lloyd Morgan's "Psychology for Teachers"). We somewhat regret that this important truth does not receive more emphasis and illustration in the present work.

The book is written with a grace and charm of style and reflects its author's enthusiasm for education and his unfaltering faith in its future.

W. JENKYN JONES.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, ABERYSTWYTH.

THE MARTYRDOM OF LABOR. By Alfred Thomas Story. London: George Redway, 1899.

Mr. Story begins the preface to his book by stating that it will doubtless call forth opposition; but it is difficult to see that it will profit anyone to make any serious opposition to a piece of tawdry rhetoric. There is no trace of any patient study or thought on the part of the author, and so it is futile for him to expect life to come out of the clash and cruscation (*vide* preface) of somebody else's thought with his want of it. He is no friend of the dismal sciences,—hear his solemn warning: "Remember the treatises on political economy are mostly written by men who, *though not exactly in the pay of the classes,** are very largely in sympathy with them and their ideals. Hence they are suspect." If this book is part of "the present widespread upheaval of thought" to which the author refers on page 12, the upheaval would appear to be one of matter in a gaseous form. If the object of the book is to call attention to existing social evils, such object would be better attained by a plain and sober statement of the facts. If the object is to suggest remedies for the evils, the remedies should have been stated with greater clearness. The chief proposal of the author is one for the redistribution of the land amongst the present population, but no machinery is suggested for carrying out his proposals. He patronizes the working classes, and very properly insists on the benefits of education; but warns them against the leading universities and their prevailing cynicism. If Mr. Story has any genuine feelings, let him devote his time to an intelligent study of some

*P. 198. The italics are mine.

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one of the evils of modern civilization and try to hit upon the best remedy. It is difficult to believe that a man feels deeply when his feelings do not lead him to treat serious subjects with the seriousness that they deserve. Foolish language is no cure for misery. Though perhaps he means better, Mr. Story does as little good as the bishops he despises.

C. P. SANGER.

INNER TEMPLE, LONDON.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. A. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.



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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1901

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE "LOWER RACES."

I.

THE triumphs of the navigator and of the explorer in modern times have brought into close contact races of men that have developed quite apart from one another and under diverse conditions, in which the social instincts and habits of co-operation have been established in widely different degrees; and the events of the closing years of the nineteenth century have served to fix the attention of all thoughtful men among us upon those races whose habits and traditions seem strange to us, and whose modes of thought we find in large measure incomprehensible.

In the consideration of the problems which have arisen in connection with our relations with these strange peoples we are wont to assume an attitude of complacent superiority towards them without noting that in asserting this superiority of our race we are unconsciously expressing our own very special ideals of social life. Few men, it is true, ever realize that such individual ideals exist; nor, if their attention is called to them, do they often trouble themselves to test their validity. The common man who does undertake this task, however, finds it by no means an easy matter either to explain the nature of the ideals which he thus carelessly accepts, or to present a logical basis for the current distinction between

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higher and lower people, which he thoughtlessly adopts in every-day discussion.

He finds that he cannot base the distinction upon observed differences of material prosperity, for he is forced to acknowledge that prosperity in any case is relative to a man's longings, and there is certainly no proof that individuals of our race have less unsatisfied desires than the savage. Nor is it possible to find the basis of this distinction in the happiness which at first sight seems to go hand in hand with what he would call prosperity; for observation seems to indicate that many of the races of the so-called lower types are immeasurably happier as a whole than our own race, or at least that they were so before they were deprived of their joys by contact with the so-called "higher" peoples.

It is true, indeed, that a large proportion of those who constitute these "higher" races assume, perhaps for the most part unconsciously, that it is mere physical vigor which determines racial superiority. In fact, this position is maintained consciously by no small number of highly intelligent men in our own land, who contend that as physical strength determined racial persistence in the early ages of man's social existence, so now the superiority which seems to be evidenced in certain races is maintained only by what is but a modification of this purely physical pressure, a modification due to the fact that the men of these superior races have wit enough to use complex machinery, in place of mere brawn and muscle, to hold other races in subjection, or to crush them. As we shall presently see, however, there is little ground in the history of the development of human life to warrant this contention.

Nor can it be held that the superiority of which we speak is determined by the higher intelligence of those who have incidentally invented, and who make use of, this complex machinery of aggression; for it certainly is not perfectly clear that the masses, or even the leading classes, in these dominant races are on the whole more intelligent than the corresponding classes in many races that we hold to be manifestly inferior.

Without further consideration of these or other unsatisfactory bases for the distinction under discussion, we may

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turn at once to the criterion suggested by the theory of evolution.

According to this theory, what we call the progress of civilization which determines the superiority of one race over another is but one step farther in the unfolding of organic life. The higher races, under this view, are those in which broad social instincts are firmly established, and by which well-marked habits of coöperation have been acquired. The lower races are those in which these social instincts and habits of coöperation have not become so clearly marked.

The relations which do exist, and which should exist, between these races of diverse social development is manifestly a matter of great importance in relation to the purely physical, as well as to the moral, welfare of those races which, under this criterion, we call the higher, and among which we number our own race; and if it be true, as is above suggested, that our superiority is due to qualities belonging to a form of organic life which is of relatively late development, it is certainly well worth while to fix in our minds the probable course of this development in the future, by studying the mode in which less complex forms of organic life appear to have been evolved in the past. The true implications of evolutionary theory in this connection are by too many of us overlooked and forgotten, even if, as is too often the case, they are not altogether misinterpreted.

That social life is of an organic nature will be assumed in the discussion to follow; and this assumption appears to be warranted provided it is noted that the bond of relation between the elements of social aggregates is relatively weak when compared with the bond existing between the elemental parts of an organic individual, and that the social organism therefore appears to be of a very simple type when considered in relation to the individual, whose organism is of a very highly developed type.

We raise no valid objection to this view by remarking upon the strong sense of individuality in man, nor does it suffice to reiterate that social aggregates are merely fortuitous groups of individuals. If we take such a position we are logically

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bound to hold also that all organic life consists in naught but the fortuitous grouping of elemental cells; for it is evident that, whatever our modern doctrines concerning the development of organic life have taught us, they have left quite untouched the mystery of the nature of that bond which exists between the elemental cells in an organism, and which determines what is currently spoken of as the "integration" between the several cells or the several cell-made parts. We speak very glibly of this "integration," as though we understood the exact nature of the fact in Nature to which it refers, whereas the word is merely representative of this fact, and too often serves as a cloak to cover from our own view our ignorance of the nature of the processes involved. Until we understand fully the significance of this bond between the cells of organisms we are surely in no position to hold that the bond differs in its nature from that which holds together, more or less firmly, the individual elements of social groups.*

Accepting the assumption above considered, we quite properly study the nature of this organic life as it appears, first in the individual organism, and later in the simpler tribal community, with hope that we may learn something concerning the nature of that future broader form of interracial organization which may guide us in our attitude towards the races which seem to us so inferior to our own.

The obvious lessons to be learned from such a study are so often overlooked that I believe the reader will pardon me if I ask him to follow me over ground that may not be altogether unfamiliar to him.

II.

The individual animal appears under observation to be "a great bundle of instincts." What we call instincts are capacities for action in certain definite ways. They are evidenced by what we may call "instinct actions," that is, actions which occur automatically, as it appears, when the animal is excited by special stimulations.

*Cf. my "Instinct and Reason." P. 182 ff.

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These instinctive reactions are at first sight very diverse, and more or less complex in their nature; but when they are studied as a whole they are found to have in common the one characteristic that they all subserve ends of value to the animal in which they appear. They tend to preserve the life of the individual, for instance, as when he starts back in fright from a dangerous object; or they tend to maintain the species of which the animal is a representative, as when he attacks without hesitancy this same dangerous object if it is menacing his offspring; or, in their more complex development of which we shall speak more fully in the next section, they tend to conserve the tribal community of which the animal is a member.

These instincts, as we men know them in ourselves, are differentiated by the fact that some of them modify consciousness in important ways, while others do not: we are very conscious, for instance, of the fact that we are angry or frightened, when we fight or take to flight; but we pass by unnoticed a vast number of automatic adjustments of our activities which preserve our lives from moment to moment, as for instance when we cross on foot a busy, crowded, modern thoroughfare in a great city.

If we make a closer study of these automatic instinctive actions which conserve the interests of the individual organism, our attention is called to activities in the special parts of the individual organism, which also under certain conditions affect our consciousness, but which for the most part do not affect it, in which case they are spoken of generally as mere "reflexes." The action of the beating heart, for instance, is occasionally brought to our attention, although usually we are utterly oblivious of its rhythmical functioning, while many of the "reflexes" resulting from stimulation of the spinal cord do not affect consciousness appreciably at any time.

We are accustomed therefore to make a broad distinction between instinct actions and reflexes, which is unwarranted by the facts; for when we study these reflex actions in man or in the parts of animal organisms whose conscious lives we can appreciate only by inference, we see that, although the

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instinctive reactions which function for the benefit of the organism, and the special reflexes which function for the benefit of the parts of the organism, differ widely in complexity and in the quickness and accuracy with which the reaction follows the stimulus, nevertheless that they are all of one type, and are all brought into relation by the fact that they have biological significance, that they lead to results which either directly or indirectly are of value to the organism in which they appear.

It is important to note this fact that the instinctive reactions of a part of an organism are of the same nature as the instinctive reactions of the whole organism, for otherwise the comparison of social life with the life of the individual would be of small service to us.

If we limit our thought for the present to those instinctive activities which have significance for the individual, and examine them a little more closely, we find our attention called to the fact that the individual organism is a vast system made up by the binding together of minor systems. The heart of an animal, for instance, is a little organic system in itself. We may cut out the heart of a frog and in our hand it will continue its instinctive actions—its beating, as we call it.

Now in the ordinary activity of the vast system of systems which we call the individual animal, each elementary system expresses its own instinctive tendencies, and yet at the same time all of the elementary systems acting together produce activities of the whole system of systems which are effective to the preservation of the complex individual organism. The heart does its own work as a heart, and the stomach its work as a stomach, and the brain its work as a brain; but at the same time each part does some work for the benefit of each other part, and all do some work for the benefit of the whole, and all together produce activities of the whole organism which tend to keep it all alive.

A perfectly adjusted individual organism we all realize to be one in which each elementary part does the best work it is capable of doing just in accordance with its own special capacity, and in which at the same time all of the elements, working thus properly as elementary parts, and yet together,

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produce activities of the whole organism which are advantageous to this whole mass of elements which constitute the individual. In certain low forms of organic life we see this adjustment practically perfected, where the environment is relatively stable and the organism relatively simple. But where the individual organism,—the system of systems,—becomes highly complex, and the environment changeable, failures of adjustment must in the nature of the case not infrequently occur. Each elementary system will insist upon working out its own special instincts without too great regard for the interests of the other elementary systems or of the individual organism as a whole. The heart will insist upon pumping the blood, and the stomach upon functioning as a digestive organ, and the brain upon sending its stimulating messages from one part of the body to the other, and this whether each is helping the work of the other or not, and without too great regard for the health of the whole body.

But, as we all know in our own experience, if the elementary systems carry this insistence upon their rights beyond certain limits, it is fatal to the life of the individual organism. If, under the stimulus caused by active exercise in the rarified atmosphere of a mountain top, the heart becomes too insistent upon its right to act as its own instincts would dictate, it is likely to bring death to the whole individual organism. On the other hand, while it is true that each of the elementary systems must learn to limit its own right to function normally, in order that benefit may accrue to the community of systems which make up the individual, nevertheless it is equally evident to us that these elementary systems cannot afford to subordinate overmuch their right to function in accord with their nature; for if they do so they themselves will be injured, and this injury will indirectly, but none the less surely, affect the welfare of the whole organism for whose benefit they have agreed to the subordination of their natural trends of action. We cannot afford, for instance, to do excessive brain work without taking proper exercise or food, even though this brain work will evidently be of the highest immediate advantage to the individual organism; for in so doing we are liable to

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destroy the efficiency of parts of the complex organism without whose help this brain work would be impossible.

When, then, we consider the individual organism, it becomes apparent that the perfect adjustment of which we speak can be attained only provided, on the one hand, the animal exhibits tendencies to such activities as are best fitted for the health of the individual as a whole; but also provided, on the other hand, these activities for the benefit of the individual are not of a form which will curtail the full development of the instinctive capacities in the elemental parts of which the organism is composed. Progress, as it is conceived in accordance with biological ideals, cannot occur without a movement towards this perfection of adjustment.

III.

Those readers who have found the substance of the previous section in the main familiar will also appreciate the manner in which the principles thus disclosed in the study of the individual organism are applicable to that organic form which among men we call the tribal community, or the social body, according as it is of less or greater complexity.

If the individual man living as part of a social aggregate corresponds with the organized part of a whole individual organism, then we should expect to find, as we do find, that the instincts within him that tend to the advantage of the individual, or to the preservation of the species, are modified in their reaction so that, while they still serve their purpose as conservative of the individual and of his species, they at the same time serve to foster the persistence of the social group of which the individual is a member.

Where the tribal group is simple, and the wants and aims of its individual parts are similar, as is the case in the lower forms of tribal life, the adjustment of instincts as above described may be to a great extent attainable; but where, as in our higher civilizations, the social aggregate is very complex, and the wants and aims of the individual are diverse, we must expect to find failures of adjustment which will

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result at times in an opposition between those instincts which lead to the benefit of the individual and of the species on the one hand, and those which lead to the advantage of the social group on the other hand. Thus it is that there arise those clashes of impulses within us which are indicated by doubts as to the propriety of opposed tendencies, which lead to the pressure of conscience and to the appreciation of a sense of duty, all of which are formulated in the problems of ethical theory.

But evidently, if social life is to be conserved, we must look forward to a perfecting of adjustment between these opposed tendencies. In an ideal social community, clearly, the instinctive reactions natural to the individual as such must be carried out normally as they will produce results of the greatest advantage to the individual; and at the same time these reactions must subserve the interests of the social community as well. The individual must, on the whole, tend to develop his own capacities to their full perfection, and at the same time his activities must be such as will prove to be of advantage to the whole social group of which he is a member.

Not only is this recognized as a tendency of social development, but the best of thinkers who take this view agree that the perfecting of such an adjustment should be our aim. They long for, and desire to foster, forms of social life in which the maximum of individual free development is attained, so far as that is compatible with the advantage of the social body.

It is true that many of those who acknowledge this tendency, and who theoretically look forward to its enforcement, all too often overlook the fact that it is impossible to allow the individualistic instincts unrestrained development without danger to the social life. The demand for independence from what we are wont to call the slavery of social pressure cannot be carried too far without leading to anarchy, and to the failures of civilization which anarchy implies.

Many, too, on the other hand, forget altogether that, if the end above considered is to be gained, the instincts which subserve social ends must themselves be restrained so far as is necessary to allow of the full development of the individual.

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Fortunately most progressive people do recognize this necessity in general; but there exists among us a large number of socialists, so-called, who are so much impressed with the value of social development that they would foster it even to the curtailment of individual development; who, wishing to satisfy the wants of the masses of the social aggregate, would institute governmental machinery which can produce this satisfaction only so far as it is conceived to exist in the person of the average man, and which therefore must, so far as it is effective, discourage the development of all individual life which is above this average.

There is a smaller class of men among us who go even farther than this—a class of little practical importance but worthy of special mention here because of an instructive comparison with them which we shall find it desirable to make in our later consideration. These men would distinctly aim at the improvement of social life by crushing out the so-called lower classes, or at least by forcible restriction of the development of those whom they somewhat arrogantly assume to be of hopelessly degenerate type: the criminals, the weak-minded, the socially vicious, yes, even the squalid poor who, knowing none of the high standards of life, are content with their lower social heritage.

But the logical evolutionist finds no ground for such a system of destruction or of extreme repression. Such a system implies a trust in the infallibility of the reasoning among the so-called "upper classes" which the evolutionist on general grounds finds to be altogether unwarranted. It involves the assumption that those in power are necessarily more capable of higher development than those whom they think of as their inferiors. Those who defend such views overlook a well-established fact, viz., the tendency in the "higher" form of a species to revert to the form which is more typical, and the opposite tendency in the "lower" form of a species to rise to this same typical form. They are unmindful of the fact that the life of our species has been vastly longer than the relatively short period of recorded history. They fail to see, on the one hand, that there is a great chance of the appearance of a

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higher type by the development of what seems now so low and base, if it be allowed time to rise to the typical form of the species, and opportunity to step beyond this typical form: while, on the other hand, they forget that the offspring of those individuals who now seem to represent a variation of higher type will certainly tend to revert to the typical form of the species, and may later degenerate to a still lower grade.

Such a consideration leads us to emphasize the importance, for social advance itself, of the avoidance of any further curtailment of the free development of individual life than is absolutely necessary for the protection of our civilization and needful for the maintenance in the race at large, apart from the shifting lives of the individuals who just now compose that race, of those standards which mark the trend of social advance.

The study of evolutionary doctrine thus leads us to see that it should be our aim to foster the development of individual life with as little restriction to its free unfolding as is compatible with our ideals of social stability; and, in fact, most intelligent men will agree that the ideal State would be one in which the greatest liberty of the individual would be maintained without restriction of those advantages which can only accrue to the individual by coöperation with his fellows.

IV.

When we turn to the study of broader interracial relations, in which we see the prospect of a new exhibition of the processes of organic development, the significance of our previous considerations becomes at once apparent.

If such a new organic form is to appear, the several diverse races, the "lower" and the "higher" together, must correspond with individual men in the social group. As in the one case instincts subserving the interests of the individual must be modified or reformed to subserve also the interests of the social group to which the individual belongs; so, in the other case, the instincts which have been specially developed in diverse races must be modified or reformed to subserve the interests of the whole aggregate of diverse races.

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But just as surely as in the case of social life, perfect adjustment in this interracial life will be gained only when on the one hand each race expresses its own instincts fully,—works out most completely the special capacities which differentiate it from the other races; while, on the other hand, these expressions of its special capacities in some manner subserve the interests of the whole group of diverse races.

Now evidently as this interracial community, if it is to come into being, must be an organic growth of enormous complexity; and as the bond existing between the diverse races, which are the parts forming this organic whole, must be an exceedingly weak one, we must expect much conflict of racial impulse, if we may so speak, during the process of this modification of the instincts of special races, so that they may form new trends of activity which will subserve the advantage of the new interracial whole.

But here again we see that, if this adjustment is to take place, it must become impossible for the special instincts of a special race to be expressed without regard to the opposed instincts of the diverse races of the greater group.

But while this is true, it is equally true, on the other hand, that the permanent establishment of the interracial group cannot be accomplished unless the special races are allowed just as full and free a development as is compatible with the existence of the group as an organic whole. And this is the point which I feel requires emphasis at this time.

Comparison is here suggested with that class of individuals in social groups, referred to in the last section, who, in order to subserve the growth of social life, would endeavor to restrain by stern measures the free development of what they call the lower type of individuals. If among us we have, as we have seen, but a relatively small class of intelligent men who believe in this extreme restriction of individual development, on the other hand we have a very large and influential class among the most civilized races who believe that it is the function of the "higher" races to subordinate, to crush out, to restrict the natural free development of the so-called "lower" races.

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The argument that is used for the most part by those who favor this view is one which is thought to be a corollary from the established doctrines of evolution. It is doubtless largely because a false notion of the processes of development has become current that we see the present outburst of so-called "imperialism" sustained by earnest and active-minded men in our midst. It is the main purpose of this paper to emphasize the fact that no such argument can properly be deduced from the laws of organic development if these are correctly comprehended.

Those who defend the view thus opposed are wont to argue somewhat as follows: "Whether we like it or not, the process of Nature must inevitably obtain. As we look back at the ages past we see that the stronger and better developed species have always in the end crushed out their weaker and less developed opponents. We have but to look back of human life to the animal kingdom to see that the struggle for existence has ever resulted in the overthrow and destruction of vast numbers of one race by some other which has been better fitted to survive. The obliteration of the North American Indian by the immigrants from Europe, which we may take as an instance, is but a special exemplification of this general process; and the same result must necessarily follow the spread of western civilization into the lands of the Orient which are peopled by inferior races."

In attempting to reply to such an argument it may be worth while, in the first place, to call attention to the fact that even those who use it do not pretend to be aroused to enthusiasm by this discovery of what seems to them to be Nature's plan; they take at the best but a position of stoical indifference in reference to this supposed iron rule of conflict. They tell us we must face the facts, however much we fail to sympathize with Nature's method; and they themselves will scarcely fail to agree with their opponents in feeling that this supposed method is obnoxious and revolting. But surely this lack of sympathy with what is supposed to be Nature's plan indicates that in all higher types of mankind sympathy, and the tendency to coöperate with one's fellows, have become predominant impulses. And the predominance of these sympathetic impulses

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surely in turn indicates that a new characteristic has appeared in the race of men which has not been evidenced in those animal races which have survived only by crushing out their opponents. It implies that in the higher races of men capacities for coöperation have arisen which are already modifying, and which are eventually destined to displace altogether, the very process of Nature with which we find ourselves so unsympathetic, and upon the hypothetical continuance of which is founded the argument we are now opposing.

The argument which is thus found to lack cogency shows itself altogether false if we follow out the comparison suggested in the preceding section. For we are led by this comparison to ask ourselves, in the first place, what proof we have, if we take a broad view, that our race is bound in the end to show itself so greatly superior, as we are wont to assume, to those races which we call lower. Biological and geological researches in later years have proved to us that the eras in the life of man with which we are well acquainted are but as a moment in comparison with the age of the race upon this earth. If in the course of the last few thousand years there has arisen in the western world a race which we call much superior to the races of the Far East, nevertheless we cannot forget that this lapse of time, long as it seems to us, must be looked upon as but a short period in the unwritten history of man's development. What proof have we that our vaunted civilization may not unfortunately prove to be but a temporary variation? What proof that the type which has created the western civilization may not revert in the course of a few thousand years more to a more typical form of human life?

What proof, on the other hand, have we that these so-called "lower" races, if left to themselves, may not develop a civilization more permanent and higher than anything we can ourselves imagine? Circumstances of environment and opportunity have made our race what it has become in these late centuries which are but a short span as biological time is counted. What proof have we that these nations of the Far East, whose civilization has in many cases antedated ours by thousands of years,

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may not finally outrun us in the race if given like advantages of environment and opportunity, and may not in the end produce a type of man of attainments nobler than those of which we dream?

If the considerations which we have reviewed in the preceding pages have weight with us, it appears that they must influence deeply our attitude towards the races of men whom we consider our inferiors, and should lead us to combat vigorously the contentions of the "imperialists" which are current in our day.

If we learn the lesson taught by the comparison of individual life with social life, we must see that the course of development of interracial organization, which is most hopeful, and which it is most rational withal to foster, is one which will allow each special race of diverse qualities and abilities, whether it appear to us with our limited view to be "higher" or "lower," to exercise and strengthen its full capacities with the utmost freedom, and under such restriction only as may be needful to subserve the ends of that higher organic growth to which we aspire, and which will imply the existence, side by side, of the most diverse of races, working in unison for man's advance, and held together by interracial bonds which must constantly gain in intricacy and power.

Let these bonds be multiplied and strengthened by peaceful commerce and interchange of thought, by the gentle influences of education and religion, but without any effort to crush the weaker, or any other use of force than such as is absolutely essential to the preservation from destruction of our own civilization, and needful for the furtherance of the growth of the interracial organism which we dimly see may some day come to vigorous life.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

NEW YORK.

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UNITY OF SPIRIT AS THE BASIS OF A NATIONAL CHURCH.

WANDERING over the hills in the north of England, a traveler often finds, stretched at his feet, a manufacturing town. Two classes of buildings, rising above the general level, catch his eye; the one the stately spires of the churches, the other, the gloomy chimneys of the factory. The one, as it stands calm and serene in the blue air of heaven with the sunshine playing on the gilding at the top, seems to point the way for the inhabitants to a light that lies above; the other, thrusting itself up into the darkness of its own making, and striving, like some giant polypus, to embrace with its tentacles of smoke the whole town, seems to tell the citizens that above there is only black nothingness and all of value lies below. They stand there these two buildings, the church and the factory, as types of the inner life of man, as symbols of idealism and materialism, as signs of the old struggle between the princes of light and the princes of darkness. It is a struggle ancient as the world, a struggle in which the combatants assume, in different ages, different guises and inscribe on their banners different watchwords, and in which the victory inclines now to this side and now to that. In this morning of a new century it is well to ask ourselves first how goes the battle now, and secondly in what condition are our weapons for the conflict that the coming years will bring.

First then as to the state of the fight; there is one side winning all along the line, from every peak and stronghold wave triumphantly their banners with the one magic word "Commerce" blazoned upon them in letters of gold. To see the truth of this we need but look at the standard by which the age of to-day judges a man's conduct; a standard not indeed openly recognized but yet constantly employed in practice. At present we have adopted the standard of commerce which considers actions right or wrong according as they do or do not produce a balance of material goods, and loves to measure men's lives as well as their possessions in pounds, shillings and

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pence. Take a few examples of the way in which public opinion expresses itself. If the talk is of education and the use of teaching some particular subject, by "use" is invariably meant the possibility of the child being able to coin it into money some day. If the question under discussion is reform in sanitary or housing arrangements, the whole matter turns on the probability or improbability of obtaining thereby a citizen of a superior wealth-producing capacity. If by some lucky chance a public body like the London County Council does indulge in great ideas of making a beautiful place of London instead of, as it is now, a mere collection of leagues of dismal dreary streets, we find them accused of wanton extravagance for venturing on an expenditure that can bring in no pecuniary return. If we look at foreign politics we see the vast empire of China exploited by Europeans for the sake of their trade, divided up into spheres of influence, so-called treaty ports and the like, without one single thought of the feelings of its four hundred million inhabitants. Lastly as a fitting climax, when our soldiers are dying by hundreds in a far distant land, as they believe for the honor of their country, we hear him, whose actions have done so much to cause the war in South Africa, proclaiming that the British flag is the most valuable commercial asset in the world. It is needless to give further examples; anyone can extract as many as he pleases from the daily press. Commercialism, that is to say the principle that judges actions as though they were commercial transactions to be tested by the Profit and Loss account, is in the ascendant and its power is steadily increasing.

Secondly seeing that the victory lies at present with Commercialism, we have to consider what arms are at our disposal to do battle against it. In the picture at the beginning of this essay the factory chimney stood as the symbol of this Commercialism, while opposing it were the churches representing spiritualism or idealism. It is to them that we must look if the tide of victory is to be turned; the forces appear sufficient for the work required. For the ministers of the various denominations possess unique facilities for impressing upon men any lessons they unite in desiring to inculcate; they have

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a large body of preachers, places to preach in, and an audience to listen to them. Further as the basis of all their teachings lie the denial of the belief that mankind is to be regarded always as a means, never as an end, and the emphatic assertion that each man's life is of infinite value to himself seeing that there is within him an element that no standard of commerce can ever measure. Here then we have a vast body of preachers whose first duty is to fight Commercialism to the death. How comes it then that its power is growing day by day? It is because there is not union among these preachers, because they are members of isolated churches rent by quarrels and dissensions within, unable to unite for the great effort required to combat the foe at their doors, seemingly half unconscious that there is any such foe. Here and there a kind of guerrilla warfare is carried on, but for want of proper support and often because of active opposition on the part of those who should be their friends, such attacks fail of much result. Absorbed in their own quarrels they are dwelling in a world of their own, their places of worship may be frequented from force of habit, but for idealizing a nation's life their power is gone. It is this want of union that has rendered them impotent and it is only by union that they can hope to save the nation from being swallowed up in this bog of Commercialism. What is wanted is not a collection of individual Churches but a National Church to awake the divine in man that has slept all too long.

A National Church must be one, there cannot be two or more. Just as a country with two Parliaments is in a state of civil war, so a country with two churches is in a state of religious war. In the former condition there is a loss of men's lives, in the latter a loss of something more than men's lives. The one essential of a National Church is unity; without that it is powerless; the name National is without meaning, and is only a set of words framed to mislead men.

If then Unity is a necessity there should be no doubt of the sense in which the word is employed; there should be a clear understanding as to what is meant when a Church is spoken of as one. Unity is a word that has many meanings, it may be used to signify unity of action, unity of purpose, unity of be-

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lief or unity of spirit. In which one or all of these senses (since one meaning does not exclude another) is it possible to speak of the unity of a National Church? The question is meant as a practical one. We have to ask ourselves which, if any, of these different unities can we hope to see established here in England under the prevailing conditions of modern life.

Before attempting to answer this question it is necessary to make a few general remarks as to the conditions that the answer must satisfy.

First since the unity is to form the basis of a Church it must be adequate for the purpose, it must be capable of inspiring the members with the belief that there is a real intelligible bond joining them together so that in a very true sense they are one. This brings up an important distinction that must not be overlooked, a distinction between that which makes and constitutes unity and the various ends which those who are already united may be seeking to promote. It is a distinction between the cause and the effect of unity. Just as a country which is one in virtue of common birth and common sentiment joins in working out certain purposes, purposes which by themselves could never have created a nation out of unconnected individuals; so a Church, as soon as it has become one, may unite, for example, in a struggle against Commercialism, though the need of such a struggle has been unable to give rise to unity.

Secondly the unity must unite many, it must be broad, broad as the nation. The fault of the present Churches is that they are narrow; they include few and exclude many.

Lastly, while broad, the unity must be clear in meaning, it must offer a definite issue so that no doubt can arise as to which side a man belongs.

In discussing therefore the various senses in which the word unity may be employed it is necessary to remember that a unity which is to form the basis of a National Church must satisfy these three conditions; it must be adequate, it must be broad and it must be clear. Let us now turn to the different meanings and consider them in the light of the above.

First with regard to unity of action. Men unite in action

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when they combine to carry out a definite piece of work in a definite way; as for example when the members of a Trade union strike for a rise of wages. Such a unity can never be expected as the tie linking together the member of a National Church, since uniformity of action is impossible under the different conditions of town and country. For a time a unity of action to attain some object may occur but it will cease with the attainment of the object in question. To satisfy the requirements of a National Church something more than a mere succession of single united actions is needed, a something that will bind these actions together and show them to be the expression of a single idea. Unity of action must therefore be rejected as a basis because it is inadequate.

Akin to unity of action is the second of the unities—unity of purpose. Men unite in purpose when they place before themselves some common end as the object of their desire, though they may seek its realization by different means. For example teetotallers agree in purpose when they wish to check drunkenness though they may disagree about the best means of doing so. The essential feature of this unity is the presence of a clear definite purpose; unless this exists there is either a unity of something quite different or else merely a unity of vagueness. Can such a unity of purpose be expected to form the basis of a National Church? There is something attractive in the belief that through its history a single purpose runs which, like a guiding star it has followed down the long avenue of the years, followed it may be often with wavering faltering steps, often with strange wanderings in the wilderness of error, but still followed. That a Church may have some such purpose is true, but to have it, it must already be a united Church; the purpose alone will not make it one. Either this is the case or else the unity of purpose is more accurately called a unity of belief or a unity of spirit. Take as an example the supposition that the promotion of Christianity is the purpose destined to constitute the unity. By Christianity we may mean either a certain creed or a certain spirit or lastly the development of an idea. In the first case the unity of purpose is really a unity of belief, in the second case a unity of spirit, both of which will be discussed

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later, while the third assumes some already prepared soil in which the idea is to grow. The case against unity of purpose may be put in another way. Either the purpose is clear and definite or it is not; if the latter then it cannot unite a Church, if the former, excluding all meanings which would be more correctly called by another name, then it implies an end, and to assign an end is to limit the Church's work. We must therefore reject the claims of unity of purpose because it is either inadequate or not clear, and pass on to the third unity, the unity of belief.

This is the ordinary meaning intended when mention is made of a united Church. The Church is supposed to be formed of a group of people who agree in their beliefs, who have a common creed to which they all give their adherence. Is there any hope of a National Church being established on the basis of this unity of belief? We must remember that we are considering the practical question whether such a Church can arise here and now, not the general one whether, under different circumstances or in different times, it has ever existed or may exist some day.

In the world of science we have a state of things which might encourage us to think that a somewhat similar arrangement might be found in the world of religion; for there is in the former a body of men who to a large extent and to a continually increasing extent have a common belief. The advance of science has been something like the advance of a conquering army; in the front rage continual battles, but behind lies a country in which all may dwell in peace and harmony. Does experience justify the hope that a similar agreement may prevail in religion? It does, but on one condition and on one only. This condition is that the Church shall be regarded as authoritative in matters of belief. All experience is clear in demonstrating the fact that, where free judgment prevails in place of authority, there we shall always find a confusion of beliefs empty of anything that can be called unity. We need only glance at the various beliefs of the different sects, all to be found in the Church of England, to satisfy ourselves that this is true. Belief in the truth of written documents is not

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enough; people can, and in fact do, interpret them as they please. There must therefore be in the Church some authoritative body of persons who will define, and in case of need, redefine, the common creed. This at first sight does not imply anything different from the authority to be seen in the scientific world. Here the ordinary layman in science takes his belief in scientific questions on the authority of men of science; there is nothing obviously absurd in supposing the layman in theology to take his creed on the authority of theologians.

But the cases are not really parallel and a short examination will show that authority in religion means and must mean something quite different from what it does in science. A man takes his science on authority because he observes that there is a general agreement among all who have devoted themselves to its study, because he believes that were he to investigate matters himself he would arrive at the same conclusions, and lastly because he understands that the truths of science have been discovered by following out the ordinary methods of observation and inference he employs in his affairs of daily life. In short in science authority is merely the expression of the opinion of experts who agree. But in theology a man can find nothing similar to this. He discovers that men of equal capacity and equal honesty have arrived at precisely opposite conclusions, and that there is no sort of agreement on a vast number of what are apparently essential questions. He sees himself in the position of an arbitrator who has to give judgment in a case where experts differ, and has every reason to believe that, if he studied the subject himself, he would only add another to the chaos of conflicting creeds. Authority such as is found in science is completely absent. Yet much is talked of the authority of a Church, and its claims to our consideration are urged on the grounds of this very disagreement. But this authority is one resting on a very different foundation, namely on the infallibility of the Church; in other words on the belief that the Deity has breathed into it the words of absolute truth, so that its voice is not the voice of man but of God.

The question whether the unity of a Church can be a unity of belief now becomes the question whether we can expect a

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general faith in an infallible Church to become wide-spread. There can be no doubt that such a unity would have the characteristics both of clearness and adequateness; the only point remaining to be determined is whether it would have broadness as well. Now Infallibility is in a curious predicament; it can neither be proved nor disproved by evidence, since all evidence is fallible. It would therefore seem a very questionable proceeding to depose one Church from its position of Infallibility and exalt another in its place. For to decide between the claims of conflicting infallibilities is apparently beyond the capacity of fallible intellects. This being so, it would seem clear that, as there is already a Church claiming infallibility, we must either find in it our National Church or give up all hope of having one united by a unity of belief. The question now simplifies itself and we have to inquire whether the Catholic, or, as I suppose I should say now-a-days, the Roman Catholic, Church is ever likely to widen into a National Church. I cannot believe it. It has given its sanction to so much that we shall find hard to approve, it has so much in its beliefs that we shall scarcely find credible, and, lastly, infallibility is so foreign to the spirit of the age, that there is little chance of its ever commending itself to us as a nation. It may seem presumptuous in these few lines to dismiss the claims of a Church which has had such a history as that which the Catholic Church possesses, but we must bear in mind that what we are seeking is not a Church of a great past, but a Church that has promise of a great future; not a Church that has filled the world with the fragments of those it has cast forth, but a Church that will build into one temple those scattered members. Now a Church that has steadily set its face against the teachings of science and the wider views of modern thought, and has no room within its walls for men like Dôllinger and St. George Mivart can never become that of which we are in search. A unity of belief, implying as it does belief in the Catholic Church, must be rejected because it lacks breadth.

Before passing on to the fourth sense in which the word

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unity can be employed, it is necessary to consider here briefly a scheme by which men have hoped to secure unity of belief.

The proposal is that the various sects should sink, should give up, their points of difference and join to raise a united Church on the basis of their common points of agreement. Since there is much in religious creeds about which all agree it is recommended that a compromise be made between the various parties by each side consenting to regard as unessential the questions at issue between them and to mould all that is left into a common faith. An example of something of this kind may be found in what is termed undenominational teaching such as exists under the London School Board. The plan has answered well there and indeed appears the only conceivable method of dealing with religious education of children whose parents belong to different denominations. Compromise here is necessary as it would be if compulsory attendance of adults at divine service were exacted, but compromise as the basis of a National Church leads to many difficulties.

The first and obvious objection arises out of the question where the line is to be drawn, whom to exclude and whom to include.

Secondly, granted this has been got over, it cannot be expected that the points of agreement are so clear in meaning that no dispute about them can arise in future. If they arise, there is no one to decide them in the absence of an infallible authority; in consequence any dispute must be settled either by excluding one party or by once more regarding the question at issue as unessential and as not forming part of the common creed. If the first alternative is adopted, we shall have a Church with a continually decreasing superstructure; while, if the second is followed, we shall have a Church whose foundations are constantly being chipped away; in the former case the Church will soon cease to be National; in the latter it will soon cease to be a Church at all.

Lastly the controversial questions between sects or persons, however unimportant they may seem to the disinterested observer, are just the characteristics that constitute a Church's individuality and form the source of its true life and motive

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power; for they include the very beliefs it has assimilated and made its own. To ask for the surrender of these points is to do something of this kind: I say to you, I will give up all that makes me me, you in return shall give up all that makes you you, and together we will form a Church on a basis of a united belief which has hitherto been little better to us than a form of words. Thus we will inaugurate the kingdom of heaven on earth. It is not by emptying a man of all that has made him man, that we shall rear a National Church; obtained in this way a unity can never be adequate for the purpose.

We are drawing to the end of our journey, we have sought for a unity in action in purpose and in belief and have found that none of them satisfies the three conditions of adequateness, broadness, and clearness which any unity, capable of making a National Church, must possess; we have left only the unity of spirit and must now direct our attention there. The three preceding unities were easy to define because they had to do with matters such as acts and beliefs that could clearly be known as common or not common to different people. But the fourth unity is concerned not with outward acts but with the feelings that accompany the acts; it regards man no longer as seen from without but as seen from within. We must therefore consider at some length what is meant by unity of spirit before discussing the question of the possibility of its yielding a bond to make one the scattered Churches of this land.

Unity of spirit does not imply unity of either action, purpose, or belief; they may indeed accompany it but not necessarily so. For example one man gives money to a beggar in the street to get rid of him and his importunity, a second does the same from sympathy with the man's apparent sufferings, while a third refuses it knowing that this is the kindest thing to do. Between one and two there is unity of action but a different spirit, between two and three no unity of action but the same spirit—a spirit of sympathy with his fellow men. To a certain extent these two may be said to have unity of purpose in that they are both seeking to remove pain, but the purpose is vague and indefinite, while the real point in common

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is a certain feeling, a certain attitude towards the world around. This is an example of what I mean by unity of spirit, in this case a spirit of sympathy; the next inquiry must have as its object the determination of the meaning unity of spirit can have when applied to a National Church.

It will not be enough to call this spirit the spirit of religion or of Christianity, since these are words that have had so many meanings given to them that, when used alone, they have almost ceased to have any meaning whatever; on the other hand amongst these meanings must be that which we seek. Now in the lives of those whom we are accustomed to regard as having reached the highest level man has attained, a Jesus of Nazareth, a Francis of Assisi, a Savonarola, or, in modern times, a Father Damien and a Gordon, there is something in common. In spite of the different conditions under which they have lived and the varied scenes in which they have played their part, whether as humble preachers or as inspirers of nations or as laborers among the poor and suffering, there is one single spirit that belongs to them all; it is for this spirit, the inspirer of all that is best and noblest in human nature that we want a name. It is not possible to do better than apply the name that the author of "Ecce Homo" has employed to describe the spirit of Christ, the spirit of "enthusiasm of humanity." This phrase, enthusiasm of humanity, has the advantage of being well known and of exhibiting a clear distinct meaning, so far as the definition of any feeling can be said to be clear and distinct; and lastly the feelings to which it refers form just that group of emotions which has been the common characteristic of the men alluded to above. Other expressions might have been chosen, but none so suitably; it will not however be loss of time to consider one of them, as by contrast the superiority of the term selected will be exhibited in a clearer light. In some wonderful pages of Wilhelm Meister Gœthe has defined what seems to him the peculiarly Christian spirit, as the reverence for what is beneath us, reverence for the weak, the wretched, the pitiful, aye and for the disgraced sinner as well. There is a great and beautiful truth contained in this thought, and it certainly describes one

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characteristic of the spirit we have been discussing, but it falls short of the fullness of the meaning of that spirit. Reverence is at best a passive feeling, its tendency is rather to inhibit than to promote action, while the peculiarity of the spirit in question has been that it has shown itself prominent, as indeed it must, in every field of human activity. Reverence for what is beneath us is a great truth but it is not the whole truth; it creates indeed in man a certain mood or temper of spirit, but it does not drive him along to play his part in the storm of life. Here the enthusiasm of humanity displays its superiority; it includes the reverence for mankind, but it combines with it the love of mankind, and from the two combined the desire for action is quickened. Reverence forms the atmosphere in which the man lives, love gives the motive power; and from the two, reverence and love, united as they are in the enthusiasm of humanity, has arisen the spirit that yearns and strives to lift to some higher level all that lies below. Like all feelings it must be felt to be known; to explain a feeling to those who have not experienced it in a degree is not possible; so without further explanation let us assume that, if there is to be a unity of spirit, it must be this spirit of enthusiasm of humanity.

All feeling is accompanied by some belief, by which it is nourished and which it in turn nourishes; what is this belief here? It is a belief in the Infinite in man. The enthusiasm of humanity is not an enthusiasm for men as we see them now, poor pitiful atoms, with their wild hopes and vain attempts to realize them, with their struggles and failures and successes more bitter than failure, or, worst of all, with the resignation of an irremediable despair; all alike, young and old, rich and poor, good and bad, drifting down the long thoroughfare of life, with no end before them but the grave. There is abundance here to excite a world of pity but nothing to stir enthusiasm. The enthusiasm of humanity is an enthusiasm for one existing in idea, not as yet in fact, an idealized humanity that arouses in us an enthusiasm driving to action. Now an ideal is never absolutely non-existent; it is always partially, even though to an infinitesimal extent, realized; so

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in man as he is we see traces of what he may be. There is a something in him hidden, confined, and seeking vainly for an outlet, glimpses of which are caught, though they are but fragmentary sparks of the light that is within. The clouds close round and we see it no more, but it is there. This truth the poet recognized when he said that his poem was for those—

> "Whose hearts are pure and simple
> Who have faith in God and nature
> Who believe that in all ages
> Every human heart is human.
> That in even savage bosoms
> There are longings, yearnings, strivings,
> For the good they comprehend not,
> That the feeble hearts and hepless
> Groping blindly in the darkness
> Touch God's right hand in that darkness,
> And are lifted up and strengthened."

This truth, on which Christianity has always insisted, has found its most impassioned recognition in the writings of the German Mystics. It is no new truth, but one old as religion itself, so that traces of it are seen, as Max Müller has shown in his wonderful lectures on Psychological Religion, in all the most inspiring of religions. For example, it is this truth that the writer in the Upanishads had in his mind when giving at the same time the truth and his idea of the cause of its want of recognition, he said: "That the Self-existent pierced the senses of man in front, so that man looks forward and not backward into himself; some wise man however with eyes closed and wishing for immortality saw the Self behind." It is this belief in the Infinite, the Divine, the Self, call it what you will, in man that the enthusiasm of humanity implies, inspiring all to sweep aside the mists which dim the Light. The Divine in man is as yet not a being, only a becoming.

I have now tried to explain what I mean by the unity of spirit in religion. It is the unity of the spirit of enthusiasm of humanity, carrying with it a belief in the Divine in men. It yet remains to consider whether this unity can form the basis of a National Church.

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It must satisfy the three conditions of adequateness, breadth and clearness. As regards the last two there can be but little doubt, since that which has been common to many religions must at least be broad enough to contain the different members of one; and as regards clearness what is lacking in this on the side of feeling finds its compensation on the side of the belief that accompanies the feeling. Lastly there remains the condition of adequateness to be considered. So far as greatness of idea is concerned it is satisfied but to adequateness looked at in the light of past experience an objection may fairly be raised. Since, as has been already shown, the enthusiasm of humanity together with its belief in the Infinite in man has been the source of inspiration of all the noblest lives in history and has formed part of the faith of Christianity and has yet failed to produce union, men may say that experience pronounces judgment against it ever becoming the basis of a National Church. Undeniably this objection has considerable weight. Since in what has preceded frequent appeals have been made to experience, it is not possible to dispose summarily of an argument that claims to be supported by experience itself. The following considerations may however lessen the force of the objection.

In the first place it may be remarked that the experiment of a Church connected by unity of spirit has never been fairly tried, since all attempts hitherto made have had as their object the establishment of unity of belief. If the latter is recognized to be impracticable, the former may stand a better chance, seeing that men in transferring their hopes of union from the one to the other will come to realize more distinctly the meaning of a unity of spirit. The place formerly occupied by belief in stirring men's emotions will be filled by the spirit of enthusiasm of humanity, since it will attract to itself the strong group of feelings that always cluster round the idea of union. It will no doubt be urged that after all this essay does wish to produce a unity of belief, a belief in the divine in man. To a certain extent this is true, but the unity of spirit comes first, and it is only from this enthusiasm of humanity, which con-

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stitutes the unity, that a belief in the divine in man can arise. We find ourselves possessed of this enthusiasm and seek to explain how we come by it. We can do so only by seeing in man something that no mechanical theory of the Universe can ever account for. Secondly while undoubtedly experience can show no example of a Church joined by unity of spirit it does present an instance of something very similar in the case of a country. Its citizens are united not by common descent but by a unity of spirit, the spirit of patriotism. A country is not merely a collection of individuals living within its borders but a group of units joined together by one spirit. Its interests are the interests of each one of them and its glory or disgrace is the glory or disgrace of every member. In spite of the wide gulf separating opinions, whether religious or political, in spite of the keenness exhibited in the controversies between different sections, they are one and all united in love of their country. What is possible in a country may surely be possible in a Church as well. No doubt the cause that has produced patriotism is different from the cause which may be expected to give religious unity. For some, love of country is necessary for its existence as such, seeing that without it the country, in the struggle of nations, would have disappeared. But, however this may be, there is in a country that sense of unity of spirit amidst diversity of opinions that we are hoping to see realized in a Church. In a Church as in a country the same condtion for unity is to be satisfied; men must differ while at the same time feeling themselves members of one body.

There is in the case of a country one cause which makes this harmony easier to establish than in the case of a Church. Most men admit, if not to others at any rate to themselves, that they may be mistaken, that their opinions are opinions only and not expressions of infallible truths. Recognizing error as possible in themselves we can regard it as venial in others; agreeing to differ we can look on them as members of the same country and not as enemies. In religion, however, we have not yet advanced far enough to consider error of belief as a thing deserving pardon in place of expulsion and are still in the position

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of tacitly claiming infallibility for our opinions. But time and the age are with us and our views have changed much of late years and are changing still. Men are coming to see that in spiritual matters the light given is not that of a steadily shining sun that renders clear every detail of an open plain, but resembles rather moonbeams struggling down into the heart of a dense forest and illumining only isolated tracts, whose borders are deep shadows of blackness, and giving to all things alike strange forms that pass description. Standing on the threshold of a new century and looking back on the old that is past and gone, amid the wreckage of faiths there is one belief that we see ever growing in strength, the belief in our own littleness, our own fallibility, our own ignorance; from this is springing the spirit of a wide toleration that in some degree justifies the hope that the new century will build for us a National Church.

An idle dream it may be, but there are dreams for which we are the better and which work out their own fulfillment. Such an one may be this dream of a National Church joined and made one in a unity of spirit; a Church that shall make united protest against the paltry littleness of modern life; that to Commercialism, claiming that each man has only a money price, will reply that it may be true we are bought with a price but that the price paid was the life of a Man and that only in terms of man can you reckon man; a Church that will survey and judge all things in the light of a single idea, the religious idea. In this Church one member shall say to another, "Friend, we are in a strange world in which knowledge comes to us only in fragments like spray tossed up from the infinite ocean of the Unknown. Follow we each therefore the truth that he feels within him wherever it may lead; if in the same direction then together; if not then apart, yet joined by unity of spirit, remembering that, though our ways may be widely sundered, time is long and space is broad and in eternity they shall yet meet."

R. A. Bray.

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A DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHER AND HIS WORK.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.* Born Oct. 25, 1840. Died Sept. 14, 1900.

ON the 14th of September last there died at Montreal a wise and good man whose work and influence were out of all proportion to his general reputation. A writer in the London *Spectator* recently declared that at the time of his death Thomas Davidson was one of the twelve most learned men in the world. How that may be I do not know. Certain it is that his profound and varied learning, his portentous memory, his skill in using all languages, and his familiarity with the best that was to be found in all languages—particularly in the lines of philosophy, social science and literature—were to those of us younger men who came to know him, almost appalling. He was learned, and knew that he was learned, above the measure even for learned men. Yet withal he was modest, avoiding rather than courting personal fame. Indeed, he might in truth have said, with Thomas Aquinas, that his motto was *amo nescari.*

With all his learning Mr. Davidson was, however, the most human of men, approachable by all, old and young, high and low, learned and ignorant; generous to a degree in his relations with his fellow-men, giving of himself without stint to all who sought his help or counsel whenever he thought he could be of any use to them in helping them to a higher life. An Adirondack farmer, whose place he had bought, once remarked of

*The list of Mr. Davidson's published books includes: "The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini Serbati," (London, 1882); "The Parthenon Frieze and other Essays," (Boston and New York, 1886); "Scartazzini's Handbook to Dante, with notes and additions," (Boston, 1887); "Prolegomena to Tennyson's In Memoriam," (Boston, 1889); "Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals," (New York, 1892); "The Education of the Greek People, and its Influence on Civilization." (New York, 1894); "Rousseau and Education According to Nature," (New York, 1898); "A History of Education." (New York, 1900). He contributed to *Mind, The Philosophical Review, The International Journal of Ethics, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Educational Review, The Forum*, and other periodicals, upwards of eighty articles, in addition to his reviews of books.

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him that "his hand was stretched out to meet you farther away than that of any man he ever knew." This was true, literally as well as figuratively. Any one who has had the good fortune to visit him in his Adirondack home, where he conducted a summer school of the Culture Sciences, will ever remember with the glow of a larger human kindliness his reception at Glenmore. It was Mr. Davidson's custom to have the large lecture-hall bell rung to announce the arrival of an expected guest. At that signal he would at once drop all work and hasten down from his den in the birch grove some two hundred feet above the main buildings. I can see him now hurrying down the hill, his right hand stretched out to greet me when still a good fifty yards away, his left waving his Tam o'Shanter as he shouts his cheery welcome. The warm handshake that followed, the sincere welcome beaming from every feature of his honest, earnest, sunny, intelligent face, made one feel at once that Glenmore was home.

Mr. Davidson was the most intense man I have ever known, intense in his loves and in his hates, both for persons and for doctrines. It was part of his philosophy that morality consisted, as the Greeks had said, in knowing how rightly to love and how rightly to hate, and, he would have added, in having abundant affections to distribute. He firmly believed that the stronger a man's passions were, the greater were his possibilities for virtue and victory, if only they could be rightly directed. Rousseau once wrote, *"Il n'y a que les âmes de feu qui sachent vaincre."* Mr. Davidson was one of those *âmes de feu,* and he held himself in check by an iron will, and knew how to conquer. No obstacles were for him insurmountable. Finding in the course of some of his investigations in Scholastic Philosophy that he needed a more thorough acquaintance with Arabic than he could acquire from the books, he dropped all other work and went to Cairo to live with the Arabs and learn to speak their tongue. He was then just fifty-four years of age. His last published book was written at a time when he was unable to get more than three consecutive hours of sleep, and when every waking moment was filled with intense pain. Yet his cheerful but profound optimism finds in this

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book perhaps its noblest expression, and not once does his personal suffering break through to color a single phrase.

Mr. Davidson was absolutely unsparing of himself and of his friends, downright and straightforward to the point of *intransigeance*. He could never quite forgive a man who had once told him a lie, or proved himself ungenerous. He was ever bitter in his denunciation of all forms of pharisaism and of the pride of mere respectability which consisted, he held, solely of negative virtues. Comfort worshipers, sensuous dalliant souls, and all time-servers were his special aversion. But a keen sense of humor, a hearty, jovial nature, and a broad philosophy saved him from the snares of asceticism and left him, with all his vigorous and uncompromising standards, one of the most sociable of men. He always sought out in all men traces of genuine human worth, and he knew how to look behind appearances for the real substance of worth. Consequently his friends were frequently of rough exterior and rougher manner, and he was often found with publicans and sinners. And to his friends he remained ever loyal.

Mr. Davidson was born in Aberdeenshire, in Scotland, October 25, 1840. He received his education in the common schools of his native town, and in the University of Aberdeen, where he acquired, as a second nature, the habit of exact scholarship. What this training meant for him may be inferred from the fact that he used to say, with a full knowledge of the school systems of all lands, that if he had to be educated over again and could choose his schools and masters, he would go through precisely the same training that he had enjoyed. When still a very young man he came to America and, after a brief sojourn in Canada, made his way to Boston. Later he removed to St. Louis where he taught for a time in the public schools, and where he made the acquaintance of the famous little group of St. Louis philosophers, most of whom became his life friends. But Mr. Davidson was a born dissenter who could not and would not fit into any niche. He chafed under all restraint, and was not entirely contented until he finally found his liberty in the life of a free lance, lecturing, writing, teaching private classes, and in this way earning his

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modest livelihood while holding himself responsible to himself alone and to his own lofty ideals. Opportunities for University preferment came, but he refused to surrender one jot of his freedom. His mode of life gave him a good six months of every year for leisurely study and frequent opportunities for long visits to Europe, as his studies might call for wisdom that could there best be pursued. Besides, he had a decided distrust of our universities which, he held, were still suffering from mediævalism in methods and habits, from formalism, and from an absence of entire freedom and candor. Moreover, he did not regard the students in the universities to-day as the most promising material to work with, holding that most of them were under the dominion of purely frivolous aims, while most of even the more serious students were animated by no higher motive than the desire to fit themselves to find a more comfortable berth for life. In few, if any, could he find an ardent desire for knowledge for its own sake and for the sake of the light it could throw on the purpose and meaning of life. Only in the last years of his life did he succeed in finding a class of students with whom he could work with entire satisfaction and enthusiasm. When he did find them, with characteristic fervor he gave the best of himself and of his time and energy in working for and with them, asking no other compensation for his services than honest and faithful work on the part of his students. These were the students he found amongst the bread-winners in the East Side of New York. After working with them for two years he wrote: "No one who has ever taught a class of intelligent bread-winners will return willingly to academic teaching. It would be well if all college students were engaged in the practical duties of life."* Of this work, which at last put his democratic philosophy to the test of practice, we shall have more to say later. Let us first try briefly to state that philosophy.

We cannot better approach the study of this philosophy than by noting in advance the temper of its author's mind as it revealed itself in strong antipathies to some of the

*"History of Education," p. 264.

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more popular currents of contemporary thought. Hegel, with his denial of the principle of contradiction, he held to be the "prince of confusionists." Historically Hegel's philosophy seemed to him mainly significant as the *reductio ad absurdum* of modern subjectivism, that is to say, of the modern effort to define the forms of thought so exhaustively that nothing is left for the material of thought. At the same time, however, he held that Kant had rendered inestimable service in pointing out that the real meaning of Hume's scepticism was that it had conclusively proved that the mind is essentially active and therefore does not receive any ready-made impressions, but exercises from the first a determining power in the very creation of the world that it knows; that, consequently, no concepts taken either from common sense, or from time-hallowed philosophies, can be accepted without being subjected to the most careful scrutiny. Hegel, however, had too easily concluded, from finding the importance of the part played by the thinking activity, that thought was the last term in the description of reality, and so his philosophy gave us a cobweb world, an arid and unreal system which, logically carried out, could but lead to pantheism, from which disastrous result it was saved in the letter, but not in truth, by Hegel's skill in juggling with such terms as freedom, God, Trinity, and the like, wherein was displayed his ingenuity in pouring new wine into old bottles rather than his zeal in the cause of truth.

The agnostic's position came in for equal condemnation. His whole difficulty comes from the fact that he starts out with a supernaturalistic notion of reality, with a conception, that is, of the absolutely real as, whatever else it may possibly be, never a possible object of experience. The agnostic's conclusion therefore, that reality is unknowable, is a trivial one, or, to put it otherwise, is simply another way of stating his fundamental premise, which premise, in its turn, is a downright prejudice.

Those who gloried in the confusion of philosophies and philosophers, in order that they might point a moral as to the presumption and imbecility of mere reason, whether their Pyrrhonism were proclaimed in the interest of piety, as a prepa-

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ration for faith, or in the interest of a supposed freedom that could not brook even the constraint of reason, or in the interest of nature worship like that which found expression in Rousseau in some of his more turgid moods, and frequently in Wordsworth in such passages as:

> "One impulse from the vernal wood
> Can teach us more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good
> Than all the sages can,"

—in short, the defenders of all forms of mere sentimentalism and irrationalism were treated continually, and effectually, with the scorn which they deserve. After all, there is no blasphemy worse than that which spends itself in dragging in the mire the noblest faculty with which man is endowed, the faculty which distinguishes him from the animals and enables him to lead a moral life. Not that the doctrine to which one must give adherence is a "cold intellectualism," as it is called. No, the knowledge that is the aim of our rational endeavor is "knowledge armed with moral efficiency, knowledge which commands respect and reverent submission . . . . What turns intellect into a spring of action and freedom is not its power of distinguishing things, but its power of seeing that things have different values, that one thing is better than another, and, therefore, to be preferred to another." This is what is meant by the old saying that not only the thoughts of the head but the thoughts of the heart also must be pure.*

Perhaps of all the irrationalists, the philistine misologists, the conventionally respectable men who are superior to philosophy, seemed to him the most immoral and pernicious influence of the time,—the men who contemptuously deny "that every man and woman ought to be a philosopher."

> "So much does the old habit of authority and convention in matters of intelligence and morals still prevail, so much are men still the slaves of these, that philosophy, which alone can make men free, is still looked upon with suspicion and ill-concealed contempt. One continually hears, "but you can't expect every man to be a philosopher. It takes a long time to learn philosophy, and people generally have other things to attend to.

*"Intellectual Piety," pp. 4, 5.

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They must sow and reap, buy and sell, eat and drink, and they must have a good time. Philosophy is dull solemn business.' The implication, of course, is that sowing and reaping, buying and selling, and so on, are more important things than philosophy, and this, indeed, is what the world of our time practically believes. The general belief is that the end of life is to acquire material wealth and have a 'good time,' which means to satisfy the natural inclinations, which our education accordingly fosters and pampers. I say this is the result of a failure to recognize that the aim of man's life is man's perfection, and that perfection consists in perfect insight, perfect love and perfect freedom. As soon as men see this clearly they will no longer look down upon philosophy, which is but another name for loving insight, one of the essential elements in human perfection. To despise philosophy is to despise spiritual perfection, for clear knowledge is one of the elements of that perfection. There is no duty more incumbent upon any human being than to know, unless it be the duty of loving with divine love everything known, in proportion to its worth, and sternly refusing to be guided by personal feelings and inclinations. A man or woman who is not a profound thinker, seeing the things of the world in their true ideal proportions, and acting accordingly, is a mere dependent, half-enslaved creature, whatever amount of so-called culture, refinement and kindness he or she may have. Such a person is still a slave to authority and convention, a mere play-actor in life, bound to play a traditional, unreal part, without any of the glorious liberty of the children of God, of them who see the Divine face to face, and, in the light thereof, all things in their true worth."*

We are dealing, you see, with the philosophy of a man who has banished entirely from his world things-in-themselves and unknowables, and, therefore, materialism, supernaturalism and all other forms of agnosticism, but who at the same time believes that modern idealisms, by singling out one aspect of experience, namely the formal or universal aspect, and regarding it exclusively, have thereby started upon a path that cannot but lead, when logically carried out, to pantheism and the evil type of mysticism.

We can now easily conclude this preliminary fixing of the place of Mr. Davidson's philosophy by the mere enumeration of the objects of his special admiration. These were Æschylus, Socrates, Aristotle, Joachim of Flores, St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Kant (with reservations), Rosmini, Goethe (especially the "Faust"), and Tennyson ("In Memoriam"). And of all of these undoubtedly the first place was held by Socrates, the

*"Intellectual Piety."

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genuinely religious dissenter, the confident believer in human reason and almost the only true individualist; the man who, moreover, justified in his life as well as in his philosophy his claim to our reverence for these things.

One more thing must be borne in mind in our effort to understand this philosophy, and that is the predominance throughout its author's life of the practical interest. He comes to his theoretical speculations because of vital practical needs, as could not but be the case with one of his intense temperament and strict Presbyterian upbringing. But he was a born dissenter, and he firmly believed that the times were religiously and socially out of joint, and that it was his duty, as it was that of every man, to do his best to set them right. With this end in view he took an active interest in the founding of the London Fabian Society. The name of the society is significant. Its determined aim was the gathering and disseminating of information that might lead to the amelioration of social conditions, but it was to be committed to no theory in advance. Later, as the organization drifted toward outright socialism, Mr. Davidson lost interest in it. Socialism seemed to him to be indeed the logical enough outcome of the view of life that places its highest values upon wealth, position and physical comfort; which is, however, a complete inversion of true values. Having its aim centered in these external goods, a reform that looks to them primarily must be mechanical and cramping to the life of the spirit. He saw, in other words, with profound truth that the end to begin with in social reform is always the individual, and, in the individual, his education; that, furthermore, the aim of this education should be to help its possessor to estimate things more nearly at their true worth and to give him the strength to rise above the rule of animality and rightly distribute his affections.

Mr. Davidson also founded the Fellowship of the New Life, first in London, afterward in New York. This society was organized for mutual help in the cultivation of the life of the spirit, for mutual aid in the discovery of real values, and in living accordingly. It was not a church, not even a Unitarian Church, for it had not the

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vestige of a creed, unless, indeed, it is having a creed to maintain that there is a higher life for man and that it behooves him earnestly to seek to know what that life is and then to lead it. This organization might be called a sort of Fabian Society of the Spirit. The difficulty with a society of this character is that it is apt to degenerate into sentimentalism, "to mistake" (in the strong language of a recent German writer) "fine feelings for argument and the expanded bosom for the bellows of divinity." Therefore it, too, soon proved unsatisfactory, and both of these practical efforts toward reform convinced Mr. Davidson that the one thing needful above all else in our day is a definite gospel that rests upon, and needs, no authority save the approval of individual reason, a gospel that must therefore also be a philosophy.

Such a philosophy Mr. Davidson believed he had found through his fortunate discovery of Rosmini. It was a doctrine of radical, uncompromising pluralism that was saved from the chaos of atomism by joining with it the belief in the absolute, divine, eternal worth of every member of this community. So intent was he upon saving his doctrine from any swamping monism that he insisted upon calling his view *apeirotheism*. Certainly there was no room in his philosophy for a God who works by special providence, or distributes rewards and punishments. "The God of the future," he writes, "the just God, gives to each one precisely what with his own efforts he has righteously won, neither more or less. The man who asks for more is a miserable dependant, sycophant and beggar; the man who is content with less is a fool."*

The method whereby it was sought to establish this philosophy was the epistemological method. Every one who has studied the course of philosophy at all knows that always after the zeal of the first efforts has led to the facile construction of some system or other a rival view inevitably looms up, that seems to have quite as strong a claim as the first, and yet contradicts it. So the two doctrines consume one another, and a period of doubt and scepticism supervenes. From the moment this stage is reached one can only make his escape from the intellectual slough of despond by asking, as a prior question

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in his philosophy, what *is* knowledge, and how do we come by it? Yet what you find written in the history of philosophy is also always this: that, when this question is raised, forthwith it is assumed that two antithetical terms are somehow immediately given, and that knowledge consists in bringing these two terms to unite; but as these terms are always taken to be mutually exclusive, philosophies are hard put to it to effect the union. These antithetical terms are, to take the most common instances, the fixed and the fleeting, subject and object, the universal and the particular, appearance and reality, reason and sense, mind and matter, sensitive tablet and external things. And the puzzle of knowledge is to get one of each of these pairs at its opposite. It is generally assumed that if only, by some sort of philosophical alchemy, you can transfuse these incompatibles, or forcibly collocate them, your problem of knowledge is solved. If this cannot be done, then one of the opposites is usually discarded in favor of the other. Now it is obvious that we should not begin with these terms, as if they themselves required no further scrutiny. We must begin by analyzing the act of cognition, and the act of perception, as they really appear in immediate experience, and not as they are interpreted by a ready-made theory, such as is implied in the very statement of the problem as it usually appears. Bacon said that our duty as scientists is to interpret nature and not to anticipate it. As philosophers, our task is to interpret experience and not to anticipate it.

The result that is reached by this method I can best give in Mr. Davidson's own words:

"Instead of saying as has been said heretofore, that the world starts with an inscrutable God, inscrutable atoms, or an inscrutable ether, not one of which can identify itself with our intelligence and so be known, our theory says that the world consists of a multitude of sentient individuals or atoms, whose unity is their sentience, and that these are essentially related to each other through desire. Sentience and desire are two aspects of the same fundamental fact. There is no desire without sentience and no sentience without desire. . . . Matter itself, so far as we could know it, would have to be groups of feelings. . . . The only possible completely intelligible and moral world is a world composed of essentially distinct feelings or sentiences . . . . interrelated through action and passion, two forms of feeling, and yet fundamentally impenetrable to each other.

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And, indeed, this is the world that we really find ourselves in, or in ourselves. I can feel your action and you can feel mine; but my feeling, or the feeling which I am is utterly opaque to you, and the feeling which you are to me. I can learn that you have a toothache and even understand it, if I have had one as a modification of my own feeling; but I can never feel the toothache which you feel. As sentient and desiring subjects we are absolutely impenetrable to each other, and, in so far, we are hypotheses to each other. That is the price we pay for being realities, eternal realities, if you will. If you could feel my feelings we should be merged into one and both cease to be individuals. This does not lead to Agnosticism, as might seem at first sight. There is nothing in you that I may not know if you choose to be communicative; but your feelings I can never feel. So far, happily we must be eternally agnostics. That is the price we pay for being anything at all."*

Or, consider, again, this statement:

"Each has only to ask himself, What do I know myself to be? And if he answers honestly he will, I think, say: 'I am a feeling or sensibility, modified in innumerable ways, by influences which I do not originate. These modifications, when grouped, are what I call the world, or *my* world, for I know no other. I am the sentient unity of a sensible world."†

This is, of course, a mere summary of the results reached in Mr. Davidson's philosophy,‡ and it will at once suggest many doubts and queries. I believe that we should find that these

*"American Democracy as a Religion," in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. X, p. 30 ff.

†"Education as World Building," in *Educational Review* for Nov, 1900. p. 327.

Amongst Mr. Davidson's published writings the one that throws most light upon his general philosophical standpoint is the article on "Perception," which he contributed to *Mind*, Vol. VII. (1884), at the time when the influence of Rosmini was particularly strong. The fact in experience which he then wished to emphasize was Being. This he thought Hegel, and indeed, all idealists, spirited away by regarding it exclusively in its aspect as definitely universalized in thought. Thus Being evanished into a category; the *quod cognoscimus* was taken up into, and consumed by, the *quo cognoscimus*. In the latest formulations of his philosophy we find that the term "being" has given place to the phrases, "fundamental feelings," or "substantial feelings," together with "desire"—the active aspect of feeling. The transition is easily understood. Being that is not even conceivably exhaustible in thinking, if it is not to vanish, in the opposite direction, into a mere unknowable substratum of experience, must find its meaning *in* experience, and, when we turn into experience, that which is there immediately given as real is just feeling. It should be added that Rosmini almost suggests this transition. The phrase "fundamental feeling" is his.

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doubts have not all been sufficiently considered. The full elaboration of this philosophy, in other words, had unhappily not been completed.

Just as Schopenhauer had tried to escape from the consequences of the omnivorous thought principle, upon which the German philosophy that preceded him had rested, by emphasis upon the will, so Mr. Davidson tries to avoid the pantheism of both of these philosophies by making feeling the fundamental fact in experience. Now, this is just where one naturally seeks to lay the emphasis if one is intensely interested in developing a pluralistic philosophy, for it is as feeling that we are directly shut within our own worlds, and shut out from the worlds of other individuals.

This doctrine, moreover, in two ways seeks to ward off the charge of mere subjectivism: (1) In accepting as a fact the action, through desire, of one individual upon another,—an obvious *fact*, but one which most idealisms have difficulty in adjusting to their systems. (2) In making room for a moral ideal. Life and education consist in world-building, in ordering, classifying, grouping our sensations, and hypostasizing them. "But there are worlds and worlds. Since the human being is a sentient desire, which from its very nature demands the highest and most varied satisfaction, the aim of education must be to enable him to construct a world capable of yielding such satisfaction. . . . The extent and richness of the world which any living being constructs depends upon two things: its capacity for manifold experience, and its power of arranging or classifying that experience. The former of these, again, depends upon the number and acuteness of the senses; the latter upon the force of the primitive desire for satisfaction. . . . Ethical life depends upon the completeness and harmony of the world evolved in the individual consciousness." A moral world would be one in which objects were stamped with their value for the satisfaction of desire, and loved and made motives for the will, in accordance with that stamping. The spring of all wrong doing is, as Æschylus said, false-coinage, παραχοπά. Some worlds are small but well ordered, the world of the ordinary respectable citizen; some small and ill-ordered,

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the world of the parasite and ordinary criminal; some large and well-ordered, the world of the saints, heroes, benefactors of humanity, thinkers, statesmen and reformers, the introducers of ideals; some large but ill-ordered, the world of the Macbeths and Napoleons, the great reprobates and criminals. Some worlds again are rigidly bounded, the worlds of the narrow conservative, "old fogy," or of the fanatic of one idea; others are continually expanding, the worlds of the liberal and the reformer. The pessimist is simply the man who continually fails to organize a world satisfactory to his desires, and who proclaims himself a failure in world-building.*

The pluralistic philosophy which Mr. Davidson reached, a brief and summary statement of which we now have before us, he held to be the genuine philosophy of democracy, since it recognizes the individual as the source of all authority, and at the same time regards every individual as animated by a desire that is in truth nothing less than a desire for the highest, and as capable therefore of realizing for himself the highest satisfaction. Two things follow as a necessary consequence from this teaching. (1) It should be possible for every individual to share in the inheritance of the ages, in all, that is, that the ages have produced that is of real soul-satisfying worth, in the highest culture of the time. And fortunately there is enough of these blessings to go around, for these are just the things that, as Mr Davidson used to say, can be multiplied indefinitely without being divided. (2) It should be the duty and privilege of every more favored individual to labor without ceasing in order that he may help his fellow-men into their inheritance. And such help consists not merely in giving them knowledge and culture, and helping them rightly to distribute values, but also in helping to make them more efficient and competent craftsmen. The latter work can only be undertaken by such institutions as the famous London Polytechnic, but every citizen can do his share in the former.

Mr. Davidson accordingly spent his life in the effort to

*"Education as World Building," *Educational Review* for November, 1900.

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uplift men by supplying a sound, aimful education. To him the world seemed "sadly unspiritual, sadly narrow, ignorant and frivolous. It has lost the light of reason, and is running after vain shadows." Animated throughout his career by a profound missionary zeal, he early determined to do his share in making the world spiritual again. His efforts, alone and unaided, to accomplish this work were very far from satisfying him, and he went through life hunting for kindred souls, dreaming of the establishment of a sort of Pythagorean brotherhood of the spirit, a community where the actual daily life should be a practical object lesson in the right adjustment of social relations. Indeed, the dominant aim of his life might be summed up in the words in which he described the purposes of one of the organizations which he effected with that end in view: 1. "To bring men together who really and in all earnestness desire to comprehend the world, in order that they may better it, and who are ready to consider all questions without prejudice or respect for current and conventional opinions or authority." 2. "To disseminate in every way, by teaching, lecturing, printing, and *especially by living*, intellectual and moral truth, and to put a period to living by mere conventionality and uncomprehended dogma."

None of these undertakings proved entirely satisfactory, and it was only toward the end of his life that, almost by chance, he stumbled upon the opportunity to carry on this work in a way that seemed to him altogether encouraging.

In the fall of 1898 he lectured in the Educational Alliance to a large audience composed mainly of hard-driven laboring men and women from the East Side of New York upon "Problems which the Nineteenth Century hands on to the Twentieth." At the conclusion of the lecture one man arose and objected that it was all very well to talk about profiting by the culture of ages, but, as for them, they were ground in the dust and had no opportunity. With characteristic impetuosity Mr. Davidson exclaimed that it was not so, that they had all the opportunity they deserved; that, if they only wanted these things badly enough, they could get them. "For instance," said he, "if you will form a class, and fall to

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work in dead earnest, I will come down and meet you once a week and teach you." A large number signified their eagerness to undertake the work, a class was formed which soon numbered several hundred men and women, and Mr. Davidson, always better than his word, went down twice a week, meeting, on his second visit, a class of those who were particularly interested in philosophy.

At the first meetings of the class doctrinaire socialists, steeped in the theories of Marx, were very much in evidence; but, under the Socratic cross-questioning of their teacher, they were soon put into confusion and, by common consent, it was agreed that the discussion of these most difficult and complex social questions should be deferred for some years, until they had acquired a broader knowledge of the history and meaning of civilization and of the culture which it had produced.

What he accomplished with these men and women, and how he accomplished it, forms an interesting and significant chapter in the history of modern efforts for the uplifting of mankind, but a detailed account of this work would carry us beyond the limits of this paper and must be postponed to another occasion.

In this band of intensely eager and earnest minds Mr. Davidson felt that at last he had found his family, and the work with them inspired him with a new hope for the future, a hope which he has voiced in the concluding chapter of his last published work:

> "If the teachers of the nation, with a due sense of their power and importance, would, without hope or desire for material reward, form themselves into an association for the higher education of the bread-winners, as the teachers of France are doing, and each devote a couple of evenings a week to the work, they would soon elevate the culture of the whole people, and remove the worst dangers that threaten society. Poverty, vice and degradation would, in large measure, disappear, giving place to well-being, virtue and nobility. There is no more patriotic work than this; for it is not amid the thunder of the battle-field, where men slay their fellowmen, that the noblest civic laurels are won, but in the quiet school room, where devoted patriots, men and women, combine to slay misery, meanness and corruption." (Hist. Ed. 276).

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THE PROPAGANDA OF CIVILIZATION.*

If the mood in which the beginning of the century finds the chief nations of the northern temperate zone is to last, we are passing into one of those sharply marked off epochs in human history. In whatever directions we may think the intellect of the eighteenth century failed, its freedom from national assertiveness, its claim to international kinship, its enthusiasm for a humanity undivided and undivisible, have been practically unassailed. The national state of mind and the political policy necessary to give expression to this intellectual catholicity have been inculcated with an unquestioning devotion and allegiance generally reserved for matters of religious faith. The state of mind we have been taught to preserve is that of consideration for neighbors, upon the assumption that they, as well as we, are contributing to a fabric of law and order called civilization; and the political policy adopted has been one of modest and non-provocative guardianship of our national heritage as regards its foreign relationships, and of reforming and elevating effort in its domestic affairs. "It is required that we should aim at living in the community of nations," wrote Mr. Grant Duff in his introduction to his "Elgin Speeches," "as well-bred people live in society, gracefully acknowledging the rights of others, and confident, if we ever think about the matter at all, that others will soon come to do no less for us."

That state of mind and that political policy are being seriously assailed in Great Britain for the first time since the Whig ascendency. We have had our war passions often, and our dreams of a tinsel greatness, but these have only touched the surface of our national life. To-day, the Imperialist movement goes deeper. The shouts of the crowds in the streets, are not merely, as they were in the days of the French and the Russian wars, the bravos of a people that had to be kept quiet, they are the opinions of an electorate whose mental state has to be consulted by public representatives seeking to win votes.

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*A lecture delivered to the West London Ethical Society.

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Nor is the Imperialism of the day a mere outburst of angry nationalist pride roused by insult or aggression; it is a quickening of that sense of national righteousness which every people feels when it contains within itself either the awakening life of a great future or the invigorating discipline of a splendid past. The movement is all the more fraught with possibilities for good or ill that it is an expression of fundamental and permanent characteristics, that it is an expression of the sovereign will and not merely the holiday admiration of a disfranchised mob.

So far as the underlying spirit of Imperialism is a frank acceptance of national duty exercised beyond the nation's political frontiers, so far as it is a claim that a righteous nation is by its nature restless to embark upon crusades of righteousness wherever the world appeals for help, the spirit of Imperialism cannot be condemned. Morality is universal; the human sympathies and aspirations are so imperious that they embrace the world; the reforming ardor which compels us to embark upon the stormy and treacherous waters of world-statescraft, gushes from springs seated not merely in our nationalism but in our humanity. Hence it is, that when national existence is no longer threatened, national boundaries no longer disputed, and national life well knit together, the nations must invariably issue into a conflict regarding their place and influence in the world—regarding the scope and value of that righteousness which they think is theirs. A nation, like an individual, must live morally and not merely exist physically, and one of the first essentials of the moral life is a feeling of responsibility—a vindication of the use of that life to something else than its own self. The higher the type of life, the more imperious is this desire. Carlyle's shriek to produce in God's name, is heard and understood by nations as it is by persons. Christianity is the best example of this necessity of the active life to assimilate, to overflow, to outgrow, to conduct a propaganda. At its birth, it issued its royal proclamation. Its missionaries have been in every land and speaking in every tongue, in their crusade to "preach the gospel unto all peoples."

In this respect, indeed, I see no difference between Chris-

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tianity as a faith and a national ideal as an inspiration. Both assume a special custodianship of what may be called "living truth"; both believe that they can contribute to the highest well-being of the world; both believe that they have discovered something which has been only partially discovered otherwise, or perhaps not otherwise discovered at all; both believe, as has been said of Christianity, "The gospel (the nation would say liberty or justice) having been designed for all nations, and its field being the world, it was from the first associated with means for its own extension."

The special form of this conception of national duty to the world in general, is that it is the duty of a nation to spread civilization. We are all more or less hypocrites in the sense that other people see the logic and the application of our principles in some respects better than ourselves, and we are therefore—even the most uselessly self-centred amongst us—open to the attack of somebody whose critical faculty has discovered some difference between our professions and our conduct to which we ourselves are blind. And so it is with nations. It is easy to dismiss with impatience Russia's efforts to reduce European armaments by a description of Russia's military system; it is easy to laugh at France's *Liberté, Fraternité Egalité* by a short enquiry into France's poltical and social history; it is easy to shatter the claims of morality made by Great Britain by a recital of some glaring events in British politics. That is an outside critical contribution, but it does not alter the fact that the Slav thinks that the Teuton has had his day, that he has sunk the spiritual things of life under a load of material excrescences; that the French believe that they preserve for the world those sentiments of good feeling and those manners of polish which are the most characteristic signs of progress from the stage of the brute; that the Briton, in an unimaginative but deadly serious way, considers that the torch of political enlightenment has been handed by some controlling cosmic power into his hands. Each defends its world policy on those grounds of moral economy.

Such are the "destinies" which the nations have placed before them. When the nations begin to be allured by what

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they call their destiny, when they feel a conviction that something imperious whose designs are "inevitable" in history has selected them as a chosen people, it is no gross motive which inspires them to begin with. It is not my business, however, to take these ideals of destiny as a dim rushlight, and try with their aid to peer into the future. That would be interesting and, I think, somewhat profitable; but I have referred to them now only because I want to make it clear that however successful designing men may be in prostituting the high purposes of the nations to their own ends, or however imperfectly the nations themselves interpret their ideals in their political policies, the compulsion to expand and to assume world responsibility is worthy at its origin. It is nothing less than a recognition on the part of nations that they have a duty to the world, and that is as worthy as the idea that individuals have a duty to the communities in which they live.

The question to which I venture to give an answer is: How is this national duty to be performed? How can one nation promote the civilization of another? It is here that we discover the point of departure of two great parties in the country. That departure certainly does not take place on the question whether a nation has a duty to the world or not. The division appears when opinions how the duty is best fulfilled are expressed.

The answer to these questions must depend on how we regard civilization. If it is a veneer imposed by law or military force, a routine of life prescribed by authority, a garment of order which may be put on or taken off in accordance with a sovereign will, the question is obviously a very easy one to answer. A free distribution of administrators who have passed examinations in English law and native languages, and of soldiers who have been taught the arts and mysteries of Maxims, will civilize the world in a generation.

But civilization is not this thing apart, this garment, this surface characteristic. Guizot has likened it to the ocean, which receives all the streams of national life. It is not only the civilization of China or of India with their long centuries of political and moral evolution—their religions, their sys-

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tems of law and order, woven inextricably into their national fabric,—that is joined by myriad fibres to the past, but the social order of the rudest tribe whose spiritual development has not gone beyond witchcrafts and devilries, is also an organic and disconnectable part of its existence. It is as true of the most barbaric as it is of the most civilized nations, that their code of social habit and their system of moral order are outgrowths from the historical and national circumstances of the people and have no life apart from those circumstances. The valuable "Report on Native Laws and Customs," by a Commission appointed by the Cape Colony Parliament in 1883, lays special stress on the fact that "many of the existing Kaffir laws and customs are so interwoven with the social conditions of the native population, that any premature or violent attempt to break them down or sweep them away, would be mischievous and dangerous in the highest degree, besides, as experience has shown, defeating the object in view."

Therefore, the distinction so often made between civilization and barbarism is mistaken in so far as it assumes that barbarism is a state of unmade or chaotic nature, a state unillumined by reason, a state of brutishness characterized by an absence of wise adaptation of institutions to a desirable end. The lowest form of institution is a growth from conditions and shows rational adaptations of man to circumstances and society to tribal history. The lowest barbarian has his civilization. He may be a child, but he is a child with a social inheritance. He is not a thing to bend at will. His resistance to civilization, as *we* understand it, is not simply that *he* does not understand it, but that he has a civilization of his own which he *does* understand.

Consequently, the first important fact which the propagandist of civilization has to keep in mind is, that each grade in social and political development has its own civilization, and that his influence must be directed not *de novo* but on lines already determined by tribal experience.

His next discovery is equally important. It is not only that there are different kinds of civilization, but that every civilization has some political, social or ethical excellence which in

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that respect may place it superior to the propagandist's civilization itself.

The Western propagandist is still very much like the old dame who opened her school for the instruction of youth with no other equipment than a few large print copies of the alphabet, the Book of Proverbs, and a long strip of leather or a cane. The inhumanity of the Chinese, not being the inhumanity of the citizens of London, Paris, Berlin or New York, can always be recited to arouse crowds in those cities to a righteous horror of the "heathen Chinee"—just as the Western civilizations can be described in Pekin from the point of view of the cultured Chinaman, and be made the starting point of a Boxer movement. The shortcomings of an Egyptian Government under the Paschas appear to the English mind a good reason why English administrators should govern Egypt, but the shortcomings which the Egyptian, brought up in the civilization of the Nile Valley, feels regarding British rule, are put down to the incapacity of the Egyptian to understand the value of favors received. A nation which is at once the prosecuting attorney for another nation's faults and the judge of its own work, can hardly be expected to see that the faults may be upon both sides and that its claims to be the agent of civilization may amount to little more than that, in a game of see-saw, it has tilted the beam to the other side. The beam may not have been tilted so much beyond the just balance as it was formerly, but the balance is tilted; and a sudden tilt in a new direction, however near to the balance of justice the beam may rest, may be fatal to a national life which has been taught to adjust itself to less ideal conditions, whilst the faults of the new order may be painfully apparent to the people trained in blindness to the greater faults of the old.

The superior claims of Western civilization are founded mainly on two circumstances—the first is our abhorrence of violent human suffering; the second, the value we place upon settled government. Both are of comparatively recent growth, and the first is only imperfectly developed. We abhor the torture of human beings in which the sentiment of the Middle Ages revelled, but the half stifled moan of humanity

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bending under a daily load, the quiet sufferings, the weeping in the closets, are still regarded as something which should not disturb our serenity. We have controlled our eyes, we have not opened our hearts. A massacre of Hindoos after the manner of the Armenian atrocities would be impossible in our Indian Empire, but an Indian famine touches the consciences of but a very few of us. Some peoples less civilized than we are, still indulge the eye, but are controlled more by the heart. The Armenian who said that he preferred an occasional Turkish massacre to a never ending Russian tyranny expressed this point.

Strange as it may seem at first, it is nevertheless true that the value we place on settled government is a great impediment in our way as civilizing agents. We have come to identify settled government with civilization itself, and that mobility of social ethics which is a characteristic of the peoples we have to deal with, is neither understood nor allowed for by us. I can now only deal with one illustration of this. From our settled government, we have acquired a sense of legal justice, which is a great virtue, but we have lost an understanding of the patriarchal system of common-sense equity. Our justice is in the main a mechanical justice. "The state in its capacity as the sustainer of rights has nothing to do with the amount of moral depravity in the criminal," says Green ("Principles of Political Obligation," p. 191). "The state," means *our* state—the state of the west—with the special relation between the person and the state to which we are accustomed. Green's philosophy of political obligation to a cultured Indian, for instance, would be miserable, immoral, Machiavellian. Not the least striking pages of that striking book, "The Soul of a People," are those which tell of our ideas of justice compared with those of the ordinary Burmese (chap. VIII., etc.). The story is told of an English officer in Rangoon, who caught his servant stealing money and had him sent to jail. When the boy was liberated, he came back smiling to his master expecting to be taken into his service again. But the English idea of punishment is not the Burmese idea, and the poor boy was turned away absolutely bewildered, fail-

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ing to understand why, having "wiped out" his crime by punishment, he was not regarded as spotless. The officer's idea was that punishment was a form of revenge; the Burmese idea was that it was part of the great law of Buddha "the eternal inevitable sequence that leads us in the end to wisdom and peace," (p. 111).

A second difficulty arising from our experience of government is that of our social system. We have lost all sense of a tribal or national life on its industrial side and are now just beginning to strive to build it up again especially by municipal enterprise. Individual liberty has been abstracted from tribal and national liberty, with the result that we have come to see that warring thousands of individuals can neither secure nor protect liberty. In throwing our social system into the disorganization of individualism, we have killed the national goose that lays the golden egg of individual liberty. This error is fundamental. And yet in the case of many of the peoples whom we have taken over to civilize, we have found existing this very condition of true liberty which we ourselves are trying to recreate, and the first thing we have done is to destroy it. Nine-tenths of the troubles we have had in Africa have sprung from the fact that before being many days amongst a people, we have instructed the chiefs to regard tribal property as being personal to themselves. "The European authorities have always been prone to assume, not only that anyone holding the apparent position of sovereign over a district they wish to acquire, is its rightful head, but also that his supposed headship entitles him to dispose as he will of all the land and its products under his control."

It is worse than futile to quarrel with the course of our progress in civilization. It has been determined by historical circumstance. But the most ignorantly absurd of all the justifications for the propaganda of civilization undertaken by Western peoples is that which assumes that the Basuto and the Chinese, the Hindoo and the Ashanti are doomed to go through an industrial revolution precisely the same as ours—

*"Blacks and Whites in South Africa," by H. R. Fox Bourne, p. 55.

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like us, are doomed to see their tribal economy disrupted by an aggressive assertion of personal right—are doomed to have to substitute for practical purposes, the mechanical judgments of law for the moral considerations of equity.

If the line of thought I have been pursuing and the considerations I have been advancing are true, one or two important corollaries follow. Civilization cannot be transplanted. History shows this very clearly. The Englishman who proceeds to govern India, cannot pack his British civilization with his sun helmets and linen. At the end of a year's residence in Calcutta, he is not an Englishman at all. He is an Anglo-Indian in nature as well as in name. He does not, he can not, interpret to the people of India the political ideas of the people of Great Britain.

A second corollary is even more important. It is that the propaganda of civilization by political methods is a profound mistake and can lead to no good. The political method is this. When the civilizing nation is the stronger, on some pretext or other it makes itself responsible for the government of the weaker nation. It sends its administrators to manage the state, its civil servants to manage the finance, its lawyers to manage the courts of justice. It puts an end to abuses—as it sees them; it invests the state income in objects of public utility; it restores order and stability; it introduces its notions of political and economic government everywhere. The history of Imperial peoples is full of instances of this kind of government. Rome built roads and established courts of law; Athens offered protection; Holland and Spain opened markets. As Dr. Johnson said, "Cromwell's occupation of Scotland taught the Scots the use of cabbages." The most typical example of this work in modern times is the British occupation of Egypt. In Egypt, we have worked wonders. But even there, the failure of the political method is evident. We may build reservoirs, we may train an army, we may restore stability in government, we may establish honest systems of taxation and finance, we may banish petty tyranny and relieve the peasant from the fear of the pascha. That is excellent. But is it civilization? We know how much security of property

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and stability of government mean to us. Do they mean the same thing for all peoples? A system of government that, on the admission of everybody, would vanish within twenty-four hours after our troops are withdrawn, is a very artificial contribution to the civilization of the world. Let me apply this thought to our own history. Supposing the coming of the Prince of Orange or of the Elector of Hanover had been marked by the clearing out from responsible government positions all men of English birth, supposing both the legislation and the administration of the country had been recast on Dutch or German models, supposing the law and order which came through those political changes had been, not so much sought by us as imposed upon us by benevolent propagandists of civilization, supposing that in order to save us from the tyranny of the Stuarts our benefactors had decided to ingraft Dutch and German speech and methods of thought upon our English stock, what would be the state of the country to-day? Would we have had poets? Would we have had philosophers? Would we have had statesmen? Would our people be now looking across the borders of a new century with youthful hope and vital vigor? Just as one people cannot borrow the civilization of another people, so is it impossible for a people to impose its peace and security on another. Be the foreign officials ever so upright and well-meaning, they are still foreign. A people may flourish under a tyranny which has been nurtured in its own history; a native bureaucracy or an aristocracy may be the means of elevating a nation; a Hohenzollern may be the guide of a Prussia of a Germany; but paternal government when the governors are one people and the governed another, can do nothing but level down and crush out. It can curb the energies of disquiet and revolution, it cannot lead them into more profitable channels. It can bring peace, but it is the peace of national death.

I have already indicated the reason why. The government of a people must be determined by the historical antecedents of that people. Separated from us by so slight differences as the nations of Europe are, I can prove my point from them. During the revolutionary periods of this century, England was re-

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garded on the continent as the model of free government and its parliamentary system became the pattern for continental statesmen faced with the task of making a constitution. France, Germany, Italy, Austria, modelled their constitutions on the English pattern. Germany subsequently changed and found a place in its government for the tyrannical temperament of the Hohenzollerns. But, in so far as it has remained faithful to our model, and in the case of Austria, Italy and France, the result has been that observers of parliamentary government on the continent have come to doubt the wisdom of parliamentary government altogether. But if you examine thoroughly the problem of representative government as illustrated on the continent, you will discover that it is not one of representative government at all, but one of, How far one people can borrow from another its various forms of civilization—of which government is one of the chief. Over and over again, Mr. Whitman, in his "Imperial Germany," congratulates that country that it has not copied too devotedly English parliamentary methods as it was once inclined to do; and Mr. Bodley in his book on "France" turns repeatedly to point out how French political copying is largely responsible for French political inefficiency. "If nations were subject to the same just resentments as human beings," he says, "France might well dislike England for the very reason of having imported an institution modelled on one of hers, and of having found it a failure" (pp. 468-9).

Forms of government really express the differences of national experience. Religion, social condition, temperament, political exigencies, determine them for each people. They are but the mould of many inner spiritual forces, and, changed apart from the operation of these forces, they become unnatural and either lead to revolution, if the vitality of the governed is strong, or to an elimination of national characteristics, if the hand of the governors is too heavy to be thrown off. The Western estimate of the value of law and order *per se* is altogether exaggerated by the propagandist of Western civilization, because he innocently approaches all problems in civilization from his own standpoint.

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When we start our search for the best means to fulfill our duty in the world, with the idea in mind that the peoples of low civilization are children, we may happily be led to consider educational methods. The first essential of a sound method in education is, not that you have to make the child, but that you have to assist it to grow. The educationalist does not begin to operate on a featureless nothing, but on something which offers him resistance if led in certain directions and encouragement if led in others. So with the propaganda of civilization. To abolish any native method, saving perhaps some of the most revolting customs like cannibalism—is a mistake. The care of the educator should be to rationalize all native methods on the lines of the development which those methods have followed already. The abolition of the village courts in India, of the chiefs' jurisdiction amongst the African tribes and so on, has been a profound mistake. To step in and do what the natives have been doing themselves is a profound mistake. The one hopeful chapter in all our imperial history is that of our relations wth Basutoland since it became a Crown Colony in 1884. We have allowed the chiefs to govern, our representatives being advisers; and we have kept out drink and the white men excepting a few missionaries and legitimate traders.

The ring fence method is the best. Outside that fence we must keep all those products of our civilization which if granted admission would destroy native life—the spirit seller, the land speculator, the gold prospector; whilst our function inside should be an influence rather than an authority, a light rather than a goad, reason rather than law. Liberty to the native does not mean that his borders are to be opened to all comers, but that he is to be policed by moral considerations and led into the ways of reason.

But the propaganda of civilization is not only a problem in native rule, the most advanced nations influence each other. The impact of nations makes for progress. That the Jew should meet the Greek, that the Teuton should meet the Celt, that the Saxon should meet the Latin has been good. They have exchanged wealth—intellectual and moral as well as material. Their meeting has opened up new epochs in human

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thought. But in these modern days such impacts are only useful provided that the various nations so conduct their relations with each other that each one really cares for the opinions of the rest. The aim of an enlightened foreign policy is respect not hate. And how is international respect won?

I have said that the spiritual necessity underlying policies of expansion is "the call of duty in us all to regulate our race towards the unattainable." And nations instinctively respect their rivals whose success in that race is most marked. Unions for the sake of policy—Triple Alliances and Dual Alliances—have nothing in common with those mutual exchanges of experience which make for peace and progress. A nation wins respect just as it wins a command over the spiritual elements in its own destiny, as it builds its own political foundations and rears its own fabric of government upon plans of spiritual excellence. The wise statesman appeals to the youth of his country, not on considerations of Imperial responsibility, but of national excellence. The appeal to objective claims is the unethical, and consequently futile, substitute for an appeal to the love of youth for what is ideal within themselves. The name of Glasgow is world-wide and is respected, not because of its size nor because of its trade, but because of its success in creating a municipal life. What I may call "walking warily" in the ways of peace, or carefully studying your neighbors' sentiments so as to avoid giving offence, are but negative conditions to national respect. A nation is held in regard by the civilized world, not because it has been careful not to offend, but because it has been bold in forming a worthy deal of its own communal destiny and zealous in working it out. How weighty are the thoughts on this matter that come by pondering over such words as those written by Louis Blanc in his introduction to "1848." "It will ever be to the glory of England, that in the middle of the nineteenth century she should have been the only impregnable asylum in Europe for the exile driven from his country by absolutism or usurpation. How imposing the spectacle of a nation running the risk of war rather than condescend to the ignoble task of hunting down the homeless. She is the last sanctuary in Europe open to the human mind itself. It is no small honor to her that her

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language should be at this moment the vernacular of Liberty; the only language in which freemen of every nation can interchange ideas, and print their thoughts with any chance of finding a public allowed to read them." A century of hate will not have the weight of a sunbeam in determining the greatness of English influence in the world, compared with the spirit of respect expressed in the eloquent opening sentences of Louis Blanc's history.

In the long run, we can do more for Africa by civilizing the East end of London than by putting an end for ever to the iniquities of the Khalifa in the Soudan. It is easy to fight battles, to vote millions, to sacrifice thousands of lives, to welcome the victors home. By such means we can see peace come to smile on the earth as we see the sun struggling through the frost hazes of winter. But the peace is as deceptive as the winter sunshine. In dealing with the products of the innermost nature of man, it would be well if we remembered that the life of a generation is but a span, that the life of a people is from the fathomless past to the fathomless future and that all the changes which count, grow slowly in the mysterious silence of things. Man seizes nature by violence and chains her to his will, and in his vanity proclaims that he has conquered, that he rules. Even as he proclaims his power its foundations quiver with the shock that is ultimately to undermine them. Nature rules. She is slow to wrath and long suffering. She allows man to indulge in vanity. But she rules; and so thorough in her work is she, that she grinds to dust the very tombstone which is the last record of the existence of him who proclaimed himself her king. So with the life of peoples. It is not to be changed by our proclamations, by force. Our conquests, our protectorates, our imposed civilizations are but oil we pour on deep and troubled waters. In the hidden depths below flow the currents and the tides that move the waters, and the surface calms make no difference. Down into those hidden depths we must go if the work we are doing in the name of civilization, is to add one atom to the permanent good of human effort.

J. R. MacDonald.

London.

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IMAGINATION AND JUDGMENT.*

THE writings of the moralists are full of passages showing the vanity and the cruelty of imagination; and the antithesis of imagination and judgment is found in ordinary use, to bring out the hazards of a particular type of mind. "Too much imagination and too little judgment"—it applies to the sanguine and optimistic man of business, to the hot-headed soldier, to all the great race of borrowers, all those who are ready to pledge their future, who believe what they wish to be true. Even the whole human race comes under this description, in many sermons on the Vanity of Human Wishes:

> "When I consider life, 'tis all a cheat,
> Yet fool'd with hope men favor the deceit;
> Trust on, and think to-morrow will repay;
> To-morrow's falser than the former day;
> Lies worse, and while it says we shall be blest
> With some new joys, cuts off what we possest.
> Strange cozenage! None would live past years again,
> Yet all hope pleasure in what yet remain;
> And from the dregs of life think to receive
> What the first sprightly running could not give.
> I'm tired of waiting for this chymic gold,
> Which fools us young, and beggars us when old."

Between the idle imagination that will not take proper account of circumstances, will not see things as they are, and the heated imagination that over-estimates all values (with or without the delusive help of poetry) there are plenty of opportunities for the moralists, and there is little need for quotation. But one exceptional passage may be quoted, because it illustrates a remarkable diversion from the common track of the moralist; a passage in which Wordsworth eloquently and fervently recites a number of cases of illusion and exaggeration, not in order to display the weaknesses of human nature, but to derive hope and encouragement from the very thought of its passions:

> "The history of all ages; tumults after tumults; wars, foreign or civil, with short or no breathing spaces, from generation to generation; wars—

*An address read to the London School of Ethics, Sunday, Feb. 18, 1900.

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why and wherefore? yet with courage, with perseverance, with self-sacrifice, with enthusiasm—with cruelty driving forward the cruel man from its own terrible nakedness, and attracting the more benign by the accompaniment of some shadow which seems to sanctify it; the senseless weaving and interweaving of factions—vanishing and reviving and piercing each other like the Northern Lights; public commotions and those in the bosom of the individual; the long calenture to which the Lover is subject; the blast, like the blast of the desert, which sweeps perennially through a frightful solitude of his own making in the mind of the Gamester; the slowly quickening but ever quickening descent of appetite down which the Miser is propelled; the agony and cleaving oppression of grief; the ghostlike hauntings of shame; the incubus of revenge; the life-distemper of ambition; these inward existences, and the visible and familiar occurrences of daily life in every town and village; the patient curiosity and contagious acclamations of the multitude in the streets of the city and within the walls of the theatre; a procession, or a rural dance; a hunting, or a horse-race; a flood, or a fire; rejoicing and ringing of bells for an unexpected gift of good fortune, or the coming of a foolish heir to his estate;—these demonstrate incontestibly that the passions of men (I mean the soul of sensibility in the heart of man) in all quarrels, in all contests, in all quests, in all delights, in all employments which are either sought by men or thrust upon them—do immeasurably transcend their objects.*

This flaming sentence might easily be taken as an exposure and indictment of human frailty and folly, and there is certainly no need for any increase in the vehemence of its tone. But the moral which Wordsworth wishes here to enforce is not the old one, and his vehemence is not intended as denunciation.

"The true sorrow of humanity consists in this, not that the mind of man fails; but that the course and demands of action and of life do rarely correspond with the dignity and intensity of human desires: and hence that, which is slow to languish, is too easily turned aside and abused."

Men are ennobled, that is, by their passionate and imaginative courage and perseverance, even when they may be throwing themselves away on vanities. Men are frequently stronger than sound judgment would allow them to be, says Wordsworth, in effect. The object of his political tract was to prove the importance of the Spanish rising, and he supports his case by proving the motive strength of illusion. You might think that the Spaniards would see their true interest in yielding to the French; but no! it is just as likely, from general principles of human nature, that they will make a heroic defence

*Wordsworth, "The Convention of Cintra."

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against the invader. Heroism is just as natural as cowardice, passionate strength is just as natural and just as common as timidity. Passion may be either good or evil, and Wordsworth in his torrent of examples takes no pains to choose only those that are favorable. But it is at least as often good as not, and one of the influences that help to make it good is imagination. From passion and imagination other moral results may be expected than those proceeding from sound judgment; on that point all moralists are agreed; but this moralist adds that all the really great, good and noble things of humanity come from passion and imagination.

This is not the ordinary teaching. At the same time it is not purely schismatic doctrine; it is characteristic of Wordsworth, indeed, but it is in some measure also characteristic of the age in which he was writing. We are accustomed to hear as an historical fact that there was a great revival of imaginative power at the close of the eighteenth century, a revival shown in the works of poets and novelists. There was at the same time a good deal of theorizing, more or less philosophical, about the nature of imagination, a conscious and reflective acknowledgment of the dignity of imagination, and something like a general movement to gain for imagination the respect and even more than the respect which had been usually given to prudence and sound judgment. Wordsworth and Coleridge are the principal expounders of these views, but there were others. Blake, for example: "Imagination is the real and eternal world of which this vegetable universe is but a faint shadow." Going along with this mysterious doctrine in Blake's mind is a hatred of abstractions, a love of what is concrete. The two points of view are held in turn, it will be found, by many of the chief opponents of prosaic rationalism; they are mystics for a time, but when they return from the transcendental region there is no confusion nor cloudiness about their perceptions of things; their imagination makes them see truly. So Blake, having apparently dismissed common realities under the contemptuous label of "this vegetable universe" goes on to show that this lofty demeanor, this transcendental

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imagination, goes along with the most severe and scrupulous judgment in regard to common realities:

> "He who would do good to another must do it in minute particulars:
> General good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite and flatterer—
> For Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely organized particulars
> And not in generalizing demonstrations of the Rational Power:
> The Infinite alone resides in definite and determinate identity."

Or, one might say, in other words, Science, Art and Morality are all apt to be spoiled by abstractions, and are all alike saved by Imagination, that form of Reason which makes definite pictures in place of abstract propositions.

Blake's countryman Burke is on this side also. Though he does not make the same use of the term, it is on Imagination that Burke relies in his contest with abstract theory. What he hates is the analytic understanding, the sort of acuteness that is satisfied with partial successes, with single and separate arguments, with abstract demonstrations. What he vindicates as the true legitimate form of Reason is a kind of imaginative comprehension, in which realities are not stripped of their individual bodily life. His favorite position is that all political reasoning needs body in it, filling, substance, matter, and that precisely of the sort which cannot be generalized, which needs to be taken as it is, concretely. What the political thinker most requires is imagination. Burke does not say this in so many words, but imagination seems a fitting name for the mode of thinking which he explains in almost every page of his works. It is an ordinary word, at any rate, for the faculty of realizing to oneself in an intuitive way the meaning of what one is talking about, and it is this gift that Burke would recommmend to Members of Parliament. They cannot know what a Constitution is unless they know the character, temper, prejudices and aims of individual Englishmen; they must take account of the living circumstances. Political success, in Burke's view, depends on things local, domestic, particular; things that make the familiar content and coloring of life. "We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighborhoods and our habitual provincial connections. These are inns and resting places.

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Such divisions of our country as have been formed by habit, and not by the sudden jerk of authority, were so many little images of the great country in which the heart found something which it could fill."

While Burke's thinking is thus more concrete and detailed than that of the abstract politician, it is also wider and more comprehensive. It breaks the illusion of the abstract thinker by calling in the aid of definite individuals, seen clearly in their details, as with the mind of a dramatist working out his story; it also rises above the limitations of abstract thinking to the magnificent wide view of all the kingdoms of the world, the profusion of life in its course from century to century, "the great mysterious corporation of the human race." These are the two modes of his thought, and both are worth illustration.

This is the way in which he tests the sentimental English sympathy with the Jacobins. He finds the adversary trading with the name of France—an abstraction—and he proceeds to substitute individual terms for that generality:

"'France,' says the author, 'will do this;' 'it is in the interest of France.' "The returning honor and generosity of France,' etc., etc. Always merely France; just as if we were in a common political war with an old recognized member of the commonwealth of Christian Europe;—by sleight of hand the Jacobins are clean vanished, and it is France we have got under our cup. Blessings on his soul that first invented sleep, said Don Sancho Panza the wise! All true blessings and ten thousand times more, on him who found out abstraction, personification, and impersonals! In certain cases they are the first of all soporoficks. Terribly alarmed we should be if things were proposed to us in the *concrete*, or in fraternity was held out to us with the individuals who compose this France by their proper names and descriptions; if we were told that it was very proper to enter into the closest bonds of amity and good correspondence with the devout, pacific and tender-hearted Syeyes, with the all-accomplished Rewbel, with the humane guillotinists of Bordeaux, Tallien and Isabeau; with the meek butcher Legendre, and with 'the returned humanity and generosity' (that had been only on a visit abroad) of the virtuous regicide brewer Santerre. . . . But plain truth would here be shocking and absurd; therefore comes in abstraction and personification. 'Make your peace with France.' That word *France* sounds quite as well as any other, and it conveys no idea but that of a very pleasant country and very hospitable inhabitants. Nothing absurd and shocking in amity and good correspondence with France. Permit me to say, that I am not yet well acquainted with this new-coined France, and, without a careful assay, I am not willing to receive it in currency in place of the old Louis d'or."

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On the other hand, leaving all minute things, Burke will speak of "that elevation of Reason which places centuries under our eye, and brings things to the true point of comparison; which obscures little names and effaces the colors of little parties; to which nothing can ascend but the spirit and moral quality of human action." And again in a passage which begins with some of Burke's characteristic freedom in the use of common terms and goes on to something like a prose version of Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty," or even like the "large utterance" of one of the older Greek philosophers:

"Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure—but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, tobacco, or some such other low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence, of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection.

"As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal Society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place."

This is generalization, but it is the generalization of the artist judging the total effect, the main features, of the object he has before his mind; it is synoptic, like the eye of the painter when he is finding the composition of a landscape, or like an author working out the right proportions of his story. Though general, it is not abstract; the matter is still definite, though it is regarded from a point of view that lets the subordinate differences fall out of notice.

It is not easy to find a better name than Imagination for these modes of thought; they are imaginative in their hold upon the living particulars of experience, on the one hand, and in their lofty and comprehensive vision on the other. And they exemplify a habit of mind that has some claim to rank among the intellectual virtues, or perhaps more rightly as the highest

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form of practical wisdom or prudence. This kind of imagination is not opposed to judgment; it is the ground and source of right judgment, being the habit of mind which is both comprehensive and definite, both long-sighted and minute.

A sort of imagination is required for all right action, and there are few good actions but might be improved by a little more of it. May we take the name imagination to denote the power of realizing what one is speaking and thinking about? It seems a permissible and not uncommon use of the term. There is a significant piece of moralizing in a remark of Gordon's among the horrors of the Chinese rebellion: "I hope to get the Shanghai people to assist, but they do not see these things." "These things" are the various abominations of famine, and one gathers that if the Shanghai people had more of imagination they would be more active in a practical way. It was this kind of imagination that Carlyle was always talking about and encouraging when he was not among the Eternal Verities; or perhaps it would be truer to say that as with Burke and Wordsworth, the Eternities and the Infinities put compulsion on him to look in everything for minute particulars, to see things clearly and bodily, to think himself defrauded, and to express his feelings in strong language, when he found his authors leaving out the accessories in their story. Perhaps he expected too much from History, but there can be little question, I should think, about the value of his advice for a School of Ethics when he insists that people should do their best to realize—to "see," in the common figurative sense—the facts with which they are concerned in theory or in practice.

The great difficulty is that ignorance is as requisite for life as knowledge; it is not easy to discern in every case which of the two is the better. One must be content not to know most things, and to know very little about what remains; not to reflect, not to imagine, is often not only the most comfortable, but the most virtuous course—*e. g.*, in the case of one's grievances against other people, and in the case of all things that do not really matter. There is no need to prove the harm that may be done by the imagination when it takes the wrong turning, and magnifies everything painful and disastrous. The

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Self-Tormentor is an old favorite in comedy. But on the other hand the right use of imagination is little less than the very bond of human society; and it has hardly been made enough of by the moralists. No man ever gave away to another or made allowance for him without being something of a dramatist; dramatic imagination enters into every question of justice. How can you understand other people's motives unless you act out a fragment or two of a play in which they are characters? The process described in the introduction to "The Ring and the Book" is no invention of the poet's—it is part of the common traffic of life. You find a story presented to you, with certain facts and events recorded; you cannot at once give judgment on the meaning of it all; you want to get at the truth, to make the facts intelligible. There is no way but by adding something out of your imagination. You set the puppets moving in a private theatre of your own; you invent thoughts and speeches for them; you succeed in getting a coherent and intelligible sequence. You add an alloy, like Mr. Browning in his poem, to make the metal workable. The process may be used for an epic or a drama, but the process is known to the whole human race and is not among the privileges of men of letters merely. Most of life is spent in judging one's neighbors, and there can be no judgment good or bad without imagination. The phenomena of my neighbor, his sayings and doings, have to be put together to be interpreted. By the most rudimentary and simple minds they are dramatized, they are made to fit into an imaginary character which seems to explain them. My neighbor is a character in my novel, as fictitious as Mr. Micawber or Captain Costigan. He is a working hypothesis, made by the imagination. He may be also real in his own way, but that makes no difference to my mode of judging him.

One moral theme which the moralists have not quite exhausted is historical judgment—the estimate of characters and situations in history. It may not be of the greatest importance in the conduct of life, but it is not mere diversion. It bears upon practice, and on that judgment of my neighbor which goes on from day to day, and which enters into every bargain and exchange. The graduations between a practical estimate

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of my neighbor and a theoretical, historical, estimate of the character of Alexander the Great are not broken by any gap. The same method is used in both cases, though the materials are not the same. The value of historical problems in a School of Ethics is, for one thing, that they bring out the peculiarities of those who judge, and give at times a cruel demonstration of their fallacies. In private cases there is seldom opportunity for thoroughly testing an opinion; but history is more or less common ground, and if you can get a man's results on some historical question you have probably added something to the data of Ethics. It is one of the uses of history to afford materials for the moral philosopher. It sometimes provides refreshment for the scorner, in the paradoxes of historians. The grossest fallacies in this region are due no doubt to pure ignorance, as when Luther is revered by devout persons who would be pained by his tolerance of polygamy; or as when one comes upon ardent admirers of Cromwell who believe in the essential beastliness of war. But there are fallacies also among the historians arising from defect of imagination. It is not every historian who can judge and reveal the great complex and self-contradictory minds, of which Shakespeare's Macbeth is one type, and his Henry IV. another. History is full of absurd false drawing. What is a historian to do when he comes on a personage who is at the same time magnanimous and malignant, who domineers over the weak and apologizes to those who challenge him, and yet is great and dignified? One may ask that if the historian is unable to solve the contradictions and show the character as Shakespeare can represent it, both lofty and degraded, both generous and selfish, enlightened and at the same time self-deceived, he should at least acknowledge the contradiction and state the paradox. To shrink from attacking such historical problems when they come in his way is for the historian to aid in debasing the moral currency.

Character drawing is necessary in history; it is necessary in practice, in conduct, though it need not be formal or even articulate; it is also convenient in reflection on conduct, in ethics. Aristotle in his character sketches is led far from the ways of philosophic research, in the direction of comedy; he is seen

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feeling his way towards the methods of the novelist. He does not get quite as far as that; his sketches are satirical rather than dramatic, and satire is generally an inferior and an easier form, a description by enumeration, by means of collected notes. But satire and drama are pretty closely related, and no doubt the philosopher would have gone further if he had had time, and would have strengthened and defined more fully the lineaments of his exemplary characters. Mr. Raleigh in his history of the English Novel has shown how the old Aristotelian form of typical "characters," handed down from Theophrastus to the humorists of the seventeenth century, was modified into something less abstract and more imaginative; the characters came down out of their cases in the ethical museum and walked about with Sir Roger de Coverley and his friends. This, no doubt, according to Aristotelian principles, is what Aristotle and Nature really intended in the beginning, and all the host of imaginary persons in novels are really the supplement and realization of the Nicomachean Ethics. Many students of the Ethics have thought that what they really required to complete them was a knowledge of modern fiction.

There are other ways in which Imagination comes into the matter of Ethics. Wordsworth has explained them in different parts of his writings. It was not of dramatic imagination, of imagination as applied to the problems of individual character, that Wordsworth was thinking when he made Imagination into the dominant faculty by virtue of which the functions of all the other powers of mind are determined and qualified. He was thinking rather of the faculty that quickens perception, that raises the value of ordinary experience, without adding to it any fanciful or mythological decoration.

The great imaginative moralists, as it has been already remarked, show in their writings an alternation between two contrary points of view. They are at one moment high in some lofty region of contemplation among the Immensities, clean out of reach of sober rationalism: at another they are down among the meanest particulars, where respectable writers of prose are equally unable to follow them. There is Blake, for instance,

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who is lost in his mystical tragedy of Space and Time till he reappears quite happily talking about Poplar and old Bow—

> "The *Jew's Harp House* and the *Green Man*,
> The Ponds where boys to bathe delight,
> The fields of cows by Welling's farm
> Shine in Jerusalem's pleasant sight."

There is Burke, who after drawing into one view the meaning of all the centuries, will be off inventing scandalous comparisons for the liberal shepherds of the Revolution. There is Carlyle—but what need is there to illustrate by any quotation the range of Carlyle, from the silence of the Eternal Spaces down to the manners of contemporary pig-merchants on board the Irish packet? In Wordsworth there are the same extremes and he explains the relation between them better than the other moralists.

Imagination to Wordsworth is not only poetical imagination —the faculty that is bound to express itself in verse—it is also a power that is shared by the poet with his audience, much more common than the talent of the artist. It is not fiction, nor, in the ordinary sense, invention. If the instances are taken from the "Prelude" in which he describes from his own memory the way his imagination was influenced and taught, it will be found that most of the imaginative "visitings," to use his favorite word, are capable of being represented, literally and prosaically, as extensions of ordinary experience, or, better, as the intensifying of ordinary modes of perception. In some of his early experiences, it is true, there is what looks like a beginning of mythological invention, as when the sense of something terrible in the mountains seems to turn into the shape of vast Titanic personages:—

> "huge and mighty forms that do not live
> Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
> By day, and were a trouble to my dreams."

But he does not usually find this kind of suggestion in what he remembers best—the sense of the desolation of upland waters on the moors—the scene where he lay watching for the ponies that were to bring him home at Christmas:

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> "the wind and sleety rain,
> And all the business of the elements
> The single sheep, and the one blasted tree
> And the bleak music from that old stone wall,
> The noise of wood and water, and the mist—"

These moments are not regarded by Wordsworth as inventive, but it is to these that he returns for the refreshment of his imagination. What they indicate as he reflects on them is that the mind is capable of being quickened to see more of reality than it usually sees—a fragment, here and there, of what the universe may be like in the everyday perception of higher intelligences. Hence the rest and peace of the imagination in the remembrance of these moments, because they are known to be not capricious and carnal fancies but veritable insight and attainment. There is in this sort of imagination no disabling of ordinary perception or ordinary judgment. The stone wall, the sheep, the thorn tree, remain as before good natural solid things of prose, if you choose to take them so. Only for the Imagination, as it happened, they were part of an experience in which the mind was elevated, quickened, and made to know more than it is commonly able to apprehend. The mind is not left to itself in these perceptions or imaginations; its perceptions are not isolated pictures, but part of an untraveled world to which it is from time to time admitted. It is this sense of security in Wordsworth's visionary moments, the sense of not being left to his own fantasy, but of having indefinite possibilities of revelation all about his experience, that explains the relation between his poetical treatment of common matters and the mystical theory recorded in the "Tintern Abbey" and elsewhere. It is not only that he has something of Blake's mystical confidence that all the outward creation, Blake's "vegetable world," is equally valueless, and all capable of being transfigured, so that Islington and Marybone, the "Green Man" tavern and Welling's farm may have their places in the new Jerusalem. The weakness of this theory of Blake's is that it may be so easily imitated and degraded by anyone who chooses to make a dogma of it. Equally with its opposite, "the general good," it may be made "the plea of the hypocrite and flatterer." But Wordsworth's position is different from this

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and does not lend itself to imitation so easily. His belief is that the imaginative moments of which he speaks, by bringing the mind beyond its usual limits, by giving it a view, here and there, of a more lively world than the ordinary, yet without refuting or confounding the ordinary world, lead first to a secure and tranquil frame of mind, and then, in that calm weather, to a sense of the life of the universe. So the mind attains its proper freedom, through imagination. And at the same time this religion is protected from the shallowness of the "false infinite," of the conventional vague optimism, by the difficulty and complexity of the process that leads to it. In the life of Wordsworth there may be many faults and fallacies, which the critics have sufficiently displayed, but his biography of the Imagination is without a flaw in its sincerity, and every step in it is an ordeal.

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ETHICS AND THE WEATHER.

THE problem of human conduct, as far as the individual is concerned, is perhaps no nearer a solution to-day than it was in the time of the Sophists. Certainly no one has been able to formulate a law from which can be predicted what A and B and C will do, under given conditions, for each is sure to react to them, in his own peculiar manner; still it is safe to say that the conditions are becoming more and more subjects of study. Yet, however hopeless may be the enigma of the conduct of the individual, that of the mass does not present quite so many difficulties. In human nature there are enough characteristics common to all, to form a working basis, and certain laws of conduct may be formulated for a people even though they lose their validity when applied to the individual. So-called "Racial Traits" are but the observed effects of such laws, and are generally based upon the influence of some condition of the environment, not infrequently the climate, upon the people. The fact that they are not true for every individual

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does not invalidate them for the race, nor lessen their weight in the prediction of the conduct of the mass under given conditions.

Problems in the ethics of the mass are, however, by their necessities limited in number. Only those may be studied which furnish adequate data of conduct and in which the condition that is supposed to influence behavior is constant for all, or varies simultaneously for all, if the effects of changes in the condition are to be noted. The influence of bad breakfasts upon the conduct of a people, however potent an ethical factor they may be, could not well form the basis of a statistical study, for the reason that we have no means of knowing how many people, on a given day, were suffering from them. On a morning when A's emotional equilibrium had been ruffled by poor coffee, B's was calm in the enjoyment of a cup of the most savory quality, and with the accidental relations which bad breakfasts bear to one another in point of time, no regular fluctuations in the occurrence of crime can be attributed to them. Among the problems which can be considered are those of an economic nature, for hard times affect all in a community either directly or indirectly, and these problems have received considerable attention. The influence of periods of financial depression upon the prevalence of suicide and certain other crimes is recognized, and the student of social statistics can predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy the effect of such periods upon the people, as shown by the population of our penal institutions. But aside from widespread economic influences and occasional waves of social or religious enthusiasms, the conditions which can be said to influence conduct, are for the most part peculiar to the individual or to a limited number. The one marked exception to this is the weather.

For any given community of limited area, a change in weather conditions means a change in the environment for every inhabitant. If this change in the environment tends to influence conduct, and any statistics of conduct are kept, their study in connection with the records of the weather would disclose the fact. It is just this problem with which our paper deals. It is an attempt, by empirical methods, to discover the

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influence of the weather upon human behavior. It has nothing to do with the permanent or racial effect of prevailing meteorological conditions, but with the immediate and temporary effect of definite fluctuations of those conditions. In other words, not of climate but of weather.

That certain phases of the weather have a marked effect upon the emotional states of many people cannot for a moment be doubted. Fiction bases many of its tragic climaxes upon such a belief, and not a few of the world's greatest thinkers have left a record of such recognized effects upon their own mental states. "Weather Wisdom" is based upon such an influence upon the members of the lower animal kingdom. The newspapers not infrequently touch upon it in attempting to account for an epidemic of suicide or some other crime, and the literature of insanity is full of allusions to it. School teachers almost without exception, and all those who are in charge of individuals in great numbers—as wardens of prisons and penitentiaries—are firm believers in such an influence. Yet most of us do not need the evidence of others to be convinced of its existence; we feel it and make it the scapegoat for all sorts of sins of omission and commission when no other seems conveniently near. The purpose of this paper, then, is not so much to demonstrate *that* such an influence is as *what* it is, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The method followed is a purely inductive one and consists of a comparison of the average daily occurrence of certain recorded abnormalities of conduct, with their occurrence under definite meteorological conditions. The data of conduct considered were all taken from the records of the New York City Coroner, Chief of Police and Superintendent of Schools, and consisted of the daily record of suicides, both successful and attempted, of arrests for assault and battery and drunkenness, and of deportment in the City Penitentiary and certain of the public schools; in all over 400,000 separate occurrences, covering a period of ten years. The meteorological data for comparison were taken from the records of the New York Station of the United States Weather Bureau and comprise the mean temperature, barometer and humidity, the total move-

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ment of the wind, the character of day and the precipitation for each day of the period covered by the data of conduct.

Given, then, facts bearing upon the deportment of the people of New York City for every day for so long a period of time and the exact meteorological condition for each day, by means of a somewhat laborious process of tabulation* it is possible to determine with exactness the weather conditions under which deportment is at its best or worst. In the tabulation, the average daily occurrence for all the days falling under a given meteorological condition was compared with the average daily occurrence for the whole period studied and an excess or deficiency for definite weather conditions noted. This excess or deficiency was ascribed to weather influences. The right to do this might at first thought be questioned, but a brief consideration will, I believe, show its validity. Let us see: We find marked fluctuations in the daily occurrence of immoral acts in a given community and must believe these fluctuations to be the effects of some cause or causes, since the time is past when the scientific mind can relegate them to the category of chance. The community is large and the immoral acts are distributed throughout its length and breadth, so in searching for possible causes, all those which are narrowly local, in affecting but a few individuals, fail to meet the requirements. A's bad breakfast and B's financial failure and C's love affair then, though all potent in determining the behavior of these individuals on given days, bear but accidental relation to one another in point of time, and in considering 1,500,000 A's and B's and C's for a series of years would fail to be cumulative in effect. There is in fact but one condition in the environment which changes simultaneously for all the individuals considered, and that is the weather.

On *a priori* grounds then we might expect some definite relation between fluctuations in the weather curve, and that of the occurrence of crime; at least such a thing would be not unreasonable. Yet the *onus probendi* must still rest upon the *a*

*See "Conduct and the Weather," Monograph Supplement, No. 10, *The Psychological Review.*

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posteriori method. This we have followed, with the result that a fixed relation is found to exist between the prevalence of certain weather states and an increase in the occurrence of crime, which can be considered hardly other than causal. Yet we must define a little more freely the sense in which the weather can be considered the cause of crime. It is not probable that once in ten thousand times is the weather the immediate and exciting cause of any of the misdemeanors we are considering. We cannot for a moment suppose that a low state of barometer ever drove a man to suicide, though we shall see that suicide is three times as prevalent during conditions of low barometer as during high. In all probability every man whose arrest for assault we are to consider had what seemed to him at the time an all-sufficient excuse for the deed which brought him trouble, and the state of the weather was not in any sense a motive. The question is this: Would the provocation which brought about so violent and disastrous a motor reaction under one condition of weather, have produced the same under another? In other words, are some meteorological conditions productive of emotional states during which an impulse to do an immoral act is less likely to be inhibited than during others? We believe the facts stated in this paper prove this to be the case, but even then we must suppose the direct effect of the weather to be physiological and only through influencing the metabolism of the body, psychological.

The relation between body and mind and the interaction of the one upon the other is known to be of such a nature that, given a physiological change, the mental change is sure to follow and the nexus is in every sense causal. For whatever fixed relations we find then between certain weather states and an increase in crime, we must suppose various and varied provocations peculiar to each individual misdeed and accidental to the weather problem, together with prevailing meteorological conditions which so affect the body that emotional states are produced during which such provocations are likely to be yielded to. In stating these relations, which we have perhaps a logical right to ascribe to "weather effects," I would

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call attention to the fact that averages in daily occurrence are in every case considered, so the fact that for some of the meteorological conditions there were very many more days than for others, and consequently more crimes, does not in any way invalidate the result. Those conditions, however, which occurred so seldom that the probable error from causes accidental to the problem are equal to the indicated influence, are omitted. I shall not attempt by psychological analysis to account for any of the peculiarities shown.

Temperature.—The effects of different degrees of temperature upon the frequency of the acts studied is very marked. At both extremes of heat suicide was found to be excessive: for temperatures below 10° (Fahrenheit), more than three times the normal, and for those between 85° and 90°, 46 per cent. above the average. These facts are, however, not hard to account for, as the actual misery entailed by such conditions is great. The relation of the temperature curve to the prevalence of assault is interesting. In tabulating 40,000 arrests for this crime, hot days were found to be the ones which make trouble for the police-judge presiding over a fighting precinct, although this statement must be modified, for the mercury may get so high as to leave his prisoners' box nearly empty. For example: on days when the mean temperature was below 50°, arrests for the crime of assault were below the normal in number, in amounts varying from 50 per cent. to 10 per cent.; from that point in daily means, till a temperature of 85° is reached, there is a rapid increase in the number of assaults to an excess of 80 per cent., at which point there is a sudden drop to an excess of 33 per cent. for males and a deficiency of 35 per cent. for females. It would seem that under conditions of great heat there was little energy left for fighting. For drunkenness the conditions are almost exactly reversed. The cold days are here shown to be the saloonkeeper's friends. Arrests for this crime increase as the mercury goes down, and with almost an equal regularity from a deficiency of 40 per cent. for temperatures in the vicinity of 85° to an excess of 38 per cent. for those of 10°. In considering the demerits of more than 100,000 pupils in the public schools we have, in

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spite of the similarity which seemingly should exist between conditions there and upon the street, a striking difference. For temperature above 70° we find misdeeds below the average in number. To those of us who know the fretfulness of our own children during hot weather this seems inexplicable till we study the conditions. The temperatures made use of in the tabulation are those of the Weather Bureau, while the children are experiencing those of the school room. In the large city school building, these remain cool even on the hottest days, and their contrast with the outside air is undoubtedly sufficiently soothing to account for the lack of disorder. For the penitentiary great heat was found to be disastrous to discipline, a fact which does not speak well for the ventilation.

Barometer.—In the influence of the meteorological condition indicated by this instrument we have one of the most interesting features of the problem. It is in many cases infinitely greater than that of heat, although by our senses we cannot ordinarily tell whether atmospheric pressure is great or small. Generally speaking, the crimes which we are considering were excessive when the mercury column was low; this is especially true of suicide. For readings between 29.30 inches and 29.60 inches, which are near the lowest limit for New York City, the average excess was 150 per cent. (two and one-half times normal), while for an inch higher (the upper limit) the deficiency averaged 65 per cent. (one-third normal). For the other data considered in this paper, except drunkenness, the relations were similar though the effects were less marked. For drunkenness (and the death rate which is not here discussed) there were deficiencies shown for low barometrical conditions. For the showing of the barometer curve it is not easy to account except by referring to its relation to storms. The instrument is low for a period just preceding a violent storm, and the peculiar physiological and mental states at such times are well recognized.

Humidity.—Varying degrees of moisture in the atmosphere affect differently the prevalence of the misdemeanors which we are considering. For great humidities (much moisture) suicide and drunkenness and death are excessive, while assaults

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and disorders in the schools are deficient with the reverse conditions for low humidities. With reference to these facts I will simply state here—for I wish to refer to it in the conclusion—that a dry atmosphere is invigorating and a moist one debilitating, all other things being equal.

Wind.—To many people much movement of the atmosphere is extremely exasperating, and to find that it has a considerable influence on conduct would not be surprising. Its greatest effect seems to be upon the suicide and the drunkard. For the 3000 suicides studied there was a gradual increase from one-half the normal for movements below 150 miles per day, to more than twice the normal for those of 600 miles. For drunkenness the effect was not so great (minus 23 for calms, plus 30 for hurricanes), but still with the same gradual increase for greater velocities. For the other misdemeanors studied the greatest excesses were for moderate movements of the air, though always with marked deficiencies for virtual calms. The fact that disorder of an active nature is so markedly below the normal on days when there is scarcely a zephyr is extremely interesting, especially in the light of a study made of the composition of the atmosphere in the crowded portion of some of the large English cities by Dr. J. B. Cohen. He found the volume of CO_2 to be nearly three times as great there on some occasions as at others, or as he found at the same time in the outskirts of the city. He did not refer these fluctuations to different conditions of the wind, though it seems reasonable to do so, and just as reasonable to refer the quieting effects of calms to the debilitating influence of a vitiated atmosphere not properly circulated by the wind.

Character of the Day and Precipitation.—By the Weather Bureau days are characterized as clear if for not more than three-tenths of the period from sunrise to sunset the sun is obscured; as partly cloudy if from four-tenths to seven-tenths (inclusive) are obscured, and as cloudy if more than that amount. Under Precipitation I have contrasted those days upon which there was some rain or snowfall with those upon which there was none, without taking into consideration the amount; in other words, "wet" and "dry" days. A study of

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these conditions presents some surprises. Of these the most marked is the occurrence of suicide. For New York City at least the classic statement of Montesquieu that "the excessive number of suicides for England is due to its gloomy climate" loses weight. It had long ago been proved that suicide is not excessive in England, and this study would seem to rob the "gloomy" day of its force. The source of my data of suicide was the record of the Coroner where every item was given, and seems reliable. The facts are that self-destruction was 11 per cent. above the normal upon clear days and 17 per cent. above upon dry days, while it was 10 per cent. below upon those characterized as partly cloudy, and 14 per cent. deficient upon those which showed some precipitation, a difference of 21 per cent. between clear and partly cloudy—the most delightful and perhaps the most depressing conditions—and of 34 per cent. between dry and wet, with the greatest number—*mirabile dictu*—on the least gloomy weather. Cloudy days showed a deficiency of 1 per cent. The influence of days of different character upon the prevalence of drunkenness was surprisingly small. Without exception the other misdemeanors which we are considering were found to be least frequent upon cloudy and wet days, and most frequent upon dry and clear or partly cloudy ones.

The foregoing facts, together with extended studies of the death rate, strength tests made in the gymnasium of Columbia University, the behavior of the insane and a record of 3000 clerical errors made by the employees of the largest banking institutions in the city, seem to warrant the following conclusions:

1. That the weather has a marked influence upon each of the classes of human activity studied.

2. That a weather state which is accompanied by an increase in the number of certain of these activities is accompanied by a decrease in others.

3. That the activities considered may be divided into two classes: those which are due to an excess of bodily energy, and those which are due to a deficiency of it.

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4. That activities of these two classes are affected in different ways by weather conditions.

The first and second of these conclusions are based upon the actual facts disclosed by the study and need no further discussion. The third is based upon an analysis of condition and judgment, and might be challenged. To the teacher it seems certain that the disorder in the school room and about the school building is for the most part due to the necessity on the part of the child of working off superfluous energy. The pupils who give the teacher the most trouble are the healthy, energetic, wide-awake ones, who find it necessary to open some motor safety valve, and under the restraint of school discipline this generally means disorder. The boy who rushed down the stairs, two steps at a time, after a long session, was called back, reprimanded, and figured in our data of misconduct, was not an anemic, nor was he necessarily vicious. He had an excess of energy and could not restrain the impulse to work it off in this way. We can easily imagine the effect of some condition which should increase the energy of 100,000 boys on a given day, and we have the result quantitatively shown by our study. The study of deportment in the penitentiary and asylum for the insane, and that of assault and battery must be placed under the same head. A mere desire to fight, no matter how ardent it be, will get no one into the police court unless it lead to the act, and the latter is determined very largely by the energy at command. The air might be blue with profanity, but on a day when everybody lacked the confidence which comes from the conscious feeling of strength, and did not know that everybody else lacked it, personal combats would be rare, as indeed we have found them to be under devitalizing weather states. On the other hand, certain of the activities which we are considering would increase with a recognized lack of energy. Drunkenness is an example of this. When a man feels that lack of confidence which comes from devitalized bodily condition he takes a "bracer," and for many that means the police court and a place in our records. Suicide comes in this class though showing some peculiar contradictions which will be considered later. The death rate, poor attendance at school, weakness in strength tests in the

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gymnasium and error in computation in the banks would all be in reverse ratio to vitality, and naturally fall into the class of activities which we are now considering.

But some one asks: Are we to suppose that this world's disorder would be lessened if the sum total of human energy were cut down a few per cent.? Could we then get along with less policemen, and would the teachers' troubles be diminished? Were the Ascetics right? Our answer to that question must in the main be in the affirmative, but there is another side to it, and a very important one. What should we find increased under such devitalized conditions? Death, suicide, drunkenness, muscular strength and mental inexactness. In fact the opposite of all the elements of growth and progress. The world might be less disorderly, but it would be the order of the sanitarium or the hospital ward, and accomplishment would not be one of its elements. Energy, as shown by our analysis, may be a somewhat dangerous thing to have in excess, but most of us are willing to run the risk incurred for the sake of its usefulness.

If our analysis be a correct one, the weather influences, which we have demonstrated, affect but the metabolic process of life which control the production of available energy, in such a manner that during some meteorological conditions its excess is greater than during others. Those conditions which seem to increase that excess are clear, dry days, moderately high temperature, low humidities, moderate movements of the wind, with somewhat conflicting influence of barometrical conditions. The reverse of these meteorological states seem to lessen the reserve energy. The very marked exception to these statements is the influence of clear, dry days upon the prevalence of suicide. If they are exhilarating, why such an increase in self-destruction? The question is hard to answer, but perhaps the most satisfactory explanation is that of contrast. It is a fact that the suicide chooses the most delightful of all conditions for his exit from this life's sorrows. The clear, dry, bracing days of May and June, the very ones which to a man mentally and physically sound seem most worth living, are the ones of his choice. Is it not that when the March winds blow and the sky is overcast and all nature frowns, that he hopes for

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a pleasanter to-morrow and with it a brighter mental horizon? Life is still precious, and like the drowning man he clings to the last straw of hope. To-morrow comes with brighter things for everybody but him. Can he hope for a bluer sky or a brighter sun? Yet how different seemed the blue skies and bright suns of other happier days! This time they fail to bring the hoped-for relief. The only solace now is the bullet.

> "Comfort? Comfort scorned of devils! this is truth the poet sings,
> That a sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things."

In spite of the fact that whatever the effect of the weather may be, we cannot hope to alter it to suit our desires, the relation which our study shows between cold, windy days and the prevalence of drunkenness is at least suggestive of a line of attack upon the drink problem. Arrests for drunkenness were shown to be one-third more than the normal for temperatures near zero, and about the same for very high winds. Impossible as it might be to keep the mercury out of the thermometer bulb or to lessen the violence of the wind, it is not at all impossible to modify the effects of such conditions upon the human body. When a poor fellow is cold, his greatest desire is to get warm. If the windows were only tighter, or if he had a few buckets of coal, he might find comfort, but both better tenements and fuel are beyond his means. A warm overcoat and a pair of mittens would help, but he has none. He can buy temporary comfort and perhaps forgetfulness within his scanty means at the saloon on the corner. He finds both, and figures in our problem. Generations of legislation with liberal applications of prohibition have left our liquor problem as big as ever. To many a temperance agitator the drink habit figures as an indication of viciousness or wicked caprice. To the physical wreck, shivering in his cheerless room or freezing upon the street, it seems a matter of stern necessity. Already the betterment of the social condition has been recognized as a factor in the reduction of crimes of many sorts. Why not strike at one of the roots of this evil and try the application of better heated tenements, of warmer clothing and of more nourishing food?

Edwin G. Dexter.

The University of Illinois.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF WAR—IN REPLY TO MR. J. M. ROBERTSON.

MR. ROBERTSON, in his article in the April number of the JOURNAL, seems to assume that in my paper on "Peace and War" in the January number, my remarks were "constantly pointed at the present Boer war." Now it so happens that the greater part of my article was put together out of materials written in 1898, when I may have been thinking of the Spanish-American war, but certainly did not foresee the South African. Mr. Robertson may think the brief discussion of the attitude of Christian Ethics to war introduces a "negligible issue." The question, however, bulks very largely in the minds of many persons besides the Quakers. Mr. Herbert Spencer, for instance, has frequently spoken as if it was quite inconsistent in Christian clergymen to approve of war. It seemed to me worth while to call attention to pronouncements on the subject of war in authoritative and representative documents, and to remind those who appeal to the "Gospel of Peace" as if it condemned everything they call "militarism" and "imperialism," that, although Pilate was persuaded against his own judgment to put Jesus to death as the leader of a Jewish Nationalist rebellion, Jesus and his immediate followers consistently sanctioned the claims of the Roman Empire to the obedience of the Jews, and discouraged the narrow political ambitions of their own race. This was one of my main objects in the first part of the paper. In putting old materials together last year (in a form perhaps too condensed for some of my readers) I could not help thinking of the terrible war then raging in South Africa. But the only parts of the article which were entirely new were the passage from p. 145 to the top of p. 150, and the few remarks about The Hague Peace Conference. I am glad, however, that Mr. Robertson should so clearly have seen the applicability of the principles of judgment at which I had long ago arrived to the particular case of the South African war; though I must regret that his attention has not been sufficiently attracted to the method by which I sought to bring into clear consciousness the principles adopted by the great majority of persons who believe in the value of orderly constitutional government and of intellectual liberty and enlightenment, when they judge the rightness or wrongness of wars which are *"at a sufficient distance from our own times to*

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enable us to see them in proper perspective" (p. 146). Mr. Robertson only refers to a very few of the examples I took. In the case of the partition of Poland and in that of the American War of Independence he makes, I think, a wrong application of the principles involved. In reference to the Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Robertson makes the mistaken statement that I admit that "Prussia got up the war of 1870." I admit no such thing. By "those who pushed Napoleon III. into a war for which the French army was not prepared," I meant his French advisers; and I should have thought that was clear enough to anyone reading the sentence. I certainly condemn strongly the want of preparation on the part of a government. I could wish that Mr. Robertson had told us his ethical judgments on the American Civil War and on the strenuously severe measures adopted to subdue the South, on Garibaldi's raid into the Two Sicilies, and on the Italian occupation of Rome, and the grounds of these judgments. I should then know better whether we had enough in common in those "middle axioms" on which our particular ethical judgments are practically based, to make a discussion with him profitable to ourselves or others. With an advocate of the absolute Divine Right of all existing communities that call themselves States or Nations I am not prepared to argue. I am not prepared to discuss matters with a champion of the old South Carolina doctrine of "state rights" nor with one who believes in the absolute integrity of the Ottoman Empire or in the inviolability of the Pope's temporal power. Nations exist for mankind and not mankind for nations; and when any nation, small or large, fails to serve the purpose for which nations exist, it has no absolute moral right to block the onward movement of human progress, even while it may still have a certain quasi-legal status under the convenient fictions of International Law, until that status is altered by stern facts.

Mr. Robertson appeals to "the law of reciprocity" (p. 278), as the ethical rule which he would apply directly to determine the rightness or wrongness of any particular war. Now the principle of reciprocity is a good rough and ready maxim by which to check individual selfishness. But it is no complete principle of moral judgment, even when applied to dealings between individuals within a nation.* It would *e. g.*, justify the duelist who challenges

*I have criticised the abstract principle of "equal freedom" at some length in my book on "Natural Rights," pp. 141-147. In the same book will be found my attempts to define "Progress" (See pp. 111-114) and "Civilization" (pp. 54-62).

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another to fair combat: on the other hand it would seem to condemn the employment of a large force of police to capture a small but dangerous band of brigands. In an orderly state of society it is not expedient that the police should give the brigands fair play. Nations, however,—in spite of Mr. Robertson's attempt to treat them on the analogy of individuals,—are not, so far as I can see, the subjects of ethical rights and duties in the same manner as individuals. An individual may, if he likes, give away his own property or refuse to enforce his legal and moral rights, out of love towards his neighbor. Statesmen are the trustees of their nation (including the unborn generations*) and are not morally entitled to part with what they consider to be the real interests of their country even for the sake of obtaining a reputation for charity and magnanimity, at the cost of other people than themselves. It is necessary for a nation's welfare that it should be respected by the governments of other nations: it is not so necessary that it should have all the ill-informed journalists of other countries speaking well of it on all occasions or sentimental anarchists singing its praises. Nations are to one another in the same position as individuals who have no state over them (*e. g.*, persons of different nationalities shipwrecked on a desert island). War is therefore inevitable in some cases, where the threat of war, as a means of enforcing claims, proves ineffectual: and war must remain the ultimate court of appeal (the appeal to God, as John Locke calls it) except in so far as nations cease to be absolutely sovereign and independent and become absorbed in larger political organisms with legal tribunals and sufficient police or soldiery to enforce their decisions. Everything that helps towards the ideal of a federation of the world (not in a mere sentimental sense but in the stricter political sense of the term "federation."†) or of greater portions of it, seems to me a genuine movement for durable peace. Peace and order within a nation have only been secured by the reign of law, which means the strict *enforcement* of law. All government rests on public opinion; but all government involves the potential use of force. The peace of mankind

*A *Bundesstaat*, not a mere *Staatenbund*—still less, of course, a mere rhetorical phrase that may be used at International Expositions, etc.

†Even Prof. Sidgwick, who adopts Utilitarianism in its individualist and not in its evolutionist form, recognizes in his "Elements of Politics" that we must take into account not only the human beings who are actually living, but those who are to live hereafter" (Edit. I, p. 34).

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cannot be rested on vague sentiment (more or less consciously anarchical) but requires regulated force as its ultimate safeguard. Where an orderly government exists with sufficient force to protect its citizens and to execute the decisions of its law-courts, the aggrieved individual has no excuse for resorting to personal violence or other irregular methods of avenging what he conceives to be his wrongs. Independent nations are still to one another in the condition in which the turbulent nobility of individual states were, before the central government gained sufficient strength to put down private war and to maintain standing armies. Resort to arbitration must remain a purely voluntary matter so long as nations retain their independence: and what *is* a nation depends on the power which a community may have to assert and to maintain its independence and so acquire an international status.

On the particular case of the South African war, on which Mr. Robertson thinks differently from the vast majority of the inhabitants of Great Britain and of her self-governing colonies, I should not shrink from meeting him in argument even on his own somewhat arbitrary and abstract principle of judgment. But were I to go fully into the matter, I should have to deviate into many questions of law, history and politics, which would hardly be in place in a JOURNAL devoted to the discussion of ethical principles rather than to the examination of the minor premises that come under them in their particular applications. I shall therefore say very little on the subject, though I should like to say much.*

Even if we apply Mr. Robertson's principle of "reciprocity" to the dealings of Great Britain with the late South African Republics, a very good case can be made out for our much-abused statesmen and commanders. The limited independence which had been granted to the Transvaal was granted not to persons of Dutch race but to all the white inhabitants; and it was granted on the express understanding that all the white inhabitants should receive equal treatment. Great Britain demanded of the Trans-

*Especially to American readers who may wish to see impartial discussions of South African questions, I should recommend Prof. Bryce's "Impressions of South Africa," a perfectly "objective" statement of the condition of South Africa, shortly before the war—the more valuable as evidence, because Mr. Bryce has since then condemned the action of the British government, as may be seen in his Preface to the third edition. "The Settlement after the War," by M. J. Farrelly (Macmillan), contains a valuable collection of documents. Dr. Farrelly was advisory counsel to the Transvaal Republic at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference.

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vaal no advantages for persons of non-Dutch race which were not granted to persons of Dutch race in Cape Colony and Natal. Great Britain was not either formally or actually the aggressor. We now know that a great Anti-British propaganda had been going on for years and that the danger to British sovereignty in her own South African colonies was far greater than our too easy-going statesmen had supposed. The measures taken for the protection of loyal colonists were too slight and too tardy to save them from much suffering. In the course of the war, again and again, many of the Boers have violated the usages of civilized warfare; but the British commanders, while reporting such violations, have continued to treat them as belligerents and not as brigands. If British commanders have erred, the error has been on the side of a humanity which has unhappily not always been reciprocated and which has undoubtedly led to the prolongation of hostilities. When South Africa is pacified, all white races will be put upon an equality as in all the British colonies, and the natives will have a better legal status than they had under the Transvaal Republic, which rigidly excluded any equality whatever between black and white, "whether in Church or State" (See Mr. Bryce's chapter on "Blacks and Whites"). The adverse sentiment of so many people in Europe and America has been largely due to misunderstanding of the nature of the British "Empire" and to the circulation of deliberate falsehoods on the part of Afrikander emissaries and sensational journalists. We can safely trust to the calmer judgment of the future and of the best-informed people in other countries. Let me quote a passage from a carefully reasoned article by Mr. Talcott Williams, of Philadelphia, in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Sept. 1900), Vol. xvi., No. 2, p. 59:

"The present war in South Africa, whose results may any week be complete, is itself an illustration of the mutual acceptance in theory of the principle of self-rule by both combatants and of the inevitable conflict between the rights of the small, integral community exclusively to rule itself and the rights on the other hand, first, of men to go where they will and in all lands enjoy all the political privileges of self-rule; and second of the claims of the larger territorial unit of which the small state is a part to control the latter. For there is no reasonable doubt that a century hence the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony will have become part of a South African domain, whose common fellow-citizens will look upon the present war as do the citizens of the Union on our Civil War, as an issue on which men could honestly differ, but on which all men can gladly and loyally accept the final result."

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The parallel here suggested between the South African struggle and the American Civil War is a most instructive one and could easily be elaborated in many details.* In both cases compromises in the past have not avoided war in the long run, but have rather perhaps rendered it inevitable. In the new case, as in the old, the result of the suffering will be, I am certain, to make the citizens of distant commonwealths aware of a common membership in a larger whole. The Civil War made the American people feel themselves one nation as they had never done before: the South African war has revealed an enthusiasm for the integrity of the British Empire on the part of her self-governing colonies, such as British statesmen of a short time since would have pronounced, and did pronounce, impossible.

Mr. Robertson says that "in a discussion elsewhere" [he can only be referring to a paper that was called "The Ethical World"], I "repeatedly insinuated that the shortness of an opponent's stay in South Africa discredited his opinion (though that was fully reasoned) as against the opinion of Sir Alfred Milner, who had been there for a longer period. On that footing, any litigant might contemn the opinion of a judge who in a few weeks disposed of a suit on which the litigant's mind had been fixed for twenty years." Mr. Robertson's analogy seems to me in any case grotesquely inappropriate; but his statement of what I said is recklessly inaccurate. I referred to missionaries and others who have lived and worked in South Africa, as against the utterances of journalists sent out on a short visit by partisan newspapers and then posing as impartial judges (*Ethical World*, Feb. 3, 1900). But what I actually wrote in *The Ethical World* about Sir Alfred Milner had nothing whatever to do with length of residence. In the issue of Feb. 3, 1900, I used the words:

"I certainly prefer the trained accuracy of experienced admistrators like Sir Alfred Milner to the random assertions of his irresponsible assailants."

On March 3, I wrote:

"My private judgment, based upon experience, leads me to prefer the authority of Sir Alfred Milner to that of his irresponsible assailants."

*The parallel is worked out in some of its details in an article on "The American and African Civil Wars" by W. K. Sands in the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1891.

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In the issue of Jan. 13, 1900, in referring to some writer who quoted an unnamed "German doctor" as an authority for the assertion that Milner issued "lying dispatches," I said I did not know the writer in question, but, I continued:

> "I do know Sir Alfred Milner, from the days when we belonged to the little circle that Arnold Toynbee gathered round him for the study of politics; and I know of no man whose accuracy in dealing with everything he touches, whose calmness of judgment, impartiality and absolute personal disinterestedness can be more implicitly trusted."

Anyone who ever knew Sir A. Milner well, knows that he is of the very finest type of English statesman—a quiet, strong, fearless man, while his half-German upbringing has given him in addition a width of outlook and a breadth of sympathy that save him from the narrowness of judgment of too many Englishmen in dealing with unfamiliar types of civilization. I feel that it is almost an indignity to praise Sir Alfred Milner. I believe that future generations in South Africa, alike of Dutch and of English descent, will look on him as all Americans now—and not Americans only—look on Abraham Lincoln, as the man whose insight and firmness have secured unity, peace and equal justice to a long distracted and divided country.

With Mr. Robertson's insinuations against the British troops in South Africa I need not deal here. Even the best disciplined armies will have some black sheep in them. But this we know, that slander after slander repeated by those of Mr. Robertson's way of thinking and by much more reckless persons than he, have broken down on examination. Mr. Robertson thinks we condemn the war in South Africa (*i. e.* the British cause in that war) because there have been some noisy public meetings where excited youths drowned Pro-Boer speeches by singing "Rule Britannia" (badly) instead of following the wiser course of outvoting the resolutions. Violence at meetings, whether of one party or another, is always to be deplored. Unfortunately it is an old tradition of "free" countries. But, as a matter of fact, our English "Copperheads" (if I may borrow an historical American term) have been allowed a liberty of speaking and writing and circulating their utterances, such as no other country in the world (least of all the late South African Republic) would have tolerated on the part of assailants of the national policy in the very crisis of a terrible war,—a liberty of utterance, on the part of a small but very blatant faction, which has unfortunately helped to mislead



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the Boers and induce them to prolong a struggle which less ignorant people know to be hopeless. As to Mr. Robertson's attribution of "rowdiness" to the effects of war, how does he explain the turbulence of meetings among the Irish Nationalists who have all been violent and pugnacious supporters of "peace"?

Mr. Robertson writes: "Charges of corruption against statesmen are perfectly fit where they are believed to be true; and their ethical condemnation is to be compassed only by disproving them." It has been a wise maxim of English law that a man is to be held innocent until he is proved guilty. Mr. Robertson adopts the converse principle. If such are the ethics of the "peace-party," I prefer the code of honor and of kindliness to foes as held and practised by the ordinary soldier who is produced out of very indifferent material by a very unsatisfactory army system.

Mr. Robertson thinks the cases of Poland under Russian and of Ireland under English rule "the cases most nearly analogous to that under discussion" (by which he means the treatment of the annexed states in South Africa—a question I was not discussing). He also adds various references to the attempt of Edward I. to conquer Scotland, as if that were an alternative parallel to what will happen in the Transvaal. Now historical parallels are never quite exact, as Mr. Robertson admits. But his parallels are most fantastically chosen. The only fair analogy would be the conditions of other British possessions in the present age, above all of Canada, where the difference of races makes a close analogy to one of the difficulties of South Africa, and where the difference in the prevalent religion might have seemed to make the problem much harder. Mr. Robertson's assertion, that "normal British principles" mean treating new territory as Russia has treated Poland, is not worth serious consideration. If any person *seriously* supposes that the South African States will be treated as Russia has treated Poland, or as the Plantagenet kings tried to treat Scotland or as Oliver Cromwell treated Ireland, such a person only betrays ignorance of the present actual political condition of what we call the British Empire. In the matter, indeed, of incorporating alien races of European descent, there is no gap made in the practice of the English-speaking peoples even by the great disruption of 1776. Dutch, French, Spanish possessions have been absorbed by English colonists and their descendants in America; and you will find men, in what was once New Amsterdam and in what was once New France, taking a just historic pride in the

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famous races from which they derive their names and yet loyal in their devotion to the English-speaking nations of most varied race which have given them citizenship in free self-governing communities, whether under the Stripes and Stars or under the Union Jack. Is there any reasonable ground for supposing that, with the precedents of what policies have failed and of what policies have succeeded in America, Great Britain will fail in the long run to conciliate South Africa? When representative institutions are introduced, there will be no taxation without representation (such as there was in the so-called "South African Republic"); the language, the religion, the law of the Dutch will all be respected; there will be no attempt to obliterate local differences in a cast-iron centralized system. The solution is to be found in Federation, *i. e.* in a legally *indissoluble* union with local self-government and a central law-court to settle disputes. That solution we have learnt from the United States, from the Swiss constitution after the war of the *Sonderbund*, from Canadian experience after the trial and failure of various other systems.

Mr. Robertson writes as if I held that "a forcible unification by conquest, however desperate, is in the end as good a thing as a willing federation." Where have I said that or implied it? I agree with Paley that conquest may *sometimes* produce as good results (Paley thinks sometimes even better results), but only if the conquest is followed by the introduction of better government and a higher type of civilization than the conquered people enjoyed before. There are, apparently, cases where disputed questions could only be finally settled by war—all previous "voluntary" arrangements proving makeshift arrangements which one or the other party did not accept as final. Is it likely that without the Swiss war of the *Sonderbund* and the American Civil War the legal indissolubility of these and other similar federations would be a settled question?

To turn to Mr. Robertson's chosen analogies—I think that the Poles who have come under Prussian and Austrian rule (he seems to have forgotten them altogether) are probably *now* better off than under their old aristocratic anarchy. Those annexed by Russia are probably worse off. Russian encroachments on the Finnish constitution are an injury to the cause of humanity. But if Finland had conquered Russia and introduced constitutional government, even against the will of an ignorant peasantry, an obscurantist clergy and an interested bureaucracy, that would in

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the long run have been a great gain to the Russian people.

The days of the Plantagenets are a somewhat remote source from which to draw arguments to the politics of to-day. Edward I.'s earlier attempt to govern Scotland as a vassal state may at least serve to show, that to set up nominally independent but subordinate states is a bad policy, when adopted with a high-spirited and militant people. If Edward I. had succeeded in incorporating Scotland as he succeeded in incorporating Wales (where the incorporation in the end prevented warfare, though it did not crush out national sentiment) and had made it the sharer in English parliamentary institutions and in the English rule of law, Scotland would not have become the tool of France, and Scotland would have had a less romantic, but undoubtedly a less blood-stained, history. It is quite arguable that the world has gained in picturesqueness, and in some other important things, by the particularist and centrifugal tendencies of the middle ages; more "variations" were thus provided in institutions for the natural and artificial selection of later times. But the independence of Scotland meant certainly "not peace, but a sword." A weak monarchy left the land a prey to perpetual internal feuds in Highlands and Lowlands, apart from the ever-recurring warfare with England. When Cromwell had defeated the Scotch supporters of that reluctant Covenanter, King Charles II., he at once proposed the plan of an incorporating union—in this, as in his Imperial policy, showing himself a statesman in advance of his age. The merely "personal union" of the Crowns brought little good to Scotland. Even the Union of the Parliaments was not at the time a very "voluntary" act on the part of most Scotsmen. It was the work of a few far-seeing and not always very scrupulous statesmen and of the commercial classes. The "consent" of Scotland came afterwards with the internal peace and greater prosperity that resulted from sharing in a larger citizenship. If either the Covenanters or the Jacobites had succeeded in making Scotland independent, the country would be a worse place to live in than it is.

Ireland may seem the perpetual reproach to English rule, and presents undoubtedly the hardest problem. But the cases of Ireland and Scotland are an instructive contrast. If England had treated Ireland in a manner analogous to that in which Scotland was treated at the Union of the Parliaments, *e. g.*, if the Roman Catholic Church had been established and endowed in Ireland

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(the Crown retaining a right to be consulted in the appointment of bishops and taking security for the toleration of Protestants) and if Ireland, like Scotland, had been allowed to retain much of her old system of law, as to land-tenure, etc., the Irish problem might not be so difficult as it is; and even the average Irish politician might be as enthusiastic an Imperialist as the average French Canadian, or the average Irish soldier. But it was only with Catholic Emancipation that England began to undo the mischief caused by Protestant ascendancy, an ascendancy rendered inevitable by the bigotry, if not justified by the fears, of English Puritanism—an ascendancy which forms a striking parallel to the kind of government that has at length been brought to an end at Pretoria, with this difference, that in the Transvaal the least enlightened part of the population tyrannized over the more enlightened and more industrial. But admitting the want of success in the treatment of Roman Catholic Ireland, can we say that the cause of *peace* (which was *the* question under discussion) would have gained, if Ireland had remained independent? If Ireland had been left alone by the kings of England and had (as is probable) continued quite untouched by the Protestant Reformation, its previous state of "glorious" native warfare and violence (unchecked by the cold-blooded, unsympathetic "Saxon") would have lasted on, until perhaps some one king or chief had killed off all the others. An independent, militant, Catholic Ireland would have been the useful ally of Spain in the time of the Armada, of James II. in his attempt to bring back England under allegiance to Rome, of Louis XIV. in the time of William of Orange and of Napoleon in his attempted invasion of England. The state of Ireland would be no better than it is, unless indeed France had annexed it and kept a strict control over the priests. But in that case there might have been more frequent and more terrible warfare between France and Britain. Imaginary history is a highly conjectural region. But so far as one can see, the cause of *peace* at least has gained by English rule in Ireland, whatever other causes may have suffered. Fault-finding, as Hegel wisely said, is an easy kind of criticism. When we are condemning existing institutions, it is always well to ask ourselves, What is or was the alternative? And we must ask the question, without assuming all human beings to be perfect.

Mr. Robertson seems to argue that the absorption of Hanover in Prussia has not served the cause of peace. Would the state of

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Germany have been better in 1870, if France (as of old) had found allies among some of the smaller German states?* Prussian "militarism" *guided by Prussian statesmanship,* has lifted Germany out of the particularism which resulted from the weakness of the Imperial power, and which made Germany in the past the scene of ever-recurring internal warfare. The armed peace of the Federal Empire may not be an ideal state; but it is infinitely preferable to the acute agony of the Thirty Years' War or to the chronic maladies of the Holy Roman Empire—an empire with no regular armed force to support it and to keep its subject princes from fighting with each other. I am not arguing for centralization, except in so far as it is necessary as a security for peace. As I have said elsewhere, the two greatest political "inventions" of mankind, since the Greeks invented the city-republic, have been the invention of representative institutions and the invention of federal government. Representative and federal government make it possible, not merely for large nations but for great communities of nations to enjoy peace without sinking under despotism. The Roman Empire gave such peace to the Mediterranean lands as they had never known before and have not yet known since. (If Mr. Robertson wishes to contradict that statement, let him cite his authorities.) But the Roman Empire decayed because of the absence of self-government, except in municipalities, and because of the absence of military training which allowed its citizens, for generations unacquainted with war, to fall so easy a prey to the barbarian invaders. If the British Empire, a vast and as yet only partly organized collection of nations varying in form of government according to climate and inhabitants, should fail in its task, its failure will be due to the make-shift methods of its statesmen, to the miserable squab-

*For the purpose of my argument I might as well or perhaps better, have taken the cases of Bavaria and the Kingdom of Saxony, which have not been "absorbed" in Prussia (as Hanover has been, wisely or unwisely), but incorporated in the Federal Empire in 1871. The war of 1866 benefited not only Germany, by settling vexed questions, but Italy and Hungary, and to some extent even Austria. Mr. Robertson refers to the good understanding since then between Austria and Prussia. But no one can suppose the Triple Alliance to be as effective in securing peace between the powers concerned as was the formation of a united Germany and a united Italy in putting a stop to chronic dissension and chronic risk of war between men of the same race and the same language and living under the same social conditions.

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bles of party politics,* and to the individualist selfishness which shrinks from the sacrifice of money, comfort and lives on behalf of the unborn generations and the ideals of a new and wider patriotism.

Believing as I do with Hegel that "the real is the rational" and (what is part of the same doctrine) with the Hebrew prophets that the judgments of Divine Justice are known to us in the rise and fall of nations, I do not think we are entitled to pronounce on the right or wrong of particular wars in the light of abstract and arbitrary intuitionalist theories or by a supposed insight into the motives of statesmen (which we never really possess),† but only on the analogy of the judgments we pass on those wars which we consider to have helped human progress in the past. And by "we" I mean persons who believe in the progress of mankind through struggle, of which struggle war is at times an inevitable, and not always the worst or the lowest, form. "Give peace in our time, O Lord," is a prayer which admits of a somewhat selfish interpretation. The evils of war may have to be endured for the sake of a more lasting and more widespread peace than could be obtained without them.

D. G. Ritchie.

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Reply to the Foregoing.

In his very lengthy reply, Mr. Ritchie entirely ignores a large part of my criticism of his ethical theory, and raises a number of

*Mr. Robertson seems to think that constitutional government necessarily means party-government. One of the many lessons we may learn from Switzerland is that a self-governing country may have parties, but need not therefore have party-government—any more than a well-governed municipality among ourselves. Even party-government does not necessarily mean vituperation of persons, which simply diverts attention from the discussion of problems.

†*Cf.* T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," p. 319. "It is wiser not to make guesses where we can do no more than guess, and to confine ourselves, *where no question of self-condemnation or self-approval is involved,* to measuring the value of actions by their effects without reference to the character of the agents." Of course in estimating the value of *evidence* we have to take account of the character and intellectual qualifications of our authorities, so far as known to us.

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fresh issues, some of which seem to me extremely out of place. I shall try to be more concise in my rebuttal.

1. Mr. Ritchie in closing observes that "party government does not mean vituperation of persons, which simply diverts attention from the discussion of problems." Yet he has thought fit to liken his opponents on the present issues to the "Copperheads," and to call them "a small but very blatant faction." They include Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. John Morley, Mr. Frederic Harrison, Mr. Leonard Courtney, Mr. Theal (the historian of South Africa), Mr. Selous (an expert in South African matters), Dean Kitchin, Colonel Hanna, Mr. Frederick Greenwood, Professor Sylvanus Thompson, Professor Gilbert Murray, and Professor Bryce (who for Mr. Ritchie was a good witness when he echoed colonial loyalist opinion, but is "blatant" when he condemns the war). Comment here seems needless.

2. Mr. Ritchie asserts that I have been "recklessly inaccurate" in saying he had insinuated that the shortness of an opponent's stay at the Cape discredited his opinion (though that was fully reasoned) as against the opinion of Sir Alfred Milner, who had been there for a longer period. Without venturing to say explicitly that he did *not* do this, Mr. Ritchie goes about to prove his charge against me by citing passages in which he *did* say that he trusted Sir Alfred Milner as against opponents on the ground of his personal and intellectual merits. What then? I fear Mr. Ritchie overvalues the method of subterfuge. I have simply to repeat that he *did* do what I said, and that it is no answer to me to say he also did something else. I pointed out that he used absurd tests in his calculus. The fact remains that he did.

3. In this connection Mr. Ritchie admits, be it observed, that Sir Alfred Milner whom he champions is his personal friend. At the same time he tells his opponents that they are not impartial! To the same end, he supplies prophecies—a favorite form of demonstration with him—as to the future universal acquiescence of mankind in his view. There is to be no vituperation of persons; yet Mr. Ritchie vituperates persons; and at the same time he goes about to settle "problems" by eulogies of those whom he supports. In view of his apparent theory of proof and persuasion, I perhaps ought to mention in so many words that I consider Sir Alfred Milner and his British coadjutors to be well-nigh destitute of political wisdom. But I must formally demur to the introduction here of such dialectic methods.

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4. As to "problems," Mr. Ritchie unfortunately fails to see the point of the more important of the arguments with which he does deal. In reply to his argument from the present peaceful relations of Scotland and England, I pointed out that the attempt of Edward I to annex Scotland led to 300 years of hatred and strife, in the course of which occurred a second attempt in the same direction, productive of the most frightful savagery of retaliation. To this Mr. Ritchie answers that if Edward had succeeded things would have gone better! I have seldom seen a more grotesque *ignoratio elenchi.* His argument was that peace is promoted by annexations—this or nothing. I answer that attempts at annexation very often fail, and that they have immeasurably multiplied hatreds and strifes. His defence is either a plea for more general and strenuous aggression or a vacuity.

5. As for his assumption that a crushed Scotland would have had a less blood-stained history, it proceeds on disregard of (*a*) the many civil wars in England—in particular the War of the Roses—and (*b*) of the case of Ireland, where again and again more slaughter was wrought by English policy in a few years than was ever wrought in free Scotland in a century.

6. Mr. Ritchie represents me as "asserting that 'normal British principles' mean treating new territory as Russia has treated Poland." He then proceeds to say that any one who supposes that Britain will treat the Boers "as Russia has treated Poland, or as Plantagenet kings tried to treat Scotland, or as Oliver Cromwell treated Ireland," betrays ignorance. These sentences are misrepresentations. I wrote that *"should the attempt* (to crush the Boers) *fail,"* the situation will be analogous to the old one between Scotland and England (since England *is now* trying to treat the Boers as Plantagenet kings sought to treat Scotland), and the later one between England and the United States from 1774 till 1874. *This* issue Mr. Ritchie ignores, save for the nugatory remark before cited. Then I wrote that, should the Boers be crushed and be governed henceforth *"as far as possible,* on normal British principles," the analogy "will be with the cases of Ireland and Poland."

7. Mr. Ritchie drops all mention of Ireland in this context. Later he admits "want of success" in Ireland. As usual, he obscures the issue by asking whether Irish independence would have made for peace. It could hardly have involved such enormities of butchery and systematic age-long decivilization as the

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English overlordship did, but that is not the final issue. The final issue is whether peaceful union is best attained by slow peaceful methods or by brute force. Ireland might very well have come into a peaceful union. Of course it never occurs to Mr. Ritchie to ask whether Ireland would have been Catholic had she not been held down by England in the pre-Reformation period. He appears to conceive of political causation on one line only. Further he argues as if Ireland was in itself doomed to perpetual civil war; as if there had been more civil strife in pre-Norman Ireland than in Anglo-Saxon England.

8. There remains the analogy with Poland. Mr. Ritchie burkes the obvious issue as to whether "normal" British methods (which he evidently defines as those followed latterly in Canada) will be possible in remote regions where an alien and hated population has been dragooned into a deeper detestation of British rule than is felt even in Ireland. When these dangers are forced on his notice, Mr. Ritchie rides off on a prophecy—the method of the platform politician whom he affects to contemn. I suppose I must mention that I personally do not value his prophecies at one straw. But I am at a loss to guess on what grounds he expects them to be taken as settling the very question in dispute. Already a round dozen of the most confident prophecies made on his side have been ludicrously refuted by events. The prophecy he quotes from Mr. Talcott Williams is on a par with his own. If such disputes are to be closed by somebody's saying, "there is no reasonable doubt" that his view is right, they are really not worth beginning. Are we to be "justified" in a policy which destroys tens of thousands of lives, enormous treasure and well-nigh the whole means of existence for white men in two vast territories, besides breeding malignity like a pestilence, all on the score of prophecies by professors? I will not talk here of "blatancy," but I may mention the word "farce."

9. While Mr. Ritchie is prophesying that after the war "all white races" will be put on an equality, multitudes on his side in South Africa are insisting that non-British Europeans must be excluded from the Transvaal, *as they actually have been to the number of thousands,* and that the Dutch must be treated as a subject race. The Premier himself has publicly declared that a generation may elapse before they are treated otherwise. Mr. Ritchie's further prediction that "the natives will have a better legal status than they had under the Transvaal," is made in the

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face of all probability, seeing that (*a*) the most influential Outlanders have openly striven and argued for legislation which shall force natives to labor in the mines, and that (*b*) one of their declared grievances against the Republic was that it would not meet their wishes on this head. Others on Mr. Ritchie's side predict that the natives will get the franchise in the Transvaal, when they are unenfranchised in Natal!

10. On my remark that he " has *inevitably the effect* of contending that a forcible unification by contest, however desperate, is *in the end* as good a thing as a willing federation," Mr. Ritchie asks, "Where have I said that or implied it?" Perhaps he misconstrues my words. I, of course, did not mean that he did not care whether a given federation was accomplished by coercion or by an *equally rapid* voluntary process. I meant that he seemed to think the final outcome in civilization of a forced union is the same as the outcome of a willing union. And to his question I answer that, inasmuch as nobody is opposing voluntary federation anywhere, his argument has no practical application save to the case of contest, and that in point of fact he is applying it at this moment to the case of an extremely desperate contest.

11. In regard to the case of Hanover and Prussia Mr. Ritchie, as usual, raises a fresh issue instead of meeting my criticism. I pointed out that the annexation went far to *make possible* the great war of 1870, which was played for by Prussia. He replies that *in* that war Germany would have been worse off if Hanover were not already annexed! Is the whole question at stake then the military good fortune of Germany? As it chances to suit his purpose, Mr. Ritchie alternately treats war as *the* evil to be avoided and as an inevitable episode. He says I am mistaken in supposing that he admitted Prussia to have got up the war of 1870. So be it; but on his own construction the context of his passage becomes far from clear. He was ostensibly dissenting (p. 147) from Mr. Spencer's view that France's territorial losses were a due punishment for her aggression. If he merely meant to say that she committed aggression when ill prepared, he was not countering Mr. Spencer's remark, unless by suggesting that "France" ought not to be punished for the impolicy of her Emperor and his Ministers. I am not sure whether he meant to suggest that Britain ought not to be made to suffer for the impolicy of her present Government, who, in the terms of his

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own admissions, have "done Britain a grievous wrong" in forcing on a war for which *they* were not prepared.

12. Mr. Ritchie appears to think he is using an argument when he says I "think differently from the vast majority of the inhabitants of Great Britain and of her self-governing colonies." It therefore seems necessary to point out in reply that *he* thinks differently from the vast majority of the people of Europe, the educated as well as the mass, while he has with him the Mafeking mob and the tens of thousands who rejoiced to hear of the wrecking of houses and shops which had harbored Mr. Cronwright Schreiner, of houses inhabited by the female relatives of the owners of the others, and of houses and shops belonging to "pro-Boers" in general. I wish him joy of his majority which has approved of *every* foreign war waged by England. But if such questions are to be cleared by counting heads, why use other arguments at all? It ought not to be necessary to suggest to a professor of moral philosophy that the mass in any nation are hardly likely to be just judges of its quarrels.

13. While thus raising issues which ought never to have been raised in these pages, Mr. Ritchie strangely fails to work out the central ethical issue of all. He says I "appeal to the law of reciprocity." I did a great deal more. I put it that *the* ethical problem is that of the fit limitations or rather definitions of the law of reciprocity. Yet he proceeds to argue as if I had refused or failed to recognize any limitations. Thus he has finally left untouched the great theoretic problem, merely reiterating some political and moral commonplaces.

14. When Mr. Ritchie allows himself to say that I adopted the principle that an accused man is to be presumed guilty until he is proved innocent, I can only say that he has grossly falsified the issue. He began by arguing that to *charge* corruption against statesmen is to exhibit an immoral malignity. I answered that such charges, *when believed to be true,* may fitly be made by politicians, especially against statesmen who impute treason to all who denounce their policy, and that they are to be met not on his plan of burking them but by *disproof.* His charge is thus a fresh subterfuge. All the while, like his leaders, he himself flings aspersions broadcast. Thus on his own showing the policy of national coercion has multiplied evil on all hands.

15. It seems hard that Hegel should be saddled with the platitude (pronounced "wise" by Mr. Ritchie) that "fault-finding is

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an easy kind of criticism," in a case where the effect of its use is to justify fault-finding against a small and hard-bested State, and to burke it as against a large one.

16. Concerning the *pax Romana* (whereanent Mr. Ritchie asks my authority for saying that it is a conventional illusion), I will simply ask the reader to go through any good historical epitome and find *when* there was *pax*. Even in the "Mediterranean lands" it never subsisted for a generation. Roughly, the Roman history was as follows: Hundreds of years of inter-Italian strife until Rome had subjugated Italy; then 250 years of almost uninterrupted wars between Rome and other Mediterranean lands, with latterly a series of frightful civil wars to boot; then 450 years of continuous social dissolution, marked by scores of wars, civil wars, revolts and massacres, in the Mediterranean lands as well as almost continuous wars on the frontiers, until moribund civilization fell before barbarism, which meant a new era of well-nigh universal war. At the best, some *parts* of the Mediterranean lands had more peace in their time of miserable decadence than in the time of their progress. If that be the *pax Romana,* then England has had peace since 1745.

17. While constantly imputing "sentimentalism" to others, Mr. Ritchie is extraordinarily given to sentimentalism of the flimsiest kind. Thus he announces with triumph that "the Civil War made the American people feel themselves one nation as they had never done before." So that the destruction of well-nigh a million of men, including the flower of American youth, the working of stupendous material havoc, the blighting of the lives of millions and the inoculation of millions more with hatred, is to be regarded as compensated by the subsequent growth of the *sentiment* of national unity. It is in this spirit that Mr. Ritchie handles the great problem of Roman imperialism. The absolute ruin of ancient civilization, the degradation for centuries of half the human race, the impoverishment for an æon of the human mind —all is rhetorically balanced by the mention of a peace which was no peace.

18. The crowning discredit, to my thinking, of Mr. Ritchie's historical philosophy is his absolute failure to read the one organic lesson of the whole Roman evolution. "The Roman empire decayed," he tells us, "*because* of the absence of self-government, and because of the absence of military training . . ." Will it forever be necessary to proclaim that these things were

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absent *because of the Roman Empire?* Had they been present, the Roman Empire had not been! They disappeared step for step with the rise of Empire; the causal connection is open, palpable. Before men take to determining their politics by prophecies of the future, let them, in the name of science, comprehend the past!

19. I am not a Christian, so I leave it to Christians to pronounce upon Mr. Ritchie's thesis that the ethic of "Jesus" prescribes love merely to individual enemies and sanctions the deliberate crushing of a nation. On the same score I leave it to theists to deal with Mr. Ritchie's belief, shared, as he says, with "the Hebrew prophet," that "the judgments of Divine Justice are known to us in the rise and fall of nations." I shall merely say that in the view of the Hebrew prophet the plague at Cape Town would be a manifestation of Divine wrath; and that, in general, this latest development of Mr. Ritchie's ethical system is to my thinking the very negation of rational morality, to say nothing of the teaching of "Jesus" about the fall of the tower of Siloam. I only wonder why he puts it at the end and not at the beginning of his argument.

20. Mr. Ritchie permits himself to talk of my "insinuations against British troops." The statements I made about the war ("looting" and "ferocity") are categorical and are substantiated twenty times over by the *published letters of British soldiers.* If Mr. Ritchie does not know this he is casting aspersions in a matter where he has no proper information. I expressly limited myself to facts thus substantiated beyond all honest dispute. Nor did I cite these facts by way of aspersing either the army or the war party as Mr. Ritchie asperses Boers and pro-Boers; regarding them as normal in warfare (see the last issue of the *Humane Review*), I cited them as considerations of obvious importance in any calculation of the pros and cons of the policy of willful war. Mr. Ritchie, on his side irrelevantly, nay, worse than irrelevantly, repeats general charges of atrocity and treachery against the enemy, charges many of which have been emphatically repudiated by British officers and by correspondents of pro-war journals, while others have been quashed by explicit contradictions through the very news agencies which brought them. But as usual Mr. Ritchie has missed the issue. For, *supposing his charges against the enemy to be true, they only prove that the process of war has grossly barbarized that enemy.* All such

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barbarizations Mr. Ritchie had excluded from his view in supporting his own thesis. Nor did he think fit in that to say a word against the brutalities of the war party at home; indeed even now he carefully minimizes and misdescribes them.

21. I have now noted, I think, all the noteworthy points raised by Mr. Ritchie in his reply to me. A number of his propositions, I consider, are not worth discussing. But there is one of his irrelevances which I cannot let pass without a word of comment. We of the small but very blatant faction, he tells us, having had a liberty of utterance which "no other country in the world (least of all the late South African Republics) would have tolerated," have "unfortunately helped to mislead the Boers and induced them to prolong a struggle which less ignorant people know to be hopeless." Mr. Ritchie's language shows him to regret the alleged liberty of utterance, as he well may, on his Roman principles. It is very likely that he and his friends will one day compass the end of that and of other forms of intellectual liberty, whether or not by the instrumentality of mobs of blackguards. It matters little that he should disclaim, as he does, in ignorance of the fact that in France there was vehement criticism of the "national policy" at the "very crisis" of the war in Madagascar; that in America there has been similar criticism at the "crises" in Cuba and in the Philippines, and that in the Transvaal there was long tolerated by the Boers an Outlander propaganda of gross and direct sedition such as would never have been tolerated at any time in England or at Cape Town (where editors are now imprisoned for printing matter that is printed with impunity *here* and in loyalist newspapers *there*). The point worth fastening on is the standing formula about "encouraging the Boers." It is the very stuff that was talked by our imperialists in the war with the American colonies, when Chatham exulted in the resistance, and Burke warned his countrymen in vain. Observe the present implications. With martial law in force all over South Africa save in a few coast towns, the Boers get our pro-Boer (or other) newspapers, and, belike, the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.* Yet, while they must in

[*NOTE. A gentleman residing in Johannesburg, who has for several years been a subscriber to the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, wrote to us last December that he had not received any issue since April, 1900. The numbers, however, had been mailed regularly. He added further: "I should be very glad to know whether you received an article written by

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the terms of the case also learn that they are carrying on a "hopeless" struggle, and that our encouragement of them is futile, they struggle all the same! The small faction inspires them to unyielding resistance; the vast majority does not cow them! Was there ever such a confession of weakness on the part of the wielders (for Mr. Brodrick makes it) of the whole military force of a great Empire, opposed to a handful of frontier farmers? Or, to put it otherwise, was George the Third himself more absurd at any stage of the war which dismembered his Empire?

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE MEANING OF GOOD. A DIALOGUE. By G. Lowes Dickinson, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1901. Pp. 231.

Whatever may be thought of Philosophic Dialogue as a literary form, there can be small doubt that it offers great advantages for the task that Mr. Dickinson has undertaken, the task, that is, of dragging to light the essential convictions that underlie the actions of modern men, and pressing home the consequences for action that follow from modern theories. The characters introduced are representative of the time: we have the man of the world who professes to accept life as sufficient in itself without the need of any opinion, the pessimist who yet continues to fight the battle, the follower of Herbert Spencer and worshipper of science, the common-sense citizen who would bid us simply fulfill the laws of our own time, the metaphysician for whom Good is something in and by itself that may have no relation to human life at all, and finally the sympathetic acute critic and speculator, the "J" of the conversation reported, whose views we may ascribe on the whole to the author himself. To each man he puts, with

me for publication in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, expressing my views on the ethics of the conflict now going on between the English and the Boers. I posted under ordinary cover the above on April 24th, 1900, expecting the article to appear in the July number . . . . if you considered the same worthy of publication." The article referred to has not yet (June, 1901,) been received.—Managing Editor, Philadelphia].

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Socratic persistency, these vital questions: Whatever your theory, do you, or do you not, act as though you yourself aimed at some goal? And if so, at what goal? And how far does your theory accord with your action?

The method of inquiry is somewhat novel, and, used as it is used here, seems highly valuable, if only for clearing the ground, locating the difficulties, and giving scope for trenchant criticism and pregnant suggestion. Browning's dictum that "all action is belief" might be taken as the motto of the book, for the contention throughout is that faith in some goal valuable for man, some Good that can be called his Good, is a necessary postulate of all active life. "To anyone who refuses to accept any judgment about what is good, I prove, or endeavor to prove, that such refusal cuts away the whole basis of his life," (p. 33). This being admitted, at least provisionally, the next attempt is to show that a man is driven to postulate not merely a Good for his individual self, but also one in which all men can share. Here, as it seems to us, there is a lacuna which is to be regretted. The argument (pp. 23-31) maintains that if a man does not believe in such a common Good he has no intellectual right to work for anything but his own Good or at most for that of some one man, with the likelihood that he is thwarting and injuring many others" (p. 26). This seems an over-statement. No account is taken of the possibility of working for the Good of several and several only, as was done by the mediævalists who believed in hell, and is done now by those who aim only at the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Following Mr. Dickinson's own method, the questions to put to such men would then be whether so fragmentary a Good could permanently be accepted as worth working for, whether man could really be satisfied with anything in which even one life "is cast as nothing to the void." These would be interesting questions to raise, and it seems a pity not to do so expressly.

Mr. Dickinson then proceeds to criticise several widely accepted doctrines. How can we say that Good is readily known by instinct in the face of conflicting assertions on every side? How can we find the true standard in current conventions when it is the very business of the moral reformer to change them? What right have we to abdicate from our own power and let nature give the law to our judgment about Good? (p. 46.) How can we consider Utilitarianism as "clear, simple and precise"

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unless we take Pleasure in the narrowest sense of the word? And if we do this, how can we say that the fundamental dogma is one which commends itself to everyone's consciousness? (p. 66.) On the other hand, how can belief in a Good which could not satisfy man and cannot be learnt from experience give any motive for human action?

We next have the writer's own suggestion of a method by which Good can be known. His view seems to be that it is discovered by direct perception, but a perception that is at first vacillating and obscure, and only gradually advances towards clearness and harmony. The power closely resembles "taste" in matters of beauty, and is, as it were, an organ of sight, rudimentary, but capable of growth into perfection. At bottom it is the same for all men; apparent contradiction, of whatever kind, is merely a token of temporary misinterpretation, and unity of conviction can be reached, not indeed by "logic and demonstration," but by teaching one another where and how to look. All this is very striking and suggestive, but there is at least one serious difficulty not fully cleared up. Is harmony of conviction just the same as certainty? If so, it would seem, in the first place, that we must always assume in the case of beliefs admittedly imperfect, however passionately held, a secret unrest which must lead to open rupture. Some such answer Mr. Dickinson seems inclined to give—see pp. 85, 86—but even granting this, there still remains the question: Suppose, for instance, that our æsthetic perceptions were all harmonized according to the standard of the Hottentot Venus, ought we to say that they would be as true as if they led to the Greek? In other words, does not certainty imply truth? And truth a reference to something that *is* whether it is perceived or not? This point is actually raised and a significant answer given (p. 93): "we . . . affirm what we find to be good, and in that sense determine for ourselves what for us was previously indeterminate; but, on the other hand, *our determination is not mere caprice;* it is determination of Good, which we must therefore suppose somehow or other to 'be' before we discern it." Here the necessity of some external reference seems admitted almost in so many words, but one would like to know exactly how to conceive it.

The second half of the book attempts to determine more precisely, according to this method, the content of Good, conceived as the object of human action. Such a Good, it is first laid down,

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must be an object of consciousness, a state of activity (pp. 113 and 132). On this basis, various goods are tested and each found inherently defective. To labor for the welfare of future generations alone, or for "the species," does not seem a fair enough arrangement to satisfy man. To delight equally in all activities just as they are is to reach a chaos of indifferentism. To follow the moral law as a mere law, an alien command, cannot be considered as perfect as an entirely willing activity. Goods of sense are precarious, and further they rise from "things which have quite another nature than that of being good for us" (p. 154). The first objection does not seem strictly relevant: other Goods admittedly better, the Goods of love and friendship, for instance, are just as precarious; nor can one think that the Goods of sense would be any the less wearisome if they were as unfading as the houris in Mahomet's paradise. One might suggest that when Mr. Dickinson speaks of "precariousness, what he really has in his mind is the unsatistying nature of their content, the fact that the spirit of man could not rest in them. This is supported by his quotation lower down from the "Ode on a Grecian Urn," for what Keats really meant must surely be that it is the glory of Art not to make the passion of the senses permanent but to make another thing of it, transform it, lift it—in Mr. Dickinson's own words—"and fix it like a star in the eighth heaven." But the second objection leads on to a much more fruitful result. The vital point seems to be that these goods spring from something that is not "good in essence and substance" (p. 155). A similar objection is brought against the Good of Art. Whatever its merits, it is not real in the sense that it is not something "distinct and independent" (p. 162): we, the human workers, are responsible for its goodness; we have not found "that ultimate thing we wanted, that Good in and of itself, as well as through and for us, Good by its own nature apart from our interposition, self-moved, self-determined, self-dependent, and in which alone our desires could finally rest" (p. 165). Thus in considering Value we reach a remarkable parallel to the conclusion suggested concerning Truth. We could not be said to know Good, if it was merely determined by us, and now it appears that we should not care for it if we did.

Nor can knowledge be taken as the goal. If it is defined as the description in brief formulas of our perceptions its only intrinsic merit can be the discovery of order, order, it may be, in Bad as

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well as Good: if it is to be "a closed circle of necessary connections," pure thought and logic, how are we to endure the intolerable airlessness due to the utter absence of anything analogous to sense?

At last the love of human beings to one another is brought forward, and here it is urged we find a Good in objects, not merely ideas, objects immediately presented, and yet somehow quite satisfactory. Such a love, at its best, if all-comprehensive and all-enduring, would be the perfect Good. Now it may well be granted that all that is valuable in the relations of men to one another might be summed up in love lke this, but it is hard to see how their other activities could be thus interpreted, and hard to dismiss them as mere vagaries. The love of Nature, the passion for Beauty, the interest of a Kepler in the planetary motions, the philosophic search for the "why?," the reverence for Right as Right, the longing to worship and work under some power that moves the Whole, all these and more, that the religious consciousness has covered, in however blundering a fashion, by the conception of God, how can they possibly be reduced to an interest in individuals without losing their essential characteristics, and with the loss of each is not a glory, to borrow Mr. Dickinson's phrase, shorn from the perfect Good?

Towards the end of the book a new and most important point is raised. The argument so far has been that if we are to have a really intelligible principle of choice throughout our lives, and if we are to understand "our pleasures and pains alike, our longing and our dissatisfaction" (p. 193), we must somehow or other conceive of one absolute Good, whether we are ever to reach it or not. But now it is asked: Is it worth while going on at all if we can attain so little of it as can be got in this life on earth? Thus the old question of personal immortality meets us once more. No decisive answer is given, but it is easy to see that the author's own attitude towards life is "one of affirmation," and the discussion closes with a Platonic myth of "the grand Perhaps," exquisitely imagined and told. The book is prefaced, it may be added, by a noble sonnet of dedication, full of grave and piercing pathos.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

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CHALMERS ON CHARITY. Arranged and edited by N. Masterman, M. A. Archibald Constable & Co., Westminster, 1900. Pp. xxii., 414.

There is no one branch of knowledge in which experience has been so frequently gained and lost, as that which refers to the art of Charity and the disease of Pauperism. Elsewhere men experiment and learn and accumulate knowledge, which they indeed may have to leave behind them; but the harvest they have accumulated is garnered and stored for the use of the generations who come after them, and who labor as eagerly in the appropriation of the old treasure as in the acquisition of new. Small indeed would be our range of knowledge if each generation of men had begun anew for itself the heavy task of buying its own experience, and yet that is much what we have been content to do in the field of social work. Every thirty years or so we start afresh in our efforts to combat pauperism and relieve distress, with new ideas, new aspirations, new methods; which, if we did but know it, have all been conceived and tried and tested over and over again before our time. All our new devices, all our eager experiments, all our heart-breaking failures and false issues, we might have spared ourselves if we had but studied first the records of past experience. For to some extent at least the records are there, and it is nothing but a strange wilfulness, and misplaced self-confidence in philanthropists and statesmen which make them so persistently blind to the lessons of the past. Had we been trained to study in this branch of knowledge as in others, and to build our own hopes on a firm basis of experience, we might have been far advanced by now in the path of social reform.

Perhaps the most important contribution made by any one person towards this knowledge was that of Dr. Chalmers. It is hardly too much to say that he both discovered and practised the art of a wise treatment of poverty, and that in his work and writings are to be found the principles upon which all future progress must be based. To a few—probably very few—students and experts he has long been a familiar guide, but for most social workers he will be practically a re-discovery. And yet it is little over fifty years since he died, and since his teaching was attracting the attention of legislators and influencing the charitable work of thoughtful people all over the United Kingdom. In the book

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before us Mr. Masterman has undertaken to make a selection from his writings and to give an account of his work which should be very important in recalling attention to the teaching of a great master.

That teaching, like all teaching which embodies great truths, is both simple and difficult. It is simple in that it goes right to the heart of the matter, and relies solely upon a few great facts of human nature. It is difficult in that it demands great faith and patience and humility from its disciples. "Appeal to the higher qualities of men, and refrain from tempting them into dependence, and there will be no pauper class"; that in brief was what Chalmers said, and what he proved by active trial.

The conditions under which he worked differed in one important point from those of England to-day, for he was contending against the introduction of a Poor Law into Scotland, and aimed at showing that it was not only unnecessary, but certain to be detrimental. But his argument remains just as true, and indeed is being sadly verified by our own experience of the impossibility of getting rid of a pauper class while the Poor Law exists. His great principle was "the sufficiency of the poor"; their sufficiency, that is, to maintain themselves and to give each other all necessary assistance in times of difficulty and distress. Nor was it any theoretical sufficiency upon which he relied; upon what the poor should be able to do under different economic conditions. "It is a great comfort to know," he says quaintly, "from the general fact of the sums expended by the working classes on intemperance alone, that after all, and apart from private Charity, the *matériel* of an entire subsistence passes into their hands, and that naught but the *morale* is wanting which might impress a right distribution upon it." That *morale,* he held, would naturally show itself, if the people were not tempted to neglect the natural ties which hold them together, and to look to public funds instead of to their own exertions.

But he was far from thinking that the poor should be severely let alone, or that the rich have no duty towards them. He insisted upon what he called the "aggressive method." The real friend of the poor will always be making demands upon them; urging them to educate their children, to support the parish institutions, to assist their neighbors, nay even to give of their money to missions and churches. Only by so doing is it possible to help them on in the difficult path they have to tread. The

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rich, on the other hand, must refrain from starting funds and charities, they must even refrain from giving to individuals except with caution and knowledge; but they must give freely towards all educational institutions and asylums for the afflicted.

But why, it may be objected, if the poor may give to each other without ill effects, may not the rich, or better still the state, give to the poor? In the one case the giving is done with difficulty and sacrifice; in the other no one feels any sacrifice at all. Chalmers gives no uncertain answer. It is just because of the sacrifice involved that the help of the poor is safe, and certain not to be abused. It will be given with full knowledge, it will be accepted only in real need. On the other hand when the source from which Charity flows is practically impersonal, there will be no moderation in the claims made upon it, and little wisdom in its bestowal.

One other point he presses as of ultimate importance; and that is the dissociation of alms-giving from the functions of the minister of religion. That does not imply that the church should abandon the work; his whole system was based upon the proper organization of the church parish. But until he had made it understood that he and his elders had broken off all connection with the charities, and handed over to his deacons the work of looking after the material needs of the parish, he found it impossible to make real progress with his spiritual ministry. At the present day, when ministers of all denominations insist so vehemently on their claims to be alms-givers as well as teachers, the opposite point of view should be seriously pressed. But for the actual account of Chalmers' work and its success, we must refer the reader to Mr. Masterman's book, and, if it can be obtained, to Chalmers' own book, "On the Sufficiency of the Parochial System without a Poor Rate."

HELEN BOSANQUET.

SURREY, ENGLAND.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ, with an Appendix of leading passages. By Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: University Press, 1900. Pp. ix, 311.

Mr. Russell's book is decidedly one of the most important of recent contributions both to the history of philosophy and to philosophical criticism. It is by no means easy reading, but that

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is less the fault of the author than of the subject. Of all the great philosophers of the seventeenth century, that most wonderful period of modern intellectual activity, Leibnitz is perhaps the most suggestive, and is certainly the one whose ideas are hardest to discover from the mere perusal of his published treatises. It was not until the publication of his correspondence with Antoine Arnauld and the little treatise on Metaphysics written for Arnauld's benefit that scholars came into possession of the materials upon which a proper understanding of the system of Monads has to be based. Mr. Russell's is, I believe, the first English work which is founded upon a minute study of this important material, and it may therefore be said, without any derogation from the merits of the excellent works of Mr. Merz and Prof. Latta, that Mr. Russell has for the first time enabled the English student to form a serious estimate of the value of the Leibnitian system as a philosophy of existence. The first and principal merit of the author, then, is by the use of material published within the sixty years since the appearance of Erdmann's edition, to have made it clear that the peculiar doctrines of the "Monadology" are really based upon a few general assumptions, partly logical, partly metaphysical, and in particular to have shown how intimately the Leibnitian theory of substance is connected with a doctrine of the nature of predication. Only second in importance to this examination of the logical foundation of the system are the discussions of Leibnitz's peculiar views of matter and force. Mr. Russell has the advantage, in treating of the Dynamics of Leibnitz, that he writes as a mathematician as well as a philosopher, which is more than can be said of some of his ablest predecessors. His examination, wherever it is intelligently followed, ought once for all to show how ambiguous was Leibnitz's use of fundamental dynamical terminology and how little connection there is between his contributions to dynamics and his metaphysical principles. The mere proof that "activity" and "force" mean different things to Leibnitz according as he is dealing with dynamical or with metaphysical problems, simple as it is, is by no means uncalled for, seeing that Leibnitz has constantly been rather unintelligently lauded for his confusions on this very topic. A third excellent feature of the book is the convincing way in which Mr. Russell brings out the fact, not in itself altogether novel, that all the better known parts of Leibnitz's doctrine, the theory of soul and body, the proofs of the existence of God, the

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doctrine of sin, in a word everything by which he is best known to the general student, are simply "lifted" with a little toning down of unorthodox phraseology from Spinoza. Lessing's declaration, which Jacobi found such a paradox, that Leibnitz was at heart a Spinozist, was, in fact, absolutely justified by all that Lessing or Jacobi could know of Leibnitz. There are indeed important differences between the two philosophers, but those differences can scarcely be understood without a careful study of Leibnitz's writings for Arnauld, of which the world in Lessing's day knew nothing. Finally, in speakng of the general merits of Mr. Russell's book, it must be added that the Appendix of passages in illustration of Leibnitz's views will be found invaluable both by students and by teachers who do not possess or have not time to master in detail the six large volumes of Gerhardt's edition.

Coming to deal more particularly with some of the subjects enumerated, I must say something of what is, to my mind, the most important and original part of the book, the criticism of the logical foundations of Leibnitz's system. As an exposition of Leibnitz the first six chapters of the book cannot be too highly praised, but as a contribution to philosophical criticism the argument seems to be vitiated by a curious confusion. After pointing out, correctly, that Leibnitz's doctrine of substance is directly derived from the logical theory that all judgment consists in the ascription of a predicate to a subject, Mr. Russell goes on to identify this doctrine as held by Leibnitz with the position maintained in Mr. Bradley's "Logic," and to urge against both philosophers that propositions which assert relation, as also propositions which predicate number, cannot be reduced to the subject-attribute type. Now as against Leibnitz this contention is perfectly valid and hits one of the central defects of his thought. For Leibnitz it is essential to hold that all predications of relation can be successfully resolved into ascriptions of an attribute to a subject, or, in other words, that relations are all phenomenal of the qualities of substances. Unless this is so, the whole scheme of the "pre-established harmony" falls to pieces, and there is real "interaction." Again, Leibnitz, as his "proof of the existence of God," shows, regarded existence as an attribute, inconsistent as this no doubt is with the principle of his famous distinction between propositions of reason and propositions of matter of fact. But to ascribe either of these doctrines to Mr. Bradley is little

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better than an *ignoratio elenchi.* No one has laid more stress than Mr. Bradley himself upon the impossibility of a simple reduction of judgments of relation to judgments of the subject-attribute type. Mr. Russell should have remembered that one of the chief defects alleged against the syllogism in "Principles of Logic" was precisely that it is confined by its traditional formulæ within the limits of the subject-attribute form of predication. Similarly the view taken in "Appearance and Reality" was that both *attributes* and *relations* are shown to be merely phenomenal by the very fact that, though we cannot devise any coherent doctrine as to the connection between these, neither can be successfully resolved into the other.* So again, Mr. Bradley's definition of judgment as the ascription to reality of an ideal content is expressly devised to exclude that view of existence as an attribute which the "predicative," or as it should rather be styled, the "attributive" theory of judgment involves. Superficially alike in expression, the two theories of predication are really as far asunder as the poles. Leibnitz's doctrine is based upon the old conception of judgment as the affirmation of one "notion" about another which he shared with Locke and other philosophers of the time; the whole point of Mr. Bradley's doctrine, on the other hand, is that our affirmations are made not about a "subject-notion" directly or indirectly, but about *perceived* reality as a whole. Without discussing the relative merits of the two views, we may point out that while the first leads straight to monadism, the second at a blow knocks the bottom out of the monadist metaphysics. The doctrine of the unity of the ultimate subject in fact bars to monism the same relation that the doctrine of a plurality of subjects does to monadism. What view Mr. Russell himself takes of the ultimate nature of judgment it is difficult to discover. He can hardly hold that all attributes can be satisfactorily resolved into relations between terms which are themselves without qualities, though something of the kind seems to be implied in the statement that "this is red" is a judgment of relation (p. 15). Nor would it be fair to credit him with thoughtless acquiescence in the popular idea of attributes and relations as subsisting in some unexplained way side by side. He by implication rejects the notions of substance and of an "absolute," and yet nowhere definitely commits himself to mere Phenomenalism.

*See "Principles of Logic," p. 241, ff. "Appearance and Reality," ch. 3.

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Similarly it would be hard to say exactly what is, to his mind, the connection between truth and reference to real existence. That truth does not depend upon existence is definitely affirmed (p. 182), and the author consequently holds with Leibnitz that there can be whole systems of "eternal truths" which have no relation to the actually existent. But, like Leibnitz, Mr. Russell fails to make it clear how such mere possibilities are distinguished from the purely arbitrary, or how apart from some indirect relation to the actual perceived order of things possibility itself can have any meaning. To tell the truth, he seems to fall in his desire to avoid a "cheap and easy" identification of truth with fact into an equally cheap and easy denial of any connection between them. At any rate, until further explanation of his own logical position, Mr. Russell must not be surprised if the adherents of the "existential" doctrine of predication charge him with failure to grasp its exact significance and the real nature of the issues at stake. Mr. Russell is clearly right in finding the source of the worst contradictions in Leibnitz in the inconsistency between his view of judgment and his assumptions that the ego is a substance and the external world real, but the contradiction arises precisely because Leibnitz did *not* maintain an "existential" view of judgment. The difficulty in fact is to see how, in the Leibnitian theory, *any* judgment can assert real existence. The length at which I have discussed the fundamental logical problem suggested by the author's line of argument compels me to abstain from referring in detail to the numerous other topics of interest with which he deals. I will therefore only add that the account of Leibnitz's principle of Sufficient Reason is of special value, as it enables the English reader (again, I believe for the first time) to distinguish Leibnitz's great teleological postulate from the jejune variety of the common causal axiom which is frequently confounded with it.

A. E. Taylor.

Owens College, Manchester.

Problems of Evolution. By F. W. Headley. London: Duckworth, 1900. Pp. xv, 373.

In this book Mr. Headley, who is well known to ornithologists as the author of a valuable study on the Structure and Life of Birds, attempts to find a solution of some of the most difficult

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problems of Evolution. These are for the most part connected with heredity and variation, and the point that Mr. Headley insists on most strongly is that the theory of natural selection as propounded by Darwin and amplified by Weismann is adequate to explain all the facts. The agency on which Lamarck relied to produce adaptation, the moulding influence of the environment, is decisively rejected by Mr. Headley. In pursuance of this view he carries on a sustained polemic against Lamarck which is not always convincing. Lamarck held that environment produces variation. No, says Mr. Headley, environment can only draw out variations which already exist potentially. But as Mr. Headley goes on to assume the existence of a practically unlimited stock of potential variations in the organism, the difference between the Lamarckian view and his own seems to become mainly verbal. However, these are topics not immediately connected with the interests of this JOURNAL. We proceed to his second part which treats of the problems of human evolution and more particularly of the evolution of morality. Here, we must say at once, Mr. Headley is on ground much less familiar to him than in his first part. The scientific side of the book, so far as we are able to judge of it, possesses high merit, but the ethical part, though not without interest, is decidedly weak and confused. His argument may be summarized as follows: Natural Selection falling with unmitigated impact on individuals is the sole cause of race improvement in the pre-social stage. The aggregation of men into societies is primarily a fresh device of natural selection to promote survival. Presently, however, within the society altruism arises which mitigates the natural penalties and prevents the wicked from being exterminated. At the same time cleverness increases and enables individuals to cheat society to their own advantage. At this critical moment when the altruism and cleverness which society has generated threaten to destroy it, religion steps in, "providing," in the words of Mr. Benjamin Kidd which Mr. Headley adopts, "an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." Thus, it seems, moral decay was checked, but physical decay is still going on. For Mr. Headley will not allow that anything but natural selection improves the physique of a race. Hardship,

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vice and disease are rampant in low civilizations, eliminate the unfit and so improve the race. Comfort, good morals and sanitation mitigate the selective process and so are weakening us daily. There will be no remedy but to call in religion once more, and to treat the propagation of weakness and misery as a sin.

This is not a very convincing argument at first sight, and Mr Headley adduces next to no historical evidence in support of it. In fact, the historical evidence would be hard to come by. The account of the way altruism and cleverness undermine primitive society and religion comes to the rescue is all as mythical as the Social Contract. But the oddest thing in Mr. Headley's view is the social beneficence of vice. "Alcohol is a potent force that has much to do with the development of race character: as I have already shown it promotes physical evolution;" that is to say, it kills off the unfit. In short, the more that dirt, disease and vice abound the better for the physical welfare of the nation. This is not a remote deduction from Mr. Headley's reasoning, but a prominent point in it. Such extraordinary conclusions prove that the principles which lead to them are inadequate, and that biology alone is not enough to explain the nature and development of so complex and spiritual an organism as modern society.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON: HIS LIFE, TEACHING AND POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By W. R. Scott, M. A. (Dub.), D. Phil. (St. Andrews), F. R. S. A. (Ireland), Assistant in Moral Philosophy and Lecturer in Political Economy in the University of St. Andrews. Pp. xx., 296. Cambridge: The University Press.

Dr. Scott in his very modest preface mentions that the present volume arose out of his search for information regarding Hutcheson's life in Dublin. This biographical interest is, one feels in perusing the volume, predominant throughout it, and certainly the author has in this aspect of his work secured a distinct success.

The work is divided into three parts corresponding to the subjects of the sub-title. Chapters I-VII are biographical; IX-XII give an account of Hutcheson's philosophy; while XIII-XIV, the last few pages, along with c.VIII, which introduces the statement

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of his teaching, indicate his place in the history of thought. The first section, partly because Dr. Scott has come into possession of hitherto unused material, partly because he has here covered rarely frequented ground, fills up, perhaps as completely as will ever be necessary or possible, a blank in the history of the life of the eighteenth century. Nothing but praise can be given for the ingenious way in which the author has traced his sources, and pieced together from very scant material the outline of the story of Hutcheson's life and environment. And if here and there the unavoidable gaps in his story have led or misled a disappointed but still curious biographer into supplying the deficiency from the resources of imagination, this is after all the pardonable weakness of sympathetic interest in his subject. The delightfully chatty and cheerful style in which this part is written makes these chapters very pleasant reading. Dr. Scott has, however, hardly managed to convey such an impression of Hutcheson's personality as will arouse in the reader an enthusiasm for his author similar to his own.

It is with Hutcheson's philosophy that the readers of this JOURNAL are more especially concerned. In the statement of Hutcheson's views (chps. 9-12) Dr. Scott is rather disappointing. He repeatedly emphasizes the fact that we must not expect a systematic discussion of the various doctrines put forward by Hutcheson. And indeed what Dr. Scott says of Hutcheson's attitude towards metaphysical problems seems according to him to be true of his author's philosophy generally—"that there are few writers who more persistently evade supplying answers or, when one is imperative, give the perplexed reader a larger number to choose from" (p. 260). But even when this is admitted it is hardly possible to allow that such a lucid and thoughtful author as Hutcheson held views so chaotic and inconsistent as Dr. Scott's criticism seems to show. In fact the difficulty for the reader of these chapters is not so much to understand Hutcheson, as to grasp the precise point which his critic wishes to make against him. There is a lack of concentration of meaning in Dr. Scott's running commentary which makes this part of the work needlessly perplexing. To quote a few instances: On p. 186, Dr. Scott asserts that Hutcheson advanced on Shaftsbury by making *explicit* what had remained implicit in the latter: "the 'internal sense' of the latter is *now divided into Sense and Beauty and the Moral Sense.*" Yet on p. 191 it is said, "Though Hutcheson appears to have separated

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the objects of his Æsthetic and Moral Senses they *are more closely related than the different kinds of Beauty which Shaftsbury embraced under the province of this single sense.*" Again, "The harmony of the individual character with social good *takes precedence* of the Beauty of action" (p. 186). But (p. 193), "The general drift of Hutcheson's thought serves to make the objects of the moral sense a *subdivision* of those of the sense of Beauty." Or again (p. 206-7), in the "second period" the "Moral sense becomes a supernumerary called in *not to ratify* the decision of Benevolence but merely to grace the occasion and provide an unsought reward," while, (p. 214), in fact, "The moral sense of the second period is the *final determinant* on the side of Benevolence." Similar ambiguities are to be found repeatedly throughout this section of Dr. Scott's volume. It is difficult also to know precisely what he means to imply in using the term "macrocosm," which with its correlative "microcosm" is almost a technical term with our author. "Macrocosm" is taken to mean "system as a whole," and in general (p. 200), a whole of "ethical ends" (p. 213), "social organism" (p. 227), the "cosmos" including both man and God (p. 200, 227 and others). A slightly different method of exposition and greater definiteness of expression would have made this part of the work much more effective.

Nor can we agree very readily to the division of Hutcheson's philosophy into periods, of which Dr. Scott finds four, determined respectively by the influence of Shaftsbury, Butler, Aristotle, and Stoicism. In a confessedly unsystematic writer such as Hutcheson, divisions of this sort have little value, partly because such an author does not use his terms with sufficient precision at any stage to justify the supposition that his views have changed, partly because new influences are rather appropriated by old principles than allowed to bring about a changed mental attitude. And this comes out in the course of Dr. Scott's investigation. For example, "Happiness" as the end, is equivalent also to "Pleasure" or "Perfection," and Hutcheson seems unaware of any fundamental distinction between them (p. 216 *cf.*, also p. 275, and especially p. 279). So again regarding his interpretation of the "Springs of action" (p. 199), it is hardly possible to speak of a change in his views. It might have been simpler and more satisfactory to have treated him merely as a popular writer and

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to have limited the exposition to the statement of his general meaning.

There is one part of this section of the work (C. XI pt. ii), which is however of great interest. It occurs partly as a digression, and deals with the relation of Hutcheson to Adam Smith's Economics. The exposition here is so complete and careful that it seems to leave nothing further to be said on the subject.

In the last division of his work (the position of Hutcheson in the History of Thought), Dr. Scott is much more successful than in the preceding. The chapter on "Hellenic and Philanthropic Ideals" (c. VIII) might have been made shorter and more concentrated, but is suggestively written. "Puritanism" is used very loosely, and the supposition that puritanism was historically or is in principle inconsistent with the Greek Spirit seems quite erroneous. How will Dr. Scott reconcile his position with the life and work of such a typical Puritan as Milton, or even with Oliver Cromwell's interest in art (p. 151)? We would call attention to the interesting chapter (XIII) on Hutcheson's influence on the Scottish Aufklärung, and more especially to the last chapter, XIV, where Dr. Scott traces (by the way he says, of a "digression") the origin of the principle, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." This is admirably done, and is one of the best things in the book.

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The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Edited by Benjamin Rand, Ph. D., Harvard University. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. xxxi., 535.

This interesting volume was published almost simultaneously with Mr. Robertson's edition of the "Characteristics." It consists of two parts, the unpublished letters and the philosophical regimen. Prefixed are a short introduction by Dr. Rand and a sketch of Shaftesbury's life by his son, the fourth Earl. As Dr. Rand points out in his very brief but excellent introduction, this life of Shaftesbury was printed in its essentials by Thomas Birch in Boyle's General Dictionary. The letters in this volume, with some exceptions, and the philosophical regimen, both appear in print for the first time. The letters extend over a considerable period of

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time, from 1689 to 1713, and are arranged in chronological order. Some of them deal with personal and family matters; some with political affairs; and a few have a philosophical interest. Of these last the most important perhaps is one, dated November 9, 1709, and addressed to General Stanhope. In it Shaftesbury gives his opinion of Locke's philosophy. The dispute about innate principles is, according to Shaftesbury, "one of the childishest disputes that ever was. Well it is for our friend, Mr. Locke, and other modern philosophers of his sire, that they have so poor a spectre as the ghost of Aristotle to fight with" (p. 414). He goes on to declare that it is "the poor secondary tralatitious system which is the subject of their continual triumph" (*ibi*). Shaftesbury maintains that the real question is not "whether the very philosophical propositions about right and wrong were innate; but whether the passion or affection towards society was such: that is to say, whether it was natural and came of itself, or was taught by art, and was the product of a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and delivered down the prejudice" (p. 415). His view of Locke as a philosopher is, in this letter, not very high. He thinks him inconsistent, an "ill-builder," and "little able to treat the home points of philosophy." The two philosophers were however on excellent personal terms, as one may judge from Shaftesbury's numerous letters to Locke, with whom, as he says, "I ever concealed my differences as much as possible" (p. 416). As to the other miscellaneous letters, it is for the purposes of this journal only needful to say that they reveal a remarkably benevolent disposition on Shaftesbury's part to assist young men. He is a worthy predecessor of the philanthropic seventh Earl.

It is the Philosophical Regimen that one is here chiefly concerned with. It is a series of reflections on various philosophical subjects, such as natural affections, Deity, good and ill, human affairs, self, passions, pleasure and pain, fancy, character, nature, life, and philosophy. These were written at various times during a period extending over fourteen years. They were not intended by the author for publication (p. 242). Hence they lack a finish and completeness which belongs only to works definitely written for the public. It is also probably owing to the same cause that the style is interrogative, questioning. Such a manner of writing palls upon one, and seems alien to an Englishman. It is, however, relieved by many eloquent passages. Instance that on Deity (p. 36) in praise of the man whose faith in Providence does not de-

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pend on historical tradition, and who leaves the future to take care of itself, satisfied that all things are for the best.

The reflections are called by Shaftesbury Ἀσκήματα (exercises). They embody his attempt to lay down for himself correct rules of life. But they cannot be said to throw much fresh light upon his well-known ethical theory. They exhibit throughout the strongest marks of the influence which the Stoical writings, especially those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, had upon Shaftesbury, who quotes largely from them and even reproduces their technical language. Philosophy is for him essentially practical. "The work of philosophy is to fortify a mind, to learn how to be secure against avarice, ambition, intemperance; how to throw off cowardice and effeminacy; how to cure disquiet, restlessness, anxiety, and to find that which may satisfy and content us, since riches, honors, etc., neither can, nor if they could, are such as to be counted on as durable or certain" (pp. 269-270). He has little interest in pure speculation about ideas, their agreement or disagreement, etc. (p. 268). To the present-day reader, who is accustomed to a close conjunction of ethics with metaphysics, such indifference will appear strange; nor will it bear too close an examination.

Such being Shaftesbury's conception of philosophy, one naturally asks in what the good of man consists. The answer is in brief a cheerful Stoicism. "What is really my good, Providence has placed within my power to obtain; what is ill, to avoid" (p. 43). Man's good is in a certain temper and disposition, in a certain mind and will. His ideal is to have "a generous affection, an exercise of friendship, a constant kindness and benignity of disposition, a constant complacency, constant security, tranquility, equanimity" (pp. 54-5). This equanimity of mind is attained by recognizing, and acquiescing in the order of things. Like the Stoics, Shaftesbury enlarges upon law and order in nature. Our end is "to act according to nature" (p. 52). But he does not, any more than the Stoics, seem to reconcile effectively (1) reverence for the established order of nature, as the manifestation of a Universal Mind, with (2) indifference to all the objects of worldly desire. Indeed he carries at times (see his reflection on Human Affairs) this second element so far as almost to preach indifference to other men's characters. This would put an end to all moral reform. But in a man's notes for his own guidance, written at different times during a considerable period, and never revised as a whole,

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one must not press such objections too severely. The Philosophical Regimen is a remarkable presentation in English of Stoical principles, and, although more popular than strictly scientific in its treatment of the various topics it deals with, is well worth reading.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

EVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Otto Pfleiderer. Edited by Orello Cone. London: A. and C. Black, 1900. Pp. 306.

In collecting the papers which compose this volume, "the editor has been actuated by a desire to place in a convenient form before English readers some of the occasional writings of one of the foremost theologians and scholars of this century." The volume will, no doubt, enable those who are unacquainted with Professor Pfleiderer's larger works to form some idea of his theological views. But apart from this purpose the papers are so largely of a popular and occasional character as hardly to call for republication, especially when it is considered that the important works in which Professor Pfleiderer's philosophical and theological views are fully and carefully stated have been already translated. Some four papers deal with the relations of theology and science, or the requirements which must be fulfilled by a scientific theology. In these Professor Pfleiderer explains in a popular way the standpoint of the Rationalistic school of which he is a prominent representative. He would no doubt disclaim the epithet "rationalistic;" but it is perhaps the most convenient term to express, on the one hand, the transformation of Christian doctrine which is involved in the rejection of the supernatural, and, on the other, that subordination of theology to philosophy, in virtue of which the truth of religion is proved not from religious experience itself but by some process of metaphysical reasoning. Two papers are of a more specially theological character. That on "The Essence of Christianity" is perhaps the most valuable in the book; it gives a brief but very clear and comprehensive sketch of Christian theology from the Rationalistic point of view. The other discusses "Jesus' Foreknowledge of His Sufferings and Death." There are other papers on Luther, on "The National Traits of the Germans as Seen in their Religion" (in

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which "the noble German nature" is eulogized), and on the anti-papal movement in German Austria (written in a spirit of strong hostility to Catholicism). Finally, there is a paper on the relations of Moralty and Religion, which has a more direct interest for the readers of this JOURNAL. In this essay Professor Pfleiderer first replies to criticisms directed against a morality based on religion, and then goes on to criticise the morality that is divorced from religion. He is more successful in the former than in the latter part of the essay. In his criticism of independent morality he seems to exaggerate its deficiencies, while not showing very convincingly that his religious morality is in a better position. For instance, he finds in independent morality a strong tendency towards egoism, and argues that "only because all individuals are conscious of their union with the super-subjective divine Will, which is at once the common ground of their being and the unconditional law of all action, do they feel that they are related to one another as parts of one organism, that they share in the same life, and are governed by the same law." But if individuals cannot become conscious of their moral relationship to each other in some more direct and ethical way, it may be questioned whether the consciousness of such a "transcendental union" would be more efficacious. At any rate the reasoning by which Professor Pfleiderer seeks to prove his contention is too vague and summary to be really convincing.

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GOOD CITIZENSHIP; A Collection of Essays. Edited by the Rev. J. E. Hands. London: George Allen, 1899.

"This book is intended as an appeal to Englishmen to take their citizenship more seriously." This review is an appeal to the authors to take the topics they deal with more seriously. To criticise in detail twenty-three essays of varying lengths and merits would take more space than can be offered here; to attack or praise a few of these essays and neglect the rest would be to pass over the main purpose of the book. There is one duty incumbent upon human beings who write essays on social, personal and economic problems and obligations, and that is to study the problems to the best of their ability and to write and think clearly and accurately upon them. It is by no means clear that many of the authors of

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this book have done this. Few social and economic problems are at the present time more to the front than that of the Housing of the Poor; this topic has been treated by the editor. Statistical carelessness is one of his characteristics. He quotes death-rates without stating whether they are "crude" or "corrected." The value of the figures depends largely upon this; to expect the reader to obtain and study the Registrar General's returns in order to find out what the author means is unreasonable. We can only conclude that the author was careless whether or not his figures conveyed true or false impressions to the reader. The author urges that Mr. Booth's shelters should be treated like common lodging houses. They are common lodging houses. See Logsdon *vs.* Booth in 1900, 1 Q. B. (This case was subsequent to the date of the essay). The author then discusses our present system of rating on the basis of annual value, and then says that our *land system* enhances the value of sites. Land system is not an accurate phrase for rating system. But perhaps Mr. Hands means something different. If so, what? The general line of the argument is that the question is serious and that a certain alteration in the basis for rating might effect some amelioration, but only a slight one. What then is to be done? We are not told, but only that "the time is ripe for the Council to initiate a vigorous housing policy." But the whole difficulty is, what is the policy to be? If it is a bad one, the greater the vigor the more disastrous the result. To treat the subject like this is not a good example of taking citizenship seriously. Similar defects to these are to be found in many of the essays. A little rhetoric or a little insistence upon the fact that we are in name a Christian people is made to do duty for clear thought, hard work and luminous exposition. This condemnation is not true of all the essays. Mr. Dodds' on "The Poor Law" and Miss Wilson's on "Factories and Workshops" are more businesslike, and Archdeacon Wilson's on "The Progress of Morality in the Relation of Men and Women" is vigorous—too vigorous, perhaps, for it neglects many factors in the evils it discusses. The book as a whole leads to the conclusion that the "effort to show that a worthy citizenship must have its basis on a Christian and Ethical foundation" has not been successful.

C. P. Sanger.

London.

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THE SCIENCE OF CIVILIZATION. By Cecil Balfour Phipson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xv, 512.

The author of this book exhibits some ingenuity in his argument and a freshness of treatment which is largely attributable to a misunderstanding or ignorance of the work of his predecessors. Nothing would be gained from describing the author's main contentions and his methods; for although his intentions are good, namely to present to a world, "now revolting from the lordship of these selfish, soulless and fatal principles which have so long claimed to direct its economic activities," principles in their stead which "reconcile at last what has too long remained not only irreconcilable but antagonistic, viz., Christian ethics and scientific economics . . . .," yet we cannot but regard his work as misleading to the inexpert and of no value to experts. It is a thousand pities that those who have the capacity and time to conduct economic investigations should refuse to carry on the work of their predecessors, and insist on beginning the science anew. Of course the outcome is much that is worthless—naturally, because none have the ability to do better in two or three years what has been accomplished by many generations, and few are Adam Smiths or Ricardos. In social science there are too many offenders in this respect. It is not so in the other sciences; and until it ceases to be so in social science we cannot expect much advance.

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IN CAMMINO: Agli Uomini di buona volontà. Periodico Mensile. Anno I. N. 11-12. Numero di Natale, 1900. Anno II., N. 13, 1901. Milano: L. F. Cogliati. [N. 11-12 (bound in one) contain articles on "The necessity of a moral education, patriotic and religious, for our emigrant laborers," on "Pain as a means of education for society and the individual," on "The wisdom of humorists" (extracted from a recent book entitled "Humor," by P. Bellezza), on "Sensuality," as No. 3 of the Seven Deadly Sins, on "The Millennial City," and on "The saints and the dead," with reviews on R. Mariano's "Cristo e Budda," and on l'Abbé F. Vernet's "S. Francois d'Assise intime." Pp. 481-576.—N. 13 contains articles on "Marriage and the Family," and on contemporary literary tendencies under the title "Towards new Horizons." The latter concludes with the sentence. "In the firmament of art the sun is the thought of God." Pp. 56.]

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Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
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Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. A. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

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